1. Introduction

Borders and border relations were extremely problematic elements of international relations, as well as social interactions, between Central European states and nations in the 20th century. After 1989, border twin towns (described also as divided towns) began to play a role as European integration laboratories, where the European project is being tested in a micro-scale, combining different legal, cultural, economic and social systems in everyday coexistence. Spatial conditions were an interdependent factor in this regard. The main question that appeared then was that of tools and models of governing twin settlements forming common space and sharing – under open borders – common needs, opportunities, problems, etc. These were settlements that were representing at the same time different political, economic, social and cultural realities.

This paper’s aim is to analyze challenges related to governing cross-border settlements in Central Europe in the context of European integration, with governance theory being a theoretical prospective of the investigation. The main presumptions will focus on the multi-level character of border twin-town governance, where a joint management of the public sphere has to involve not only the administrative structure of the divided towns in question, but also non-governmental organizations, inhabitants, as well as state and European levels.

2. Borders and border twin towns – the case of Central Europe

Borders are instruments that separate the “self” from the “other”\(^1\). However the process of European integration has been increasingly modifying the meaning of borders. By differentiating them into internal (with no controls) and external (protecting the free-flows within Schengen area), also separation function has been modified. Processes regarding borders seem to be especially visible in border twin towns – towns located at border and directly neighboring each other. Spatial proximity leads to the situation where many sectors of the everyday existence have to be managed together (often water supply systems, public

transportations, etc. are inseparable). Additionally peripheral location (at the edge of the states’ territory) and consequently limited resources problem, may be overcome only by close collaboration. Especially if it is supported by external (European, national) aid and expected by local populations. Border twin towns are considered then often as laboratories of European integration – spaces where it is tested in micro scale under relatively controllable conditions. Additionally they often are used for symbolic purposes, as manifestations of successful integration. This element is eagerly used by politicians but also local structures for own purposes.

Central Europe – here understood as 2004 EU enlargement area – seems to differ significantly in terms of border relations from the western part of the continent. Borders are much more undefined here – their number and location have been changing since the beginning of the last century many times. They were often designed arbitrarily by external players, who did not take into considerations local ethnic circumstances. Consequently in many cases ethnic borders had to be adjusted to the political ones. Borderlands have been then (not rarely) zones of perpetually self accelerating conflicts between religions, nations, civilizations. Additionally Central European borders reflect asymmetries, both at their eastern and eastern edges.

Border twin towns appeared on the map of Central Europe usually much later then their equivalence in Western Europe and started integration later (especially comparing to the model case of Herzogenrath and Kerkrade). Jan Buursink differentiates three types of border twin towns: partitioned (result of division of one town by shifting a border), duplicated (town existing on one side of a border was copied on the other) and connected (two separate towns are liked by infrastructure). Majority of the pairs in Central Europe belong (contrary to Western Europe) to the first category, however division time was also various.

A relevant change in couples’ relations was initiated by collapse of communism and then European integration process. Especially, with regard to de-bordering and re-bordering as well as Europeanization process. Both led to new ways of governing the couples in the form of multi-level governance and cross-border governance.

---

4 A. Gasparini, Situations, conditions, style of life and government in Border Towns, „ISIG Quarterly of International Sociology“, No. 4/1999-2000, p. 3.
3. Europeanization, multi-level governance and cross-border governance

According to Roberta Ladrech, Europeanization is a process where EC political and economic dynamics become a part of the organizational logic of national politics and policy-making. Johan Olsen, points out that Europeanization implies adapting national and subnational systems of governance to a European political centre and European-wide norms. Polity, policy and politics are influenced by norms and ideas, institutional and non-institutional actors. This process corresponds with inability of states to be responsible for all the public issues. Transfer of competences and involvement of other levels fill this gap. Multi-level governance is then the process of permanent negotiations that involve different territorial levels. This shall lead to the more effective problem solving mechanism by involving subnational actors who can act independently on both domestic and international arenas and create transnational links.

If multi-level governance is related to the transfer of competences to the four other levels: international organizations, civil society, local government and business, specific situation may be observed at the state borders. Noralv Veggeland marks, that cross-border regional space have to be built by different institutions of territorial partnership. De-bordering and increasing mutual interdependencies create the necessity of border-crossing governance of the traditional public sphere, where all those actors are involved (Graph 1.). Cross-border governance is consequently gaining relevance in Europe.

