


EU Frontiers

Student Paper Series

Prospects of EU Enlargement

The Case of Stabilization Conditionality in Serbia

Martina Dupáková



Volume I

Center for EU Enlargement Studies
CEU  ENS

June 2013

EU Frontiers Student Paper Series

The “EU Frontiers Student Paper Series”, launched by the CEU Center for EU Enlargement Studies (CENS) is an online journal specifically geared towards students and young experts of European foreign policy. As a policy research institution, CENS is dedicated to contributing to the debate on the future of a “Wider Europe” by exploring the results and lessons of previous EU enlargements, assessing the developments concerning the enlargement policy in the Western Balkans and Turkey as well as the neighborhood policy towards the EU’s Eastern neighborhood. With its activities, CENS seeks to widen the network of experts who deal with the issue of EU enlargement broadly understood. In doing so, the Center is committed to serving as an international hub for young talents –both professional and academic—for discussing the road that lies ahead for Europe, and how previous enlargements have pushed the limits of the European project. The “EU Frontiers Student Paper Series” contains publications that discuss European enlargement and neighborhood policy vis-à-vis the Western Balkans, the Eastern neighborhood and Turkey; as well as works that deal with the lessons of previous enlargements.

Martina Dupáková

Martina Dupáková is a recent graduate of the International Relations and European Studies Master's Program at the Central European University (CEU), Budapest. She received her BA degree in Political Science at the Comenius University in Bratislava. She also studied European integration at Eötvös Loránd University in Budapest. Her main interests are European integration and EU foreign and enlargement policies.

E-mail: [martina.dupakova\(at\)gmail.com](mailto:martina.dupakova(at)gmail.com)

Prospects of EU Enlargement

The Case of Stabilization Conditionality in Serbia

Introduction

If we have a look at the history of the Balkan Peninsula, we can see that maintenance of stability has always been troublesome. Even nowadays we can identify a few possible hot spots that endanger the good neighbourly relations between the Balkan countries. As a matter of fact, the possible instability in the so-called Western Balkan region, as an enclave surrounded by EU member states, poses a serious threat to the EU's own security. Therefore a peaceful resolution of problems and stabilization of this area lies at the heart of all of the EU's approaches toward the region. The settlement of the currently most manifested hot spot in the Western Balkan region, the case of northern Kosovo predominantly tenanted by ethnic Serbs, depends on the ability of the EU to influence the domestic policies of the EU candidate country, the Republic of Serbia.

The first part of the brief provides an analysis of the most important approaches used by the EU, based on security precautions, to stabilize the region and influence the politics of Serbia. Secondly, it focuses and assesses the most successful approach deployed by the EU, the Stabilization and Association Process (SAP), which has attempted to bring about changes in the region for almost twelve years. As a part of the enlargement strategy, the Stabilisation and Association Process uses strict conditionality.¹ However, its influence on the situation in Kosovo remains questionable. Therefore, this report identifies potential problems that the EU faces and brings in recommendations on how to improve performance, such as:

- **Establishing a date for opening of accession negotiations** to keep Serbia motivated
- **Launching an information campaign** to overcome the fatigue and decrease in Serbian accession support both domestically and internationally
- **Redirecting financial assistance to motivate cooperation** to support other common Belgrade/Pristina projects aimed at reconciliation between the ethnic groups
- **Putting a broader agenda on the Belgrade/Pristina dialogue** to open the discussion on more political issues

¹ G. Noutcheva: Fake, Partial, Imposed compliance. *Journal of European Public Policy*, 2009, pp. 1066

- **Common position of the EU** to make clear the outcomes expected from Serbia and improve the effectiveness of the EU conditionality as such.

