From Governance to Governmentality in CSDP: Towards a Foucauldian Research Agenda


ABSTRACT: Governmentality theory is a tool to study networked governance beyond the state. Its research profile is characterised by a focus on power and micro-practices from a critical perspective. The article identifies the theory’s comparative strengths and its distinct analytical style. It lays out the conceptual tools of governmentality theory before applying them to internal CSDP governance and the external governance by the CSDP of post-conflict societies. These short case studies serve the didactic purpose of demonstrating the kinds of research questions, analytical concerns, arguments, empirical evidence and methods that governmentality research calls for and the sorts of findings that it can generate. The article concludes by pinpointing limitations of the theory.

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Introduction

Poststructuralist work influenced by Michel Foucault has a small but distinct presence in European Union (EU) studies, including some fine examples of Foucauldian discourse analysis of European foreign policy (EFP) (Diez, 2004; 2005; Larsen, 1997; 2005; Wæver, 2000; 2005). In recent years, a more important Foucauldian presence in EU studies has been provided by the Paris School of critical security studies. Drawing eclectically on Foucault, this research has generated novel and highly critical analyses of the external dimension of justice and home affairs (JHA) (Balzacq, 2009; Bigo, 1994; 2002; 2006; Neal, 2009). Both critical security studies and EU studies would benefit from an extension of this Foucault-influenced work on JHA to the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), not least because these two faces of EU security policy are themselves increasingly overlapping in practice (Mounier, 2009). This article, however, takes Foucault in a somewhat different direction. It draws on governmentality theory to elaborate a research agenda that is primarily concerned with the dynamics and functioning of internal and external CSDP governance rather than with the CSDP as a site of and contributor to processes of securitisation.
Governmentality theory is a prominent strand of Foucauldian theorising. It is a tool to study networked governance beyond the state. Its research profile is characterised by a critical focus on power and micro-practices. This article highlights the theory’s comparative strengths and its distinct analytical style, lending to the presentation a certain didactic character. The article presents two short case studies and one case study design to showcase what can be achieved using governmentality theory to study the CSDP. These empirical illustrations detail the sorts of research questions, analytical concerns empirical evidence and methods that governmentality research calls for and the sorts of findings that it can generate.

The article begins with an introduction to governmentality theory and explicates its six central concepts. The paper briefly compares the manner in which conventional EU approaches and governmentality theory analyse governance, paying particular attention to the value-added of governmentality theory to the study of CSDP. The article then deploys the toolkit of concepts provided by governmentality theory to interrogate internal CSDP governance and the external governance by the CSDP of post-conflict societies. In conclusion, the article flags some of the limitations of governmentality theory. In his work, Foucault embarked on investigations of the relationship between power and populations in the context of studies of political rule and political economy (Foucault, 2003; 2007; 2008). Foucault traced the shifting mentalities underpinning how rulers have thought about their art and the different practices of rule they have devised and employed to perfect it. He referred to these mentalities and practices as ‘governmentalities’ (for an overlapping discussion of Foucault, see Bickerton’s article in this issue). This work highlighted transformations in governmentalities from a concern with the glory of the prince and the defence of his territorial possessions to the protection and promotion of the life of populations. It also emphasised the variegated ways in which the government of populations has been conceived. For instance, liberal forms of governmentality
are premised on the belief that population dynamics and the market economy have their own intrinsic laws. Hence, good government is limited government that respects these natural laws. Contemporary neo-liberal governmentality settles on the understanding that society is best governed at a distance through networked forms of governance. Governance is to be based primarily on regulatory as opposed to legal interventions. Neo-liberal governmentality is thus more about co-opting and administering people than about ruling them through top-down laws and decrees. This work on different governmentalities has been systematized by later Foucauldian scholars (for overviews, see Burchell, et al., 1991; Dean, 1999; Rose, 1999). 

Governmentality theory is a ‘thin’ theory with a light conceptual apparatus. As a poststructuralist theory it does not offer any causal models that can be used to formulate testable hypotheses. Governmentality researchers study the cooption and administration of people in terms of the ‘heterogeneous intellectual and technical conditions ... that link aspirations of rulers with the conduct of the ruled. (Miller and Rose, 1995, p. 594). Researchers carry out detailed empirical studies that deliberately concern themselves with ‘minor aspects’ of governance in areas like crime and alcohol consumption.