As Tarmo Pikner defines, cross-border governance capacity may be understood as a social infrastructure across the state borders which create channels for the transfer of flow of material and non-material resources. Enrico Gualini defines three dimensions of cross-border government: political-economic, institutional and symbolic-cognitive. The first one is

---

8 J. P. Olsen, The Many Faces of Europeanization, ARENA Working Papers, WP 01/2, p. 3.
related to the process of strategic selectivity of aims. The second is related to the institutional aspects of collaboration. The third deals with the creation of trans-border communities and inventing cross-border identity\textsuperscript{15}. All those three dimensions have to be analyzed from the point of view of actors involved in its creation.

**Graph 1. Cross-border governance**

![Cross-border governance diagram](Image)

Source: Author’s concept

It was assumed in the research – when identifying actors - that governance in a border twin town results from interactions between individual citizens and administration, mutually influencing each other, also in the cross-border behavior. They formulate specific postulates with regard to a town across the border. Additionally civil society seems to be a third actor in-between them, cumulating and articulating ideas, interests and social energy. However in every border twin town pair the structures are duplicated. This fact creates natural level-partners for interactions on both sides of the border (Graph 2.).

Consequently cross-border governance have two dimensions. Vertically it contains three levels: administration, NGOs and individuals that interact in the process of formulating policies addressed to the partner town. Horizontally, on the other hand, at each level corresponding actors interact. Cross-border governance in a border twin town may be *top-down* or *bottom-up* inspired, but it always requires collaboration of at least two actors from both sides of the border, representing the same level of governance.

To evaluate opportunities and difficulties in governing a border twin town, empirical investigation is needed, where three described levels are tested.

Graph 2. Cross-border interaction forms in border divided towns

Source: Author’s concept

4. Empirical test – different cases of Central European border twin towns

Border twin towns in Central Europe represent various features that may influence cross-border governance form. Two variables were introduced when selecting the sample. First was about the location. It was assumed, that governance at three mentioned levels shall be differently reflected at internal and external EU borders. Administrations shall have more instruments there for close collaboration on internal borders, when external status shall limit the maneuver space. It was also expected that the situation, where partner towns are inhabited by ethnically different populations (with its consequences for language knowledge level, cultural differences, mutual contacts type, etc.) shall facilitate other governance possibilities then in case of pairs that are homogeneous (the same nationality dominates on both sides) or where population is mixed (big minority of the one nation lives on the other side of the border).

When searching for examples, four were selected, representing for different combinations of abovementioned variables (Graph 3.).

Frankfurt (Oder) - Słubice on the German-Polish border is a pair representing internal EU border with ethnically separated populations, Gorizia - Nova Gorica at the edges of Italy and Slovenia has the same legal status, but has a long tradition of ethnic mixture. Terespol – Brest (Poland and Belarus) is located at the external EU border with ethnically separated
populations, Narva – Ivangorod (Estonia and Russia) have ethnically homogeneous status. Two first pairs are located additionally at the western edges of Central Europe, two last at the eastern. Both represent two types of asymmetric relations.

Graph 3. Cross-border governance patterns

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>EU internal border</th>
<th>EU external border</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Frankfurt (Oder) – Slubice</td>
<td>Terespol – Brest</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gorizia – Nova Gorica</td>
<td>Narva-Ivangorod</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Author’s concept

4.1 Frankfurt (Oder) – Slubice
Frankfurt (Oder) and Slubice represent a typical example of partitioned town, that appeared on the map as the result of Yalta conference decisions and border shifts in 1945. Frankfurt (Oder) had been before a German town located far from political and ethnic Polish-German border. After the Oder River became the borderline, the eastern suburb – called previously Dammvorstad – was renamed as Slubice. This name (coming from słup – boundary-post) was to symbolically stress the early middle age Polish character of the settlement. German population was evacuated, escaped or expelled, the province and the town itself was filled with the Poles, mainly from the Polish eastern provinces (now in Ukraine and Belarus). Consequently the border was a new but real (in cultural, ethnic and linguistic terms) phenomenon there.