The EU Approaches towards the Region

After the end of the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina and the signing of the Dayton peace agreement, the first attempt by the EU/EC to stabilize the Balkan region can be traced back to the EU/EC launch of two initiatives. The first was the Royaumont Process for Stability and Good Neighbourliness in South East Europe, which involved the newly created Western Balkan² region, Bulgaria, Romania, Slovenia, Turkey, the EU 15 countries, the US, Russia etc.³ This initiative was based on informal meetings, conferences etc. discussing economic or political issues. However, this process served only as a complement to the more important second initiative, the Regional Approach to South-Eastern Europe, which tried to develop closer bilateral contractual ties between the EU/EC and target countries of the Western Balkan region. The economic assistance, as well as the preferential market access became conditional on the countries' willingness to cooperate on a local basis, especially on the issues of refugee, return of internally displaced persons, and cooperation with the International Criminal Tribunal for former Yugoslavia (ICTY). However, because of the unwillingness of the undemocratic regimes of Milošević in Serbia and Tuđman in Croatia, the Regional Approach brought about only minor success.

After the failure of the EU/EC to avert growing ethnic tensions in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia⁴ and prevent the war in Kosovo, the EU/EC launched a new framework for the Western Balkan countries at the Helsinki Council in 1999,⁵ influenced by the positive experience with Central and Eastern European (CEE) post-communist countries. In the so-called Stabilization and Association Process (SAP), the EU/EC has utilized the prospect of EU accession, financial assistance and preferential market access, to facilitate institutional and governance change in the Western Balkan countries. Unlike in the case of the CEE countries, and mainly because of the previous war legacies, reconciliation, good neighbourly relations and mutual regional cooperation once again became core elements of the framework, aiming to stabilize the fragile region on the borders of the EU. The multilateral nature of the regional cooperation has been accompanied by the bilateral conditionality primarily based on the so-called Copenhagen criteria from 1993, which encompasses economic and political conditions for accession. Good-neighbourly relations became an important addition to these criteria, aiming to prevent potential future member states from importing conflicts into the EU structures.⁶

² Western Balkan region consists of the former Yugoslavian countries, minus Slovenia, plus Albania

³ D. Bechev: Carrots, sticks and norms: the EU and regional cooperation in Southeast Europe. *Journal of Southern Europe and the Balkans Online*, 2006, pp. 33

⁴ Federal republic of Yugoslavia was created in 1992 out of the remaining countries of the Socialist Federal republic of Yugoslavia, Serbia and Montenegro.

⁵ M. Vachudova: *Europe undivided*. 2006, pp. 5

⁶ M. Delevic: Regional cooperation in the Western Balkans. *Chaillot Paper*.2007

Within the framework of the SAP, Serbia, as well as other Western Balkan countries, received its potential candidacy status at the Feira European Council in 2000, which was later confirmed at the Thessaloniki European Council in 2003. The actual negotiations of the Republic of Serbia on the Stabilization and Association Agreement (SAA) started in 2005 and had been postponed due to lack of cooperation of Serbia with the International Criminal Tribunal for former Yugoslavia. The actual SAA and the Interim agreement on trade and trade-related matters were signed only in April 2008. The ratification process of the SAA between the EU and Serbia was unblocked only in 2010 after the Hague Tribunal Chief Prosecutor, Serge Brammertz, approved the satisfactory cooperation of Serbia with the ICTY. Currently, the ratification of the SAA has been pending only in Lithuania.⁷ In the meanwhile the Council adopted a European Partnership with Serbia in 2004 and updated it in 2006 and 2008. What is more, Serbia applied for EU membership in December 2009, enjoying the status of candidate country since March 2012. The date of the accession talks opening was expected to be set in December 2012, however, as the EU Commissioner for enlargement, Štefan Füle, said, because of the insufficient normalisation of the Serbian day-to-day relations with Kosovo, the decision on the date has been postponed to spring 2013.⁸

EU conditionality and Conditions for Membership

As shown above, the Stabilization and Association Process is based mainly on two distinct tools of multilateralism, in the form of regional cooperation, and bilateralism based on the strict country-to-country conditionality. Several authors⁹ pointed out that the strong bilateral ties between Brussels and any Western Balkan country, in terms of priorities' setting, monitoring, provision of funds or even the SAA, which had been based on the individual situation in every country, actually undermined the importance of the local ownership and multilateralism of the regional cooperation.¹⁰ In other words, the good neighbourly relations and mutual cooperation did not emerge as a local grassroots initiative, but has been strongly influenced and shaped by the Brussels 'conditions on the bilateral basis. Therefore, the brief concentrates on EU conditionality, and especially on those conditions by which the EU attempts to stabilize the situation in the region.

