

# Organisation of Mass Political Attitudes in Hungary

by

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## *Abstract*

The paper analyses the organisation of mass political attitudes in Hungary. The analysis is based on a survey of a national sample of adult Hungarians (N =1002), conducted in the autumn of 2000. Political attitudes and values items, representing various ideological orientations, were reduced to a smaller number of latent ideological dimensions via factor analysis. The precise meaning of the dimensions is determined after the analysis of their relationships with authoritarianism, Social Dominance Orientation, outgroup-sympathy, prejudices, ideological self-identification, party-preference and socio-demographic variables. Hungarian mass attitudes vary along conventionalism, socialist conservatism, right wing conservatism and libertarianism. The latter three dimensions polarise politics into three oppositions: old versus new regime, religious-nationalist right versus secular liberal-left, and libertarian versus authoritarian.

Key words: structure of attitudes, ideology, political attitudes, Hungary.

Published as: Enyedi, Zs. & Todosijević, B. (2003). Organization of Mass Political Attitudes in Hungary. *Polish Psychological Bulletin*, Vol. 34, No. 1, 15-26.

## Organisation of Mass Political Attitudes in Hungary

The East-Central European countries, together with their ex-Communist brethren, became important foci of political science analyses in the last years of the 20<sup>th</sup> century. This position was due to the spectacular collapse of the system of state socialism and the ensuing democratisation process. The topical question of these years asked whether the so-called transition would succeed, i.e., whether the new democratic regimes could consolidate or not. Political psychologists had an important role in assessing the prospects, since certain attitudes (typically democratic, capitalist, liberal, moderate and tolerant orientations) were generally seen as the *sine qua non* of the success.

More than a decade after the collapse of the old regime, it is time to change our perspective, at least in the case of the forerunners of the transition. They form consolidated democracies, well integrated into the global market. The quality of democracy is, of course, highly problematic in these countries, but that applies to many Western countries as well. Researchers should increasingly direct away their attention from the big question of survival towards the details of the emerging patterns of political attitudes and ideologies. These patterns are, of course, substantially shaped by historical heritage. Therefore, one must expect to find patterns of attitudes and combinations of ideologies which are different for the ones studied in the West.

The paper presents a comprehensive empirical investigation of ideological dimensions in Hungary. The adopted approach is exploratory, but with a special emphasis on conservatism. It is one of the central contemporary ideologies throughout the democratic world (and as such, has been a favorite subject of political psychology), yet, its existence and character in the post-Communist world is seriously under-researched. The scholars' attention has been principally devoted to the heirs of the former communist parties, or to disquieting extreme right.

The other reason to focus on conservatism is that its place and structure in the post-Communist context is particularly problematic. One cannot even be certain to which phenomenon one should attach this label: to the ideology resembling the Western-European or Northern-American conservatisms (and then to which of their branches?), or to the ideology which wants to 'conserve the past', in this case the communist past?

We take as a starting point Wilson's (1973) persuasive argument, that the fear of uncertainty is the psychological mechanism behind individual-level conservatism. This fear normally leads to a wish for status quo maintenance and a rigid adherence to the familiar and predictable conditions. In the post-Communist context this attitudes should be, logically, conducive to a Communist or Socialist political orientation. On the other hand, psychological security can be

provided by other well-structured world views as well, such as religion or nationalism. Intensive identification with the in-group can be instrumental in reducing fear of uncertainty. All these possibilities indicate, however, that psychological definitions of conservatism, and of any ideology, does not help us in determining its political content.

### ***Previous studies on the ideological structure in Hungary***

In Hungary ideological labels were largely avoided during the democratisation period of the 1980's, though many of the reformers used the catchwords of liberalism to describe their position. The competition on the market of ideologies became, however, very intensive in the nineties. All conceivable mixes of ideas were propagated by various groupings, from the radical right to the radical left.

Some of the peculiarities of the ideological patterning soon became visible. One of them is the way how left-right identification functions.<sup>1</sup> As almost everywhere in Europe, left-right position is a good predictor of party preferences in Hungary. But this identification itself has some particular sources. In the classic European political discourse, left and right were tied to the social and political inequality system, where left denotes the orientation of those who are at the bottom, while right stands for the interest of those who are at the top of the hierarchy. In the Communist period, however, the ruling groups identified with the left. This inverted configuration did not yet completely evaporate. The surveys conducted in the 1990's show that sometimes the leftist, sometimes the rightist identification is favoured by the social elite.

Contrary to much of Western Europe, social status and the views on economy and welfare only marginally shape left-right identification in Hungary. Its best predictors are found among cultural-ideological factors. The observers largely agree that the most significant ideological cleavage in the elite has a strong nationalist component (Kende, 2001). The members of the parliament, right-wing and left-wing alike, agree that the left is associated with equality, Hungary's integration into the European Union, and welfare, while the right with the defence of Hungarians beyond the borders, patriotism, and defence of national interests (Simon, 2001).

As far as mass attitudes are concerned, Kitschelt (1992, 1995) noted in the early nineties that post-Communist East differs from the West by having the main political cleavage between pro-market libertarians and anti-market authoritarians, instead of reproducing the familiar pro-market authoritarian - anti-market libertarian opposition. In a comparative study conducted by him and his associates in the following years, it was confirmed that Hungarian political camps delegate secondary importance to economic issues and emphasise the cultural ones (Kitschelt et al., 1999). In those studies where a left-right socio-economic dimension was found, it was always crosscut by a cultural conservative-liberal dimension, creating a two-dimensional space (Angelusz and Tardos, 1994).

