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Is Prejudice Growing in Hungary?

Changes in Anti-Semitism, Anti-Roma
Feeling and Xenophobia over the Last
Decade

Abstract

The paper answers the question of how antisemitism, and anti-Roma and anti-foreigner attitudes, have changed in Hungary over the last decade. The basis of the analysis is the May 2002 TÁRKI survey on topics such as xenophobia and immigration, the social distance from, and sympathy towards, certain ethnic and national groups, anti-Roma feelings and antisemitism.

A factor analysis on antisemitism allowed us to conclude that there were three well-distinguished types of anti-Jewish feelings: political, discriminatory and religious.

While the general level of political and discriminatory antisemitism has neither risen, nor declined, the level of religious antisemitism has dropped since 1994.

Openly discriminatory anti-Roma opinions became less frequent during the last decade. Despite this, it is noticeable that attitudes towards the Roma remain essentially negative and, in comparison with other ethnic groups, the rejection of the Roma is at a very high level.

Over the past five years the proportion of the adult population characterized by an openly xenophobic attitude has varied between 26 and 43 per cent. Xenophobia is most often exhibited by those who are older, less educated and temporarily or permanently excluded from the labour market. The open rejection of refugees is connected to a negative perception of the social effects of immigration. Almost three-quarters of respondents saw a link between immigration and the rise in crime, and more than half agreed with the assertion that 'immigrants take jobs away from people born in Hungary'.

Keywords: Demographic Economics, Economics of Minorities and Races; Non-labor Discrimination, Mobility, Unemployment, and Vacancies, Geographic Labor Mobility; Immigrant Workers, Labor Discrimination, General, Discrimination

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Introduction

As early as the 1980s, empirical studies were carried out into the issue of ethnic prejudices in Hungary, particularly in connection with research into national identity and group stereotypes (Hunyady 1996; Csepeli 2002; Lázár 1996). However, for a number of reasons the democratic transformation signalled new research directions for researchers into prejudices and ethnic attitudes. Whereas earlier, under the restricted openness of state socialism, it was not possible to discuss questions concerning the Jews, the democratic openness after 1989 opened up new ground for discussion of anti-Semitism in the press. It was no coincidence that the first studies of anti-Semitism took place following the democratic transformation in Hungary and other countries in the region (American Jewish Committee 1991; Kovács 1999).

The negative social and economic effects of the democratic transformation impacted particularly unfavourably on the most populous Hungarian minority, the Roma. Given a welfare system undergoing transformation, local social conflicts in many instances took on an ethnic hue. Following this, social researchers drew attention to the danger of the ethnicization of poverty and the heightened risk of poverty experienced by the Roma population (Ladányi and Szelényi 2002; Gábos and Szivós 2002). In addition to ethnocentric sentiment, one of the main motifs of anti-Roma attitudes became 'welfare chauvinism', or the fear that welfare provisions going to minority groups would endanger the whole of the welfare system. On this point, Székelyi, Örkény and Csepeli (2001) concluded that 'there is a strong connection between the readiness to discriminate against the Roma population and the picture formed of prevailing poverty among the Roma minority ...'.

In the developed Western countries, too, many people blamed the policies of multiculturalism for the crisis in the welfare states (Banting and Kymlicka 2003). In Western Europe in the 1990s, the tightening of immigration regulations became a key area. In Hungary, too, xenophobia became another main outward form of welfare chauvinism. Ethnic German solidarity and the inverse relation of welfare chauvinism were noticeable even by the end of the 1980s with regard to the resettlement of Transylvanian Hungarians (Sik 1990).

In our paper we will try to answer the question of how anti-Semitism, and anti-Roma and anti-foreigner attitudes, have changed in Hungary over the last decade. In May 2002, the TÁRKI Social Research Centre carried out a questionnaire survey, commissioned by the Institute for Psychology of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences (HAS), to examine the ethnic and political views of a random sample of the adult population. The research was backed by the Hungarian National Science Fund (OTKA)¹ and the National Research and Development Programme (NKFP).²

The investigation spanned the measurement of opinions concerning xenophobia and immigration, the social distance from, and sympathy towards, certain ethnic and national groups, as well as anti-Roma feeling and anti-Semitism. We chose the ranges and opinion questions so that it would be possible for us to compare the results with data from previous investigations.³

Anti-Semitism

In the block of questions concerning anti-Semitism and Jewish people, the respondents had to react to prejudiced statements and opinions about the Holocaust. Three of the questions concerned themselves with remembrance of the Holocaust. The distribution of answers was evidence that anti-Semitism connected with the World War II and the Holocaust was only marginal (Table 1). Three-fifths of respondents agreed that more should be taught in schools about persecution of the Jews, and only 28 per cent disagreed with this opinion. Furthermore, only one in ten (11 per cent) agreed with the assertion that the number of Jewish victims was much lower than is generally alleged, and more than half of respondents rejected it. The empathy reflected in these answers has limits, however. With the next question, an unexpectedly large number answered in the noncommittal category 'Don't know', and almost three-fifths (57 per cent) agreed that 'Hungarians suffered as much as the Jews.'