The border was closed by 1970 (when the Yalta border was officially recognizes by the Western Germany), then open for about a decade, closed in the 1980s’ as the result of oppositional activates in Poland, and finally re-opened at the beginning of 1990’s. Both towns were used in 1990’s symbolically by Poland and Germany to manifest mutual reconciliation process and then progress in European integration of Poland. Presidents, prime minister and
ministers of both states have met in towns many times since 1989. Consequently also the border controls were in the process of softening by 2007, when the border became an internal EU border and the direct controls were abolished.

Frankfurt (Oder) is inhabited by about 60 thousand people, Słubice by about 18 thousand. The groups are ethnically separated, the number of Poles permanently leaving on the German side is limited. The situation results from both historical developments and current limitations – e.g. German transition period on labor market access for Polish citizens that was finally eliminated only in May 2011.

The level of social integration in Frankfurt (Oder) - Słubice may be considered as relatively low. Decades of isolation, missing borderland tradition, cultural and language differences prevent individuals from non-commercial contacts. As the research reveal, the knowledge of the neighbor’s language is limited in Słubice and very limited in Frankfurt (Oder). Many Poles know German language only on communicative level (in practice necessary for commercial context of interaction), the number of fluent knowledge declarations is similar to other non-border towns in Poland. Personal knowledge of Poles was declared at the level of 65% among respondents in Frankfurt (Oder) and Germans in Słubice at 51%. Mixed families are not common as well. Inhabitants are sometimes also against the towns’ integration initiatives initiated by the local authorities. Frankfurt negative referendum on cross-border tram line seems to be one of the best examples.

As the research conducted by the author proves, despite differences in civil society development in Poland and Germany (characterized respectively by low and high individual engagement), NGOs from both towns collaborate (almost 50%, majority of them on regular bases). They declare that neither cultural differences nor prejudices are a problem in mutual contacts, they have mainly difficulties in obtaining and distributing information about each other. NGOs seem to represent then the more open part of inhabitants (aiming at collaboration

---

and contact) for better local problem solving\textsuperscript{20}. Some of them - as \textit{Słubfurt} association – symbolically stresses togetherness of the towns by its name and legal form of acting.

The most advanced collaboration may be detected between the towns administration. This \textit{top-down} organized governance is fuelled by pragmatic approach of formal structures. Together with the EU financial instruments for cross-border collaboration and positive climate between Berlin and Warsaw, local authorities have been in close relations at institutional (joint commissions, sessions, etc.), symbolic (public image of successful and model example of Polish-German collaboration), and operational (dozens of common projects in different fields, among others education, sport, spatial planning, etc.) levels\textsuperscript{21}. Public space symbolism is represented by “European integration” monuments in both towns\textsuperscript{22}. Additionally the latest research show that \textit{top-down} integration slowly contributes to individuals involvement in cross-border non commercial activities.

\textbf{4.2 Gorizia-Nova Gorica}

The town of and Gorizia has been located in traditionally borderland area, where influences of several states, civilizations and cultures have been overlapping in the last centauries. It was a part of Italian-Yugoslavian/Slovenian-Austro-Hungarian/Austrian borderland with Alpine and Mediterranean influences, as well as presence of Italian, Friulian, German, Slovene and Croatian languages and cultures\textsuperscript{23}. The appearance of the twin town – Nova Gorica – resulted from the Second World War territorial shifts in Europe and represents an example of both \textit{partitioned} and \textit{duplicated town}. 1947 Paris Peace Treaty divided the region, leaving the town of Gorizia on the Italian side of the border, when the eastern suburbs (however with the town railway station) became a part of Yugoslavia. Population was not forced to leave their houses, however numerous Italians decided to leave territories being now a part of Yugoslavia, many settled down in Gorizia. Due to the lack of urban center on her side, a decision was made to construct a new town - Nova Gorica – that was to serve as a new center for the Yugoslavian part of the region. Consequently urban area on both sides of the

border was cut by the state border and governed in the form of two administratively formed towns \(^{24}\).

Together with the eastern enlargement of the European Union and then Schengen zone enlargement, the border regime separating both towns softened and finally became a part of Schengen regulations, eliminating direct controls and physical existence of the now internal EU border. It is however important to mark that the border was relatively open also during the Cold War. To avoid Berlin scenario authorities of Italy and Yugoslavia in several agreements made the towns the main crossing point for mutual transport and goods’ exchange, open also to individuals \(^{25}\). After 2007 the border became a highly preamble internal EU border with possibility of unlimited crossing in many places alongside both towns edges.