### ***Determining one's ideological orientation***

Research on ideology provides a number of tools for identifying a respondent' ideological orientation. Ideological self-identification is one of the most often used methods. Respondents are offered several ideological labels, such as "conservative", "liberal", and "socialist", and asked to express their identification with each of the labels. The most frequently used version of this technique is the standard 10-point left-right identification scale.

Another strategy is to ask the respondent about her voting intentions. It is also a simple and easy-to-use method, but it presupposes the existence of ideologically unequivocal parties. In Hungary it is not the case, however. For example, if one would decide to classify as conservative parties those which apply neo-liberal economic policies in government, then she would have no better candidate than the *Socialist* Party, the successor party of the Communist Party.

Ideological orientations can be determined, finally, by analysing the structure of socio-political attitudes and values, contrasting them with textbook definitions of ideologies. This would be an open-ended method: it allows the possibility of discovering unexpected ideological dimensions. This method fits well to the central hypothesis of the present research: that the structure of ideology in a post-Communist context has to exhibit certain specific features, different from those commonly obtained in the West. Within this approach one may concentrate on general principles and 'values' or on more concrete attitudinal dimensions. In the first case conservatism would be defined by, for example, resistance to change, or a particular view of human nature, in the second case by nationalism, religiosity, Protestant work-ethic or pro-market economic views.

We principally identify ideological positions by the latter two approaches, since they are obviously less arbitrary and are context-sensitive, and we use the first two measures to corroborate our findings. The two chosen methods are integrated by the joint factor analysis of an attitude and a value scale. We expect the obtained factors to be interpretable in terms of relatively general ideological dimensions.

The content of these dimensions will be determined, next to the items loading high on the factors, by their relationships with relevant criterial variables. In this set of variables we included selected socio-demographic indicators, ideological self-identification, party preferences, and a number of socio-psychological constructs known to be related to ideologies, such as authoritarianism, Social Dominance Orientation, hostility against outgroups and prejudices.

## Method

### Sample

The survey took place in November 2000. Our respondents were interviewed on 120 locations that were stratified by region and type of settlement. The respondents (N=1002) were chosen according to a combination of a random route method and a quota which required the sample to be representative in terms of sex (women represent 51.7% of the sample), education and age. The age range was between 18 and 79, the mean age was 44,7 years (standard deviation was 16,8).

### Measures

*Ideological self-identification* was operationalized by (1) the standard ten-points Left-Right self-identification scale (10 denoting the rightmost identification) and by (2) the question: "*How strongly do you identify with the following political labels: Conservative / Socialist / Liberal*". Answers were given on a five-point Likert type scale, from 1 meaning strongly rejecting, to 5, meaning strongly identifying with the label.

*Party preferences* were examined by asking the respondent for which party she would vote if elections were to be held next week.

The *political attitudes scale* consisted of 18 statement-type items, presented in Likert form, with five degrees of dis/agreement (higher score indicating agreement). The items were selected with the aim to represent various political attitudes which are relevant for constructing more general ideological orientations. Included are both abstract and more concrete attitudes relevant for specifically Hungarian and post-communist ideological controversies. Although the scale aims at capturing a wide set of ideological orientations, we placed a special emphasis on conservatism, and therefore this ideology was more extensively represented. Its five components were: Protestant work ethic, traditionalism, clericalism, primary conservatism, and nationalism. Next to items directly related to ideologies, we also added five items that represented attitude towards democracy and regime change. Items of the attitudinal scale are shown in Table 1 below.

*Political values* were examined via a 22-item catch-phrase scale. The respondents expressed their approval of politically relevant words or phrases on a 5-point Likert scale (higher score indicating more positive evaluation). The method was originally introduced by Wilson and Patterson (1968), and is known since as the catch-phrase type of scale. The method has been frequently used in studies of ideology (e.g., Truett, 1993, Searing, 1978). Middendorp and De Vries (1981) showed that this type of scale provides comparable results to classic attitudinal items. Items of this type are also called 'criterial referents' (Kerlinger, 1984), though we were hesitant to label them *criterial* before examining the results of the analysis. These items are grouped into four categories on the basis of the hypothetical ideological dimensions to which they belong. The first

group consists of classic conservative values such as discipline, religion and tradition. The second group contains classic liberal values (e.g., freedom, private property, free competition), which, however, have been integrated into the neo-conservative discourse as well. The third group is best labeled libertarian since it includes mainly items related to individualist life style (e.g., right to abortion, risk, erotic film). The fourth category groups values related to equality. These values (e.g., equality of women, state care) are part of the socialist ideology in the West, but they were integral parts of the official discourse of the state socialist regimes, too. The catch-phrase items are shown in Table 1.

In order to enhance the interpretation of the ideological dimensions, a number of relevant criterial variables were introduced into the analysis. We included 10-item Social Dominance Orientation scale (Pratto et al., 1994) (Alpha=.66), our 10-item version of the authoritarianism scale (Alpha=.66), five-item anti-Gypsy prejudice scale (Alpha=.69), four-item anti-Jewish prejudice scale (Alpha=.60), and a 13-item scale measuring general attitude towards outgroups (named GATO scale)<sup>2</sup> (Alpha=.88). All the listed scales are represented by their first principal components throughout the performed analyses, except the SDO scale which is represented by the summarised score. A number of variables dealing with socio-demographic status were also measured.