¹ OTKA roll number: T 034554.

² The leaders of the study were Ferenc Erős (Institute for Psychology, Hungarian Academy of Sciences) and Zoltán Fábán (TÁRKI). Participants were Zsolt Enyedi (Central European University), Zoltán Fleck (Eötvös Loránd University ÁJTK), Bori Simonovits (TÁRKI), Annamária Kiss (TÁRKI) and Anna Kende (Institute for Psychology, Hungarian Academy of Sciences). András Kovács (Central European University) and Endre Sik (TÁRKI) collaborated in compilation of the questionnaire.

³ For the results of previous investigations, see Fábán and Sik (1996), Fábán (1999), Fábán and Fleck (1999).

Table 1: Distribution of opinions on the Holocaust, May 2002 (%)

	Inclined to agree	Inclined to disagree	Don't know / No response	Total
Schools should teach more about the persecution of the Jews so that similar things will not happen again.	61	28	11	100
<i>The number of Jewish victims was much lower than is generally alleged.</i>	11	52	37	100
Hungarians suffered as much as the Jews (during the World War II).	57	28	14	100

Note: Sample size, N=1022.

A factor analysis of the section on anti-Semitism in our 1994 study allowed us to conclude that there were three well-distinguished types of anti-Jewish feeling: political (see *Table 2*), discriminatory (see *Table 3*) and religious (see *Table 4*). We imported the questions that measured these three types into our 2002 investigation as well. Six assertions were representative of political anti-Semitism, four questions covered the discriminatory (two of these were identical to questions in 1994), and two covered religious anti-Semitism.

Through the pooling of answers to certain questions, the substitution of missing data with averages, and the transformation of a four-point scale into a 100-point one, we managed to produce scales which could be used to compare the strength of anti-Semitic feeling in 2002 with that measured in the 1994 investigation.⁴ In the scales the higher the number, the stronger the degree of anti-Semitism.

Besides the reliability of the scales (see below) we examined their *validity*. According to our data, our measuring instruments give a good reflection of anti-Jewish attitudes. Those who would not be willing to vote for a Jewish parliamentary candidate got a significantly higher score on our scale than those who would be willing to do so. Our scales also correlated with the question measuring general sympathy towards Jews. This information is particularly important in the case of the scale of political anti-

⁴ In 2002, the religious and discriminatory forms of anti-Semitism were less clearly separated, with the factor analysis grouping them together into one factor. This is not altogether surprising, as the correlation between the two scales was 0.79. For comparison with the 1994 data, as well as from considerations of content, in the following discussion we still distinguish between discriminatory and religious anti-Semitism.

Semitism, since here there are assertions (for instance, the Jewish control of left-wing movements) that do not in themselves express anti-Jewish feeling in any direct way. At the same time, the fact that the scale of political anti-Semitism corresponds least well with this question, which looked into the general sympathy for Jews (the correlation coefficient was $r=0.28$ in total), indicates that the construction lies at the furthest point from visceral antipathy. It is rather discriminatory anti-Semitism that is connected with primary antipathy towards Jews ($r=0.44$).

We measured *political anti-Semitism* using stereotypical assertions from present-day Hungarian political discussion, which often fulfil the function of rationalizing anti-Jewish feeling. The six questions here formed a dependable scale (Cronbach alpha=0.82, general correlation coefficient: $r=0.43$). After transfer to a 100-point scale, we found an average of 42.5 for the total sample.

Examining the distribution of opinions, what appeared most clearly was that the proportion of those not answering was extremely high, ranging from 20 to 41 per cent. The proportion of those who did not agree was higher in all cases (37 to 55 per cent) than the proportion of those who agreed, except for the first statement: more people agreed that the Jews exerted influence on the left-wing movements than did not agree. We found the biggest disagreement with the last statement: more than half did not agree that the Jews came off well from the democratic transformation, and only one in five agreed with this.

The responses appear to show that the general level of political anti-Semitism has neither risen, nor declined, since 1994. On the 100-point scale, the average calculated for the whole population was 42.6 in 1994 and 42.4 in 2002. We get a similar result if we look at the change question by question. The proportion of those agreeing and those disagreeing only changes significantly in three cases: more people thought in 2002 that the press and cultural life were under the control of intellectuals of Jewish origin than was the case eight years previously, and in the other two instances (statements 2 and 6) the proportion that agreed fell by five per cent and six per cent, with the proportion not agreeing remaining substantially unchanged. Instead the latency rose by five per cent and seven per cent, respectively.