In recent years, governmentality theory has gone global. A growing number of researchers study ‘a range of mentalities of international rule’ (Larner and Walters, 2004, p. 5; also Aradau and Van Munster, 2007; Fougner, 2008; Heng and McDonagh, 2008; Merlingen, 2003; on the EU, see Walters and Haahr, 2005). Some scholars specialise in critically interrogating the international governance of security and development aimed at protecting liberal modes of life against risks including terrorism, armed conflicts, poverty and massive human rights violations (Dillon and Reid, 2001; 2009; Duffield, 2007; Duffield and Waddell, 2006; Mitchell, 2002).
Echoing the rest of Foucault’s oeuvre, power is the master concept of governmentality theory. Throughout his writings, Foucault was in one way or another concerned with the discursive and non-discursive ‘confinements that imprison human life and thought’ (Bernauer, 1990, p. 6). For Foucault, individual confinement was primarily the result of ‘productive power’ operating beyond the state rather than the result of the oppressive power localised in the sovereign ruler. Productive power, wielded primarily by experts and administrators, refers to the constitution of social subjects through discursive practices. The possession of material resources is not a requirement for its effective use; as a result such power is not reducible to the pattern of wealth distribution within society. In his earlier work, Foucault focused on how disciplinary power constitutes docile subjects. Disciplinary power, reposing in institutions like the military, works through ‘the constraint of a conformity that must be achieved’ (Foucault, 1991a, p. 183). The constraint is upheld through the constant surveillance of individuals, ‘examinations’ that establish individual ‘deviance’ from standardised performance patterns and through rank-orderings based on test results. In the second half of the 1970s, Foucault reworked his concept of power to emphasise how power functions by making people willingly complicit in their own governance. This latter type of power is networked and fluid rather than hierarchical and relatively stable. Networked power is more about the coordination of actors than it is about their disciplinary normalisation. However, it is important not to make too much of the difference between these two types of productive power. For Foucault, the two work together in modern practices of governmentality.

Governmentality theory provides a distinct conceptual entry point into the phenomenon of productive power. Five concepts are of particular importance: political rationalities, problematisations, political technologies, translations and expertise. Governmentality theory analyses how authorities think about rule in terms of political rationalities and problematisations. A political rationality is a particular kind of discourse. In contrast to most
discourse analyses in political studies that focus on public pronouncements by government actors, governmentality focuses on the discourses found in technical policy papers that deal with governance in a programmatic manner. A political rationality is a discourse that delimits in practical detail a field of governance – the subjects, objects and practices to be governed – and that lays out the appropriate means by which governance is to be accomplished. A political rationality shapes what is and is not thinkable, reasonable, practicable and doable in relation to governance. Political rationalities are thus relatively autonomous systems of meaning rather than merely proxies for actors’ intentions or motives. Rationalities can be analysed along a number of dimensions (Rose and Miller, 1992; Rose, 1999). First, the normativity of political rationalities can be interrogated. What are the ideals and the telos to which governance should be directed? What are considered to be - within the terms of a given discourse - the appropriate powers of authorities and the appropriate modes of governance? Second, on the basis of what knowledge claims do authorities make sense of the field of governance, its nature and dynamics? Third, by means of what vocabulary do authorities frame reality in a way that makes it amenable to intervention? For instance, do they talk about the security sector in a post-conflict society as a technical object to be managed as efficiently as possible or - as a set of practices the reform of which need to take account of the indigenous culture within which they are embedded?

Political rationalities engender their own problematisations that define the threats and challenges to good governance and the adverse effects that can be expected from any failures or shortcomings. A problematisation is neither a neutral summary of a current state of affairs nor a necessary, functional outcome of a social system or policy issue. Rather, it is a contingent construction shaped by its ideational conditions of emergence. The methodological tool governmentality theory uses to study political rationalities and problematisations is Foucauldian discourse analysis. The method enables researchers to identify and analyse the
specific discursive filters in political rationalities and problematisations that define the limits and forms of acceptable agency and of meaningful action in a particular regime of governance (cf. Foucault, 1991b).

The emphasis in governmentality theory on the constructed nature of political problems overlaps with constructivist arguments in political studies that ideas and norms matter. This overlap is pronounced in the case of ‘thick’ constructivism. The overlap is rather more limited in the case of mainstream constructivist work in EFP studies. Governmentality theory stresses the lack of foundation of all knowledge and its exclusionary effects whereas conventional constructivist research traces the ideas and norms of EFP back to the particular historical origins, nature and path-dependent development of the EU, grounding them in shared notions of appropriateness or truth and stressing their emancipatory potential (e.g. Eriksen, 2006; Linklater, 2005; Manners, 2002; Sjursen, 2006; Smith, 2004).

