D9.7. Report of Case Studies on Gender Equality as a Focus Point of National and Nativist Discourses

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The overall aim of WP9.7 is to analyse ‘cross-national case studies on gender equality as the focus of national and nativist discourses’. This deliverable is based on the national reports on the rhetoric of populist radical right parties from the seven selected countries, i.e. Croatia, Denmark, the Netherlands, Hungary, Germany, Italy and Spain, together with Israel. The objective of this synthesis report is to identify similarities and divergences in framing migration, mobility, gender and family and the implications of these frames for European citizenship. Our sample of parties were selected from continental, Nordic, Central and Eastern European and Southern European member states of the EU, all experiencing different path dependencies and breaks in their socio-economic, political and cultural institutions, something which may be formative for populist radical right agendas.

The analysis has identified different logics in the framing of gender equality in relation to migration, mobility, diversity and family issues: An economic dimension that links migration and diversity to the logic of the labour market and the welfare regime, and a cultural dimension that links gender, family and religion to national values and belongings. The economic rationale, in the sense that concerns for migration and mobility override issues related to gender equality and the family, seems to be the most prevalent one for the Northern European countries, while the cultural rationale is much more visible in the case of the other countries, South, East Central and Continental European alike.

Overall, the analysis illustrates both similarities and differences in the selected parties’ framings of migration and mobility. Many similarities exist between the Northern, Southern and Eastern European radical right parties in regards to the negative positions on migration and ethnic, religious and national minorities. Despite the similarities, the analysis also points at important variations across the geographical divide between Eastern and Western radical right parties in relation to internal mobility, primarily attached to the economic dimension. In the West, the parties perceive their citizens as “invaded” by EU-migrants, and in the East as being forced to migrate; both positions blaming the EU policies for the welfare problems, their countries experience. However, practically all parties frame migration around its financial strains on the welfare systems, the economy, and in the West also in terms of labour market integration.

Gender, family and religious issues, including women’s and gay rights, used to be a crucial part of the cultural dimension, but family issues such as the support for ‘working mothers’, have moved to the welfare dimension, as part of a Conservative agenda to secure labour power and boost the national economy. The report concludes that in spite of differences in national welfare and family models, there is a similar trend towards an instrumental use of gender and family issues as a means to secure the welfare state, or as a way to solve the problems with family crisis, demographic sustainability, and protecting the national values.

The overall conclusion of the synthesis report is that EU-citizenship is more contested than ever, and it demonstrates that the strengthening of the nativist and nationalist right-wing parties across Europe and in the EP is challenging the EU’s founding principles of free mobility of labour/open borders, the principles of gender equality, as well as the guiding principles of non-discrimination of nationalities, ethnicity, sexuality and religion. Despite their differences in relation to family and gender issues, the selected radical right parties agree upon one common goal: to restrict crucial elements of EU citizenship related to internal mobility and diversity. Some parties even propose an ethnic citizenship limited to nationals born within the country, and others call for rights of ethnic Diasporas both in EU member states and beyond. Thus, all the analysed parties across the geographical divide support increased border control, although with different arguments. They thus propose different versions of Euroscepticism, which are all opposed to fundamental principles of internal mobility, and the principle of non-discrimination on the basis of nationality.

Finally, the report confirms the importance of contextual embeddedness for the divergences between the analyzed populist radical right parties. Divergence or convergence depend on meeting points between emerging European political opportunities and national contextual factors brought to the European arena by the diverse parties. In addition it is worth noticing that major events such as the refugee crises can prompt the reorganization of agendas, marginalization of controversial points, and alignment of these parties along the same platform.
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LIST OF ACRONYMS

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AfD</td>
<td>Alternative für Deutschland (Alternative for Germany)</td>
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<tr>
<td>AN</td>
<td>Alleanza Nationale (National Alliance)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DF</td>
<td>Dansk Folkeparti (Danish People’s Party)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ECR</td>
<td>European Conservatives and Reformists Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ENF</td>
<td>Europe of Nations and Freedom</td>
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<tr>
<td>EP</td>
<td>European Parliament</td>
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<tr>
<td>FE-JONS</td>
<td>Falange Española Tradicionalista y de las Juntas de Ofensiva Nacional-Sindicalista (Spanish Phalanx of the Committees for the National-Syndicalist Offensive)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FN</td>
<td>Front National (National Front)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FPÖ</td>
<td>Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs (Freedom Party of Austria)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HDZ</td>
<td>Hrvatska demokratska zajednica (Croatian Democratic Union)</td>
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<tr>
<td>HSP AS</td>
<td>Hrvatska stranka prava dr. Ante Starčević (Croatian Party of Rights - dr. Ante Starčević)</td>
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<tr>
<td>LN</td>
<td>Lega Nord (North League)</td>
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<tr>
<td>MEP</td>
<td>Member of the European Parliament</td>
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<td>MP</td>
<td>Member of Parliament</td>
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<tr>
<td>MS</td>
<td>Member state(s)</td>
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<tr>
<td>MSR</td>
<td>Movimiento Social Republicano (Republican Social Movement)</td>
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<tr>
<td>PVV</td>
<td>Partij voor de Vrijheid (Freedom Party)</td>
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<td>PxC</td>
<td>Plataforma per Catalunya (Platform for Catalonia)</td>
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1. INTRODUCTION

The overall aim of WP9.7 is to analyse ‘cross-national case studies on gender equality as the focus of national and nativist discourses’. This synthesis report is based on the national reports on the rhetoric of populist radical right parties from the seven selected countries, i.e. Croatia, Denmark, the Netherlands, Hungary, Germany, Italy and Spain, together with Israel. The aim of this report is to explore the differences and similarities in the articulation of policy stances in regards to gender, family and migration policies of seven European RRPs, plus Israel.

The recent European elections of 2014 brought an unprecedented number of radical right parliamentarians from around Europe to the European Parliament. This could potentially lead to a radicalization and polarization of political debates on issues of core importance for European citizenship, such as gender equality, respect for complex diversity in relation to race/ethnicity, religion, nationality and sexuality, as well as issues linked to migration, mobility and the right to family re-unification, which are in the focus of the radical right political parties. The main objective of this report is to look into what this new wave of parliamentarians and their ideas may bring to the European debates on the above-mentioned issues.

One part of the literature has focused on similarities between nationalist and nativist parties and debates, in relation to gender equality, family and sexuality issues (see e.g. Akkerman, 2015; Andreassen & Lettinga, 2012; Akkerman & Hagelund), while comparative analyses have emphasized the contextual framings of gender equality and family issues influenced by different welfare and gender regimes (see e.g. Meret and Siim, 2013). Research finds that the radical right parties’ stances on gender equality largely can be summed up in two main positions: it can either be perceived as an accepted norm (see e.g. Siim & Mokre, 2013), or as a problematic principle to be denounced (see e.g. Kováts & Põim, 2015). The parties that accept gender equality policies may simultaneously denounce ethnic diversity in their own nation-states. This has also been referred to as exclusionary intersectionality, which “refers to a position that perceives tensions between [ethnic] diversity and [gender] equality as irresolvable and thus proposes a radical, one-dimensional solution – either to reduce or abolish diversity – or to abandon claims for equality” (Mokre & Siim, 2013: 11). This opposition to diversity was found in interviews with nationalist organizations across Europe, i.e. in Austria, Bulgaria, Denmark, Finland, France and Hungary, particularly aimed at the Muslim populations.

On the other hand, a comparative study of the anti-gender discourses in radical right and conservative party programs in France, Germany, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia show that that the EU’s current framework against discrimination is challenged by some of the radical right parties (Kováts & Põim, 2015). According to the authors,

Anti-gender movements want to claim that gender equality is an “ideology”, and introduce the misleading terms “gender ideology” or “gender theory” which distort the achievements of gender equality. The main targets are the alleged “propaganda” for LGBTI rights, for reproductive rights and biotechnology, for sexual and equality education. This phenomenon has negative consequences for the legislation on gender equality (Kováts & Põim, 2015: 11).

Although both positions are addressed primarily for the benefit of national voters/audiences and are not presented in the European Parliament they do, potentially, challenge the EU’s anti-discrimination framework in regards to race, ethnicity, religion, disability, age, sexual orientation and sex (as set out in e.g. the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, Council Directive of 27 November 2000 establishing a general framework for equal treatment in employment and occupation, and Council Directive of 29 June 2000 implementing the principle of equal treatment between persons irrespective of racial or ethnic origin). Those parties that perceive gender as an accepted norm seemingly discriminate on grounds of ethnicity and religion, whilst the anti-gender movement directs its attention towards sexual orientation and gender.

For more on the EU’s legislative framework on anti-discrimination, please visit: http://ec.europa.eu/justice/discrimination/law/index_en.htm
Thus, it becomes relevant to explore if, and to what extent, the European RRP, who have representatives in the European Parliament (EP) support or denounce the EU’s fundamental democratic and liberal values. This becomes a particularly imminent question, when considering the high rise in voter support to RRP in later years, a tendency, which may have repercussions on the policy output of the European Union. Hence, in this report, the objective is to understand and contextualize differences and similarities between the nationalist and nativist debates related to the different nationally embedded nativist discourses, as they are reflected at both the EU and the national level. A distinction must first be made between nationalism and nativism. Nationalism aims to preserve the national unit for the ones that at a certain moment of time belong to it. Nativism goes a step further, and is not based on citizenship, but upon membership of a virtuous ‘heartland’. It implies that the nation state should be inhabited only by members of the native group, and that non-native inhabitants per definition are a threat; they are framed as the ‘dangerous others’ no matter their intentions or willingness to adapt to the cultural values of their new place of residence. Whereas nationalism can be liberal, this is not the case with nativism, as this ideology is based on xenophobia, either on religious or on ethnic grounds.

Hence, the aim of this study is to situate divergences between the framing used by the different right wing populist parties in four contextual factors: Euroscepticism and the country’s relation to the EU; history and patterns of racist and nationalist exclusion; gender regimes; and religion. The experiences from the RAGE-project: ‘Hate-speech and Populist Othering in Europe through a race, gender and age looking glass’ (2013-2015) and other EU research projects, support the importance of a contextual approach to the national and nativist debates, which focuses on tensions and differences between, and within, the parties and other political forces. The results indicate that there are important differences in the national debates influenced by different gender, family, welfare and migration regimes. Countries involved in WP 9.7 represent Northern, Continental, Eastern-Central and Southern Europe. In our report we compare Croatia, Denmark, Germany, Hungary, Italy, the Netherlands and Spain. The report also includes data on Israel. While not a member of the EU, looking at how radical right parties frame gender, family and migration/diversity in Israel might add another perspective to our analysis of radical right parties in the EU member states. Our objective in Task 9.7 is thus to see how these contextualized differences and resonances meet at the EU-level and channel into European citizenship ideas.

In order to do this, the focus of this report is on the EP-electoral campaign of 2014, and the period immediately following that. The report focuses on those populist radical right parties and persons, who were elected to the EP in 2014. In this report, we used a loose definition of populist radical right parties along the lines discussed by Cas Mudde (2014). For him, populist radical right parties are characterized by a combination of three ideological elements: nativism, authoritarianism, and populism. While this framework guided our research, the ultimate decisions as to which exact parties to be included in each country analysis was left to the national teams (See List of Contributors). We had two outlier cases: Spain, which has no populist radical right party delegates in the EP, and Israel, which is not part of the EU. In these two cases, the focus was on important populist radical right parties active in the domestic political arenas.

The data consists of their manifestos, election programs, party websites, statements (both on social media and to the press), and documents released around the electoral campaign, and their statements in the EP during the first six months of the parliamentary cycle, closing at the end of January 2015. Through analysing the campaign and the immediate post-campaign discourses of these MEPs, we expect to get an understanding of the input of the radical right to the 8th EP-term on specific aspects of European citizenship.