The EU conditions for membership were set at the Copenhagen council in 1993. These conditions include political criteria of democracy, rule of law, respect of human rights and protection of minorities, economic criteria of market economy and legislative criteria of the ability of the prospective

⁷ Republic of Serbia Government: *European Orientation of the Citizens of the Republic of Serbia: Trends*.2012

⁸ A. Rettman: No accession talks for Macedonia and Serbia.“ *EU Observer*, 12. 12 2012.

⁹ For example G. Sasse, or G. Noutcheva.

¹⁰ C.Gordon; G.Sasse: *Specific report on the EU policies in the Stabilization and Association process*. Bozen.2008, pp.14

member state to adopt the *acquis communautaire* prior to accession. However, the most important conditions by which the EU tries to ensure stability in the Western Balkan region are the conditions of regional cooperation, full cooperation with the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia and good neighbourly relations especially included in the SAP.

To assure compliance with these conditions the EU uses a process of so-called conditionality. The conditionality model works on a "*stick (coercion) and carrot (incentive)*"¹¹ strategy, or in other words on EU rules set as conditions that candidate countries have to meet in order to receive the reward promised by the EU. The logic that drives conditionality is therefore a cost-benefit logic. As many scholars suggest, the EU "*conditionality brings about sustainable change only if expected political costs of compliance with EU requirements do not exceed the benefits of a – credible- membership perspective*".¹² Other factors that influence the success of the conditionality are preservation of the credibility of the EU's commitments in the form of membership perspective or other short- and medium term rewards. To make conditionality work properly the relationship between the applicants and the EU and their interdependence has to remain asymmetrical, the conditions should be clear, unambiguous with a serious threat of benefit withdrawal in the case of non-compliance.¹³ When analysing the effect of the EU's influence on the resolution of hot issues in the region, we have to look at the proper functioning of the EU's main tool used to ensure the stability in the region.

EU-Serbia Conditionality and SAP Conditions for Membership

The EU conditionality toward Serbia is characterized by a strongly asymmetrical relationship. Serbia is a deeply landlocked country, surrounded by various EU member states, economically dependent on the trade with the EU and its financial assistance.¹⁴ The EU is Serbia's main trading partner. In 2011 almost 65,3% of all Serbian imports originated in the EU. Similarly, 60,2% of all Serbian exports were heading to the EU. This trend has increased, especially after Serbia signed the Stabilization and Association Agreement in 2008, which boosted economic cooperation by establishing the Free trade zone. On the other hand, Serbia represents only 0,3% of all EU imports and 0,6% of all EU exports. Furthermore, Serbia has been receiving EU financial assistance since 2001. Overall, between 2001 and 2011, the EU committed over €2 billion to Serbia in the form of grants and €5.8 billion in the form of soft loans from programmes such as Community Assistance for Reconstruction, Development and Stabilisation (CARDS) and the Instrument

¹¹ D.Malová; M. Rybář: *Slovensko ako nový členský štát: Výzva z periferie?*. Bratislava: Fridrich Erbert Stiftung, 2005

¹² T.Freyburg; S.Richter: *National identity matters: the limited impact of EU political conditionality in the Western Balkan*. . 2010, pp. 1

¹³ F.Schimmerfennig; Sedelmeier: Governance by Conditionality. *Journal of European Public Policy*, 2004, pp. 673

¹⁴ DG Trade, 2012. Trade of Republic of Serbia.

for Pre-Accession (IPA). As can be seen, Serbia can lose its preferential market access as well as financial assistance whereas the EU would lose much less in the case of disengagement.