‘Political technology’, another key concept of governmentality theory, refers to the practices and devices through which political rationalities are operationalised and implemented in actual governance programmes and activities. Governmentality researchers often use the concept to refer to inscription devices such as reports, charts, tables and maps. The argument is that these signifying devices constitute particular ways of constructing and acting upon reality (Miller, 1990, p. 333). A somewhat broader conceptualisation of political technologies includes discursive technologies such as mentoring and training that aim at (re-)constituting social identities, interests and relations (cf. Fairclough, 2006). Discursive technologies are likely to function in cooperation with inscription devices. Through its focus on political technologies, governmentality theory highlights the material dimension of discursive practices, including the technical operations through which reality is formed. Moreover, it makes seemingly innocuous practices and devices recognisable as vehicles of power that
shape governance and often reach deep into the fabric of social life. Methodologically, political technologies can be approached through a combination of discourse analysis and narrative process tracing. Foucauldian discourse analysis reveals the structural biases that characterise the specific uses of seemingly apolitical technologies. For instance, it can be used to show how the meaning structure within which a training regime is embedded moulds the agency of trainees in line with certain notions of effectiveness or appropriateness. Narrative process tracing is about elaborating stories ‘with a clear sequential order that connect events in a meaningful way’ (L.P. Hinchman and S.K. Hinchman, cited in Elliott, 2009, p. 3). It is compatible with post-structuralist research because unlike conventional process-tracing it does not take the form of covering law-type explanations. This looser form of process tracing is well suited to inductive research that aims at producing thick descriptions of how phenomena are linked. It can be used to show the temporal steps involved in the deployment of a political technology and its broader social effects.

To investigate the networked character of governance, governmentality theory draws selectively on a Foucault-inspired network analysis developed by sociologists (Callon, 1986; Latour, 1986; 2005; Law and Hassard, 2004). It takes from actor-network theory (ANT) the concept of translation. Translation refers to micro-practices of network-building through which an agent or agency enrols other actors in a network by establishing itself as their ‘spokesperson’. To become a spokesperson, a network-builder has to devise ways to align its interests and associated social representations of the policy domain in question with those of others. The governmentality researcher examines how network-builders strategically use discourses to recruit network members, mould their diverse identities and interests into a coherent network and hold it together in the face of centrifugal pressures and poaching by alternative network-builders. This analysis is based on ANT’s premise that those ‘who are powerful are not those who “hold” power in principle, but those who practically define and
redefine what “holds” everyone together’ (Latour, 1986, p. 273). ANT’s micro-perspective on productive power differs from mainstream network perspectives focusing on conventional bargaining power, social power originating from the social capital formed by ties with other actors and the power of exit (Kahler, 2009, p. 12; Hafner-Burton and Montgomery, 2009). Furthermore, ANT falls into the network-as-actor category. It thus differs from the network-as-structure perspective taken by Mérand, Hofmann and Irondelle (2011) in this special issue. They investigate the social power of actors in the CSDP policy network in terms of centrality and brokerage, which refer to the quantity and quality of communicative connections linking actors and are not concerned with practices of translations.

The governmentality researcher emphasises two key moments of translation: problematisations and the construction and deployment of what ANT calls ‘interessement devices’. The term refers to political technologies that make other actors accept its problematisation and the network goals and projects associated with it and that enable it to enrol them as allies in its network. An important methodological tool for doing translation analysis is narrative process tracing. It helps the governmentality researcher analyse the sequence of discursive moves through which a network-builder seeks to construct and maintain its network and through which it responds to countermoves by recalcitrant allies and opponents. Discourse analysis is used to interpret the substance of these moves in terms of the discursive filters that give them their meaning and force.

Power operates in and through political rationalities, problematisations, political technologies and translations. In a similar vein, these discursive entities and practices are structured by expertise. Experts shape political rationalities, problematise issues and invent and operate political technologies. Expertise grounds governmentalities. What is important here is that expertise and the policy-relevant bodies of knowledge on which it draws are not mirrors of
reality. In line with Foucault, governmentality theory rejects the classical definition of true knowledge according to which the property of being true is determined by the correspondence between knowledge and the state of the world. What counts as knowledge is intrinsic to a particular governmentality. Knowledge is shaped by discursive battles and it generates power effects. It categorises and orders the world according to malleable distinctions between, say, true and false, reasonable and unreasonable or feasible and unfeasible. Through its coding, knowledge segregates and excludes, and it authorises and legitimises the exercise of power over people and things (for a discussion of expertise in relation to bureaucratisation, see the article by Bickerton in this volume).¹