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2 The project was funded by the European Commission, Fundamental Rights and Citizenship, 2013-2015. It ran in the period: 1/2/2013 - 30/1/2016. Partners: University of Leicester, Great Britain; University of Aalborg, Denmark; University of Helsinki, Finland; University of Florence, Italy; New Bulgarian University, Bulgaria; University of Paris 8, France; University of Vienna, Austria; and The Peace Institute, Slovenia.
An important turn took place in the European political arena after we had closed our data collection. The refugee crisis started in early 2015, and peaked in the late months of the same year. While we had no capacity to go back to data collection to follow up on the discursive shifts, which took place as a result of the crisis, in the conclusion, we extrapolate some of our findings on EU refugee policy to provide a background understanding to the crisis that enfolded during the year of 2015.

1.1 Method

As already mentioned, the countries involved in WP9.7 cover all regions of Europe (except for the UK), namely Northern (Denmark and the Netherlands), Southern (Italy and Spain), Continental (Germany), and Eastern and Central Europe (Hungary and Croatia). Moreover, Israel is also included in the report, to add another perspective on the specificity of the European discourses.

The report identifies a series of issues that are at the centre of Work package 9, and through which we aim to capture how far radical right parties potentially limit EU citizenship:

- **Migration and diversity**: the framing of migrant and minority women, migrant care workers, care work by minority women, etc. The context, role, and kinds of exclusion of minority/migrant women.
- **Internal mobility of workers within Europe**: the framing of intra-EU mobility of workers, and the potentially (in)-direct gendered nature of the debate.
- **Women and gender equality**: the framing of the social and political role of women and gender equality.
- **Family/motherhood**: the parties’ proposed family conception, their position on forms of family (other than the traditional ones), and their (potential) opposition to alternative family forms.
- **Crosscutting all of these**: the framing of demographic sustainability, in particular in relation to women’s role in society, to migration and migrant women, and to minority women.

The methodological approach of this synthesis report argues that context matters, and that the variety of national, historical and discursive contexts from which populist far right parties come, may influence the framing of the four topics in a variety of ways, some of which may be largely incompatible with each other. The findings support previous results emphasising that most populist radical right parties oppose immigration and promote exclusive nativist agendas and are all reluctant to promote more gender equality or progressive family arrangements. However, we find that the meanings they give to these policy problems, and the ways in which they articulate responses to them, may be different, often influenced by the specific political and discursive opportunity structures. Differences in framings can block policy consensus, and can have implications on the outcomes of policy debates, and on the further implementation mechanisms. According to Schön and Rein (1994), policy controversies are disputes, in which the contending parties hold conflicting frames. They see such disputes as resistant to resolution by appeal to facts or

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3 EU citizenship is conditioned on having acquired citizenship in a member state, and premised on the free movement of labour across the European borders. It was gradually expanded from workers to all citizens in the EU MS, first enshrined in the Maastricht Treaty (1993), which defines EU citizenship as a set of rights for all EU citizens. It was further developed in the Lisbon Treaty and the Charter for Fundamental Rights, which formally bans discrimination according to nationality, gender, ethnicity/race, sexuality, religion, age and handicap. EU citizenship is thus a multilayered citizenship with supranational, national, legal and local rights. In terms of political practice, EU citizens have the right to vote in local and EU elections, when they work and reside legally in another EU MS. The notion of ‘lived citizenship’ refers to the way EU citizens practice their rights in their daily life, and to what extent they identify as EU-citizens. Migrants and refugees residing legally in an EU MS, as well as citizens in MS that work in other EU countries may thus identify with the country or with the EU, even though they do not enjoy the same legal or political rights as other EU-citizens.
reasoned arguments, “because the parties’ conflicting frames determine what counts as fact and what arguments are taken to be relevant and compelling” (Schön & Rein, 1994: 23).

The methodological approach guiding the document analysis is critical frame analysis (Verloo, 2005; 2007). Verloo defines a policy frame as an “organising principle that transforms fragmentary or incidental information into a structured and meaningful problem, in which a solution is implicitly or explicitly included” (2005: 20). The reason for using this method is to identify critical similarities and differences between how different radical right parties frame the identified issues. In our analysis, we look for the various diagnoses offered in regards to each of the identified topics, and determine what prognoses regarding the state and/or the EU’s role are linked to those different diagnoses. We identify frames that link diagnoses and prognoses together. Our aim here is not to look at policies adopted by the EU, but to deconstruct meanings articulated by the RRP parties, which represent an important segment of EU politics in policy debates. The objective is to acquire a better understanding of the present conflicts around these key issues within the European Parliament as well as of potential conflicts for future European policies. Critical frame analysis allows us not only to identify tensions between varieties of framing, but also to identify critical elements and logics of exclusion articulated in the different frames, as well as strategic framing (Benford & Snow, 2000), used to make highly exclusive radical right frames more compatible with mainstream voters or political ideas.

All of the participating national teams and scholars (see List of Contributors above) were thus asked to write contextual reports on the above mentioned topics on the basis of their national data collection. The national teams followed detailed guidelines in developing their country reports. The focus was both on the issues, which had been given priority in the debates (how they had been addressed), as well as crucial silences, i.e. issues, which had not been debated (see the Research Guide in Annex 1).

The synthesis report consists of the following sections: the background and electoral results of extreme right wing parties in the eight outlined countries (their place and role, history, extent of public support); the seven European parties’ 2014 EP-election results and the EP party group formation (discussion of the EP-elections, and the negotiations in regards to the EP party groups); the parties’ framing of migration and intra-EU mobility, gender and family; and finally a conclusion, which will combine these topics. The conclusion debates the future role of the extreme right wing parties’ prospects within the EP, for example the importance of the differences, the prospects of forming a joint political force within the EP, and the influence on mainstream political parties. It finally reflects upon the impacts of the refugee and immigration crisis that currently challenges common European solutions, and makes the limits to European solidarity visible.
2. COUNTRY CONTEXTS

Before focusing specifically on the radical right parties from the seven EU member states and Israel, and their rhetoric on the outlined issues, it is important to acknowledge the broader transnational and national contexts in which they emerged, and in which their political agendas have been formulated. Very broadly speaking, the parties analysed here represent Southern Europe (Italy and Spain), Northern Europe (the Netherlands and Denmark), continental Europe (Germany), and Eastern and Central Europe (Hungary and Croatia). These seven EU MS have developed diverse welfare policy regimes (see e.g. Esping-Andersen, 1990, Bohle and Greskovits, 2012) and gender regimes (see e.g. Lister et al., 2007; Pascal & Kwak, 2005; Mishtal, 2015), as well as divergent migration experiences and positions vis-à-vis religion or religious authorities.

Generally speaking, one can distinguish between four Western European welfare state models: the Nordic (to which Denmark and the Netherlands adhere), the Continental (Germany), the Anglo-Saxon, and the Mediterranean (Italy and Spain) (Sapir, 2005). The Nordic countries have the “highest levels of social protection and universal welfare provision” (Sapir, 2005: 5), and they strongly focus on the labour market and “active” policy instruments. The Continental models “rely extensively on insurance-based, non-employment benefits and old-age pensions” (ibid: 6), whilst the Mediterranean focuses on old-age pensions, and consists of a highly segmented entitlement system. The welfare systems in the Eastern Central European countries are still in the development process. During the state socialist regime, social policies were based on “heavily subsidised foods and rents, full employment, the relatively high wages of workers, and the provision of free or cheap health, education and cultural services” (Deacon, 1993; Deacon, 2000), as well as on “old age pensions; health-related transfers and family benefits”, additionally supported by the systems of employee benefits and consumer subsidies (Fajt, 1999). After the collapse of the Communist bloc, the Eastern European countries have begun transitioning towards a new model of handling their social issues. The developments that have unfolded vary, and cannot easily be captured in the welfare typology developed initially for the “Western settings”. Despite the differences in how these states approach the social policy areas, the post-communist welfare regimes are characterized by “the supremacy of the social insurance system, high coverage, but relatively low benefit levels and the identification of the social security systems with the experience of the Soviet past” (Aidukaite, 2009).

The current gender regimes in Eastern and Western Europe developed under different circumstances. In the Eastern bloc, the literature talks about the phenomenon of women’s emancipation from above, as it was enacted by the socialist state through relevant comprehensive legislation and social policies. The state socialist regimes introduced both laws and measures that encouraged and enabled female participation in the paid labour force, increased their educational opportunities, and improved women’s control over their reproductive capacities (sexual education, access to contraception, and legal abortion). However, little was done to reorganize the gendered division of labour in the domesticity, consequently broadly defined care work remained almost exclusively the women’s domain, and the states provided subsidized services, which enabled women to reconcile family and employment. The dual-earner family model was the normative one. The women’s participation in the paid labour force reached between 70-78 per cent in this period. After the collapse of the socialist regimes, these attainments began to be criticised as forced upon women, undermining the natural differences between sexes, and for being corruptive for the family life. The strong patriarchal and conservative discourses set the way for non-egalitarian legislation, and were further paralleled by the aggressive neo-liberal reforms. The results were disadvantageous for women, and meant, among other things, substantial limitation of state subsidizing services, legislation that does not protect young women - potential mothers or young mothers - on the labour market, low activity rates for women, low participation of women in politics, and a weak civil society. In the early phases of the transformation toward the liberal market economy, the dual earner family model was challenged as an inheritance of the communist past. However, the economic as well as social realities proved that the return of the male bread winner/female carer family model was impossible to reinstate. Relevant policies that acknowledge the current socio-economic actualities have been unfolding slowly (Pascal & Kwak, 2005; Mishtal, 2015).
Oppositely to the former socialist states, the Western European countries witnessed a gradual undermining of the traditional family model (one earner/one carer), and brought about by the increase in women’s labour market participation, the decline of marriage, and increase in divorces, as well as rising number of births outside of marriage. The “old” traditional model of the family has been replaced or paralleled by several newly emerged arrangements: the one earner model (e.g. single parent household), one and a half earner model (in most Western European settings), one and three quarter earner model, or two earners model (e.g. the Netherlands, Denmark). Despite these profound transitions, none of the Western European countries, Scandinavian ones including, proposed measures that would equalize the position of women and men on the labour market and pension systems, as well as would truly encourage men to participate in care work. Summing up, the work–life balance remains one of the most difficult and contested issues across the EU, with a tendency to make individuals rather than states responsible for reconciling incompatible obligations (Pascal & Lewis, 2004).

![Gender Equality Index](image)

![Labour Market Participation](image)

![Domestic Care Work](image)

![Knowledge](image)

![Power](image)

![2015 Labour Market Participation (According to Nationality)](image)

Source: EIGE Gender Equality Index 2015
Almost until the end of the 20th century, the role of religion in Europe was mostly conceptualized through the thesis on increasing secularization among European populations. Indeed, when compared to other continents, Europe stood out in terms of a decline of religious beliefs and attendance in religious ceremonies across its Eastern and Western parts, albeit the phenomenon was enabled by different processes. There were a few noticeable exceptions, Poland and Ireland would be prominent examples. During the last decades, however, one observes broadly defined religion (in its orthodox or newly emerged forms) and religious discourses making space for themselves in the public sphere and in the politics specifically. Currently, the EU is a secular body that keeps no formal connections to any religion, and does not refer to religion in either the Constitution or any treaties. The largest religion within the EU structure is Christianity (72% of EU population), Roman Catholicism being its largest denomination (Eurobarometer, 2012). Declines in church attendance and in religious beliefs, as well as the increasing secularization, have been prevailing tendencies in most EU countries (East and West) over the last several decades. In 2010 there was, on average, 51% of the EU citizens who believed in a God, 26% believed in “sort of spirit or life force”, 20% declared themselves as non-believers, while 3% did not answer (Eurobarometer, 2010: 381).