Table 2: The distribution of responses to expressions of political anti-Semitism in 1994 and 2002 (%)

	Agree		Do not agree		Don' t know/ No response	
	1994	2002	1994	2002	1994	2002
1) <i>The Jews always have a controlling influence over left-wing movements.</i>	33	34	30	29	36	37
2) The Jews try to gain advantage from their persecution.	39	34	46	46	15	20
3) Intellectuals of Jewish origin control the press and cultural life.	30	34	47	42	23	24
4) There exists a secret Jewish collaboration which limits political and economic developments.	23	22	36	37	41	41
5) The liberal parties represent first and foremost Jewish interests.	21	24	41	39	38	37
6) The Jews really did well out of the democratic transformation.	28	22	56	55	16	23

The combined reliability of the four statements measuring discriminatory anti-Semitism was similarly confirmed ($\alpha=0.84$, mean $r=0.56$). The mean was 19.5, considerably lower than it was for political anti-Semitism. Less than one in ten agreed that the Jews should leave the country and almost 80 per cent did not agree. Even the 'softest' statement—that it is better for people not to have much to do with Jews—was only seconded by every seventh person. The latency was considerably lower than it was for politically anti-Semitic statements, ranging from 13 per cent to 22 per cent.

Only two statements from the 1994 questionnaire corresponded word for word with the discriminatory assertions examined here (Table 3). In both cases, the proportion of those agreeing fell. There were six per cent fewer who agreed that 'marriage between Jews and non-Jews is not good for either side', and seven per cent fewer agreed that 'the numbers of Jews in certain fields of employment should be limited'. This, however, is only an apparent improvement, since at the same time the number not replying rose by eight percentage points in both cases, while the number who did not agree did not fall significantly (by two percentage points in all).

So, as was the case for political anti-Semitism, here we cannot state unequivocally that anti-Semitism has fallen since 1994, since in parallel with the fall in the number of those agreeing, the latency has risen.

Table 3: Distribution of responses to statements of discriminatory anti-Semitism in 1994 and 2002 (%)

	Agree		Do not agree		Don't know/ No response	
	1994	2002	1994	2002	1994	2002
Marriage between Jews and non-Jews is not good for either side.	17	11	69	67	14	22
The numbers of Jews in certain fields of employment should be limited.	18	11	76	74	6	14

We measured religious anti-Semitism on the basis of two questions. After substitution of missing values, the reliability of the scale, despite its brevity, was very high ($\alpha=0.8$, $r=0.67$). Religious anti-Semitism was found to be more widespread than discriminatory anti-Semitism, but did not reach the levels of political anti-Semitism. Rather more than half of respondents did not agree with the two assertions, that 'the crucifixion of Jesus Christ is the Jews' unpardonable sin' and that 'the suffering of the Jews was a punishment from God', and only one in six agreed. The latency was comparatively high: 27 per cent and 30 per cent (Table 4).

The mean of the variable measured on the 100-point scale showed that religious anti-Semitism has fallen since 1994, from 36 to 26. At the same time, if we compare the proportion of answers given to the questions, it turns out that the proportion of those agreeing rose by only 11 per cent and seven per cent, while the latency rose by nine per cent and six per cent, respectively. So, again it was not the proportion of people rejecting anti-Semitism that grew, but rather the number of people who were unsure, or did not wish to divulge their real opinions.

Table 4: Distribution of responses to expressions of religious anti-Semitism in 1994 and 2002 (%)

	Agree		Do not agree		Don't know/ No response	
	1994	2002	1994	2002	1994	2002
The crucifixion of Jesus Christ is the Jews' unpardonable sin.	28	17	52	53	21	30
The suffering of the Jews was a punishment from God.	25	18	53	54	21	27

The socio-demographic determinants of anti-Semitism

With the help of our combined scales, we can see which dependent variables have an effect on the different types of anti-Semitism.⁵ Our 1994 data showed that anti-Semitic views were more widespread among those positioned towards the bottom of the social structure (villagers, the old, the poor, the less-educated, the inactive), though here the variables together only explained a fragment of the dispersion (Enyedi 1999).

In 2002, political anti-Semitism proved to be only a fraction less characteristic of the young and the educated: the correlation coefficient on the eight-point scale was -0.06 for age, and -0.08 for educational level. In Budapest, the scale average was relatively high, 45 as opposed to the figure of 42.5 calculated for the whole population. Our data show that in the capital political anti-Semitism was significantly higher than in the county seats. Income background did not prove to be a relevant variable. Men were more inclined to agree with the opinions than women. People who went to church every week were, on average, seven points higher on the scale than people who never went to church.

The distribution of answers correlated with political orientation: political anti-Semitism was highest for Fidesz⁶ and HJLP⁷ voters, and lowest for AFD⁸ voters. A part was played here by the left–right identity of the party choices: it was more characteristic of those on the right to agree with the statements. The correspondence with political orientation may arise from the fact that two items used for the scale explicitly refer to the left-wing and the liberal parties, respectively. However, leaving out these two statements, the scale still shows a correspondence to ideological and party preferences ($r=0.16$, $\text{sign.}=0.001$), so the somewhat one-sided character of the measuring instrument does not explain the correlation noted above.