Gorizia-Nova Gorica represent a border twin towns that are ethnically mixed. Almost 20% of Gorizia’s 38 thousand inhabitants declare to be Slovenians, the rest are mainly Italians. In the interwar period (before the division) this level was about 30%. In Nova Gorica only 1% belong to the Italian minority \(^{26}\). The number of Slovenians in Gorizia has been growing in the recent years \(^{27}\).

Contacts of inhabitants of both towns have been very intensive and social integration level very high, especially comparing to similar settlements in Europe. According to Milan Bufon it results from two factors: First of all, the fact, that the border separating the towns (and splitting the region) a relatively new element in the history of this territory, when the population structure and distribution has not changed significantly. Second, the population is mixed and has everyday contacts in different contexts \(^{28}\). About 80% of the towns’ inhabitants declare to have family on the other side of the border, many have friends. Among reasons for border crossing not only commercial but also social reasons are frequently declared \(^{29}\). Both languages are spoken in the towns by the majority of inhabitants \(^{30}\).

Social integration advancement is reflected in collaboration between civic organizations from both towns.


\(^{25}\) M. Bufon, Cross-border Cooperation ..., op. cit., p. 183.


\(^{27}\) M. Bufon, Cultural and Social Dimensions of Borderlands: The Case of the Italo-Slovene Trans-border Area, ‘GeoJournal’ 30.3 1993, pp. 239.

\(^{28}\) Jańczak 2009.

\(^{29}\) M. Bufon, Cross-border ..., op. cit., p. 183.

Administration collaboration between Gorizia and Nova Gorica shall be dated back to the 1960’s and following decades and then initiatives implemented after Slovenia gained independence in 1991. Joint town services (e.g. in the field of water supply, border traffic, etc.) were introduced31. Already around the eastern enlargement the advancement of administration-led initiatives was very high and contained public services, culture, sport, transportation, etc.32. The project of Gorizia Nova introduced a new perspective for multisectoral integration33 with a strong financial incentives form the EU. European subsidies push both towns authorities to prepare common project, however it is not a decisive factor. The governance is bottom – up organized and results first of all from strong social base.

4.3 Terespol-Brest

The couple of Terespol-Brest is an example that is not always considered to be a border twin town. Both towns formed by 19th century a settlement at the Bug River in the Russian Empire with dominating Polish and Jewish inhabitants. Due to the construction of fortress, Brest with its inhabitants was moved two kilometers eastwards, Terespol one kilometer westwards. After the Bug River became a border between Poland and the Soviet Union in 1945 the towns were separated politically from each other. They represent then an example of partitioned town.

The border regime, relatively liberal after the collapse of communism in Poland and dissolution of the Soviet Union, was re-hardened after the Polish accession to the Schengen zone, together with the necessity of introducing visa regime. Visa fees together with time consuming formalities (necessity of traveling to apply for documents in case of Terespol citizens) additionally limited possibilities of mutual contacts34. And those were even before not encouraging due to poor infrastructure: lack of crossing point for pedestrians, hour-lasting train connection and permanent traffic jam on the road terminal.

Majority of Polish inhabitants of Brest left the town in 1945 and then in 1956. At the same time the town experienced a rapid growth of population as it became a regional center.

with over 300 thousand dwellers. Poles, who stayed there, melted quickly in Belorusian/Rusian/Soviet environment. Terespol on the other hand remained a small town with about 6 thousand dwellers. In 2002 census, non of its inhabitants reported Belarusian nationality there.

Despite the fact that both languages are proximal and mutually understandable, contacts of Poles and Byelorussians in divided town are limited both by time and context. Crossing the border is time consuming and expensive, consequently does not belong to the everyday practices of the local population. The context of contacts is usually related to commercial behavior and is related to buying/selling goods and services, where especially small Terespol is trying to attract consumers from Brest. The research conducted by Krzysztof Kolanowski revealed that majority of inhabitants never or since some years no more visit the second side. Except from ethnic separation and impermeable border, additionally cultural differences related to the current situation on both sides (autocracy in Belarus and Polish involvement in its democratization) result in mutual mistrustm, also at personal level.

Among 11 existing NGOs in Terespol only 1 collaborates with a partner organization in Brest. Some from Brest have contacts with partners in the other, bigger Polish towns in the region.