The most religious state in the EU is Malta (94% believed in God), while the Czech Republic is the least religious one. For the states analysed in this report, the Eurobarometer poll in 2010 showed the following results: Italy 74%, Croatia 69%, Spain 59%, Hungary 45%, Germany 44%, Denmark 28%, and the Netherlands 28% (Ibid.). The declaration of belief in God does not necessarily translate in regular performing of religious practices. For example, the mass attendance in predominantly Catholic Spain is low despite high percentage of those who declare themselves believers. At the same time in spite of low formal attendance to the Church among Spanish citizens, the Spanish Roman Catholic Church has become increasingly more influential in politics. Across the EU, religiosity is more common among elderly, females, low level of education, and those who sympathize with the right wing ideologies (Eurobarometer, 2005). In allegedly secularizing Europe, the Vatican in particular regularly calls attention to the supposed hostility of the EU towards religion that, among other things, manifests itself through rejection of references to Christianity in the major EU documents or approval of same sex marriages, which is against the Church’s teachings. Immigration has brought prominence to religions that previously were marginal for European landscape, particularly Islam. In 2009 it was estimated there were 13 million Muslims in the EU (Miller, 2009). The countries with the largest Muslim populations are France, Germany, the United Kingdom and Italy.

Migration – both from within the EU and outside of it – is becoming an issue on the policy agenda across the EU. There is a considerable disproportion in numbers of migrants – received and sent – among the EU states. Considering intra-EU mobility, the Northern European MS are usually referred as ‘receiving countries’ in regards to labour migration. The entrance of the ten Eastern European MS into the EU has led to high levels of migration of labourers and students to other EU MS, turning them into ‘sending’ countries. The Southern European MS are both sending and receiving countries. Regarding migration from outside the EU, the Northern and Southern European MS have witnessed a large increase in Muslim immigrants during the last two decades, yet, this has been less the case for the Eastern European countries. At the same time, one must be careful with the above mentioned labels of sending and receiving, since the Eastern European countries, most often portrayed as so-called sending countries, are not free from problems related to migration. Poland, for example, is currently struggling to handle somewhere between 500.000 and 1.000.000 Ukrainian labourers, who are either legal, semi-legal or illegal migrants. Since the early 1990s, Hungary experienced an in-take of Hungarians born in its neighbouring countries, while Croatia still experiences problems in regards to the ethnic minorities of displaced Serbs, and Bosnians, who fled to the country during the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina (Minority Rights Group International, n.d.). While migration might not be such a salient issue for some of the East and Central European countries, in their case, nationalist inclusion and exclusion is articulated in relation to their inside minorities, and particularly the Roma, and their co-ethnics living in neighbouring states (Hungarians in Romania, Slovakia, Ukraine, Serbia and Austria).
In the following section, the eight radical right parties included in this synthesis report will be introduced, together with their specific country contexts.

2.1 Croatia - Croatian Party of Rights dr. Ante Starčević (Hrvatska stranka prava dr. Ante Starčević)

The contemporary Croatian radical and extreme right emerged at the turn of the 1980s and 1990s during the tumultuous period of the collapse of Yugoslavia, the establishment of the Republic of Croatia in 1991, and the war with Serbia that ended in 1995. These events marked the Croatian social, cultural and political landscape in several profound ways. Among them was the rise of xenophobia, particularly towards the Serbian population, the emergence of the Catholic Church and Catholicism as an influential cultural and political force, as well as the strengthening of a non-egalitarian gender regime. The latter took place during the transformation towards democracy in the early 1990s, a period marked by strong patriarchal and conservative discourses, which called for the restoration of “proper” relations between the sexes, allegedly shattered by the top-down emancipation of women, forced by the state socialist regime. At the same time, the democratization process resulted in a relatively strong and well institutionalized women’s movement, which contributed to the passing of comprehensive gender equality policies, which are relatively advanced for the region, in the mid-2000s. These developments form the background of the ideological foundations of the contemporary Croatian far right. The literature also marks a link between present day Croatian far right and the historical Ustasha movement; a fascist, ultranationalist, Catholic and terrorist organization, active in the period between 1929 and 1945. The movement is held responsible for the extermination of hundreds of thousands of non-Croats (Serbs, Jews, Roma) during the Second World War.

The scholarship on the subject characterizes the contemporary Croatian far right as informed by the ideology of territorial expansionism, militarism, and isolationism. It promotes national exclusiveness, demonstrating particular intolerance toward the Serbian population. Further, strong traditionalism, conservative family values, and non-democratic authoritarian principles are strong components of this ideological formation. The Croatian far right often demonstrates its strong affiliation with Catholicism. It favours the ideal of “social equality and security for all” despite its state socialist heritage (Grdešić, 1999, as cited in Šipić, 2015).

The populist radical right parties in Croatia do not have any significant political influence. Two reasons are proposed to explain this relative lack of power. First, the Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ) – the ruling party in the 1990s, which underwent a transformation from a radical populist towards mainstream conservative position in the 2000s – has successfully embraced certain elements of those parties’ rhetoric, and marginalized them politically. The second reason is the fragmented nature of the populist radical right, which makes it ineffectual at gaining support during elections. That being said, the total of 7.97 per cent gathered by those parties during the 2011 parliamentary elections points to a potential to build a strong radical right party.

During the elections in 2014, the Croatian Party of Rights - dr. Ante Starčević (HSP AS) was part of the six party coalition, led by the earlier mentioned HDZ. Due to the specificity of the electoral procedure in Croatia, HSP AS was the only right-wing party that had success during the elections. It is a nativist party, which was founded in 2009 by Ruža Tomašić, its first president. During the 2011 national elections and the 2013 European Parliament elections (in April 2013, three months before Croatia officially joined the EU), the HSP AS won one seat. In the 2014 EP-elections, Tomašić was the only elected candidate from the HSP AS, and she is currently serving her second term in the EP. Tomašić’s re-election to the EP is interpreted as her personal achievement, resulting from her popularity, rather than the accomplishment of the right-wing ideology in Croatia (Šipić, 2015). The success of the HSP AS was short lived though. Soon after her election, Tomašić left the party, whilst declaring the death of the right-wing ideology. Her subsequent alliance with the British Conservatives in the EP was not received well by her former party colleagues. Since 2015, Tomašić has been acting as the president of the Croatian Conservative Party.
Besides HSP AS, a coalition of 8 right-wing parties, the Alliance for Croatia, ran unsuccessfully in the 2014 elections. Founded in early 2014, the Alliance’s intention was to unite for the EP-elections and the national elections in 2015.

2.2 Denmark - Danish People’s Party (Dansk Folkeparti)

In order to understand the development of the Danish radical right and its perception of the nation, one must take the history of the Danish welfare state into account. Research demonstrates the legacy of Social Democracy in the articulation of the close relations between the nation, the people and the welfare state (Korsgaard, 2004). This goes back to the 1930s, when the Danish Social Democratic Party was in power, and redefined the people, by linking it not only to the nation, but to the struggle for democracy and social welfare. After the Second World War, social democracy was strengthened, and a broad political consensus about the evolution of a universal welfare state and social equality was established. Since the early 1970s, one of the hallmarks of Nordic welfare policies has been the emphasis on employment, together with ‘defamilialization’ of the responsibility for providing for welfare. The extended public responsibility for care for children below the age of three years has contributed to women’s economic independence, and has worked as a pre-condition for the high level of female labour market participation (Borchorst and Siim, 2002). Thus working mothers has become a central part of the Danish welfare and gender regime with gender equality as a key value and part of the national belonging (Siim and Stoltz, 2015).

In terms of religion, Denmark is somewhat paradoxical: The country still has a state-church, the Evangelic Lutheran Church of Denmark, known as the Danish People’s Church [Den Danske Folkekirke]. At the same time, the Danish population is considered to be highly secular. The state’s support for the Church of Denmark today is said to be primarily managerial and administrative in character. Since the Constitution of 1849 granted citizens full religious freedom, membership of the Church of Denmark depends on individual free choice. Although about 80 per cent of the population is member of the Church of Denmark, weekly church attendance is quite low—around 2.5 percent (Bech Pedersen, 2013). Though freedom of worship is stipulated in the Constitution, Denmark’s history is characterized by limited immigration, which only began in 1980. Thus, there is a lack of religious diversity, even though Islam is becoming the largest minority religion in Denmark, with about 5% of the population (Jacobsen, 2016).

Since Denmark’s EU-membership of 1973, European integration and increased immigration from countries outside the EU has reactivated questions about the meaning of the people: Who belong to the people, how to define the borders of the nation and how to link the national and social questions have again become controversial political issues, and this debate has increased over the years. The social welfare and the immigration debate are two very important factors that have contributed to the rise of the Danish radical right.

In the 1980s, the first Danish populist right-wing party appeared, namely the Danish Progress Party (FrP) [Fremskridtspartiet], which was characterised by a strong tax protest and anti-state position. In 1993, Pia Kjærsgaard left the party after disagreement with the charismatic party leader, and instead created the Danish People’s Party (DF) in 1995. During the last 20 years, DF has become one of the most successful nativist parties in Denmark and in Europe. Its success is tightly connected with the polarisation of the Danish electorate regarding the immigration question. Danish populist right wing voters are currently the least tolerant towards ethnic and cultural difference, and perceive immigration as a direct threat to national identity and security (Meret, 2010; Thomsen, 2006). These political views intertwine with decreasing trust in the political and social institutions, confirming the strong link between anti-immigration, ethnocentrism and populist dissatisfaction. DF’s ‘pro-welfare turn’ in 1995 is crucial for understanding the transformation of the contemporary Danish version of populism and nationalism. Thus, in the welfare welcoming Scandinavian context, merging a (moderate) pro-welfare orientation with anti-establishment positions, Euroscepticism, and the ‘defence’ of the nation against the threatening Others, the party has managed to differentiate between the native majority and the immigrants (Meret and Siim, 2013).
The Danish People’s Party has gained its authority and popularity by making its rhetoric more compatible with the mainstream of the Danish political spectrum. This is particularly noticeable with the party’s more approving approach to the EU, as well as with its more tolerant attitude towards alternative family arrangements and gay marriage. The latter can partly be explained by the more relaxed attitude towards religion, which characterises the Danish population, as albeit the state religion being Evangelical Christianity, “Christianity as a religion does not characterize the life of any large segment of the population” (Dencik, 2006). Yet, the party has remained firm in its endorsement of restrictive immigration politics. Moreover, remarkably, this strong anti-immigration stance has been gradually picked up by the mainstream parties. One can argue that under the influence of the DF, the Danish Liberal Party’s and the Conservative Party’s views on immigration and refugees have moved toward the right, while the tone of the Social Democrats has been sharpened (Siim & Nissen, 2015).

The Danish People’s Party experienced its first notable success during the 2013 municipal elections. DF won approximately 10% of the votes, which made it the third largest municipal party after the Social Democrats and the Liberal Party. It became influential in big cities such as Copenhagen and Aarhus, and currently has a decisive voice in numerous municipalities. During the 2014 EP-elections, the Eurosceptic DF obtained 26.6 % of the votes, which meant outdoing the two traditionally biggest parties - the Social Democrats and the Danish Liberal Party – and introducing three MEPs to the EP⁴. According to the national surveys, the level of support for the party is currently around 20 per cent (MEGAFAON, 2016).