In the case of discriminatory anti-Semitism, there was no effect arising from age or churchgoing, though it did show up for higher levels of schooling: ($r=-0.16$, $\text{sign.}=0.01$). This type of open anti-Semitism was also found to be more widespread in small towns and villages than in the cities.

There was also a linear correspondence between discriminatory anti-Semitism and personal income and consumer status: the upper income quintile group were significantly less anti-Semitic than those in the bottom

⁵ For the interactions of political, discriminatory and religious anti-Semitism with the socio-demographic variables, see *Tables A1 and A2* in the *Appendix*.

⁶ Fidesz–Hungarian Civic Party (Fidesz–MPP), after 17th May 2003 Fidesz–Hungarian Civic Association (Fidesz–MPSZ).


⁷ Party of Hungarian Justice and Life (MIÉP).

⁸ Alliance of Free Democrats (SZDSZ).

two quintiles, while those in the second highest income quintile were significantly less anti-Semitic than those in the lowest quintile. The upper consumption quintile was again significantly less anti-Semitic than those in the bottom quintile.

Political orientation did not have such a big effect on discriminatory anti-Semitism as it did on political anti-Semitism, with an overall correlation on the left–right scale of 0.07. AFD voters had significantly lower scores than the others combined, while HSP⁹ voters, the second most tolerant in this category, could be distinguished from Fidesz voters. HJLP voters had the highest score of 35 points, which compares to the average for the whole sample of 20 points.

Figure 1: *The averages for the three types of anti-Semitism under investigation according to left–right political orientation* (points on the scale)*



Note: *Contracted from a 10-point scale: (1,2 = 'far left') (3,4 = 'left') (5,6 = 'centre') (7,8 = 'right') (9,10 = 'far right'). The vertical axis shows averages on a 100-point scale.

We also checked the scores for religious anti-Semitism on a 100-point scale with dependent variables. Here, age ($r=0.21$) and education ($r=-0.12$) were shown to be significant ($\text{sign.}=0.01$). The older age groups (particularly the over-60s) and those with a lower education level (those with eight years of primary school or who have finished secondary vocational school) had a higher level of religious anti-Semitism than the younger (under 39 years of

⁹ Hungarian Socialist Party (MSZP).

age) and the educated groups (those completing grammar school or higher education).

The relation to income was clear-cut: the greater an individual's income, the lower the score for religious anti-Semitism. The situation for consumption status was similar: the higher a person's consumption, the less they would agree with the statements displaying religious anti-Semitism. The party and political orientation did not prove to be statistically significant here. People who go more often to church, however, are more likely to display religious anti-Semitism (32 points) than those who never go at all (23 points).

Anti-Roma feelings

The measurement of anti-Roma feelings

In order to map out attitudes to the Roma, or Gypsy, population we polled a long list of 14 questions on a four-value response scale of the Likert type. This series of questions contained positive, negative and neutral statements about the Roma population.¹⁰ From these, we picked out four statements that openly expressed negative and discriminatory attitudes to the Roma.

- The growth in numbers of the Roma population threatens the security of society.
- The Roma should get used to the idea that they should live in the same way as Hungarians.
- The tendency to commit crime is in the Roma nature.
- It would only be right if there were still places of entertainment where Gypsies were not allowed.

In a similar fashion to our scales measuring anti-Semitism, we formed additively a combined scale point number, which we then transformed onto a 100-point scale. A higher score indicates a higher degree of anti-Roma sentiment. Opinions about the statements were connected with each other: the correlation between items was between 0.36 and 0.54. As a consequence, the reliability of the scale was high, with Cronbach alpha indicator of 0.77. In addition to reliability, we also tested the validity of the scale. We asked in the questionnaire whether the respondents would vote in a general election for a Roma parliamentary candidate belonging to their party of choice. Those who would not vote for the candidate had an average anti-Roma score


¹⁰ The distribution of responses is shown in *Table A1* in the *Appendix*.

of 57 points. The score of the group that would not discriminate against the Roma candidate was 36. We also correlated the average score on our discriminatory anti-Roma scale with the question: 'Would you rather avoid contact with the Roma or not?'. Those who would rather avoid contact with them had a much higher score on the scale (54) than those who would not (34).

Results

In the change in attitude to the Roma among the population over the last eight years we do see some more sympathetic tendencies. Since 1994, openly discriminatory anti-Roma feeling has fallen in Hungary.

Figure 2: *The proportion of the adult population agreeing with the statement 'It would only be right if there were still places of entertainment where Gypsies were not allowed' (%)*



Source: 1994: Institute for Psychology, HAS: Study into authoritarianism and prejudice; 1997: Sixth wave of the Hungarian Household Panel Survey; 2000: TÁRKI Omnibus 2000/12; 2002: May 2002 'Opinion' Survey, Institute for Psychology, HAS – TÁRKI.