Serbia uses the cost-benefit calculations in order to decide whether it is in its interest to comply with the EU conditions such as those of Belgrade–Pristina relations improvement or other conditions that should ensure regional stability. Even though this condition might seem rather costly for politicians to comply with, the benefits of EU membership and investments might be considered as far more important. Despite the growing influence and investments by Turkey and continuous support of the Russian Federation, Serbia is highly dependent on trade and investments from the EU. The mutual relation is highly asymmetrical and Serbia would lose much more if it decided to disengage from the EU. Even if the investments and trade with Russia, Turkey and other countries increased substantially, Serbia would remain surrounded by EU member states and as a landlocked country also without any other option to deliver its goods then crossing the EU territory. Therefore, the disengagement of Serbia would be rather unacceptable.

In order to consider the credibility of the promised delivery and threat of withdrawal in the case of non-compliance, we have to distinguish between long-term reward, in the form of the actual EU membership and short-term reward, in the form of partial benefits such as visa liberalization, financial or trade benefits, opening of negotiations etc. Regarding short term credibility, the EU effectively uses the threat of postponing or withdrawing the benefits for Serbia to achieve its compliance with the given conditions. For example, the condition of full cooperation with the ICTY had for a long time obstructed its accession progress. The EU rewarded Serbia with the opening of the SAA negotiations only after full cooperation had been ensured. Serbia extradited 46 of its nationals, including the “hard cases” of indicted Radovan Karadžić in 2008 and generals Radko Mladić and Goran Hadžić in 2011, accused of war crimes and crimes against humanity.¹⁵ Serbian cooperation remains satisfactory, even though the recent cases of the acquittal of the Croatian generals, responsible for so-called Operation Storm and Flash in 1995, who were accused of similar acts, raised disagreement among Serbian authorities.

Another example of the credible usage of threat is postponing the reward of opening of accession negotiations to push Serbia to normalize its relations with Kosovo and indirectly resolve one of the stability problems in the Western Balkan region. Despite some progress, Serbian relations with Kosovo remain tense, which cause an obstacle on their way toward EU membership. According to the latest progress report, as well as according to the EU Commission’s opinion on Serbia’s application for membership of the EU, “*negotiations for accession to the European Union should be opened with Serbia as soon as it achieves further significant progress in meeting the following key priority: Further steps to normalise relations with Kosovo in line with the conditions of the Stabilisation and Association Process.*”¹⁶ In

¹⁵ M. Ristic, 2012. Serbia’s Cooperation with the ICTY won’t change. *Balkan Insight*

¹⁶ Commission Opinion on Serbia’s application for membership of the European Union. 2011. pp. 12

other words, Serbia has to improve its attitude toward Kosovo, and continue to work within the framework of Belgrade/Pristina dialogue to find a solution for this situation. The Belgrade/Pristina dialogue focuses mainly on day-to-day technical issues, such as mutual recognition of university diplomas, freedom of movement of persons, custom stamps or integrated management of border/boundary crossing points etc., however, Serbia refuses to connect its cooperation with the recognition of Kosovo as an independent state.¹⁷ Nevertheless, the dialogue can be considered as the first successful step toward better improvements. However, implementation of the agreements remains a problem. The EU refused to grant Serbia the date for negotiations opening without the real changes on the ground, which makes the conditionality and threat rather credible.

As for the credibility of the EU membership perspective as a long term reward, even though the EU has expressed its strong commitment to the Serbian "European" future on various occasions,¹⁸ the whole Stabilization and Association Process loses its momentum, which sheds a negative light on the future enlargement perspectives. First of all, the global financial crisis and economic problems within the EU deepened the perceived enlargement fatigue¹⁹ and gave rise to the voices calling for a "digestion period" after the accession of Croatia in 2013. By postponing or even never setting a final date of Serbian accession, the conditionality of the EU might be limited because of the so-called "*moving target*" phenomenon, when membership, as the main benefit, depends on the ever-growing and changing fulfilment of complex conditions.²⁰ Secondly, the fact that the EU has a lively experience in maintaining vague commitments with its candidate countries, as can be seen in the case of Turkey, does not add a reason for enlargement optimism and credibility to the EU's promises.

