Elections and democracy: representation and accountability, edited by Jacques Thomassen

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is paramount, necessary to provide a simple, all-encompassing explanation for much that is wrong with the world.

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This edited volume is unusually coherent. First, because all 12 chapters use the same data from the second round of the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (CSES). Second, because all chapters except the last one make use of Lijphart’s typology of consensus and majoritarian democracies. Another commonality is a preference for multi-level models, combining macro-level variables with micro-level data. The results are sobering. According to the editor

Our major finding is that formal political institutions and in particular the distinction between a consensus and majoritarian system of democracy are far less relevant for people’s political behavior and their perceptions and evaluations of the process of democracy than often presumed (vii–viii).

In his introduction, Thomassen, in what surely will be an oft-quoted statement, proclaims that “(t)his conclusion should be a lesson in modesty for institutional engineers” (19). That all depends, of course, on how one evaluates the evidence. In my reading, the contributions cannot show that Lijphart is wrong because they do not test his theory directly and use different data.

Although the book is presented as a test of two different views of democracy, it would be a mistake to think that Lijphart’s work is at the heart of each chapter. Many analyses include type of democracy as just one more factor to be tested, in addition to the independent variables the authors are really interested in. For example, Blais, Singh, and Dumitrescu want to know how the feeling of being represented affects turnout. Holmberg examines how the electoral system in combination with the age of democracy affects the feeling of being policy represented. Peffley and Rohrschneider test their expectation that citizens’ support for democracy is based on the procedural quality of the bureaucracy and judiciary. Sanders, Clarke, Stewart, and Whiteley first mention consensus democracy when they specify the statistical model. All these chapters could have easily been written without any reference to consensus democracy.

A second set of chapters makes more of an effort to engage with the concept of consensus democracy but struggles to find common ground. Wessels and Schmitt presuppose that “elections may be regarded as more meaningful in proportional political systems and, in particular, consensus democracies” (40). Burlacu and Toka hypothesize that Lijphart’s executives-parties dimension “promotes policy-based voting partly through ideological polarization between the parties, but also independently of that”
Magalhães’ first hypothesis is that “more consensual democracies should display higher levels of structural voting” (92). According to Weldon and Dalton, “Lijphart implies that consensualism has spillover effects that stimulate participation more broadly” (114). Aarts, Thomassen, and Van Ham, expect that the winners and losers of globalization will have more similar attitudes towards democracy in consensus democracies. All of these claims can be contested and none can be found as such in Lijphart’s work.

The contributions to this volume were apparently finished before the authors had access to the second edition of Lijphart’s *Patterns of Democracy* from 2012, as they refer to the first edition of 1999. Instead of Lijphart’s data set, the book uses Bernauer, Giger, and Vatter’s classification, which differs in important respects. First, they classify countries on the basis of only ten years (1997–2006), not multi-decade averages. Second, the number and operationalization of the features that distinguish consensus and majoritarian democracy are different. While the authors call this an improvement, without clear criteria for validity and reliability, these are simply different choices. Moreover, it always leaves the reader wondering how countries would have been scored by Lijphart. Because Bernauer et al.’s data are only available upon request, such a comparison is not easy. Third, several chapters do not measure consensus democracy as a matter of degree but as a dichotomy, which leads to some surprising classifications. Finally, Lijphart’s analysis concerns established democracies, whereas one-third of the countries included by Bernauer et al. fall short of that mark. Many of the contributions leave out the non-democracies and every chapter makes a different case selection.

In his work, Lijphart goes straight from measuring the type of democracy to measuring democratic performance. There is little theorizing about why consensus democracy should be kinder and gentler than majoritarian democracy. The main lesson from this collection is not that institutions do not matter, but that we need a more explicit theory of how type of democracy affects citizens’ political behaviour, opinion, and perhaps even values. As the chapters were not written with the purpose of advancing Lijphart’s theory of democracy, they limit themselves to testing the various claims and reporting the results. Perhaps the work of Bingham Powell, which many of the chapters also refer to and which more directly links political institutions to political behaviour and outcomes of interest, can function as a bridge.

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The global increase of nonviolent movements in the past few decades has offered an opportunity to reconsider the dynamics of unarmed strategies as tools for social and