## Results

### *Structure of ideology: Factor analysis results*

The two scales were jointly factor-analysed in order to obtain fewer number of basic ideological dimensions.<sup>3</sup> The initial principal component extraction was followed by Oblimin oblique rotation. According to the Scree test (Cattell, 1966), four factors were extracted with Eigenvalues of 6.26, 3.73, 2.81, and 1.73, together explaining 36,3% of total variance. The fact that 39 out of the 40 items load significantly (i.e., above .30) on at least one factor indicates that the factor matrix is not underfactored (Table 1).<sup>4</sup>

Eight items with the highest loadings on the first factor (items from 9 to 3) belong to the universe of conservative values: order, nation, responsibility, patriotism, tradition, marriage, discipline, and freedom can be well fitted into this line as well. However, socialist and egalitarian items, such as state care, "trade unions should have more say", "the state should provide jobs", equality of women, and equality, load on this dimension too. In order to complicate further the interpretation of this factor, two items expressing religiosity (church and religion) and four standing for liberalism (freedom, minority rights, private property, change) have also high loadings. Thus, the factor contains referents relevant for all major ideologies - conservatism, socialism and

liberalism. Obviously, this factor cannot be subsumed under a text-book definition of any ideology.

Values starting from order and responsibility, nation and patriotism, through state care and trade unions, to egalitarian treatment of women and minority groups do not define any ideology, but belong to the pantheon of virtually universally cherished values. In this sense, it could be said that this factor represents a kind of 'social super-ego' or even social desirability dimension. Since the factor pits against each other those who subscribe to a conventionally accepted value-set and those who reject these values, the factor was interpreted as primarily expressing conventionalism. It is probably the trace of the decades of the socialist regime that values such as order, discipline, patriotism and nation are integrated with values of equality, state care, and women equality, since these concepts all featured in the official rhetoric.

The second factor seems to be easier to interpret, though it is not less peculiar in its content. It starts with the prototypical conservative item, *"It is better to stick to the old ..."*. It is followed by two items (31 and 30) expressing an anti-liberal critical attitude towards the parliamentary, multi-party system. The next group consists of two items (33 and 34), expressing appreciation of the former socialist "Kádár" regime. Two items expressing the traditional view on sex-roles (items 28 and 29) appear on this factor, too. In addition, the factor contains two more classic conservative items - belief that 'people are led by their instincts', and the Protestant work-ethic item (*'Laziness is the greatest human sin'*). Finally, there is also a socialism item, claiming that the state should provide jobs, and an item (*Hungary should follow her own way regardless of the West*), which was originally interpreted as a nationalism item, but in this particular context its anti-Western character proves to be more important. The best term that covers this seemingly heterogeneous, but internally coherent orientation is *socialist conservatism*. The conservative label applies primarily to its philosophical dimension (six out of nine conservative attitude items appeared on this dimension), while the socialist to its political component.

The third factor is defined by items expressing religious orientation in politics, or clericalism. The two highest loading items are clearly clerical, demanding the introduction of religious education in schools, and that the Church should play greater role in 'managing the country's matters'. These items are followed by two catch-phrase items - church and religion. The factor contains one nationalist item, with somewhat lower loading (*Hungary should try to change the present borders*<sup>5</sup>). Finally, there are also three items (32, 35 and 34) expressing positive attitude toward the new regime (and critical attitude about the socialist system). Thus, it seems justified to name a factor that unites clericalism, nationalism and anti-communism as *right wing conservatism*.

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**Table 1 about here**

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The last, fourth factor is saturated by libertarian items, such as free competition, risk, change, erotic film, modern art, and right to abortion. Interestingly, the statement '*Most people are led by their instincts*', which was supposed to capture the 'philosophical' aspect of conservatism, proved to be part of this dimension, giving a materialist touch to it. Hence, the factor was interpreted as *libertarianism*.

The obtained factors are weakly or not at all related to each other. There are only two significant correlations: between conventionalism and libertarianism factors (!) ( $r=.13$ ,  $p<.01$ ), and between socialist conservatism and libertarianism factors ( $r=-.15$ ,  $p<.01$ ). The former coefficient (conventionalism vs. libertarianism) probably reflects the fact that the element of tolerance is present in both dimensions. The latter coefficient reflects the anti-libertarian character of the socialist conservatism factor.

The obtained factors are reasonably clear and virtually independent ideological dimensions. Three factors, namely socialist conservatism, right-wing conservatism and libertarianism have also clear theoretical relevance, while the first factor, conventionalism, has a fuzzy ideological status. Further analysis is necessary in order to obtain clearer interpretations, and to examine to what extent they are useful for analysing the citizens' political behaviour.

### **Ideological dimensions and ideological self-identification**

As the first step, we examined the relationship between ideological self-identifications and the obtained dimensions of political attitudes and values. Conservative, liberal and socialist self-identifications were examined by 5-point scales (from 1 - strongly antipathetic attitude towards the label, to 5 - "complete" identification). The answers are heavily concentrated to the middle of the scales. For example, only 3.3 percent of the respondents "completely" identify with the conservative label. With additional 18.1 percent who "partly" identify, there are 21.4 percents of potential conservative identifiers. Somewhat more people identify with the liberal and the socialist labels (28.4% and 32.8%, respectively), but most of the respondents express indifference towards each label (more than 50% for all three labels chose the middle category).

The Hungarian public seems to be reluctant to express strong ideological commitments even when ideology is framed in the general terms of 'left' and 'right'. The results for the 10-point left-right self-identification scale show that approximately 70% of the respondents placed themselves in the middle four categories (from 4 to 7). The three right-most points (8-10) are chosen by 7% of the respondents, and about three times more respondents selected the three left-most points (1-3).