At the same time the domestic support for accession has declined in Serbia as well,²¹ mainly due to the worsening of the economic situation in the country and increase of unemployment. Even though the issues of the Serbs living in northern Kosovo and the International Criminal Tribunal for Former Yugoslavia's (ICTY) acquittals are not the most important issues discussed in the country, they can play a secondary role when considering the support for Serbian accession to the EU. According to the surveys, 25% of people who do not support Serbian accession consider the EU's ambiguous position on these issues as a blackmail or pressure.²² Furthermore, according to the newest surveys, 78% of Serbian citizens perceived the EU as a biased negotiator and 86% of the citizens believe that the EU has purposely sided with Kosovo in the conflict resolution. What is more interesting, if they have to choose, 65% of Serbian citizens would rather see Kosovo fully re-integrated with Serbia than Serbia in the EU structures.²³ Therefore, we can see that

¹⁷ B. Barlovac: Serbia Denies Kosovo Officers are "Ambassadors". *Balkan Insight*, 12 December 2012

¹⁸ Enlargement Strategy and Main Challenges.2012-2013.

¹⁹ A. Paul, 2012. *EU enlargement at a Crossroads*, Cluj-Napoca: CES working paper.pp.198

²⁰ H. Grabbe:*The EU's Transformative Power*. 2006, pp.32

²¹ Republic of Serbia Government: *European Orientation of the Citizens of the Republic of Serbia: Trends*.2012

²² Ibid.

²³ B92 survey: 63% građana - Kosovo je nezavisno. B92 2012.

that the sensitive unresolved issues, such as Kosovo, can have crucial and often negative influence on the domestic support for EU accession, which can have a crucial impact on the credibility of EU conditionality.

Other factors for the proper working of the conditionality are clear and not vague or ambiguous conditions that Serbia is supposed to comply with. The SAP condition of full cooperation with ICTY can be considered as clear and unambiguous, because the cooperation of Serbian authorities in the extradition of Serbian nationals or providing relevant information for the Hague-based tribunal is easily measurable. The regional cooperation and condition of good neighbourly relations are also measurable, because it is clear whether the country is taking part in the regional organizations, projects or how many remaining issues with neighbours it has. The requirement of normalization of relations between Serbia and Kosovo and especially mitigation of unrest in the northern part of Kosovo has been the EU's requirement since the Kosovo unilateral proclamation of independence in 2008. However, based on the analysis of the progress reports and other EU documents, it is far from clear whether Serbia will have to finally recognize Kosovo's independence in order to receive EU membership. Implicitly, based on past problematic experience of the inclusion of the Cyprian frozen conflict into the union, as well as the EU's inclusion of Kosovo in the Stabilization and Association process, it can be said that Serbia will have to finally recognize Kosovo as its neighbour.

The EU has discouraged any other solution, such as partition of Kosovo and inclusion of its northern part inhabited mainly by ethnic Serbs into Serbia, as can be seen in the Feasibility Study for a Stabilisation and Association Agreement between the European Union and Kosovo. In this regard for example, the Commission has stated that "*the Stabilisation and Association Agreement would serve as an encouragement for the population of all of Kosovo, including the north.*"²⁴ The situation is even more complicated due to the internal divisions of the EU in the case of Kosovo's independence. Five member states of the EU, namely Spain, Romania, Cyprus, Greece and Slovakia, refused to recognise Kosovo as an independent and sovereign state, which makes the issue far more complex. Refusing other alternatives, the EU implicitly suggested the desired course of action and pushes Serbia in this direction. However, the actual explicit conditions for EU membership are far from clear and even blurrier when it comes to the details, especially because the EU, as such, is impotent in formulating a common position on the Kosovo issue. Therefore, the condition of the normalisation of relations with Kosovo is rather vague, unclear and undermines the EU influence on this issue.