Our assumption is that behind the fall in openly discriminatory anti-Roma feeling lies the fact that in public communications tolerance for the Roma has made increasing headway. Whereas previously, open espousal of rejection of the Roma was widely accepted, today anti-Roma sentiment appears in more hidden, coded form in the circumstances of public or semi-public communication. None of this excludes the possibility that in social,


residential or other conflicts anti-Roma feeling might come to the surface openly again.

Despite this, it is noticeable that attitudes towards the Roma remain essentially negative and, in comparison with other ethnic groups, rejection of the Roma is at a very high level.

The social distance of the Roma—the rejection of workplace, residence and family connections—remained very high for the non-Roma population. The rejection of workplace relations ran at 29 per cent, neighbour relations at 40 per cent and family relations at 58 per cent. Among the ethnic groups examined (Arabs, Roma, Chinese, Romanian Hungarians, Romanian Romanians) it was the Roma who had the highest level of social distance (Table A2).

In 2002, the mean value of the non-Roma population on the scale of anti-Roma feeling was 46 points. If Roma respondents were included, the mean value for the whole sample was 44 points.¹¹ In 1994, the mean value of the anti-Roma feeling index for the whole sample was 56 points, and in 2000, 50 points. This means there was an overall fall between 1994 and 2002 of 12 points (Figure 3).

Figure 3: The change in the mean scores on the scale of anti-Roma feeling, 1994–2002



¹¹ Tables A3–A5 in the *Appendix* collate the distribution of anti-Roma feeling with respect to socio-demographic indicators.

Anti-Roma sentiment is lower in the capital (40 points) than in smaller towns and villages (both 49 points). In the eastern half of the country there is a more negative view of the Roma than in the western regions. The highest anti-Roma feeling (an average of 55 points on the 100-point scale) is found in the Northern Great Plain region, and the lowest (44 points) in Central Hungary.

Level of education shows a significant difference, at least between those who graduated from secondary school (with General Maturity Certificate) those who did not. The lowest level of anti-Roma sentiment is found in those with a higher education (38 points), and the highest in the group with vocational training school (50 points).

Personal income and consumption status of the household—based on the supply of consumer durables—also has an influence on anti-Roma feeling. Looking at personal income, the bottom two income quintile groups are found to have a higher than average degree of anti-Roma feeling.

Anti-Roma feeling is not connected with supporters of any of the major parties. The mean score for HSP voters is 46, while for Fidesz voters it is 48. There were marked deviations for the lowest level of anti-Roma feeling in the AFD voter base (24 points), and a high level among HJLP voters, who had a mean score of 64 points on the index. (Note: in the case of both these parties the sample base was very low (N=26 and N=13), although the differences were nevertheless statistically significant.)


Xenophobia

One method to identify xenophobia is to measure attitudes to do with the acceptance of refugees. In May 2002, 97 per cent of those questioned gave a response and, of those, seven per cent declared that Hungary should accept all refugees, while 26 per cent said it should accept none at all. The mass of the population (67 per cent), those belonging to the so-called 'realist' group, would selectively accept refugees into the country. Between May and October 2002, the proportion of anti-foreigner responses jumped to 40 per cent, though according to the latest TÁRKI Omnibus Surveys (Figure 4), it had fallen again by May 2004.

Over the past five years in Hungary the proportion of the adult population characterized by an openly xenophobic attitude has varied between 26 and 43 per cent. This was the same proportion as those who, between 1997 and 2004, would not accept anyone at all into Hungary as a refugee.

We can only speculate about the reasons for the changes in xenophobic orientations during this time, but a social sketch of the groups displaying above-average xenophobia can be clearly drawn. Xenophobia is most often seen in those belonging to older age groups, to the less educated and to those temporarily or permanently excluded from the labour force.

Figure 4: Proportion of xenophobes, xenophiles and realists, between 1992 and May 2004 (%)



The open rejection of refugees is connected to the perception of the social effects of immigration. Almost three-quarters of respondents saw a connection between immigration and the rise in crime, and more than half agreed with the assertion that 'immigrants take jobs away from people born in Hungary'. A majority of the population did not agree with the statements expressing the positive effects of immigration.

In everyday language the concept of xenophobia is understood to mean a stable social attitude rather than a shifting opinion applied narrowly to certain issues. In our opinion there are two central elements to xenophobia: (1) the scapegoat concept, or the conviction that foreigners are the cause of the country's economic and social problems, and (2) the aspiration for economic, political and cultural isolation, or the rejection of the concept of an open society.

We attempted to measure the concept of xenophobia, thus defined, with the help of four assertions of attitudes. These featured, in question form, in the 1995 ISSP (International Social Survey Programme) comparative


international investigation, and the 1999 and November 2001 TÁRKI Omnibus Survey, as well as in our previous survey carried out in May 2002.