2.3 Germany – Alternative for Germany (Alternative für Deutschland)

Germany is considered as a Continental welfare regime, with a relatively Conservative family regime, premised on a division of waged work and care work. Previously, childcare institutions were only part time, since mothers were expected to stay home taking care of the children (Ostner et al., 2003). This has started to change, but still, the employment rate of women remains far from the Europe 2020 goal of 75% of the adult population (20- 64 years) (EIGEs Gender Equality Index, 2015). Hence, even though Germany’s employment rate for women is currently above the European average of 61.9, it is still far behind countries like Denmark and the Netherlands. Lately, there has been progress in gender equality in the domain of politics, for example with political initiatives to improve the situation of women in decision-making, with the adoption of a law on quota for women on boards in 2014 (BBC, 2014).

In regards to religion, the majority of Germans are Christians, divided between the Roman Catholic Church (29.9 percent of the population, mainly in West Germany) and the Protestant Evangelical Church (28.9 percent, mainly in East) (Fowid, 2016). However, a study conducted in 2008 showed a strong division between East and West Germany regarding believers in God and atheists, as 46.1 percent of East Germans defined themselves as strong atheists, whilst only 4.9 percent gave this response in West Germany (Smith, 2012). This is argued to both be due to East Germany’s Soviet past, but also the fact that the Protestant Church is “in steep decline with twice as many people leaving it every year as joining” (Thompson, 2012). This dissimilar religious confession, combined with the two different German political systems in the aftermath of the Second World War, partly explains the prevailing division of East and West Germany on numerous issues. A German study from 2015 showed that West German ordinary households are still the most prosperous, and the least prone to poverty. Yet, the East and West German life expectancy and health risks have become rather similar. Considering gender issues, due to the socialist legacy, more East German women participate in the labour force (75% to 70), and they return much earlier to the labour market after having given birth, which also relates to the fact that East Germany has more child care facilities (Damm et al., 2015).

Considering German radical and extreme right-wing parties, until very recently, the Nazi regime history had made them unwelcome in Germany, which consequently impacted on these parties’ results at the elections. Thus, albeit having extreme right-wing fractions, which either were national socialist-oriented (or Neo-nazis, e.g. the National

⁴ Anna Rosbach, who had entered the EP with Messerschmidt in 2009, later defected and became a non-attached MEP.
Democratic Party of Germany) or pertaining to the Elitist racists and xenophobic anti-Muslim groups (nationalist and social Darwinist beliefs, e.g. the Republikaner Party) (Schellenberg, 2013), they never managed to become a prominent voice in the German debate.

However, with the steady increase in immigrant numbers, anti-immigrant and xenophobic sentiments have been on the rise in the German population, especially expressed against Muslims (Schellenberger, 2015). Thus, the earlier reservations against the right-wing are seemingly disappearing, and similar to other European countries, Germany has witnessed an increase of the radical right discourse. This has for instance been visible recently, in the rise of the PEGIDA-movement (Patriotic Europeans Against the Islamization of the West). The movement not only objects to the many Muslim migrants in Germany, but also oppose the so-called “Lügenpresse” (lying press) and the political representatives in the German Parliament. This rising discontent, which mainly has been present in Eastern Germany, but also increasingly in the Western part of the country, originates in the “protests against the welfare reforms passed in the early 2000s, the anger at euro bailouts and demonstrations against massive construction projects such as Stuttgart 21” (Aman et al., 2015). Moreover, it is also based on a sentiment that Germany has allowed too many migrants to enter the country, something that is in opposition to the German mainstream parties, which, at least until recently, have voiced a very accommodating stance towards both immigrants and refugees (Schellenberger, 2013).

In the words of Schellenberger, “[t]he ethnicization of problematic social relations or individual dispositions creates favourable conditions for a radical right-wing perception of reality” (2013: 151). This could partly explain the recent rise of a new right-wing populist party, the Alternative for Germany (AfD), which was founded in April 2013. Its agenda builds on neoliberal, Christian fundamentalist, antifeminist, national conservative, and men’s rights discourses. The party program of 2014 focused on criticising the EU monetary union, and its political platform at the EP-elections of 2014 was based on its anti-Euro stance. Within the party, there are several distinct political factions and groups of interests that can be identified as neoliberals, clerical-aristocratic and new right wing factions. However, despite persistent internal conflicts, all groups are unified by the general belief in a so-called natural order of social inequalities. Disagreements pertain to details, for example whether those inequalities concern various social groups (neoliberals), or genders (clerical-aristocratic) or between Germans and non-Germans (new right wing). The resistance towards so-called gender ideology and solutions aiming to further gender equality is at the core of the party agenda, and can be found in all three fractions. Within only a few years, the party has marked its presence on the political scene by introducing its members into the municipalities of the city states of Hamburg and Bremen, to the three State Parliaments in the eastern part of the country, and finally by entering the EP.

At the EP-elections of 2014, AfD obtained 7.1% of the votes, which meant that the party could send 7 members to the EP. At the national level, the party is also increasing its vote share drastically, and the results of the three first Landtag (State Diet) elections on March 13, 2016, infer that the party is gaining prominence all over Germany (Gathmann & Wittrock, 2016). The current opinion polls indicate that AfD would obtain around 12.5% of the votes at the national elections (Zicht & Cantow, 2016).

2.4 Hungary - Jobbik Movement for a Better Hungary (Jobbik Magyarországért Mozgalom)

As the country was part of the communist bloc until 1989, Hungary brings to the contemporary period an important tradition of far right extremism from the interwar period. This tradition is based on two main elements. First: border revisionism against neighbouring countries. Romania, Serbia, Slovakia and what is now Ukraine all gained large territories from Hungary in the Great War peace treaties, meaning also that larger segments of the Hungarian

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5 It must be mentioned that the party has undergone a great transformation in recent years, as the party’s founder, Bernd Lucke, was forced to quit AfD in July 2015, due to a “bitter power struggle with the group’s populist rightwingers” (Wagstyl, 2015). Under the new leader, Frauke Petry, the party has become much more like the other radical right parties, going from a nationalist-conservative line of argumentation to a party based on an anti-immigrant, anti-refugee and islamophobic stand point.

6 The remaining State Diets will have their elections later on, so it is hard to say whether this is a general German trend.
population became citizens of these countries. The hostility towards neighbouring nation states and groups is crucial to the traditions of right-wing extremism in Hungary. The other element is organized and even militarized forms of anti-Semitism. It is these elements that grounded the extreme right ideology in the early post-transition years in Hungary that is in the early 1990s.

The 2000s witnessed the emergence of a new kind of radical right. The political party analysed here, Jobbik (Jobbik Movement for a Better Hungary), has shaken the Hungarian politics. There are several factors informing the context in which the current Hungarian populist radical right emerged. The first is the increasing Euroscepticism in Hungary that has brought an idea of the EU as positing a threat for national interest, rather than creating developmental opportunities. The second is radicalization of the Hungarian conservative-nationalist right. After 2010, the initially centrist conservative-nationalist FIDESZ government not only became increasingly Eurosceptic, but also began employing the language of the far right, and took measures once proposed by the far right. The third factor is the absence of a legitimate and unified left wing and liberal opposition to parties in government since 2010, as well as the absence of an EU criticism by the Hungarian left. As a result, traditionally left-wing political issues, such as labour and social rights, are only addressed by the far right in a nationalist context. Regarding the strategies employed by the party itself, Jobbik could successfully “rejuvenate” the Hungarian far right by appealing to the young, particularly male, demographic, and it has gained wide political support due to its anti-establishment politics, the mobilization of far right organizations, particularly the far right youth through paramilitary and youth organizations, and the exploitation of anti-Roma sentiments in the Hungarian population. Importantly, the employment of anti-Roma rhetoric complements and even replaces at points anti-Semitism, characteristic for the Hungarian extreme right in the past. In Hungary, the anti-Roma sentiments extend beyond the far right constituency. Further, as the subsequent analyses will demonstrate, Jobbik’s charismatic leader Kristina Morvai often employs a women’s rights discourse in her rhetoric, and the party’s agenda touches upon several women specific problems. It is uncommon for both European far right parties and for the Hungarian context.

The Hungarian context is characterized by a non-egalitarian gender regime that, similarly to other states of the Eastern bloc, emerged in the early phases of the transformation toward democracy. The re-patriarchilization of the public and private, promoted in the early 1990s, was to restore a social order allegedly upset by the emancipatory legislation and policies of the state socialism. The women’s rights discourse is almost absent from the Hungarian political discourse and the media, while the Hungarian women’s movement is marginal to the political arena. In comparison to some other European radical right parties (e.g. German AfD or HSP AS), Jobbik refers to Christian values only occasionally. This may result from the fact that Hungary is predominantly an atheist country, in which none of the Christian denominations has absolute dominance. The political influence of the churches is relatively weak, yet, increasing after 2010.

Founded in 2003, Jobbik’s breakthrough came in the EP-elections of 2009, where it gained 14.8% of the votes, and secured three seats in the EP. The party currently holds 11.56% of the mandates in the Hungarian national parliament, is represented by three MEPs in the European Parliament, and several mayors and local councillors at the local level. Jobbik has 40 percent more supporters than the second largest party in the opposition. The party is currently supported by 14 percent of the voters, while Fidesz and KDNP, the governing parties, are supported by 23% (TÁRKI, 2015). Data also shows a decrease in the gap between the constituency of Jobbik and Fidesz-KDNP.

In addition, among all parties, Jobbik has the highest proportion of supporters among youth, particularly within the 18-24 age group (Rudas, 2010). Thus, the data indicates a remarkable strengthening of Jobbik, which has now become the second strongest political party in the country, with a potential to influence European politics as well.
2.5 Israel – The Jewish Home (Ha'Bait Ha'Yeudi) and Israel our Home (Yisrael Beytenu)

Nativism is fundamental to the radical right in Israel, and it is based on three intertwined political positions. The first one is the aspiration that all Jews have a right to be citizens of the State of Israel, even if they were born abroad, and they should be encouraged to immigrate to Israel. The second position entails the right of the Israeli state to the Occupied Palestinian Territories. The third assumes the repudiation of any political or ideological stance (for example multiculturalism or liberalism) that may posit a challenge to the two former claims. Since its commencement, the Israeli socio-political landscape has been shaped by an ongoing debate on the terms of the inclusion of a number of different social groups, most commonly the Palestinian citizens of Israel (Israeli Arabs), the Jewish immigrants from Arab countries (Mizrahim), and immigrants from the former Soviet Russia. The conditions of inclusion and exclusion in this truly immigrant society are an object of negotiations and a subject of change. However, there seems to be an agreement with respect to the exclusion of the Arab minority. These ongoing debates lay the foundations for the pervasiveness and strength of populist right-wing parties in Israel (Filc, 2010), which operate in a system of so-called ‘ethnic democracy’. This is a term to describe a state strongly identifying with one ethnic group, rather than with all of its citizens. Being fuelled by ethnic nationalism, such a state intends to favour the interests of one particular group over others, and wishes to craft a homogeneous nation. Despite having equal political rights, minorities are defined as a threat, and as such kept under surveillance, and their access to power and participation in decision making processes is limited (Smooha, 1997).

Currently, the two main Israeli radical-right parties are The Jewish Home (Ha'Bait Ha'Yehudi) and Israel our Home (Yisrael Beytenu). The Jewish Home was founded in 2008, and is a Zionist religious party representing primarily nationalist orthodox Jews. The party aims at strengthening the Jewish identity of the Israeli state, and supports a right-wing stance regarding the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. It strongly supports the Jewish settlements in the Occupied Palestinian Territories, as well as disapproves both the withdrawal from the occupied land, and the establishment of a Palestinian state.