Administration cooperation is difficult due to asymmetry in size of both partners as well as political tensions between Poland and Belarus. In 2002 a cooperation agreement was signed, officials' meetings are sporadic. Cultural cooperation is visible in e.g. participation of individuals from Terespol in “Brest Days” or common marathons, however results are almost invisible in sectoral collaboration organizing everyday life governance. No European subsidies for cross-border cooperation are reported by both sides for joint projects. What is interesting, the only visible initiative is related to the heritage of Brest fortress and to be used for tourism development.

38 *Strategia współpracy miasta Terespol z organizacjami pozarządowymi na lata 2011-2016*, Terespol 2011, p. 28.
4.4 Narva-Ivangorod

The pair of Narva-Ivangorod represents a border town with a very long tradition. Both towns were a crossing point between Denmark, Sweden and Russia what is represented in the architectural landscape of both towns by two castles facing each other by the border bridge on both sides of the Narva River. The towns were a single urban and administrative entity in the interwar period. Together with the Soviet incorporation of Estonia border was shifted westwards. Estonia became a part of the Soviet Union, but eastern parts of this republic were transferred to the Russian Socialist Federal Republic. The border separated the eastern suburb – Ivangoordin, a new town in RSFR – from the town of Narva. Despite its administrative character the border was an internal Soviet one and was invisible in everyday existence. After regaining independence by Estonia in 1991 the border really separated both towns. Estonia was trying to again obtain control over pre-war eastern outskirts of her territory (including Ivangoordin), however those attempts were unsuccessful. At the same time Russian population of Narva was looking for autonomy. Consequently the pair represent the example of partitioned town.

Introduction of border controls in 1991 initiated the phase of towns’ re-bordering. Together with the eastern enlargement of the European Union and the Schengen zone three years later, the border in the middle of the town became an external border of the EU. Its permeability decreased due to the visa regulations, what accelerated already visible process of the towns’ separation.

Both towns are inhabited by Russian speaking population. Among 70 thousand inhabitants of Narva they constitute 96% and almost all of 10 thousand dwellers in Ivangoordin. Originally dominating Estonian population in the pre-war period was replaced by Russians as a result of population evacuation in 1944 and industrialization process in the late 1940s’ and 1950’s. Nowadays both towns are ethnically Russian.

As Thomas Lundén marks, the inhabitants of Narva can be divided into three categories of about equal size according to “citizenship”. One third has acquired Estonian citizenship, another third is Russian subjects while the last third consists of those who are considered aliens. The latter are required to have a special permit which, until recently, also

---

functioned as a valid entry permit at the boundary. According to his research many belonging to the second and third category are not interested in Estonian passport due to several privileges they can obtain in Ivangoorod as Russian citizens. Additionally, identity factor plays a role. On the other hand the third category has to obtain permissions to conduct many of the everyday-life activities, e.g. to work, establish business, invite relatives form Russia, etc.

Russian language is instructed in Narva in all schools as the first language, Estonian offer is limited due to shortage of teachers, Russian is almost exclusively spoken in both towns, Russian language media from both Russia and Estonia dominate on the local market, local media are also broadcasted in this language.

All those described cultural and language elements create the situation of relatively close ties between individuals on both sides of the border. Family and friendship ties are close. Due to the visa regulation they are not as easy as before Estonia’s EU entrance, on the other hand they are strengthened by different legal status of Narva dwellers. Several thousand regular-based border crossings are noted everyday. At the same time it is reported by some scholars that Narvian identity appeared, (?) which is not Russian anymore, but has not yet become Estonian either. This separates the previously homogeneous community.

Civil society is very weak in both towns what results from the dominating patterns of political culture in post-Soviet space.

Collapse of the Soviet Union and economic depression strongly affected both towns. This, together with the interstate relations, led to the dissolution of the previously existing functional and infrastructural ties between towns. In the early 1990’s separate systems of transportation, telecommunication, electricity and heating, water supplies, sewage purification, urban planning, etc. were introduced. As Thomas Lundén marks even if Narva and Ivangoorod form a historical unit and are forced to cooperate on some technical issues (water, cross-border traffic), their coexistence is marked by an absence of official co-operation. Additionally, national politics seems to play an important role. One of the symbolic examples could be re-erection of the Swedish Lion monument, commemorating

---

43 Ibidem.
44 Ibidem.
48 T. Lundén, Valga-Valka, Narva... .
Russian defeat in year 1700\textsuperscript{49}. On the other hand the European Union and OSCE are active to encourage re-establishing collaboration links between the towns\textsuperscript{50}. Here especially development possibilities are stressed with fortresses as common heritage that shall attract attention of both inhabitants and visitors.