The majority of conditions for proper functioning of conditionality have been constantly met, because the threat of withdrawal as well as the short-term delivery of promises is credible. However, the long-term reward of final EU membership remains blurred, because of the enlargement fatigue and decrease of support for EU membership in Serbia itself. This might cause

²⁴ Feasibility Study for a Stabilization and Association Agreement between the European Union and Kosovo, 2012, pp 5

problems when considering whether the benefits of the compliance would exceed its costs or vice versa and consequently decrease the influence of the EU on the stability of the region. Another problematic part of the conditionality that might hinder its effectiveness is the lack of clarity of some conditions, such as the desired final status of Kosovo. The EU plays a strategic game, when setting mild conditions of mutual normalization of day-to-day relations, which could eventually lead to the implicit and later also explicit recognition of independence. Serbia is in a deteriorating economic situation, with unemployment more than 25% and needs all the financial and other support of the EU. It is, however, questionable whether the eventual recognition of Kosovo is politically acceptable. The issue of Kosovo has strong sensitive connotations connected with the very elements of Serbian identity and therefore, it is questionable whether the benefit from the EU rewards would outweigh the losses connected with recognition of Kosovo.

Policy Recommendations

As can be seen from above, the EU applies its conditionality based on the SAP to ensure the stability of the region. Via conditions of full cooperation with the ICTY, regional cooperation and good neighbourly relations, it attempts to resolve the major hot spots such as the Kosovo issue. However, to bring about satisfactory results it is necessary to assure Serbian compliance with the conditions and at most to offer Serbia sufficient reward to outweigh the cost of compliance.

The following recommendations are therefore made:

- **Establishing a date for opening of accession negotiations:** The EU has to keep Serbia motivated in order to achieve compliance with its conditions. One of the biggest motivations, in the short run, and assurance of the EU's serious commitment is opening of accession negotiations. The EU should set a precise date without any delays, however keeping the whole negotiations conditional on implementation of deals agreed with Pristina during the Belgrade-Pristina dialogues.
- **Launching an information campaign:** The fatigue and decrease in Serbian accession support has to be taken seriously, because the fewer people support the EU, the less political authorities are willing to take political risks and actually implement conditions connected to the highly sensitive issue of Kosovo. Therefore, the EU should directly launch or financially support a project aiming to increase knowledge of Serbian people about the benefits of EU accession and how they can personally profit. Furthermore, the EU should support pragmatic approaches of the Serbian government toward Kosovo.
- **Redirecting financial assistance to motivate cooperation:** In order to support the improvement of cross-border/boundary cooperation, the EU has to redirect its pre-accession financial assistance to not only support

the priorities set during the Belgrade/Pristina dialogue, but also other common Belgrade/Pristina projects, including support of civil society cross-border/boundary projects aimed at reconciliation between the ethnic groups.

- **Putting a broader agenda on the Belgrade/Pristina dialogue:** Except day-to-day technical issues, the Belgrade/Pristina dialogue could gradually turn into the forum for discussion on more political issues such as northern Kosovo, demarcations of borders etc. The EU should support and motivate parties to participate in this kind of discussions.

Common position of the EU: The EU should launch a campaign among the five member states which have not recognised Kosovo's independence to formulate a common EU position. This would not only make clear the outcomes expected from Serbia but also improve the effectiveness of the EU conditionality as such.

Bibliography

- Barlovac, B., 2012. Serbia Denies Kosovo Officers are "Ambassadors". *Balkan Insight*, 12 December. Available at: <http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/serbia-dismisses-kosovo-officials-claims-on-ambassadors> [12.12.2012]
- Bechev, D., 2006. Carrots, sticks and norms: the EU and regional cooperation in Southeast Europe. *Journal of Southern Europe and the Balkans Online*, pp. 27-43. Available at: http://www.sant.ox.ac.uk/esc/esc-lectures/carrots_sticks.pdf [16.12.2012]
- B92 survey, 2013. 63% građana - Kosovo je nezavisno. *B92*. Available at: http://www.b92.net/info/vesti/index.php?yyyy=2013&mm=03&dd=04&nav_category=640&nav_id=692113 [01.04.2013]
- Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council. 2011. Commission Opinion on Serbia's application for membership of the European Union. Available at: http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/key_documents/2011/package/sr_rapport_2011_en.pdf [13.12.2012]
- Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council. 2012. Feasibility Study for a Stabilisation and Association Agreement between the European Union and Kosovo. Available at: http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/key_documents/2012/package/ks_feasibility_2012_en.pdf [16.12.2012]
- Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council. 2012. Enlargement Strategy and Main Challenges 2012-2013. Available at: http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/key_documents/2012/package/strategy_paper_2012_en.pdf [14.12.2012]
- Delevic, M., 2007. Regional cooperation in the Western Balkans. *Chaillot Paper*, July, pp. 5-105. Available at: <http://www.iss.europa.eu/uploads/media/cp104.pdf> [14.12.2012]
- DG Trade. 2012. Trade of Republic of Serbia. Available at: http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2008/august/tradoc_140028.pdf [12.12.2012]
- Freyburg, T.; Richter, S., 2010. *National identity matters: the limited impact of EU political conditionality in the Western Balkan*. s.l., National Centre of Competence in Research. Available at: <http://www.nccr-democracy.uzh.ch/publications/workingpaper/pdf/WP19.pdf> [11.12.2012]