From Governance to Governmentality in CSDP Research

In this section, I briefly spell out the similarities and differences in how governance research and governmentality theory analyse governance, focusing on the comparative strengths of governmentality theory. Governance theory and governmentality theory overlap. Both emphasise forms of rules that are characterised by heterarchy, public-private cooperation, the role of ideas and norms and multi-level and networked forms of cooperation (for more details see Mérand et al., this volume). Moreover, the strength of both approaches is to provide a descriptive vocabulary to map new security actors, relations and practices. What, then, is the added value of governmentality theory when it comes to the study of the CSDP?

First, governmentality theory directs attention to ‘minor aspects’ of CSDP governance that are ignored by governance approaches. It shows the analytical leverage that can be gained by looking at these micro-sites and micro-practices. Second, it prioritises the analysis of the role and effects of power in CSDP governance. Governance research does analyse different faces of power, say resource-based bargaining power or knowledge-based agenda-setting power.
Yet at the same time, the ontological premise of conventional approaches is that governance constitutes a more consensual way of doing politics. Hence, most governance researchers in the field of EU studies downplay a concern with power for an emphasis on processes such as deliberation, mutual accommodation of interests, joint problem-solving and learning (Kohler-Koch and Rittberger, 2006; Mérand, et al., this volume). Third, governance research emphasises the changing nature of the modern state and the emergence of new policy issues to explain the rise of governance. Thus, EU security governance is understood as the ‘functional’ adaptation of national security policies, processed by the vagaries of multi-actor negotiations in a densely institutionalised setting, to new transnational security threats and new private security actors in post-cold war Europe (Kirchner and Sperling, 2007; Krahmann, 2003; 2005; Norheim-Martinsen, forthcoming 2010; Webber, et al., 2004). Conversely, governmentality theory argues that the spread of ‘post-modern’ modes of rule cannot be understood without paying attention to changes in the political rationalities and problematisations informing policymaking. Finally, the toolkit of governmentality theory is designed to make available for analysis the ‘unnatural’ intellectual and technical work that goes into making governance work. By thus denaturalizing governance and focusing on the actors that lie behind it, governmentality theory has the capacity to generate highly critical perspectives on CSDP governance that question official CSDP discourse and mainstream academic work. In the next three sections, this article uses governmentality theory to illustrate what can be achieved with it, paying special attention to problematisations, political technologies and translations.

**Problematisations Matter: The CSDP Fact-Finding Mission to Macedonia**

CSDP fact-finding missions, which are composed of EU Council and national experts, are an important element in CSDP governance. Dispatched during the pre-decision deliberations about CSDP deployments, their problematisations of (potential) host societies provide an
important input into these deliberations. Moreover, if fully-fledged CSDP missions are launched, the problematisations provided by the fact-finding experts shape mission mandates. Despite their importance, fact-finding missions have remained in the shadows in the academic literature, a result of difficult data collection and a belief among researchers that the analysis of such missions tells us little about the CSDP. Appearances suggest that fact-finding experts simply record governance failures and shortcomings in the security sector in concerned countries; governmentality theory suggests otherwise. The experts employ contingent and contestable premises and discursive filters in order to construct countries as problem-spaces in need of the particular brand of security governance provided by the CSDP. Also, their problematisations can have unintended negative consequences for missions. In what follows, I empirically illustrate these claims with regard to the fact-finding mission that preceded the deployment of EUPOL Proxima in Macedonia.

The Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia declared independence in 1991. Unlike Croatia and Bosnia, the country did not descend into civil war. It managed to maintain a precarious peace between the Slav-Macedonian majority and the Macedonian-Albanian minority throughout the 1990s. At the turn of the millennium, the inter-ethnic compromise collapsed and by the beginning of 2001 Macedonia was in the grip of armed violence. With the help of EU and NATO mediation the fighting was brought to an end. The peace agreement between the warring parties – the Ohrid Framework Agreement of the summer of 2001 – stipulated a number of institutional and constitutional reforms that Macedonia had to carry out in order to build a stable peace. Police reform was a major item. It was led by the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe, with a European Commission JHA team and the U.S. International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program both playing a major role in Macedonian policing reforms (Merlingen and Ostrauskaitė, 2005a). After two years of intensive internationally guided police reforms, the EU dispatched a fact-finding mission to
the country to explore the need for an additional CSDP police mission. The experts reported back to Brussels that such a mission was indeed necessary. The conclusion was based on an analysis of policing in Macedonia that brought certain features into sharp relief while rendering others barely visible. This meant that when Brussels decided to dispatch a CSDP mission and put together a mandate, certain questions were not asked and certain issues were not addressed. This came back to haunt the mission later.