Correlation coefficients between ideological dimensions and self-identification items, presented in Table 2, show relatively weak interrelationships. Conventionalism is related to socialist self-identification ( $r=.14, p<.01$ ) and weakly to leftist identification ( $r=-.08, p<.05$ ). Thus, the previous interpretation of the conventionalism factor can be updated with the fact that it is associated with leftist meaning. This is not surprising since this factor contains some egalitarian items, but it shows that some of the concepts usually associated with the right (order, discipline) are perceived as neutral and as leftist (like marriage) by the Hungarians.

The factor labelled as “socialist conservatism” is also related to socialist and leftist identification (.14 and -.11 respectively, both  $p<.10$ ), and negatively to liberal identification ( $r=-.18, p<.01$ ), but the coefficients are notably low. Thus, on the high-scoring side of this dimension socialist and left-wing identifiers are somewhat more frequent, on the low-scoring side we can find more liberal identifiers, while conservative identifiers are virtually equally distributed on both sides of this dimension. This finding underscores the observation that in political (and not philosophical) term this factor is linked to a leftist orientation.

The right-wing conservatism dimension differentiates conservative and socialist identifiers. It is related positively with conservative identification ( $r=.21, p<.01$ ) and negatively with socialist identification ( $r=-.27, p<.01$ ). As expected, it is positively related to right-wing identification ( $r=.22, p<.01$ ).

Libertarianism factor has the opposite correlates than socialist conservatism. It is positively related to liberal identification ( $r=.17, p<.01$ ), and negatively to socialist identification ( $r=-.14, p<.01$ ). It is also related to rightist identification ( $r=.12, p<.01$ ).

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**Table 2 about here**  
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The fact that the coefficients are rather low can be partly due to the facts that the attitude and value scales are not totally comprehensive, that some of the value- and attitude items are insufficiently discriminative<sup>6</sup>, and that in the case of identification-items the answers are concentrated in the middle of the scale. But this finding also means that the ideological labels still do not have crystallised and universally accepted meaning for the Hungarian public. The meaning of the socialist label seems to be the most clear.

On the other hand, one must not forget that the ideological factors were constructed *independently* of the ideological labels, i.e., not with the aim that they should correspond to the public understanding of the ideological labels. From this point of view, it is a noteworthy finding that the isolated dimensions actually correlate in logical way with self-identification items.<sup>7</sup> This

should be taken as a sign of political sophistication of the examined public, i.e., as evidence *against* claims that the public is ideologically illiterate (e.g., Converse, 1964).

### **Ideological dimensions and social-psychological variables**

Further evidence on the meaning of the ideological dimensions is obtained by examining their relationships with a set of relevant psychological variables. As it can be seen in Table 2, the conventionalism factor is *not* related to authoritarianism ( $r=.04$ ,  $p>.05$ ), nor to anti-Gypsy and anti-Jewish prejudice. Instead, it is negatively related to social dominance orientation ( $r=-.34$ ,  $p<.01$ ) and positively to general sympathy toward outgroups ( $r=.14$ ,  $p<.01$ ). Our conventionalism factor is obviously different from the conventionalism described in the authoritarianism research (Adorno et al., 1950, Altemeyer, 1988). It again appears as a 'good-natured' conventionalism, or social-super-ego factor, expressing social desirability.

Socialist conservatism, however, looks less benevolent - it is strongly related to authoritarianism ( $r=.58$ ,  $p<.01$ ), to negative attitudes towards outgroups ( $r=-.31$ ,  $p<.01$ ) and to anti-Gypsy ( $r=.27$ ,  $p<.01$ ) and anti-Jewish prejudice ( $r=.22$ ,  $p<.01$ ). However, it is not related to social dominance orientation, although one would expect that the egalitarianism embedded in this scale correlates with any variety of socialist ideology. Thus, this ideological dimension is both more and less than what the joined terms of conservatism and socialism imply. It is a mixture of authoritarianism, resentment against the regime change, and traditionalism. It could be called 'authoritarianism of the left' (cf. Stone et al., 1993; Enyedi et al., 1997), but not forgetting that what makes this dimension 'left' is virtually only nostalgia for the old communist regime, and that it contains a number of elements of classic conservatism.

The correlates of the right-wing conservatism dimension more 'properly' resemble theoretical expectations concerning a conservative factor. This factor is related primarily to authoritarianism ( $r=.34$ ,  $p<.01$ ), weakly to anti-Jewish prejudice ( $r=.14$ ,  $p<.01$ ) and social dominance orientation ( $r=.09$ ,  $p<.01$ ). Thus, this conservatism is authoritarian, somewhat antisemitic and anti-egalitarian. In these aspects it corresponds to the conservatism factor frequently obtained in the western countries. It is remarkable, though, that hostility against various outgroups correlates with the socialist and not the right wing version of conservatism.

Libertarianism has fewer and weaker correlates among the examined variables. It is related to positive attitude toward outgroups ( $r=.24$ ,  $p<.01$ ) and low authoritarianism ( $r=-.17$ ,  $p<.01$ ). It is noteworthy that the coefficients are low, and non-existent in case of antisemitism, anti-Roma sentiments and social dominance orientation. This observation shows that the factor expresses indeed libertarianism and not principled liberalism. Libertarians are not in favour of the oppression of minorities, but are not particularly interested in enhancing group equality either.