The following statements were used:

- (1) Crime is on the increase because of immigrants. (CRIME)
- (2) Immigrants take jobs away from people born in Hungary. (WORK)
- (3) Immigrants make Hungary more open to new ideas and cultures. (OPENNESS)
- (4) Immigrants bring benefits to the Hungarian economy. (BENEFIT)

In general, it can be said that among the Hungarian population the estimation of immigrants tends in a negative direction, in that the majority of respondents disagree with the positive statements and agree with the negative ones. Almost three-quarters of the total population agreed that crime was rising because of immigrants, and a good deal more than half agreed that immigrants were taking jobs away from people born in Hungary. For the positive statements, the proportion of non-responses or 'don't know' answers was substantially higher than it was for negative statements, yet still the majority (52 and 61 per cent, respectively) disagreed that immigrants made the country more open to new ideas and cultures, and that they were a benefit to the economy (Figure 5).

Figure 5: *The distribution of opinions about the positive and negative effects of immigration, May 2002 (%)*




Source: 'Opinion' Survey, Institute for Psychology, HAS – TÁRKI.

Like anti-Roma feeling, xenophobia cannot be linked to any of the large political camps. Xenophobia was higher than average in the non-voting groups, who do not articulate their opinions. An accepting attitude towards immigrants was characteristic of voters of the liberal AFD party.

The perception of ethnic attitudes

Almost half of respondents (48 per cent) thought that the degree of anti-Roma sentiment in the country was 'high', and 15 per cent thought it 'very high'. According to the general perception, there was a much higher degree of anti-Roma sentiment in the country than there was xenophobia or anti-Semitism (Figure 6).


Figure 6: The perception of the level of Hungarian anti-Jewish, anti-Roma and anti-foreigner feelings, May 2002 (%)



Source: 'Opinion' Survey, Institute for Psychology, HAS – TÁRKI.

Four-fifths of the adult Hungarian population perceived the level of anti-Roma feeling to be either unchanging (39 per cent) or increasing (38 per cent). The general perception thus runs counter to the observed changes in attitudes (Figure 7).


Figure 7: Percentage distribution of valid answers concerning the perception of changes in ethnic attitudes, 2002



Note: The question was originally: ‘In your opinion, to what degree has a) anti-Jewish feeling, b) anti-Roma feeling, and c) anti-foreigner feeling changed in the country?’

Source: ‘Opinion’ Survey, Institute for Psychology, HAS – TÁRKI.

Figure 8: The perceived degree of anti-foreigner sentiment in the country, according to the attitude to foreigners (scale average)



The perception of anti-Roma feeling is not independent of attitudes towards the Roma. Those who responded more negatively towards the Roma were more inclined to feel that the level of anti-Roma feeling in the country was high and that recently the level had been increasing.

How do attitudes to foreigners relate to the levels and trends in anti-Jewish, anti-Roma and anti-foreigner feeling perceived in the country? Xenophiles perceive a lower level of anti-Jewish and anti-Roma feeling in the country than do the realists and the xenophobes, while the realists and xenophobes both perceive a greater amount of anti-Jewish and anti-Roma feeling around them (*Figure 8*).

The degree of the perception of xenophobia in the country is strongly influenced by the feeling of xenophobia, with each group being inclined to project its own feelings onto the rest of the country: xenophiles feel those around them to be less xenophobic, the realists perceive others to be more xenophobic, and the xenophobes feel others to be highly xenophobic.

It is noticeable that, on the basis of measurable indices, anti-Roma feeling has fallen relative to the 1990s, and xenophobia and anti-Semitism have not changed, whereas in the popular perception it is anti-Roma feeling that has grown the most.

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*Appendix***Table A1: Public attitudes to the Roma—the combined proportion of all, 1994–2002 (%)**

	1994	1997	2000	2002
From every point of view, the Roma have reached the point where they can decide their own affairs.	37	–	38	44
More help should be given to Roma than to non-Roma.	15	10	15	12
Roma should be completely separated from the rest of society as they are not capable of coexistence.	33	–	25	18
The problems of the Roma would disappear if they finally began to work.	89	–	85	88
Among the Roma, many do not work because they cannot get a job.	–	39	47	46
The Roma would not wish to act in any way not in keeping with being Roma.	76	–	68	64
The Roma should get used to living just like the Hungarians.	78	–	81	82
It would only be right if there were still places of entertainment where Roma were not allowed.	46	47	38	33
The growth in the Roma population threatens the security of society.	70	–	63	55
Every Roma child has the right to study in a class together with non-Roma children.	–	–	88	89
There are the same number of criminals among the Roma as there are among non-Roma living in a similar environment.	–	59	–	46
The tendency to commit crime is in the Roma nature.	64	–	55	53
The reason there are so many children in Roma families is that they want to live on the family benefits they get for them.	–	–	77	74
Among Roma the honour of traditional family values is higher than among non-Roma.	–	–	63	66
Sample number	988	3857	1521	1022

Note: The table contains combined and rounded data.