The fact-finding experts rendered two features of Macedonian policing opaque (Merlingen with Ostrauskaité, 2006; Merlingen, 2007). First, they overestimated the reform space available for yet another international actor in the crowded Macedonian police aid field. This was already an area where donors struggled to avoid stepping on each other’s turf. The assessment of the fact-finding experts was based on a simplistic understanding of the complex relationship between operational and transformational police aid. They argued that by providing quick fixes for operational shortcomings, the CSDP mission would be able to complement the work of other international donors who tackled longer-term institutional reforms. Second, the fact-finding experts overestimated the shortfalls of Macedonian policing relative to the quality of policing across the EU because they employed an idealised yardstick of best European policing practice. Their particular take on EU policing led them to ignore the views of those international actors on the ground who argued that there were ‘no significant [public] security concerns in Macedonia at the time’.iii It also led them to downplay the similarities between policing in Macedonia and in many EU jurisdictions. Many EU and non-EU states who subsequently contributed personnel to the CSDP police mission in Macedonia also struggled with problems of home-grown organised crime and various forms of police misconduct such as corruption and discrimination of minorities.iv
The particular way in which the fact-finding mission constructed Macedonian law enforcement negatively went on to affect the work of the mission deployed in December 2003. First, the mission was unable to devise and impose a clear division of labour between itself and other police aid donors along the lines envisaged by the fact-finding experts. Short-term operational issues were inevitably linked to long-term institutional ones and could only be tackled in parallel. To make such parallel reforms work would have required tight coordination between Proxima and other international police aid donors. Yet the latter were not willing to let the late-comer Proxima second-guess and coordinate their reforms. The upshot was that Proxima struggled to devise reform projects that improved local law enforcement without interfering with ongoing international reforms. Second, by rendering the unsettling hybridity of ‘normal’ and ‘abnormal’ policing features in the EU and in Macedonia invisible, the fact finding experts created an unbridgeable gap between the imaginary subject position of the good European ‘copper’ and the really existing subject position of local ‘coppers’. The imaginary high standards of European policing best practices led to benchmarks for mission reforms that were unachievable. Also, the exaggerated gap between EU policing and local policing created a false sense of superiority on the part of CSDP administrators and decision-makers in Brussels. They never asked how credible or effective Proxima could be in reforming the local police given that some Proxima staff came from police services that faced similar challenges as their local counterparts. As a result of these and other problems unrelated to the issue of problematisation, EUPOL Proxima failed to come even close to achieving its mandate in the available time. The mission had to be extended for one more year.

The broader point being made here is that governmentality theory draws attention and provides the tools to study the problematisations underpinning security governance. CSDP missions are decided upon and programmed on the basis of social representations of their
theatres of operation. Yet despite their grounding in expertise, these representations are not objective recordings of what is risky, dangerous, unstable and bad practice in the concerned countries. Hence, it is important to examine how precisely the EU goes about constructing post-conflict societies as ‘the location of certain problems, the repository of specific hopes and fears, the target of programmes’ (Rose and Miller, 1992, p. 191). Using discourse analysis, the governmentality theorist can investigate the knowledge structure of such problematisations and the contingent conceptual choices they engender. Problematisations such as those produced by fact-finding reports categorise, organise, position and differentiate the subjects, objects and spaces to be governed. They construct in technical detail the normal and abnormal, the desirable and undesirable in a manner that is far from self-evident. Governmentality theory enables researchers to ‘deconstruct’ these seemingly objective problems and to identify and analyse sources of mission shortcomings that are missed by other approaches.