- Gordon, C.; Sasse, G., 2008. *Specific report on the EU policies in the Stabilization and Association process*. Bozen, EURAC research. Available at:
http://www.eurac.edu/en/research/institutes/imr/Documents/24_SAP.pdf
[12.12.2012]
- Grabbe, H., 2006. *The EU's Transformative Power: Europeanization Through Conditionality in Central and Eastern Europe*. s.l.:Palgrave Macmillan.
Available at: http://st.free-lance.ru/projects/upload/f_4d904ec333b8e.pdf
[14.12.2012]
- Malová, D.; Rybář, M., 2005. *Slovensko ako nový členský štát: Výzva z periferie?*. Bratislava: Fridrich Erbert Stiftung. Available at:
<http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/bueros/slowakei/04212.pdf> [13.12.2012]
- Noutcheva, G., 2009. Fake, Partial, Imposed compliance: the limits of the EU's normative power in the Western Balkan. *Journal of European Public Policy*, pp. 1064-1084.
- Paul, A., 2012. *EU enlargement at a Crossroads*, Cluj-Napoca: CES working paper. pp.198 Available at:
http://www.cse.uaic.ro/WorkingPapers/articles/CESWP2012_IV2_PAU.pdf
[12.12.2012]
- Republic of Serbia Government, E. I. O., 2012. *European Orientation of the Citizens of the Republic of Serbia: Trends*. Available at:
http://www.seio.gov.rs/upload/documents/nacionalna_dokumenta/istrazivanja_javnog_mnjenja/istrazivanje1_jun_12%20final_en.pdf [12.12.2012]
- Rettman, A., 2012. No accession talks for Macedonia and Serbia. *EU Observer*, 12 december. Available at:
<http://euobserver.com/enlargement/118502> [13.12.2012]
- Ristic, M., 2012. Serbia's Cooperation with the ICTY won't change. *Balkan Insight*, 23 3. Available at:
<http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/dusan-ignjatovic-serbia-will-continue-to-fulfil-its-obligations-to-the-icty> [12.12.2012]
- Schimmerfennig, F.; Sedelmeier, U., 2004. Governance by Conditionality: EU rule transfer to the candidate countries of the Central and Eastern Europe. *Journal of European Public Policy*, Issue 4, pp. 669-687.
- Vachudova, M., 2006. *Europe undivided. Democracy, Leverage and Integration after Communism*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

EU Frontiers Student Paper Series Volume I, June 2013

Content

Let's Talk Turkey: The Economic Impacts of Turkish Accession to the European Union

Roisin Berghaus

EU-Ukraine Relations after the 2012 Parliamentary Elections in Ukraine: The Road to Signing the Association Agreement

Veronika Czina

Prospects of EU Enlargement: The Case of Stabilization Conditionality in Serbia

Martina Dupáková

Establishing the Rule of Law in Kosovo: The Local Ownership and International Control

Bojan Elek

Lessons of the Libya Crisis: Why the Multi-Level Governance Structure of the EU Makes CSDP Less Effective

Melinda Krajczár

EU Towards Belarus: Go Hard and Lose It or Go Smart and Gain It

Kateryna Levchuk

Published:

Center for EU Enlargement Studies
Central European University

Contact:

Nádor utca 9, Budapest, H-1052, Hungary

Tel.: + 36 1 237-3000 ext. 2391

cens@ceu.hu