Source: 1994: Institute for Psychology, HAS: Study into authoritarianism and prejudice; 1997: Sixth wave of the Hungarian Household Panel Survey; 2000: TÁRKI Omnibus 2000/12; 2002: May 2002 ‘Opinion’ Survey, Institute for Psychology, HAS – TÁRKI.

Table A2: Distribution of answers concerning social distance, May 2002 (%)

‘How would you react if you were to work together with a ...?’					
	Favourably	No difference	With hostility	DK/NR	Total
Arab	13	65	18	4	100
Roma	15	54	29	2	100
Chinese	12	62	23	4	100
Romanian Hungarian	28	62	7	2	100
Romanian Romanian	11	62	23	3	100
Jew	18	66	13	3	100
‘How would you react if your neighbour were to be a ...?’					
	Favourably	No difference	With hostility	DK/NR	Total
Arab	7	68	22	3	100
Roma	8	50	40	2	100
Chinese	7	66	24	3	100
Romanian Hungarian	21	69	8	2	100
Romanian Romanian	7	68	23	2	100
Jew	12	74	11	3	100
‘How would you react if a close relative were to marry a ...?’					
	Favourably	No difference	With hostility	DK/NR	Total
Arab	9	37	49	4	100
Roma	9	30	58	3	100
Chinese	7	37	52	4	100
Romanian Hungarian	30	49	19	3	100
Romanian Romanian	8	40	49	3	100
Jew	15	53	28	4	100

Note: Total sample, N=1022.

Source: ‘Opinion’ Survey, Institute for Psychology, HAS – TÁRKI.

Table A3: Correlation of political, discriminatory and religious anti-Semitism, and anti-Roma feeling, with socio-demographic variable: component attributes of the 100-point scale according to age, sex, settlement type, region and education, 2002

Variable	Category	Political anti-Semitism			Discriminatory anti-Semitism			Religious anti-Semitism			Anti-Roma feeling		
		Mean	SD	N	Mean	SD	N	Mean	SD	N	Mean	SD	N
<i>Total sample</i>	<i>Mean</i>	42.42	20.00	1022	19.48	20.94	1022	28.63	26.44	1022	46.00*	24.30	910
Age	18–39 yrs	40.52	19.93	405	18.40	21.14	405	25.70	25.13	405	45.23	26.15	355
	40–59 yrs	43.15	21.62	362	19.53	21.17	362	28.02	25.80	362	45.42	24.47	314
	Over 60 yrs	44.33	17.35	254	21.11	20.27	254	34.16	28.59	254	47.90	21.01	240
Sex	Male	43.99	20.73	478	20.04	20.96	478	29.34	26.51	478	46.28	25.25	418
	Female	41.03	19.24	544	18.99	20.92	544	28.00	26.38	544	45.76	23.49	491
Settlement type	Village	42.37	18.19	371	21.99	20.68	371	34.06	26.31	371	48.82	22.76	329
	Town	42.82	20.21	267	18.61	21.02	267	26.70	25.59	267	48.59	23.62	227
	County town	39.64	20.71	195	15.25	19.57	195	23.72	25.73	195	43.41	24.10	177
	Budapest	44.81	22.06	189	20.17	22.04	189	25.73	26.94	189	40.05	26.86	177
Region	Central Hungary	44.32	21.17	278	19.87	22.05	278	26.14	26.72	278	40.99	25.82	261
	Central Transdanubia	40.64	21.24	119	13.98	15.80	119	21.53	25.13	119	41.35	21.10	110
	Western Transdanubia	47.07	19.83	106	22.38	20.33	106	28.76	26.20	106	47.47	22.23	91
	Southern Transdanubia	38.04	16.23	89	17.59	18.35	89	23.50	24.35	89	41.14	22.99	81
	Northern Hungary	39.59	19.60	134	21.39	22.48	134	31.77	27.80	134	48.98	23.26	107
	Northern Great Plain	42.76	18.13	155	21.19	20.30	155	37.71	26.73	155	54.66	23.51	134
	Southern Great Plain	41.78	20.39	141	18.70	22.99	141	29.66	23.87	141	50.76	24.06	126
Education	At most primary education	42.80	17.11	362	22.99	21.32	362	36.05	28.31	362	48.61	23.40	295
	Vocational training school	43.82	20.17	259	20.70	22.05	259	30.18	26.39	259	50.20	25.64	234
	Secondary education	41.58	21.89	277	16.04	19.69	277	21.99	22.30	277	42.99	22.21	263
	Higher education	40.19	22.88	123	14.30	17.99	123	18.31	22.38	123	37.64	25.69	117

Note: For questions used in the scale see Tables 2–4 in the paper and the text. *among non-Roma respondents

Source: ‘Opinion’ Survey, May 2002, Institute for Psychology, HAS – TÁRKI.