5. Conclusions - towards the cross-border governance model

The presented analysis allows the following constatation: Governing of the border twin towns in Central Europe in its cross-border form depends on the EU related character of the border and ethnic/cultural situation in there. Graph 4. presents four models of cross-border governance. Geometric figures’ divisions correspond with the Graph 3. Here, the wider a given level is, the more intensive, frequent and effective the collaboration is as well as the role in governance. The more narrow – the less.

In case of internal EU borders, institutional, symbolic and financial incentives (coming from both European and national level) enhance the collaboration. This is usually used by administrative actors on both border sides. In case of the EU external border, the instruments are incomparably weaker, some of the factors (especially state related) are additionally of de-motivating character. Political de-bordering (observable on the borders that gained internal EU status) is then a collaboration attract-factor when re-bordering (visible on the borders that became external EU borders), despite if caused by border introducing or border hardening, a repel-factor.

However – taking into consideration three element character of the cross-border governance – also the role of individuals is crucial. Population cultural and ethnic proximity creates the social pressure for integration. In ethnically separated towns it is on relatively low level and individuals’ contacts are limited to commercial contexts. In situation of ethnic homogeneity of both sides or visible presence of minority of one of them in the partner border twin town (usually rooted in longer tradition of coexistence), cross-border governance is based on this element as well.

Civil society may serve as a bridge, combining individual involvement with structurised activities for the common goodness.

Concluding, the most favorable situation for effective governing across the border in border twin towns is the one, when the \textit{top-down} led initiatives of administration are met by

\textsuperscript{49} S. Burch, D.J. Smith, \textit{Empty Spaces} ..., p. 915.

\textsuperscript{50} P. Jaenniemi, A. Sergunin, \textit{When two aspire}..., pp. 17-19.
bottom-up expressed will of the inhabitants. This happens on internal EU borders with ethnically mixed/homogeneous inhabitants.

**Graph 4. Cross-border governance patterns**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>EU internal border</th>
<th>EU external border</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Towns ethnically separated</td>
<td><img src="image1" alt="Diagram" /></td>
<td><img src="image2" alt="Diagram" /></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Towns ethnically mixed/homogenous</td>
<td><img src="image3" alt="Diagram" /></td>
<td><img src="image4" alt="Diagram" /></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Author’s concept

In case of the internal border location and populations’ ethnic alienation, governance may be still satisfactory, as the tools the administration is equipped with (especially by the European Union) allow to initiate collaboration and implement it with external financial support. This situation additionally creates contexts, when individuals naturally involve in interactions and social integration elements appear, especially in the longer perspective.

External character of the border causes that the governance presents difficulty (especially in the Central European interstate political context), however ethnic proximity creates space for individuals contacts and potential for the future developments. On the other hand political isolation has consequences for identity perception and may cause more difficulties in the future at the individuals’ level.

The most difficult situation is represented by border twin town on external EU border with ethnic separation. Authorities have difficult task with limited instruments and population pressure is also minimal.

Special attention to additional elements may be also relevant. Analyzed cases show that EU external border twin towns in Central Europe represent at the same time the
civilization boundaries, also in their political meaning. This – with regard to Central European states necessity of confirming the European belonging – creates their role of borders’ defender. Cross-border collaboration is then even more difficult. Symbolically it is illustrated by monuments confirming differences. Internal EU border twin towns are located in the same (western) civilization (also in political meaning). Here belonging is proved by openness (symbolically also by European monuments). Re-bordering in the east means (in maximal form) only collaboration, de-bordering in the west of the region – exemplary integration. Ethnic mixture/homogeneity influences this situation, by creating social pressure on the administrations. Symbolically, when on the internal borders those are joint tram lines and schools that represent the cross-border governance (stressing togetherness), on the external they are plans related to fortresses (that are still protecting and separating in their basic meanings).

As all of the pairs represent de facto different forms of divided towns, internal border couples additionally prove re-integration by de-bordering when external border – disinintegration by re-bordering. In the first case asymmetry is to be reduced, in the second not necessarily.