Thus, in this part of the analysis, we found that the conventionalism dimension is related to egalitarianism and tolerance of outgroups. Socialist conservatism is strongly related to authoritarianism and somewhat less to prejudice. Right-wing conservatism is considerably authoritarian and somewhat antisemitic. Libertarianism is modestly related to outgroup-tolerance and low authoritarianism.

### **Ideological dimensions and socio-demographic variables**

The analysis of socio-demographic variables shows that conventionalism is positively related to religiosity (Table 3). This finding was expected, since the dimension contains items like church and religion, but is, at the same time, somewhat surprising, since this orientation was previously shown to be – weakly - related to leftist political preferences. It seems that leaning to left is not necessarily in contradiction with a modest amount of religiosity. In general, the conventional orientation tends to be more popular among the religious, older respondents, and those who are coming from families with relatively lower education.

Socialist conservatism is better rooted in socio-demographic indicators. The evidence is rather clear: socialist conservatives come from the poorer, less educated, and older segments of the population. They seem to be good candidates for the title, the 'losers of the transition'. Interestingly, and in spite of their political preferences, they also are somewhat more religious than the average.

Right-wing conservatism has similar correlates as socialist conservatism, but the coefficients are somewhat lower, with the exception of church attendance. Therefore, their lower-than-average income and education, and older age are relatively less emphasised than in the case of socialist conservatism. Moreover, as the item on subjective economic status shows, right-wing conservatives do not perceive themselves as worse-off than the rest of the population. But the most important difference is due to this factor's high correlation with church attendance. This high correlation again justifies that this factor expresses the well-known, traditionalist right-wing conservatism

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### **Table 3 about here**

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Libertarianism is specific for the younger population ( $r=-.34, p<.01$ ), the less religious ( $r=-.13, p<.01$ ), for those who are better educated and come from better educated families ( $r=.19$  and  $r=.20$ , respectively, both  $p<.01$ ), and for those who are better off financially ( $r=.14, p<.01$ ). Libertarians correctly perceive themselves as doing economically better than the average ( $r=.14, p<.01$ ).

Among socio-demographic variables, church attendance and age shape most robustly the ideological dimensions.<sup>8</sup> Conventionalism proved to be the dimension least related to socio-demographic variables. Libertarianism is primarily supported by the better off youth. Socialist and right-wing conservatives have similar social profile (economically worse off, less educated, and older), although the relationships are stronger in the former case. The lesson is that those who failed to gain from the transition feel nostalgic for the old system (socialist conservatives), unless they have strong cultural (religious) motivation to greet the new system (right-wing conservatives).

### ***Ideological factors and political parties***

No analysis of the ideological dimensions can be considered complete unless their utility for discriminating support for political parties is examined. *Conventionalism* factor, as expected, is the least relevant politically of the four obtained ideological dimensions. According to ANOVA results ( $F=1.81$ ,  $df=7/734$ ,  $p<.08$ ) supporters of different Hungarian parties hardly differ in this dimension (Table 4). The communist Workers' Party (Munkáspárt) seems to be the least conventional, i.e., significantly less conventional than MSZP and KDNP supporters. Liberals (SZDSZ) appear also less conventional than the Socialists (MSZP). Since the socialists are the only strong party among the relative higher-scorers, we should recall that this factor contains a component of egalitarianism in the form of low social dominance orientation.

Since the three major parties, i.e., SZDSZ, Fidesz and MSZP, are all in the middle of the distribution, it seems that the values defining the conventionalism factor are consensual, or valence issues (Stokes, 1963). Though the differences are by and large non-significant, it is worth noting that the extremist parties on both sides of the spectrum (i.e., Munkáspárt and MIÉP) are low on this factor. Those who challenge the mainstream politics obtained low scores. After all, 'extreme' is by definition non-conventional, regardless of whether left or right.

*Socialist conservatism* factor is much more relevant politically (ANOVA result:  $F=5.08$ ,  $df=7/734$ ,  $p<.001$ ). On the high-scoring extreme of this dimension we find Munkáspárt, which significantly differs from virtually all other parties. Socialist voters (MSZP) are also relatively high scoring on this factor. Thus far, this dimension fairly well distinguishes the "old versus new regime" opposition. The Christian-democratic voters (KDNP) also appeared among the socialist conservatives, probably because at the time of the survey they emphasised its Christian-Socialist credentials and attacked the other right wing parties.

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**Table 4 about here**  
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*Right-wing conservatism* factor primarily differentiates voters of the Christian Democratic Party (KDNP) from the rest of the voters. According to the ANOVA results ( $F=8.80$ ,  $df=7/734$ ,  $p<.001$ ) KDNP differs from all other groups. In addition, MDF and Fidesz score significantly higher on this factor than Socialists and the Left-Liberals (MSZP and SZDSZ), and FKgP scores higher than MSZP. Interestingly, the two extremist parties (Munkáspárt and MIÉP) appear in the middle of the dimension, which basically divides left-liberal parties (MSZP and SZDSZ) and conservative-religious parties (KDNP, MDF, Fidesz).