Founded in 1999, Israel our Home is a nationalist party mostly preoccupied with interests of immigrants from the former Soviet Russia. On its website, Israel our Home defines “three basic principles” as “the cornerstones of our worldview: Unity of the Nation; The State of Israel as the National Homeland of the Jewish People; and No Citizenship without Allegiance” (Yisrael Beytenu, n.d.). ‘Unity of the nation’ indicates that conciliation between the different political groups within Israel is of bigger importance than the idea of “Greater Israel”. Consequently, the party’s peace plan with the Palestinians includes an exchange of territories and populations. The second principle assumes Israel as being the state of the Jewish people (not of all its citizens). Finally, the third principle conveys the belief in sameness of rights and obligations for all Israeli citizens (Muslims, Christians, Druze, etc.).

After the national electoral campaign in March 2015, the two parties entered the parliament. However, their vote shares were smaller than at the previous elections. The Jewish Home gained 8 seats and Israel our Home 6. The 2015 elections brought yet another victory for the Likud party. However, with only 30 out of 120 seats, the party’s leader Netanyahu struggled to form a government. He finally managed to assemble a coalition that gave him a narrow majority in the parliament (61 out of 120 seats), by giving away a number of important ministerial posts to other parties. The Jewish Home entered the coalition with the Likud Party, while Israel our Home joined the opposition (Gal & Halevy, 2015).

2.6 Italy – North League (Lega Nord)

Nativist discourses in Italy date back to the 1920s, when the Fascist rhetoric centred on the themes of the protection of the “Italian values and historical roots, the traditional family.” Following the alliance with the Nazi regime of Germany, a racist component, mainly anti-Semitic, was further added to the discourse. Due to the Fascist legacy, nativist discourses were not employed explicitly by the right wing in post-war Italy. However, it must be noted that the
chief ideological successor of the Fascist party, the Italian Social Movement (Movimento Sociale Italiano) did not cease to employ nationalist rhetoric, and continued endorsing the selected elements of the Italian culture, such as the traditional family or its strong ties with Catholicism.

The early 1990s witnessed a rise of a new power on the right side of the Italian political scene, which explicitly utilized nativist rhetoric: the Lega Nord (LN). Established in 1991, the LN originally merged several regionalist parties (e.g. the Venetian League in the Veneto Region, the Lombard League in Lombardy, and the Piemont Liber in Piedmont). After its commencement, the LN’s agenda was built around an ethno-regionalist ideology. The party argued for the independence of Padania, defined as a homogenous nation with a distinct ethnic identity and historical past. This early regional nationalism resulted in a discursive production of southern Italians as the racialized Others. However, after the arrival of Albanian immigrants in the late 1990s, the LN began to define the non-Italian, non-western migrant as the ‘other’. Already at the turn of the century, during its coalition with the Second Berlusconi Government (2001-2005), the LN marked the political scene with its strong anti-immigration, anti-Islam and anti-Roma stance. Thus since the 1990s the Lega Nord has deployed several forms of nationalist exclusions: of fellow Italian citizens from Southern part of the state, EU migrant labourers, Roma, and (Muslim) migrants from outside of the EU. The strongly nationalist and nativist stance of the party is justified as a way of protecting Italian culture, women, traditional family, Catholic values, national security and welfare system. The Catholic Church, which exercises enormous political, social and cultural influence in Italy, has never openly supported the LN anti-immigration discourse, yet, there are overlaps between the LN’s and the conservative bishops’ position in particular with regard to Islam (Guolo, 2003). The LN’s conservative family stance is expressed in the context of delayed implementation of gender equality policies compared with other EU member states. State feminism in Italy is described as “traditionally weak and strongly dependent on the color of the cabinet” (Lombardo & Bustelo, 2012). Some progress in gender equality has occurred during the recent years though, however, reproductive health, political representation of women, and work-family balance are of particular concern. After the economic crisis of 2008, women proved skillful providers for their families, which has initiated transformation of traditional gender order (Rosselli, 2014).

During the elections of 2014, Lega Nord scored 6.15% of the votes, which was the fourth best result in Italy. The five candidates of the Lega Nord entered the EP. Besides LN, another right-wing party, Brothers of Italy (Fratelli d’Italia), ran in the elections, but with only 3.66% of the votes, none of their candidates entered the EP. The party was founded in 2012 by several radical right-wing members of the National Alliance (Alleanza Nationale, set up in 1994), who felt dissatisfied with AN’s growing disconnection from the nativist discourse.

2.7 The Netherlands – Party for Freedom (Partij voor de Vrijheid)

Up until the 1980s, the Netherlands was perceived as an open-minded society, which was tolerant of diversity, with an open eye to the world, and a history of religious diversity. Such an attitude fits well to the core economic activities of the country; trade, transport, export and banking. It was, therefore, almost imperative that the Netherlands would become one of the countries founding the EU in 1958. The first signs of the unsustainability of this open minded attitude were displayed already in the 1980s, against the guest-workers from predominantly Italy, Spain, Morocco and Turkey. This resulted in the first protests against competition for work, income and housing by ‘outsiders’.

The Netherlands was the first European country in the post-war period with an extreme right wing party in parliament. The Centre Party [Centrum Partij] (CP) was represented from 1982-1986, and was a single issue party, purely gaining votes on the basis of its anti-migration rhetoric, which was characterized by racist, xenophobe and even national socialist statements. The party was met with a political cordon sanitaire, which excluded it from mainstream politics. It was thus only at the end of the century that the Netherlands saw a revitalisation of right-wing politics. Reorganisations of the welfare state, which triggered a fear of losing social security and growing immigration, fuelled support for the populist parties that highlighted national values, cultural heritage and isolationism. Firstly, Pim Fortuyn
obtained success with the *List Pim Fortuyn* (*Lijst Pim Fortuyn*). The main explanation of this success is that he gave voice to the discontent of working and lower middle class with immigration, cultural difference, and the reforms of the welfare state. After the national elections of 2002, *List Pim Fortuyn* became part of the Dutch government, yet, this was no success, and in 2007, the party ceased to be.

The current main Dutch populist radical right party, *Partij voor de Vrijheid* (*Party for Freedom*) (*PVV*), was founded in 2006, and its discourse employs elements of populism, nationalism, nativism, and authoritarianism. 2012 became quite a turning point in the PVV’s rhetoric: the once neoliberal and conservative party began to shape itself as a protector of the national welfare state (Kniijn & van Maaren, 2015), just as DF does in Denmark. Yet, the Dutch context is rather different than the Danish, as the welfare policy regime is not finalized, and despite it being categorized as a well-provided, universal, model, debates still exist regarding who is to finance its provisions (ibid.). This is where the protests of PVV against the reforms of all domains of the welfare state (healthcare, elderly care, social housing, pensions, and income policies) fit in. This protest goes hand in hand with a cultural discourse on national identity, cultural diversity, freedom of speech, and the loss of national politics due to ‘the power of Brussels’. The party explicitly blames the political elites, the EU, and the increasing number of migrants for the reduced social protection of the population.

Islam, internal mobility within the EU, and exclusion of “corrupted” state members like Romania and Bulgaria from the EU were central in PVV’s campaign during the 2009 EP-elections, where the party obtained 17 per cent of the votes. This unexpected success made PVV the second Dutch party after the *Christian Democratic Appeal*. The results of the municipal elections in March 2010 proved further growth of PVV’s popularity. Running in only two Dutch cities, the PVV won in Almere, and came second in the Hague. At the national elections in 2010, the PVV gained 24 out of 150 seats in the parliament, which made it the third biggest party in the country. Yet, at the 2014 national elections, PVV only won 6% of the votes, which meant nine seats in the House of Representatives. Similarly, despite being one of the most popular parties during the 2014 campaign, and obtaining 13.32 % of the votes (4 EP-seats), the PVV saw the result as a disappointment, as it had hoped for better results (Fontanella-Khan, 2014).

### 2.8 Spain – Plataforma per Catalonia (Platform for Catalonia)

Spain has a strong legacy of extreme right-wing ideologies and politics, as they informed much of the twentieth century developments in the country, particularly under the rule of General Franco (1937-75). Currently, it is estimated that there are around 20 right-wing extremist parties (that is of fascist or Falangist origin), and approximately 50 fascist or Neo-Nazi factions and movements. However, in the research on the mobilization of right-wing parties across Europe, Spain is a puzzling phenomenon. On the one hand, there is a seemingly fertile ground for the right-wing ideology to grow. In the 2000s, Spain accepted the highest influx of immigrants among the EU member states. It currently witnesses rising Islamophobic and anti-immigrant discourses, which are employed by the populist right-wing parties. On the other hand, since the death of Franco, and the state’s shift towards democracy, the Spanish extreme right has had little impact on the domestic or international political scenes. The 2014 elections brought yet another defeat for the formation of populist radical right political forces. This occurred despite several reform attempts, which transformed the Spanish right from a traditionalist movement with a strong Francoist legacy into a more ‘European’ type of extremism.

It is believed that the main reason for the inability of the Spanish right-wing parties to mobilize their constituencies lies in their obsolete discourse. Across Europe, Northern European countries are telling examples: the radical right has replaced explicitly racist rhetoric with nativist or culturalist arguments, so as to position themselves as defenders of Western culture against the conquest of Others (either from outside of Europe (Muslims) or Southern or Eastern Europe). Although such revamped xenophobia proves to be appealing for voters, Spanish right-wing parties have been unable to embrace a similar discourse. Another reason listed as potentially responsible for the lacking electoral success of the Spanish far right is the Spanish public discourse (towards EU migrants and the Muslim population), and
the on-going antagonism between groups of Spanish citizens over their loyalties to local (regional) identities. Suppressed under the dictatorship, ethnic nationalism erupted after Franco’s death. Debates over national belonging and cultural proximity also include the autochthones, and subsequently cause the fragmentation of the radical right scene, in which regional identity may have priority over the national identity, and national level exclusion. During the elections of 2014, some of the radical right parties signalled their support for the broadly defined Christian values. Importantly, such statements were made in the context of the recent growing political influence of the Spanish Roman Catholic Church, for whom the current government has made several generous concessions. The conservative views on gender and family of the Spanish radical right have a particularly interesting background. Within the last three decades, Spain has emerged as a pioneering EU member state in terms of gender equality policies; with a parity government, 36% political representation of women, a progressive legislation against gender, violence and a well consolidated institutional structure to enable relevant policies (Lombardo, 2009).

The literature differentiates between Spanish extreme and populist radical right parties. Five Spanish extreme right-wing parties ran unsuccessfully in the 2014 EP-Elections, obtaining around 0.4% of the total number of votes: The Spanish Phalanx of the CNSO (Falange Española de las JONS) obtained most votes (21,577 votes, 0.13%), followed by the ad-hoc alliances Social Impulse (Impulso Social) (17,774, 0.11%), Spain Underway (La España en Marcha) (LEM) (16,879 votes, 0.1%), as well as National Democracy (Democracia Nacional) (12,904 votes, less than 0.1%) and the Republican Social Movement (Movimiento Social Republicano) (8,875, less than 0.1%).

The Platform for Catalonia (Plataforma per Catalunya (PxC)), founded in 2002, is the main regional level right-wing populist party (van den Broek & Suárez-Fernández, 2015). Even though the party did not participate in the EP-elections, PxC is still the Spanish party that most closely aligns with the other parties analysed in this report. This is why we have chosen to focus on its framings of the outlined topics below. The party was founded in 2002, and from the outset, the party attempted to present an image similar to that of the populist radical right in other European countries, thus distancing itself from the ideology and symbols of Spain’s traditional right-wing extremist parties (Hernández-Carr, 2012: 93). Since its creation, the party has become increasingly hostile towards Muslims, and it criticizes the mainstream politicians, especially those adhering to the left side of the political spectrum. The party has a rather ambivalent stance on the status of Catalan autonomy, neither expressing strong support nor rejecting more independence.