**Governing Natives: The CSDP Technology of Mentoring**

Governmentality theory directs attention to the manner in which productive power is exercised over locals by CSDP missions that generally lack coercive power and cannot issue commands. An important discursive technology used commonly by civilian CSDP missions is mentoring, which targets both local security sector operatives and administrators/managers. Whilst researchers drawing on mainstream approaches in CSDP studies will have little to say about this discursive practice and are unlikely to recognise it as a tool of power governmentality researchers are likely to be more critical. To analyse the mechanism through which CSDP mentors exert power, the researcher first identifies the distinct steps involved in the use of the technology. This is done through narrative process tracing, which reveals that CSDP mentoring has come to be codified in a particular way. It relies on two distinct phases
in the relations between mission staff and locals. Each phase is associated with a particular type of power: a disciplinary power based on hierarchical observation and ‘examinations’; a co-opting power aimed at reconstituting the subjectivities of indigenous security sector staff. The concrete organisation and implementation of these types of power differ from mission to mission and have to be examined on a case-by-case basis. Second, the governmentality researcher makes use of discourse analysis to explore what substantive changes mentors seek to achieve in their mentees’ social identity and the principles of exclusion that shape the arguments they use to bring about such changes (Merlingen and Ostrauskaitė, 2005b; Merlingen Ostrauskaitė, 2006).

The technology of mentoring works best when CSDP staff are co-located with the local security sector personnel they are expected to ‘reform’.

By ‘shadowing’ their charges, CSDP experts are able to familiarise themselves with the details of local ways of doing things. This intimate knowledge of indigenous work routines based on nearly permanent surveillance is important in the first, disciplinary phase of mentoring. It empowers mission experts to establish to what extent local staff conform to international and EU best practices, the promotion of which is the telos of virtually all civilian CSDP missions. Deviations from standards are inscribed in written reports that add to the initial problematisation of the security sector carried out by fact-finding experts described above. These reports enable mission headquarters to identify particularly salient problems and to devise ways to tackle them. Mentoring is one such low-key way of correction. It works by co-opting mentees into their own governance. Co-locators and their mentees convene at regular intervals during which the former present the latter with a ‘truthful assessment’ of their job performance. To help their charges to overcome the identified deficiencies, the CSDP experts provide them with hands-on advice.
During the first mandate of the EU police mission in Bosnia (EUPM) from 2003-2005, co-locators identified the ‘authoritarian personality’ of local rank and file police officers and lower-level police managers as one of the impediments standing in the way of a professional police service. Local staff was content with the low degree of delegation characterising their hierarchically managed police organisations because it was seen as a way to keep their workload low and to shirk responsibility. They displayed little or no willingness or capacity to provide input into operational policing decisions and they tended to wait for orders from superiors instead of taking initiatives themselves. One of the technologies used by EUPM experts to change what was identified as a lack of best practice was mentoring. Mobilising the authority of their seemingly superior Western expertise, co-locators talked to their mentees about the importance of seeing themselves as professionals who actively seek to identify and correct shortfalls in how they do their work. They also stressed the need for mentees to see themselves as being able to make a difference in their police organisations and the provision of public security and as able to develop clear career aspirations for advancing in their profession. EUPM staff provided their mentees with practical techniques for and tips on how to re-fashion themselves into police experts who act in accordance with recognized best practice. In doing what they did, EUPM co-locators inculcated a rational-entrepreneurial mindset in their mentees that incited them, in opposition to the prevailing cultural patterns both inside and outside the indigenous police organisations, to self-identify as human capital requiring investment to yield better performance. In short, co-locators used the political technology of mentoring to refashion the social identity of their supervisees according to a particular vision of good policing and its associated views on individual agency, organisational norms and the universal applicability of Western-generated professional expertise. Through this seemingly apolitical discursive practice local police officers were enrolled, without realising it, in their own governance in line with the objectives of the EUPM rather than locally defined goals.
The conclusion that can be drawn from this discussion is that governmentality theory helps analysts to avoid underestimating the power of civilian CSDP missions. Few missions have executive competencies that authorise them to ‘take the law into their own hands’. Yet even when they lack coercive powers such as search-and-arrest powers, they have the means to exert considerable influence. Indeed, the productive power of a seemingly innocuous technique such as mentoring will often have a more far-reaching and lasting impact on the local security sector than traditional command powers. Also, governmentality theory encourages analysts to interrogate the apparent neutrality of political technologies and to uncover the biases and blind spots in how they construct a particular policy domain.