The *libertarianism* factor also differentiates well Hungarian parties ( $F=4.06$ ,  $df=7/734$ ,  $p<.001$ ). High-scoring parties on this factor are Fidesz and SZDSZ, and they are significantly more libertarian than FKgP and MSZP supporters. Fidesz is in addition scoring significantly higher than supporters of the KDNP. Among the low scoring parties we find both leftist and rightist parties (e.g., FKgP, Munkáspárt, KDNP), but due to low frequencies in some of these parties, no significant differences are obtained. It seems that Fidesz voters, in spite of the conservative turn of the party leaders, are still among the libertarian part of the electorate. It is also noteworthy that the liberal parties are actually not significantly more libertarian than some of the parties with anti-libertarian reputation, such as, for example, MIÉP and Munkáspárt.

We would like to emphasise that our goal was *not* the construction of dimensions that would be best able to differentiate parties. Yet, three of the gained dimensions well differentiated parties. Only the conventionalism factor proved to be very weakly politicised. The socialist conservatism dimension represents primarily the “old versus new” regime cleavage, though it captures part of the traditionalist orientation, too. It pits the socialist Left (whether reformed or not) against the liberals, and to a lesser extent, against right wingers in general. Right-wing conservatism factor, which contains primarily a religious component but also a nationalist one, differentiates right-wing parties, such as KDNP, MDF and Fidesz from the centre left (socialist MSZP and liberal SZDSZ). Finally, the libertarianism factor differentiates parties with liberal reputation - Fidesz (although in this case the liberal reputation is a bit outdated) and SZDSZ - from parties opposed to libertarianism on both sides of the spectrum.

Thus, on the basis of the analysed attitudes and values, the Hungarian party system can be described with the help of three ideological oppositions. One is the old-new regime conflict (socialist conservatism). The other is the religious-nationalist right-wing vs. secular liberal-left opposition (conservatism). The third dimension differentiates the two liberal parties from the rest (libertarianism).

## **Discussion**

The aim of the research was to discover underlying or latent dimensions of political attitudes and values in the Hungarian public. The items used in the research were selected with the

double aim of including topics relevant for theoretical or text-book definitions of the main ideologies, and for understanding ideology in the post-Communist context. The attitude and value scales were factor-analysed jointly and four virtually independent factors were extracted and rotated. As far as the included attitudes and values are concerned, the Hungarian public's political views vary according to their degree of 1. conventionalism, 2. regret for the communist and traditional past, 3. religious-nationalist views, and 4. libertarian values.

The first factor, named Conventionalism, was loaded with classic conservative values, such as *order*, *nation*, *responsibility*, and *tradition*. However, the factor included also a number of items emphasising non-conservative values, such as *equality*, *state care*, *equality of women*, and even that “*Trade unions should have more say*”. The factor was interpreted as representing commonly accepted values, values concerning which there is an overwhelming consensus in Hungary.<sup>9</sup> It was weakly related to socialist and left-wing identification, and somewhat more specific for the older part of the population, and for those whose parents are slightly less well educated. Conventionalism proved to be egalitarian, tolerant of outgroups, not specific in terms of authoritarianism, anti-Gypsy and anti-Jewish prejudices, but also somewhat religious. This is not, therefore, conventionalism of the sort described by Adorno et al. (1950). It attracts non-authoritarian but egalitarian socialist voters, and similarly inclined religious individuals.

Socialist Conservatism was defined by a number of *abstract* conservative and traditionalist items. At the same time, it contained socialist items and a strong positive sentiment towards the old, socialist, regime. This orientation sees the past as the realm of positive and desirable values, whether it was a world of traditional sex roles or a world where the state provided jobs. It is, therefore, a *par excellence* conservative orientation. At the same time, it is a socialist orientation as well, since the past was itself socialist. Socialist conservatism correlated with socialist and left-wing identification and negatively with liberal identification. It was also related to high authoritarianism, general dislike of outgroups, anti-Gypsy and anti-Jewish prejudice and to religiosity. Individuals supporting this ideological orientation are disproportionately in favour of the Munkáspárt, i.e., the party that represents the direct heirs of the old ruling party. It is somewhat ironic that the socialist conservatives also disproportionately support MSZP, although this party had particularly harsh monetarist policies in the government, while Socialist Conservatism is clearly an ideology of the economically frustrated populace.

Another kind of conservatism was represented by the third factor. It was primarily a religion-based, or clerical conservatism. It also included a touch of nationalism and affirmative attitude towards the contemporary regime in Hungary. Thus, the factor was interpreted as Right-Wing Conservatism. This label was corroborated by this factor's correlations with conservative and right-wing identification (positive), and with socialist identification (negative). The right-wing conservatism has similar socio-economic basis as its socialist counterpart. It has also similar socio-

psychological correlates, though in both cases coefficients are somewhat lower for this version of conservatism. Thus, the right-wing conservatives are also authoritarian, antisemitic, but they are in favour of hierarchical relationships between social groups (correlation with SDO), as well. This factor's most specific feature is its stronger connection with religiosity.

The two conservatism factors demonstrate that the ideological content of conservatism may vary, but the different patterns are equally well explainable by the 'fear of uncertainty' (Wilson, 1973) and by older age. Socialism is able to become conservative by integrating this psychologically and not politically driven traditionalism. Similar socio-demographic correlates of the socialist and right-wing conservatism indicate that religiosity (and attitude towards the former regime as its mirror-image) might be the deciding factor in the *ideological* channelling of the socio-economic frustration. Economic frustration and insecurity leads the religious to become right-wing conservatives, and those less-religious to become socialist-conservatives.

Finally, a fourth factor was defined by values such as free competition, risk, erotic film, change, modern art and right to abortion. Since the factor's emphasis is on the cultural and lifestyle matters, it was named Libertarianism. Libertarianism is more popular among the liberal and right-wing identifiers, and less popular among socialist identifiers. It has a strong class and age component as well, the social elite and the youth being considerably more libertarian.