At the local elections of 2011, the party obtained its best result thus far, as it became one of the main parties in the area around Barcelona. However, the party has lost momentum due to various circumstances, and its future political prominence is questionable, even though it has attempted to form a strong national party, in the shape of the Party for Freedom (Partido por la Libertad) (van den Broek & Suárez-Fernández, 2015)

This short overview has shown that the backgrounds and national contexts from which the eight populist radical right parties come are highly divergent, both in terms of their historical path, their gender and welfare regimes, their religion, as well as their forms of nationalist exclusion. These diverse contexts importantly feed into the way they frame their position concerning Europe and European citizenship.
3. Euroscepticism within Radical Right Parties as a Contextual Variable for Framing Migration, Diversity, Gender and the Family

A key contextual factor defining the ways in which radical right parties frame migration, diversity, gender and the family is Euroscepticism. The approach to European cooperation might be less important in defining the problem (the diagnosis), yet, it can be the case that Europe will be seen as causing some of the problems (for example the decay of family values in Italy). Attitudes on European cooperation will be foundational for devising policy interventions (prognosis) and allocating responsibility. The concept of Euroscepticism is used to capture the approach of these parties to European cooperation.

Euroscepticism is an elusive phenomenon, which is not only identified by radical right parties, but may refer to anti-EU sentiments among political parties on the right, as well as on the left side of the political spectrum. It originated within journalism and politics in Britain in the 1980s, and refers in general to skepticism towards increased European cooperation. Initially it was defined by Paul Taggart to contain “contingent and conditional opposition to European integration as well as total and unconditional opposition to it” (Taggart, 1998: 364). Yet, there is no scholarly agreement about how to define the concept of Euroscepticism. Scholars often emphasize different dimensions of the concept. One important dimension for the radical parties has been skepticism towards supranational solutions premised on national sovereignty, and the fear that the EU is a barrier to national identity and self-determination. This is often mixed with political skepticism, directed against the democratic deficit of the EU.

The literature also differentiates between hard and soft forms of Euroscepticism (Taggart and Szczerbiak, 2002). Hard Euroscepticism means ‘principled opposition to the EU and European integration’ (including withdrawal) and ‘soft Euroscepticism’ is ‘qualified opposition’ to particularly EU policies that may be seen as contrary to the ‘national interest’. Recent studies link Euroscepticism to populist politics and contestation (Leconte, 2015). Vasilopoulou (2009:4) identifies three types of Euroscepticism in his research on the European far right: the ‘rejecting’ parties, who are wholeheartedly against all aspects of European integration; the ‘conditional’ type, parties that are not against the EU cooperation principle, but against its practice and future, and the ‘compromising’ type, including parties accepting both the principle and the practice of EU, but are opposed to future integration.

Euroscepticism has spread during the last 20 years, where all European countries have seen the growth of radical right parties, who are either negative towards further European cooperation, or want their country to outright leave the EU. One indicator of Euroscepticism is the general trust in the European project among the population. Data from the Eurobarometer shows that trust in the European Union has fallen dramatically since the euro-crisis7. If Euroscepticism equals lack of faith in the EU institutions, it has been growing in all European countries, in the center as well as in the periphery, in the North as well as in the South. As a result, Euroscepticism is no longer limited to the far right or the far left, but has entered mainstream political parties as well (Brack & Startin, 2015).

Euroscepticism is still a key element of the radical right parties’ programs. New aspects of Euroscepticism have, however, been identified since the financial crisis, followed by the euro-crisis, and what is called economic skepticism is not only between Brussels and the populations of the member states, but may refer to a clash between the populations in Northern creditor countries, like Germany, and Southern debtor countries, like Italy and Spain (Torreblanca & Leonard, 2013). Arguably, the current refugee and migrant crisis has further challenged the EU institutions. On the one hand, the current situation has increased the need for common European solutions to the refugee crisis, but on the other, the differences in the countries’ geographical position and ideological positions towards refugees and migrants have created obstacles to European solutions and solidarity.

7 Since the beginning of the euro crisis, trust in the European Union has fallen from +10 to -22 percent in France, from +20 to -29 percent in Germany, from +30 to -22 percent in Italy, from +42 to -52 percent in Spain, from +50 to +6 percent in Poland, and from -13 to -49 percent in the United Kingdom (see Torreblanca & Leonard, 2013).
The focus in this report is on Euroscepticism within the selected radical right political parties in the seven analysed countries: Croatia, Denmark, Germany, Hungary, Italy, the Netherlands and Spain, as well as their position within the EP. The time and conditions of accession to the EU is an important aspect here. In our group of countries, we have three old member states: Italy, Germany and the Netherlands, one long-time, yet reluctant, EU member, Denmark, Spain, a member since 1986, after the collapse of the Franco regime, and two late accessions: Hungary (2004) and Croatia (2014). The report illustrates that the forms of Euroscepticism they use are influenced by national contexts. Although there are important similarities across the countries, there are also differences in the ideology of the selected parties and relations to the EU, influenced by the time of their accession, but also by the countries’ history, institutions, and by the countries’ specific opportunity structures. This can be illustrated by the development of the parties’ position in relation to the political group formation in the EP after the EP elections of 2014. One of the results is that the seven parties joined different political groups. The Danish Peoples’ Party (DF), and the German Alternative (AfD) are presently members of the European Conservative and Reformist Group (ECR), founded in 2009 by David Cameron. The only Croatian member, Tomašić, also joined the ECR, but later left the party to become the President of the Croatian Conservative Party. The Italian Lega Nord and the Dutch Party for Freedom joined the Europe of Nations and Freedom (ENF), while the Hungarian Jobbik remained an unaffiliated party. Currently, none of the analyzed parties are members of the Eurosceptic Europe of Freedom and Direct Democracy group, which is led by Nigel Farage from UKIP.

3.1 The EP Political Group Formation Process

The EP-political group formation at the dawn of the 8th European parliament session (2014-2019) gives important background information to the parties analysed for this report, illustrating well some of the incompatibilities in the political programs that emerge between the various radical right political parties currently in the EP.

The European Conservatives and Reformists group (ECR)

The ECR was founded in 2009 by David Cameron from the British Conservative Party. After the 2014 elections, the group entered a fierce competition with another rightist parliamentarian group - the Europe of Freedom and Direct Democracy - over new members. The admission of the two Nordic right-wing populist parties the Danish People’s Party and the Finns Party to the ECR was a very surprising move by the group (see e.g. Keating & Vogel, 2014). It was rather expected that ECR would reject DF’s application, just as it had done in 2009. This was due to the fear how an alliance of the British Conservatives, the biggest party in the group, with the once described as ‘toxic’ DF would be covered by the British media (The Economist, 2002).

There are issues on which DF and the ECR group do not reach agreement. One pertains to Turkey’s EU membership, which is supported by the ECR, but strongly rejected by DF. The party also voted against the new Commission constellation in the fall of 2014, in spite of the fact that the majority of the ECR-group voted in favour. However, as explained by the DF-MEP Vistisen, these divergent opinions have been permitted in the initial agreement, which allows DF to express opinions or vote in disagreement with the ECR group’s line (Bay-Larsen, 2014).

Furthermore, there were deliberations among the British Conservatives over whether the ECR’s alliance with the highly Eurosceptic German AfD was worth putting the good relations between London and Angela Merkel, the chancellor of Germany, at risk (Keating, 2014). Not only did the AfD finally join the ECR, but the charismatic Beatrix von Storch from the AfD also received the prominent function of representing the ECR in the area of gender politics.

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8 Israel is a special case. It is included in the report in relation to right-wing populism, but not in relation to Euroscepticism, since it is not a member of the EU.
After the elections, as the president of the HSP AS, Ruža Tomašić joined the ECR Group. It is her second term in office with ECR. When explaining her affiliation with the European Conservatives, Tomašić stated:

Protection of [Christian] values was, among other things, an important reason why I joined European conservatives and reformists. The group is very active in defending Christians in the Middle East, and the protection of our traditional Christian values in Europe is one of main political characteristics of its work in Parliament” (Tomašić, 2014c).

Her affiliation with ECR was interpreted as betrayal by Tomašić’s party colleagues. Soon after the elections, Tomašić announced the death of the right-wing ideology and left the HSP AS. She is currently listed as an independent member of the ECR group. Tomašić firmly rejected any possibility of cooperation with the ‘extremist’ parties like the National Front (HSP AS, 2014c).

As for today, the ECR group consists of 75 MEPs, mostly from Northern and Central Europe. The two largest parties in the group are the British Conservative Party (20 seats) and the Polish Law and Justice (18). They are followed by the German Alliance for Progress and Renewal (5), the Belgian New Flemish Alliance (4), DF (3), the Czech Civic Democratic Party (2), and the Italian Conservatives and Reformists (2). The other 21 ECR MEPs come from 17 different parties, or are currently independent members of the EP. ECR is the third largest political group in the 8th parliament.

Europe of Freedom and Direct Democracy (EFDD)

After the 2014 elections, the Europe of Freedom and Democracy group, under the leadership of Nigel Farage, experienced difficulties in surviving as a political group, as it was fighting the British Conservatives on the one hand, and Front National’s efforts to launch a new independent far-right group in the EP, on the other. Subsequently, the EFDD group witnessed the departure of several of its members to either ECR (for example the Danish People’s Party) or to the newly launched Europe of Nations and Freedom parliamentary group (e.g. Lega Nord). After major changes in its membership compared to the 7th parliamentary session, the group revamped itself, and consolidated under the new name of Europe of Freedom and Direct Democracy. It consists of 45 members, and the two largest parties are the UK Independence Party (22 seats) and the Italian 5-Star Movement (17). The remaining 6 seats are spread amongst 5 distinct parties.

Europe of Nations and Freedom (ENF)

For the first year of the 8th EP-session, the Dutch Partij voor de Vrijheid (PVV) and Lega Nord (LN) remained unaffiliated. During the 7th EP-session, the PVV did not enter any political group either, and therefore lacked significant influence in the parliamentarian work. However, already during the electoral campaign of 2014, the PVV made efforts to form a European far right fraction. It first contacted the French extreme right Front National (FN). Finding other possible collaborators proved difficult (EP procedure requires parties from at least 7 countries to register a political group). The immediate problem that hampered the establishment of a new group was the existence of the Europe of Freedom and Democracy Group. The leader of UKIP, Nigel Farage, did not wish to cooperate with Front National, due to the anti-Semitic elements in its agenda (Traynor, 2013). Furthermore, the Danish People’s Party and the Swedish Democrats had already selected other fractions. After negotiations, the PVV and FN ultimately allied with the Italian Lega Nord, the Belgian Vlaams Belang and the Freedom Party of Austria (FPÖ), forming an informal European Alliance for Freedom.

Despite socio-economic and cultural nationalism and strong Euroscepticism being at the core of these parties’ agendas, the members of the Alliance had a hard time achieving consensus on numerous issues, such as gay rights or freedom of religion. For instance, FN and FPÖ are openly anti-Semitic and homophobic, whereas the PVV is known for its pro-Israeli attitude and being in favour of gay rights. Believing firmly in the principle of religious freedom, FN opposes the PVV’s proposal to ban the Quran.
After the failed negotiations between the parties, the *European Alliance for Freedom* ceased to exist, but the overall project of launching a new right-wing fraction did not. FN pursued an idea of collaboration with and between these parties, and continued to search for other parties to form a political group. In October 2014, FN thus launched the *Movement for a Europe of Nations and Freedom*. The parties which previously affiliated with the Alliance joined the movement, apart from the PVV, which disliked the idea of the movement being financially supported by the EU. However, the PVV sustained efforts of forming a political group, since being a non-attached member effectively means no impact in the Parliament.