**Researching Translations: EDA as a Network-Builder**

The actor networks on which governance is based have to be constructed and maintained. The governmentality researcher looks at these processes in terms of translations. The approach is premised on the assumption that even actors short of resource power or formal competencies can be network-builders and successfully do translations. Their success depends on two conditions. First, can they come up with political rationalities and problematisations that frame their interests in a manner that resonates with prospective network members? Second, can they come up with political technologies that persuade prospective members to enrol and remain in the network even when they are tempted by rival network-builders to exit the network in question? In what follows, the article illustrates what is involved in investigating translations. It details a series of questions and types of actors, political technologies, empirical sources and methodological issues that a governmentality researcher has to engage with when analysing the role and influence of the European Defence Agency (EDA) in CSDP governance.
The EDA was established in 2004 with a mandate to ‘improve the EU’s defence capabilities in the field of crisis management and to sustain the ESDP as it stands now and develops in the future (Council of the European Union, 2004). The EDA is one of the CSDP institutions that has received comparatively little scholarly attention. Those who take a closer look at it often describe it as a relatively powerless intergovernmental agency (Bátora, 2009, p. 1084; Menon, 2009, p. 238). While the formal competencies and budget of the agency are certainly limited, its role in shaping the CSDP capability development process is significant. The governmentality researcher goes beyond institutionalist analyses that argue that the EDA is a bit player in EU defence governance because of its restricted functions as standard-setter and information broker (Bátora, 2009). He or she examines the ways in which the EDA interposes itself between a whole range of actors concerned with CSDP capabilities, making itself their spokesperson who practically defines their common objectives and projects. To begin with, the researcher examines the political rationality within which the agency situates CSDP capability development and the challenges to good governance it identifies. How does the EDA frame the objectives towards which the development of EU military capabilities should be directed? What differentiated roles and tasks does it envisage for (potential) network members? What are the obstacles that it identifies as standing in the way of achieving the desired goals? What solutions to the identified problems does it discard because they would give the role of spokesperson to another actor? What weight does it give to different modes of governance, say, harmonisation or de-centralised peer pressure, in advancing the CSDP? To answer these and related questions, one must undertake a detailed discourse analysis of the agency’s political rationality and problematisations. They can be inferred from sources such as its long-term vision paper, its work programmes, strategies, reports, issues of its Bulletin, articles and published interviews by EDA staff and press statements.
Following on from discourse analysis, the task of the governmentality researcher is to investigate how the agency’s efforts to translate its own interests and associated representation of CSDP capability development into those of potential allies play out among the latter. This requires attention to the temporality of action-reaction cycles, which can be tracked with the help of narrative process tracing. The questions to be addressed include the following. Do the EDA’s political rationality and problematisations resonate with the diverse concerns of actors who have a stake in the military CSDP, such as defence planners in national defence ministries, finance ministries, the European Commission’s Directorate-General Internal Market, the European Space Agency, defence contractors, researchers and engineers working on military R&D and humanitarian NGOs? Do these actors show a readiness to be enrolled in the EDA’s network on the terms defined by the agency? Who takes up, resists or seeks to modify its discourse? Against what other problematisations framed by rival network-builders does the EDA struggle? It is at this stage that the analysis has to turn to the political technologies, used by the EDA to make its problematisations ‘stick’.

The EDA has proven itself quite inventive in devising and employing a range of means to construct collective purpose. For instance, it employs to identify and advance new avenues for and modalities of defence cooperation; promotes the harmonisation of certification processes for the design and production of military hardware in the EU and cooperation in the area of research, development and procurement; encourages joint defence investment programmes among member states; advocates the pooling of their military capabilities and logistics; organises training courses for national militaries; promotes voluntary codes among governments that rely on peer pressure and reputational effects rather than hierarchical enforcement; and runs workshops to create a communauté de vues on defence priorities and actions across the EU. These political technologies have considerable discursive properties. The question to be asked of them is to what extent they succeed in shaping the identities,
interests or strategies of those at whom they are targeted? Do they succeed in incentivising, co-opting, enticing, convincing, seducing and constraining allies and in neutralising opponents? What adjustments to the deployment of these technologies, and the problematisations for which they seek to build support, does EDA have to make to enrol actors in its networks? Which actors refuse to join or stay on the margins of the networks and why? To what extent do the technologies help the EDA outflank competitors, such as certain actors in the Commission Directorate-General responsible for Development and development NGOs? These development actors see in EDA-centred networks the militarisation of the CSDP, a trend that threatens their own efforts at building alternative civilian-focused EFP networks. How robust are the EDA’s networks, i.e., how vulnerable are they to defection and how willing are its members to mobilise for common action?

The case study design just outlined differs from how conventional approaches go about studying the EDA and CSDP networks more generally (compare with the account of networks in Mérand et al, this issue). Governmentality theory gives ontological priority to institutional micro-sites and micro-practices. This is in line with Foucault’s argument that governance is super-structural in relation to micro-powers that flow through barely visible capillary circuits. From this perspective, even low-level governance actors such as the EDA can turn themselves into centres of translation by means of practices that enable them to constitute a networked field of action with its internal rules for what counts as, say, the main governance challenges, effective regulation and desirable governance outcomes. In short, governmentality theory offers a micro-analysis of CSDP governance that complements existing governance approaches to the CSDP, most of which are pitched at the level of middle-range theories.