Table A4: Correlation of political, discriminatory and religious anti-Semitism, and anti-Roma feeling, with socio-demographic variable: component attributes of the 100-point scale according to economic activity, income and financial status, 2002

Variable	Category	Political anti-Semitism			Discriminatory anti-Semitism			Religious anti-Semitism			Anti-Roma feeling		
		Mean	SD	N	Mean	SD	N	Mean	SD	N	Mean	SD	N
Economic activity	Employed	41.81	20.58	430	18.34	21.66	430	24.81	23.60	430	44.73	25.17	393
	Self-employed	46.22	21.13	39	20.71	18.12	39	24.44	25.88	39	49.00	21.68	38
	Pensioner	43.63	18.88	344	21.03	20.26	344	33.23	27.13	344	47.78	21.98	309
	Unemployed	43.33	17.14	54	21.69	20.51	54	39.38	29.33	54	49.60	23.47	41
	Other inactive	40.44	21.36	152	18.20	21.26	152	26.42	29.20	152	43.13	27.67	126
Personal income	Lowest quintile	45.14	17.91	166	24.77	22.62	166	38.13	29.97	166	53.76	24.13	136
	2nd quintile	42.52	20.64	169	22.35	22.43	169	34.21	27.42	169	49.80	26.30	148
	3rd quintile	43.31	18.92	168	20.55	19.85	168	26.33	24.70	168	46.30	21.24	153
	4th quintile	42.02	19.91	192	18.02	20.13	192	26.33	24.53	192	43.10	22.57	171
	Top quintile	43.36	20.68	176	15.92	19.12	176	23.05	22.09	176	41.56	26.33	169
Household income per person	Lowest quintile	41.55	17.51	173	23.43	21.89	173	32.20	25.61	173	47.14	27.45	130
	2nd quintile	42.76	20.77	188	21.08	22.36	188	33.42	30.70	188	48.50	23.28	164
	3rd quintile	43.57	20.07	163	19.43	21.81	163	28.77	25.80	163	45.75	25.14	148
	4th quintile	41.36	17.94	172	17.98	18.82	172	26.93	24.48	172	47.16	21.53	163
	Top quintile	43.79	22.55	172	18.45	21.27	172	24.49	25.27	172	42.20	25.71	165
Consumption status	1 (low)	46.79	18.46	50	27.43	22.89	50	42.69	29.05	50	63.46	23.42	33
	2	45.03	17.52	165	24.23	22.52	165	37.58	28.25	165	48.21	23.42	134
	3	38.79	19.67	140	20.56	23.23	140	34.15	29.75	140	45.57	22.33	119
	4 (medium)	41.14	19.34	149	17.82	18.83	149	27.49	26.27	149	43.48	22.28	137
	5	45.74	19.46	195	20.85	22.47	195	25.04	24.04	195	47.32	25.42	188
	6	39.54	21.79	196	16.59	17.89	196	23.58	21.73	196	45.26	25.26	181
	7 (high)	42.16	21.46	128	13.39	17.12	128	20.12	23.22	128	40.96	24.31	118

Source: 'Opinion' Survey, May 2002, Institute for Psychology, HAS – TÁRKI.

Table A5: Correlation of political, discriminatory and religious anti-Semitism and anti-Roma feeling, with socio-demographic variable: component attributes of the 100-point scale according to political party support and left–right identification, 2002

Category	Political anti-Semitism			Discriminatory anti-Semitism			Religious anti-Semitism			Anti-Roma feeling		
	Mean	SD	N	Mean	SD	N	Mean	SD	N	Mean	SD	N
<i>Mean</i>	<i>42.42</i>	<i>20.00</i>	<i>1022</i>	<i>19.48</i>	<i>20.94</i>	<i>1022</i>	<i>28.63</i>	<i>26.44</i>	<i>1022</i>	<i>46.00</i>	<i>24.30</i>	<i>910</i>
Party preference												
HSP	39.39	20.10	363	17.65	19.20	363	27.08	28.22	363	45.94	24.71	323
Fidesz	47.58	20.46	335	22.40	23.28	335	31.15	26.10	335	48.18	24.96	295
AFD	29.93	21.91	26	6.80	11.69	26	19.65	30.73	26	24.00	24.50	24
HJLP	70.32	19.02	13	35.04	27.79	13	34.39	31.82	13	66.32	26.77	13
Other party	40.13	14.78	22	19.20	17.23	22	24.08	16.29	22	39.12	23.49	20
Left–right identification												
Far left	38.01	20.13	67	19.00	17.09	67	29.90	28.77	67	41.42	20.24	61
Left	39.68	19.81	225	17.67	18.26	225	24.99	25.17	225	44.67	24.56	204
Centre	41.29	19.97	395	19.04	21.03	395	27.08	24.86	395	47.56	24.89	343
Right	49.27	20.85	140	22.20	24.24	140	28.42	24.45	140	45.84	24.61	130
Far right	52.05	27.35	43	23.13	25.79	43	36.11	33.73	43	49.80	27.73	43

Source: ‘Opinion’ Survey, May 2002, Institute for Psychology, HAS – TÁRKI.

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
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