According to these relationships, two of the ideological dimensions are correlated with the left-wing self-identification in Hungary, though both coefficients are rather low. There is a group of left-wing identifiers who are more tolerant, egalitarian and even religious, while the other is more authoritarian, intolerant, prejudiced, and backward-looking. The former is rather unspecific according to their socio-economic characteristics, while the latter is comprised mostly of those who experience economic hardships.

We found two ideological dimensions associated with right wing identification, libertarianism and conservatism. They are united by the rejection of the old regime and the rejection of the socialist label. However, almost everything else divides them sharply. Libertarian values are championed by the younger, better educated and economically well-off respondents, who do not go often to church. They seem to represent those, who experience the transition positively. They also appear as non-authoritarian, less religious and more positive concerning outgroups (though not less prejudiced than the average). Partywise, they are frequent among the supporters of parties with liberal reputation, i.e., Fidesz and SZDSZ, and rare among the non-libertarian left (MSZP, Munkáspárt) and right-wing parties (FKgP, KDNP). Right wing conservatives show the opposite feature on all these dimensions.

All relationships between ideological identifications and dimensions were in the directions we could have expected on the basis of the content of the factors. However, it is also obvious that

the factors are not identical with any of the ideological self-identifications. First, coefficients were in general of rather modest magnitude. Second, most of the ideological dimensions have multiple self-identification correlates. For example, those self-identified with socialist label were scoring high on conventionalism and socialist conservatism factors, and low on conservatism and liberalism factors.

The lack of relationship among ideological dimensions seem to substantiate Kerlinger's (1984) claim that ideologies are not opposed but orthogonal to each other. At the same time, the fact that identifying oneself as a liberal means being *in favour* of libertarian values and attitudes, and *opposed* (therefore not being neutral) to socialist conservatism attitudes and values, indicates that the level of ideological identity brings higher level polarisation into the field of political attitudes.

The structure of ideological in Hungary seems to be three-polar. The secular Left (socialists and liberals) is opposed to the conservative Right, the anti-Communist liberals and conservatives are opposed to the nostalgic socialists and the economically successful libertarians are opposed to the authoritarian collectivists. The most fascinating in this picture is not that it is three dimensional, as opposed to the classic one- or two-dimensional spaces, but that the opposition between lower class, non-religious, egalitarian Left and the religious, pro-capitalist, upper class Right does not appear even as a sub-dimension. Actually, none of the classic, Western ideologies like social democracy, liberalism and conservatism constitute major dimensions of the ideological space in Hungary.

In general, our original tentative hypotheses, on the basis of which we classified the attitudes and values as belonging to specific dimension, failed miserably. Most prominently, conservatism fell apart, some items enriching the orientation of leftists, other shaping the character of conventionalism, and only some clustering into a classic conservatism dimension. But our ambition was exactly to find non-standard packages of ideologies, and from this point of view the results cause much satisfaction.

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**Table 1 Oblimin rotated pattern matrix of the ideology items\***

Items	Factor 1	Factor 2	Factor 3	Factor 4
9. order	.72			
19. nation	.68			
21. responsibility	.67			
10. freedom	.63			
12. patriotism	.62			
13. tradition	.61			
16. marriage	.60			
3. discipline	.59			
22. state care	.57			
1. equality of women	.55			
8. equality	.53			
17. countryside life	.50			
6. private property	.44			.30
26. Trade unions should have more say.	.33			
2. minority rights	.32			
43. It is always better to stick t the old that is working than to experiment with something new.		.60		
31. Multiparty-system is impediment in front of the national unity.		.57		
33. Under the Kádár-regime the leaders paid more attention to the people		.54		
28. Everybody is better off if the man works and the woman takes care of the household and the family		.53		
34. Under socialism people could have more trust in the future.		.49	-.34	
30. Parliamentary democracy is not able to resolve crisis situations.		.46		
44. Most people are lead by instincts.		.44		.39
29. The relationship between people of the same sex is always wrong.		.41		
23. Our country should follow its own way, not caring about the expectations of the West.		.40		
25. The state should provide job to everybody who wants to work.	.34	.34		
36. Laziness is one of the greatest human sins.		.33		
27. Individual liberty is superior to state interest.				
22. Religious teaching should be compulsory in all elementary and secondary schools			.72	
21. The role of Church should be increased in managing the country's matters.			.71	
7. church	.40		.70	
4. religion	.45		.66	
24. Hungary should try to change its present borders.			.41	
32. In spite of its weaknesses, parliamentary functions well in Hungary.			.39	
35. Since 1990 people can influence the fate of the country better			.37	
15. free competition				.65
20. risk				.64
11. erotic film				.61
14. change	.32			.56
5. modern art				.38
18. right to abortion				.33

\*Items with loading above .30 shown.

**Table 2 Correlation between ideological factors and ideological self-identifications and social-psychological variables**

	Conventionalism	Socialist conservatism	Right-wing conservatism	Libertarianism
Conservative identification	.03	.00	.21**	.01
Liberal identification	-.01	-.18**	-.03	.17**
Socialist identification	.14**	.14**	-.27**	-.14**
Left-right identification	-.08*	-.11**	.22**	.12**
Authoritarianism <sup>a</sup>	.04	.58**	.34**	-.17**
Social Dominance Orientation	-.34**	-.01	.09**	.00
Anti-Gypsy prejudice <sup>a</sup>	-.05	.27**	.04	-.03
Anti-Jewish prejudice <sup>a</sup>	-.03	.22**	.14**	.04
GATO scale <sup>ab</sup>	.14**	-.31**	-.03	.24**

\* $p < .05$ , \*\* $p < .01$  (2-tailed).