Conclusion
This article laid out the conceptual tools of governmentality theory and it made the case for their use in CSDP studies. There are three principal advantages of adding governmentality to the menu of theories on offer for studying the CSDP. First, it highlights the productive power that is exercised in and through the CSDP. Seemingly weak actors can avail themselves of the discursive means to exercise such power. They can establish themselves as spokespersons of governance networks and they can reform the security sectors of countries transiting from conflict by refashioning the professional identities of and relations among locals. Second, governmentality theory directs the attention of researchers towards ‘minor’ but nevertheless important details of CSDP governance, and it provides them with the tools to show that the ‘micro-physics’ of governance matter. In so doing, it shifts attention away from a focus on effectiveness and that has dominated much CSDP research thus far (for an elaboration of this point, see Bickerton et al., this volume). Third, it enables researchers to provide analytical accounts of the CSDP that are, to paraphrase Theodor Adorno (2005, p. 80), at a distance from the continuity of the familiar. This adds a fresh critical perspective to a field of study that sometimes lacks critical distance to its object of study.

To conclude, researchers should nevertheless be sensitive to some of the limitations of governmentality theory (for general critiques, see Joseph, 2010; Kerr, 1999). They do not invalidate its strengths but they flag the fact that its analytical focus is considerably narrower than that of mainstream EU studies theories. To begin with, the theory has a rather small toolkit of concepts. It enables researchers to excel at a few things that they could not do so well with other approaches. Conversely, a considerable amount of what is of interest to students of the CSDP, such as bureaucratic politics among Brussels-based security policy actors, socialisation in CSDP committees and working groups and intergovernmental negotiations, cannot be dealt with in-depth by governmentality. Second, governmentality theory is conceptually ill-equipped to examine how non-discursive conditions and contexts
interact with and shape discursive practices. Many governmentality theorists will not worry about this since they see it as a non-problem. For them the world is a text that is constituted by discursive practices only. CSDP scholars who want to retain the ability to study the relationship between ideational and material factors will regard the ‘discourse-all-the-way-down’ attitude as a drawback (for a detailed examination of how material and ideational factors in CSDP can be related to each other, see Meyer and Strickmann, this issue). Third, governmentality theory’s epistemology does not lend itself to conventional causal explanations. Unlike most approaches used to study the CSDP, it is not grounded in the notion of expectability according to which an explanation establishes the explanandum as something that was to be expected in the circumstances where it occurred (Dessler, 1999). Instead, its strength is to provide thick descriptions of the explanandum. Those CSDP researchers who are interested in predictions may find the ‘mere’ description provided by governmentality theory as insufficient unless combined with analytically more ambitious theories. In short, while governmentality theory can add considerable value to the study of the CSDP, and thus should be an important tool in the toolbox of CSDP researchers, it can neither replace nor compete with approaches such as foreign policy analysis, institutionalism, constructivism and realism.

Correspondence:

Name: Michael Merlingen

Postal Address: Central European University, Nádor u. 9, 1051 Budapest, Hungary

Email Address: merling@ceu.hu
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i Foucault is notorious for having insisted that knowledge or expertise is inextricably linked to power in power-knowledge spheres (cf. Gordon, 2000, pp. xv-xvi).

ii Indeed, governmentality theory expects that such negative consequences are common because governance ‘is a congenitally failing operation’ (Rose and Miller, 1992, p. 190).

iii Interview with a former Proxima member, Sarajevo, 29 November 2005.

iv Such policing challenges have been widely documented in many Western jurisdictions. Talking of police misconduct, two observers argue that the ‘consistency of [such cases] across national and criminal justice system boundaries provides compelling evidence that the problems confronting policing are neither isolated nor simply “events” ’ (Neyroud and Beckley, 2001, p. 13). For policing shortcomings in the area of organised crime control in EU states one has to look no further than Italy.

v The fluid boundaries between CSDP police officers and those they reform remain a problem as a recent incident involving EULEX Kosovo personnel shows (Pop, 2010).

vi Co-location has evolved into one of the hallmarks of civilian CSDP missions.

vii Interview with a EUPM co-locator, Sarajevo, 22 February 2005.