To make collaboration between the parties possible, FN limited the list of issues, the parties should agree on, to one: the principle of minimalising the authority of EU for domestic politics and strengthening competencies for the member states (MENF, n.d.). In June 2015, one year after the elections, the fraction welcomed the much needed two additional members – one MEP from the Polish *Congress of the New Right* and a British ex-member of UKIP, which made it possible to officially launch the *Europe of Nations and Freedom Group (ENF)*. As expected, Marine le Pen was elected the President of the ENF, whereas Marcel de Graaff (PVV) became the Vice President. The ENF parliamentary group consists of 38 members from 7 MS, and it is the smallest group in the 8th EP-session. 20 out of the 38 MEPs are from FN. Other members of the group include: *Lega Nord* (5 MEPS), the *Freedom Party of Austria* (4), PVV (4), the Polish *Congress of the New Right* (2), and two Independent MEPs: one from Romania (initially elected for the Romanian *Conservative Party*) and one from the UK (initially elected for UKIP).

**Non-Affiliated Party - Jobbik**

The Hungarian *Jobbik* remains an unaffiliated party. Morvai has claimed that she was not approached by Le Pen with an invitation to join the ENF group at any point of the negotiations. It is believed that the political stances of *Jobbik* are too controversial for ENF (Hungary Today, 2015).

### 3.2 Partial Conclusion

As visible from the patterns of affiliation with different EP groups, as well as from the party’s electoral programs, a variety of Eurosceptic positions emerge in the sample of radical right parties included in this report. Importantly, these range between conditional and compromising versions of Euroscepticism, but do not articulate rejecting positions. We find compromising Euroscepticism in Hungary and Croatia. Right-wing populist parties in these two countries (late accessions to the EU) emphasize the weakness and weak capacity of the EU to enforce norms, but not necessarily its legitimacy to do so. In the cases of the Croatian and Hungarian radical right, the EU simultaneously features as a threat (to national values or national economy for example), and a promise (for example its authority vis-à-vis corruptive local powers, funding to overcome economic crisis). Further, despite its skepticism towards the EU as undermining local identities and overwriting the competences of the members states, the LN also calls for EU interventions for example in regards to gender issues.

In contrast, the German, Dutch and Danish radical parties have a very limited understanding of EU prerogatives, at least as far as gender and family matters are concerned, and this makes them conditional Eurosceptics. The Dutch PVV seems most vocal in expressing its skepticism towards the potential cultural or financial benefits resulting from the EU membership in general. In line with its stance, the party consistently votes against proposals for new European laws in the EP. Meanwhile, the German and Danish parties have recently undergone a significant evolution from radically sceptical towards the EU to more moderate positions. During the electoral campaign, the DF did question the idea of a united Europe, however, now rather than being against the EU, the party negates its political impositions on the member states. It is argued that the party’s shift from ‘hard’ to ‘soft’ Euroscepticism most likely explains its electoral success, as whereas a big share of the party’s usual electorate would like to leave the EU altogether, this is not the prevalent opinion in the Danish population. Similarly, in the past, the AfD demanded that Germany should leave the
Euro zone, or remain in it only with the economically predictable Northern states, such as the Netherlands, Austria or Finland. Since spring 2014, the party has positioned itself as focused on family politics.

The Spanish radical right parties are critical of the European Union, however, their criticism manifests in two ways. The first one, represented by FE-JONS and MSR, proposes restructuring the EU so as to achieve a greater level of autonomy for the members. Meanwhile, the explicit anti-EU discourse is absent from these parties’ rhetoric. In contrast, Democracia Nacional and España 2000 contest Spain’s membership, and argue for the abolition of the EU. They propose instead a Confederation of European States with a greater degree of sovereignty of each member. PxL, PxC’s national equivalent, is based somewhere in between the two camps. While the party sees Europe as a continent in a very positive light, the party portrays the EU in a somewhat similar way as DF does, yet, in a more radical fashion. Hence, “Faced with the EU and its anti-social and anti-national policies, we want another Europe, we demand respect for our identity and our way of life” (PxL, 2015). Importantly, the type of Euroscepticism of these parties in terms of skepticism towards the role of the European institutions and belief in the sovereignty of the national states is influencing all the solutions they propose, in the sense that the problems they identify in gender, family as well as migration/diversity issues should be solved by the national governments.

The variation in expression of Euroscepticism is a theme that cuts across all of the following sections of the report, and sometimes provides explanations for critical silences in party discourses.
4. Migration and Intra-EU Mobility

In this section, the radical right parties’ stances on migration and the rights of migrant citizens will be outlined, both in regards to migration from third countries and from other EU member states (MS). As explained in the introduction (see p. 8), the topic of migration is often debated by this particular type of party, due to their nationalist, and, at times, xenophobic sentiments. Based on the analysis of the country-data, we can thus establish four main frames used by right wing radical parties to talk about migration and minorities: 1) Citizenship based on cultural proximity; 2) Migrants and minorities as strains on the social cohesion; 3) Sending EU-MS as being ignored by the EU; 4) Intra-EU migration as a demographic/family threat; and 5) Asylum seekers and refugees as security threats.

4.1 The Frames of Migration

1) Citizenship based on cultural proximity

The first sub-frame here is the perception of migrants and/or minorities as being secondary citizens due to their culture. Due to the nationalist sentiments of the radical right-wing parties, they do not wish to permit foreigners easy access to the national citizenship. Even though this nationalism is expressed in various ways across the countries, all of the radical right parties of this study adhere to certain common tendencies. They thus pose strong national policy requirements in regards to residence and integration polices, and will not accept non-adherence. This is expressed to various degrees, and a clear differentiation is discernible by certain of the parties in regards to which groups are the most ‘acceptable’, ranging from fellow citizens, through Europeans to third country migrants.

Some of the parties thus differentiate between their national citizens and certain minority populations, who are seen as culturally incompatible with the societal norms of the given nation state. In Northern and Southern Europe, this particularly refers to migrants from Muslim states. Islam is thus perceived as incompatible with the national or European cultural heritage and values. The parties that employ this sub-frame often allude to the fundamentalist sides of Islam, juxtaposing its cultural practices with the civilized lifestyles of the Europeans. This is particularly evident in their use of female Muslim migrants, whose allegedly disadvantageous situation is utilized as a means to criticize Islam (for further details on the proposed policies within this sub-frame, please see the Gender Section). The proposed solutions range from a full immigration stop to changes in the national immigration legislation. The role of the EU is hardly mentioned, and if, then only to accentuate that this should be a national policy matter. Similarly, some parties see their minority populations, who permanently reside in the party’s state, as culturally incompatible. They are constructed as non-normative vis-à-vis “the natives” for a variety of context specific reasons, and seen as unwilling to integrate. The members of these groups may or may not hold citizenship. One of the main solutions to both migrants and minority populations is to further their assimilation process by making changes to the national policies.

On the other hand, the sub-frame of nationhood based on cultural similarity emerges. It refers to an ethno-nationalist stance expressed by certain of the parties, in their wish to either improve the living situation for, or re-nationalize, people, who historically have been national citizens, but who no longer live in the given country. This can either be due to labour emigration many years earlier (e.g. the Italian case), or because of historical reasons, such as wars, which have made the people minorities or diaspora in other countries (e.g. Hungary and Croatia). In the latter case, it is perceived as a historical injustice that the territories, the people live on, are not part of the given state, and the claims are thus often revisionist. The solutions proposed involve either direct assistance in the national minority’s country of residence, or loosening the immigration legislation to further the minorities’ return to the party’s state.
2) **Migrants as strains on the social cohesion**

Within this frame, migrants are seen as causing strains to the national well-being, as they are accused of abusing the system. The overarching solution proposed is that the autochthonous citizens should always have prevalence in regards to policy solutions and financial assistance. Thus, migrants and minorities are seen as being a threat to the economic viability of the welfare state. This is voiced by the majority of the parties (all except of HSP AS), yet, to various degrees and with different lines of argumentation.

In regards to the migrants’ labour market contribution, certain of the parties hold that the they ought only be permitted to enter the given state’s labour market, if there is an actual shortage of workers. This is a means to safeguard the jobs for the autochthonous population, and the solutions proposed are to only permit migrants’ entrance, if there is a labour shortage. Another way the labour market contribution is perceived is to argue that the migrants have to contribute through work, if they wish to stay in the country. The migrants must thus enter the labour market as soon as possible upon their arrival in the host country.

Moreover, several of the parties object that the migrants or minorities make use of the more ‘generous’ welfare systems of the host countries. The argument is used against practically all migrants, but in recent years, migrant workers from especially Eastern Europe have increasingly become the targets. The arguments are dissimilar though, so the sub-frame is further divided into EU migrants and minorities and refugees and asylum seekers.

Regarding intra-EU mobility and minority populations, there are two leading themes in the argumentation of the parties: exploitation of the welfare system and social dumping. Certain parties thus argue that the migrants only come to the given parties’ countries with the sole aim of making use of the welfare provisions, which they send home to their families. The problem is mainly blamed on the EU, and its policy of open borders. Similarly, Jobbik holds that the Roma minority only give birth to children in order to make use of the Hungarian welfare benefits. The main solution is to preserve the welfare provisions for those people, who have earned them, i.e. the autochthonous population, who has contributed the longest. Other solutions include an opt-out of the EU social policies and index-linking the benefits to those of the sending country.

Another way, this financial strain argument becomes visible in regards to the Eastern European labourers, is through the occurrence of social dumping. The term is employed as a means to point at the labour migrants’ bad effects on the national labour market system. The argument goes that the Eastern European citizens are used to lower wages, and thus do not demand as high wages as the autochthonous citizens, which infers either lower wages or no jobs at all to the autochthonous people. This is perceived as unfair competition, and the critique is voiced against the state itself and the EU, for allowing these migrants to enter the given MS. However, no explicit policy solutions are proposed.

Some of the parties also draw attention to the financial strains of the asylum seekers and refugees on both the EU and state budgets. In light of the on-going refugee crisis in the EU, this has become a much utilised way of framing migration. The solutions to this problem are to curb the large inflow of people to the given party’s country, which has particularly been voiced in the EP, and against the EU; to let the MS devise their own policy on the matter; or to give financial aid to the neighbouring countries of the warzones, which should then be able to accommodate the refugees.

3) **Sending EU-MS as being ignored by the EU**

Oppositely to the second frame, the populist radical right parties of the two Eastern European MS of this study argue that the emigrating people from their respective countries are being forced to leave, as the EU is giving preferential treatment to the prosperous Western European MS. This is framed in two distinct ways, either by: expressing the EU’s ignorance of the Eastern European workforce, or by drawing attention to the (sexual) exploitation of European migrant women (see the section on Gender).

The first sub-frame problematizes the EU’s lacking acknowledgment of the Eastern European hardships, and its alleged preferential treatment of Western Europe. The argument here is that the labour
market rights for labourers in Eastern Europe are ignored, whilst those of third country nationals are highlighted. Moreover, Eastern European labourers, who migrate to Western Europe, are often exploited as cheap labourers, and their emigration’s effect on the sending country is also ignored. The solutions proposed include the renegotiation of agreements with the EU, and to improve the national labour market conditions, either through national legislative changes or EU subsidies.

4) Intra-EU migration as a demographic/family threat
The main diagnosis established in this frame is that the emigration of citizens to other EU MS leads to both a brain drain and a demographic deficit in the sending countries, something which particularly affects families, as it is often only one part of the couple, who goes abroad. The prognoses either evolve around the introduction of better social policies, or to make use of EU funds, in order to find ways to keep the citizens in their home countries.