<sup>a</sup> First principal component.

<sup>b</sup> GATO - general attitude towards outgroups scale; higher score – more positive attitude.

**Table 3 Correlation between ideological dimensions and selected socio-demographic variables**

	Conventionalism	Socialist conservatism	Right-wing conservatism	Libertarianism
Church attendance <sup>a</sup>	.18**	.09**	.42**	-.13**
Income	-.06	-.21**	-.13**	.13**
Family income	-.05	-.19**	-.09*	.14**
Age	.19**	.20**	.17**	-.34**
Education <sup>b</sup>	-.01	-.29**	-.10**	.19**
Father's education <sup>b</sup>	-.11**	-.27**	-.14**	.20**
Perceived economic status <sup>c</sup>	-.04	-.13**	.02	.14**

<sup>a</sup> Six-point scale, from 1-does not go to church, to 6-goes many times a week.

<sup>b</sup> Six-point scale, higher score meaning higher educational level.

<sup>c</sup> Ten-point self-placement scale (from 1 - poor, to 10 - rich).

**Table 4 Mean scores on ideological dimensions among supporters of different parties**

	Conventionalism	Socialist Conservatism	Right-wing conservatism	Libertarianism
Munkáspárt (Workers' Party)	-.45 <sup>a</sup>	.81 <sup>abcdef</sup>	-.06 <sup>d</sup>	-.24
MIÉP Magyar Igazság és Élet Pártja (Party of Hungarian Justice and Life)	-.16	-.29 <sup>a</sup>	-.08 <sup>c</sup>	-.04
MDF Magyar Demokrata Fórum (Hungarian Democratic Forum)	-.15	-.16 <sup>d</sup>	.33 <sup>ab-g</sup>	.02
SZDSZ Szabad Demokraták Szövetsége (Alliance of Free Democrats)	-.11 <sup>b</sup>	-.27 <sup>b</sup>	-.11 <sup>b</sup>	.21 <sup>ac</sup>
Fidesz - Magyar Polgári Párt (Fidesz-Hungarian Civic Party)	.06	-.25 <sup>c</sup>	.27 <sup>ab-f</sup>	.28 <sup>abc</sup>
MSZP Magyar Szocialista Párt (Hungarian Socialist Party)	.13 <sup>ab</sup>	.12 <sup>abc-e</sup>	-.24 <sup>a</sup>	-.13 <sup>c</sup>
FKgP Független Kisgazdapárt (Independent Smallholders' Party)	.14	.03 <sup>e</sup>	.18 <sup>a-e</sup>	-.29 <sup>a</sup>
KDNP Kereszténydemokrata Néppárt (Christian Democratic People's Party)	.26 <sup>a</sup>	.24 <sup>bc</sup>	.97 <sup>abcdefg</sup>	-.22 <sup>b</sup>

*Note:* Figures refer to standardised normalised factor scores. Superscripts within a column with different sign indicate pairwise significant difference between,  $p < .05$ , LSD post-hoc comparisons.

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## Footnotes

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<sup>1</sup> The classic Western ideological structures were also shaken by new social and political developments. The previously dominant economy-centred unidimensional ideological structure came under the attack of the New Politics - the postmaterialist left and the radical right. In addition, the Thatcherite-Reaganite revolution turned neo-conservatism into a radical political force, promoting social changes, against which the left appeared as 'conservative', striving to preserve the remnants of the 'dying out' welfare state (cf. Giddens, 1994).

<sup>2</sup> GATO scale consists of items asking for respondent's general sympathy/antipathy towards a large range of outgroups, from Gypsies and Skinheads, to Germans and Poles.

<sup>3</sup> As part of the preliminary analyses, attitude and catch-phrase scales were separately factor-analysed, and a considerable number of solutions were examined. An analysis of those results was presented in Enyedi and Todosijević (2001). The results however, were generally in accordance with those presented here, and for the present paper the analysis of a broader set of items is preferable.

<sup>4</sup> The exception is the 'philosophical' item intended to measure liberalism: "individual liberty is superior to state interest".

<sup>5</sup> The item refers to restoring the pre-1918 borders of Hungary.

<sup>6</sup> The respondents reacted positively to most of the items in the value scale. For example, 92% felt moderately or strongly sympathetic towards the most accepted value, *freedom*.

<sup>7</sup> In fact, single attitude and value items correlated rather poorly with self-identification. The highest correlation between any of the value items and identification items is between conservative identification and the value *church*, and it is  $r=.18$  ( $p<.01$ ). In case of attitude items, the highest correlation is between socialist identification and the item *Under socialism people could have more trust in the future*:  $r=.30$  ( $p<.01$ ). When all value and attitude items are entered into a stepwise regression as predictors of the three identification items, the explained variance of liberal and conservative identification is 9%, of socialist identification is 18%. Thus, connection between ideological identification and attitudes and values is rather modest.

<sup>8</sup> Analysis of gender differences showed that women score higher on the conventionalism ( $p<.01$ ) and the right wing conservatism factors ( $p<.01$ ), while men are more libertarian ( $p<.001$ ).

<sup>9</sup> The top-loading value in this factor is *order*, a value which was perceived by 90% of the respondents as moderately or strongly desirable.