5) Asylum seekers and refugees as security threats
The parties that utilise this frame assume that the unprecedented surge in asylum seekers and refugees to the European continent from 2014 and onward posits a security threat for the individual states and Europe in general. They attract attention to the dangerous nature of the asylum seekers and refugees, and the Jihadist terrorists, human smugglers, general criminals, and carriers of dangerous diseases are particularly highlighted as problematic, whilst the failure of the Joint Police Operation Mos Maiorum is lamented and criticized. There are several solutions proposed, which gives the EU the main responsibility; such as turning back the migrant boats upon their arrival on the European shore, swaying the refugees from leaving Africa in the first place, and introducing stronger police cooperation between the EU MS. Yet, another proposal is to safeguard the migration policy as a national matter, whilst the main way to solve the problem is seen as the reintroduction of border controls, an argument, which will be further discussed in the conclusion as well.

4.2 The Frames of Migration as Employed by the Parties

Citizenship based on cultural proximity

Migrants and/or minorities as secondary citizens due to their culture

Several of the analysed parties wish to introduce more restrictive measures in regards to the obtainment of national citizenship rights for non-autochthonous people. This is not the case for the Hungarian and Croatian parties though, as they have not focused on the issue of third country nationals to a large extent, but rather consider their ethnic minority populations (Krizsán & Amon, 2015; Šipić, 2015). Thus, the framing of migrants or minorities as secondary citizens is voiced in different ways, and depends on the country-specific definition of migrant and/or minority. Yet, a framing, which is shared by the majority of the analysed party, is to perceive certain migrant/minority groups as too culturally distant to the majority population.

The majority of the parties thus legitimize this anti-migration stance by pointing out the cultural differences between populations from sending and receiving countries. Thus, the given parties make an explicit graduation between those migrants, who may be accepted (most often fellow Europeans), and those who are perceived as too culturally distant to be allowed entrance. Especially strong reservations emerge towards migrants from outside of the EU, in particular from the Muslim countries. As already mentioned, several of the radical right parties are very critical towards the Muslim culture and religion (except Jobbik and HSP A9), and as can be read in the Gender section below, this is often linked to gender inequality between Muslim men and women. The parties thus emphasize the great integration

9 At least in the period investigated for this analysis. The recent entrance to Europe of Syrian refugees has led to considerable changes in their rhetoric.
problems with this particular segment of the migrant community. They perceive its manifestations and practices to be incompatible with the identity and values of the autochthonous population, and the religion is thus seen as a threat to the Christian heritage. This has for example been shown in protests against the building of mosques and minarets (PxC, PVV and DF). The policy measures proposed have focused on the prohibition of Muslim symbols and practices, which are perceived as degrading for women. Thus, PVV, DF and PxC have called for bans on the burqa and head-scarves, and PVV and DF even state that if Muslims are to oppose this ban, they can just return to their home countries.

The issue of integration is one of the key reasons as to why the parties make strict demands regarding citizenship legislation. Even though the concept of ‘integration’ is defined differently across the countries, most parties agree on the vitality that the given persons are willing to take part in, and contribute to, society, and will abide by the societal norms of the country. Höcke (AfD) has even stated that cultural assimilation must be a pre-requisite for integration, something that also could be argued as the viewpoint of PVV and DF, based on their statements (Knijn & van Maaren, 2015; Siim & Nissen, 2015). This explains their strong emphasis on making changes to the immigration laws, and the demands in the citizenship tests, especially in regards to knowledge of the culture and language of the given country (DF, PxC, AfD and PVV). PVV has even stronger requirements: the connection to the Netherlands must be stronger than to any other country, and migrants, who already live in the country, must have their civil rights reduced, including the right to vote (Knijn & van Maaren, 2015). Moreover, the party also questions the integrity of citizens that have another nationality besides from Dutch, which is illustrated by the verbal attacks on MP’s with dual nationalities.

The parties have developed more specific policy solutions to deal with the problem. Several of the parties would like a limitation to the immigration levels (DF, PxC and AfD), if not a complete stop (PVV). This is also partly why DF and PxC propose the solution of making it a national matter to regulate the migrant intake, and not up for the EU to decide. PxC is even more direct: Due to the party’s fear that “Catalonia will be drowned in a majority of Muslim, South-American and Asian people” (PxC, 2011: 2), the party proposes the establishment of a Spanish quota system, which allows migration according to cultural proximity, thus giving EU citizens the primary access to Spain, then Eastern Europeans and Latin Americans. Yet, Muslims should never gain this right (van den Broek & Suárez-Fernández, 2015). The Italian LN party has taken a much harsher stance on migrants, both of Muslim and Roma origin. In its view, migrants should not be allowed to enter the Italian labour market, nor have access to its welfare system.

Whilst Jobbik and HSP AS did not object to Muslim migrants before the refugee crisis, they did discuss the minority populations that already reside within the borders of their state with a very similar logic. Jobbik focuses its attention on Hungary’s Roma population, which it perceives as being adverse to integration, despite the fact that many of the Roma people are in fact Hungarian citizens. The party demands that they show willingness to integrate into Hungarian society, something that should be controlled through a census. It also proposes that Roma children, who cannot integrate into the school system, should be separated from their parents, and put in special boarding schools. The Croatian HSP AS, on the other hand, differentiates between native Croats and non-Croats in the Republic of Croatia. However, no specific policy changes have been proposed in this regard.

**Nationhood based on cultural similarities**

In line with the parties’ nationalist sentiments, and as a means to uphold the cultural proximity of its residents, some of the populist radical right parties wish to repatriate citizens, who either have left the country as migrants, or who have become minorities in another state for historical reasons, such as is the case in Hungary and Croatia. Jobbik thus wants to permit the Hungarian minorities in for instance Ukraine to repatriate, if so wished. The Alliance for Croatia attracts attention to the Bosnian Croats, who should get care provided, even though they do not actually live on Croatian soil.
Migrants as strains on the national social cohesion

This frame is voiced by the vast majority of the analysed parties. The main argument here is that there is a profound abuse exercised by certain groups at the expense of the well-being of the native population. The main solution thus becomes that the national citizens should always be given priority over foreigners and ethnic minorities (who are in fact citizens, such as e.g. the Roma population in Hungary or non-Croats in Croatia), when it comes to the access to public services and other welfare benefits. Here, the term ‘foreigner’ relates to both third country and intra-EU migrants. After the opening of the EU MS’ labour markets to the 8 new Eastern European MS in 2009, plus Croatia in 2014, the issue of intra-EU labour mobility became a matter of much contention in the whole of the EU.

Several of the parties thus wish to uphold the economic viability of the welfare state, a stance, which is expressed towards EU labour migrants and minorities, and asylum seekers and refugees. This economic viability refers both to labour market contribution, and the use of the welfare system. Certain of the parties (PxC, AfD and HSP AS) argue that in order for the migrants/minorities to gain entrance to the given country, they must contribute to the workforce. PxC thus holds that residence should be conditioned on having a job in Spain. Migrants should therefore only be welcomed, if there is a labour shortage on the national labour market, and the residence permit should be temporary. AfD finds that the German immigration policy should apply similar criteria as Australia or Canada. The most important criteria for third country migrants should thus be: their language skills, education level, and their professional knowledge, plus the needs of the German labour market (AfD, 2014b). The party actually promotes the entrance of qualified migrants to Germany, to ensure the demographic sustainability of the German work force, as this can safeguard both the care for the aging population, and the needs of the German labour market (AfD, 2014a: 15). Similarly, HSP AS also sees a financial threat in the refugees, and holds that migrants only should be allowed to enter a given MS, if there is a labour shortage, as it will burden the social systems otherwise. All four parties thus see it as very important that the migrants are able to contribute from day one.

Due to the structure of the Dutch and Danish welfare systems, PVV and DF see the situation somewhat differently, as they demand of the already residing migrants that they must contribute, if they wish to stay. Thus, PVV states it very point blankly along the device of ‘work or get out’, meaning that unemployed migrants must leave the country again (PVV, 2012). DF has also called for a bigger labour market contribution by the asylum seekers, who enter Denmark. The party’s leader, Thulesen Dahl, has thus problematized the asylum seekers’ lacking societal integration, and he feels that Denmark should demand of migrants that they contribute, work, earn their own money and pay taxes to the state, because a lag of productivity would drain the Danish financial resources (DF, 2014b: 5).

This political opinion of safeguarding the welfare system for the autochthonous population, which is distinguishable by several of the parties above, is also referred to as ‘welfare chauvinism’. It is a term coined by Jørgen Goul Andersen and Tor Bjørklund in 1990, in relation to the Nordic countries, which is equated with the notion that “welfare services should be restricted to our own” (Goul Andersen & Bjørklund, 1990: 212). Hence, the main contention is that the welfare system is mainly for the indigenous population, who are often depicted as more deserving than the migrants or minorities. The parties thus practically all wish to maintain at least some of the benefits in the hands of the dominant groups. This stance is both uttered in regards to EU migrants and minorities and asylum seekers and refugees, yet the line of argumentation differs somewhat.

EU migrants and minorities

During the election campaign of 2014, the welfare chauvinist sentiments have mainly been voiced against the labour migrants from other EU MS. In fact, even prior to 2014, PVV expressed negative sentiments about intra-EU labour migration, as it set up a registration point in 2012 where people, who had experienced problems due to immigrants from the so-called ‘MOE-landers’, i.e. Middle or Eastern Europe, could voice their concern. The party also discusses the attribution of welfare benefits to European migrant workers, and mainly holds that they must be able to care for themselves.
DF, on the other hand, clearly argues against the occurrence of so-called ‘welfare tourism’, where foreigners allegedly would come to Denmark, get a job, claim the benefits, and send the money back home to their relatives. Yet, at the same time, the party also emphasises that this ‘misuse’ of the system should not be blamed on the EU migrant workers themselves, as it is perceived as an obvious choice for them to come to Denmark, due to the better provisions in the country (Thulesen Dahl, 2014). Maintaining the party’s focus on the weaker segments of Danish society, this exploitation is seen as a problem for both the Danish social model, which “generations laboriously have built up” (ibid.), and those Danes whose jobs and/or benefits were said to be taken by, most commonly, Eastern Europeans (TV2, 2014).

Both PVV and DF present themselves as the defenders/protectors of the Dutch and Danish welfare state respectively. PVV sees the toll of migrants as a huge strain on the social security system, as the costs are too big for it to be viable. Both parties thus argue that the benefits should only be for those people, who have earned it, i.e. the national citizens, who have worked hard for it. In the words of DF-MEP Messerschmidt (2014b): “Our welfare benefits need to be protected and reserved to people, who actually make an effort in Denmark”10. Hence, instead, both PVV and DF highlight the need to support the autochthonous workers and the elderly. This point is clearly expressed in the following statement by the DF MP Karin Nødgaard: “It seems completely insane that Denmark has a government, which happily continues to send social benefits to children living outside the country, while at the same time refuses to lift a finger to ensure our elderly fellow citizens a dignified old age and care” (Nødgaard, 2014). The Spanish PxC argues very similar when stating that health care, (social) housing, education, and unemployment benefits should be for Primer els de casa, which is Catalan for “First our own people”.

DF frames the labour migrants’ toll on the welfare systems as the EU’s responsibility: “Every single time the EU Court delivers a new verdict, more tax-crowns are sent into the pockets of the citizens of other countries; often to children, who are not even living in Denmark, or people, who only have a short residence and do not pay tax here” (Messerschmidt, 2014a). The party has offered several possible solutions to the problem. For one, the party has proposed to create a Danish EU welfare opt-out, which would ensure that Denmark could decide for itself whether or not it wished to participate in common EU social policies (DF, 2014b). Moreover, in March 2014, Messerschmidt posed a question to the European Commission, asking for the possibility of introducing index-linked child benefits, which would be dependent on the country, where the given child was living, and not where the parent was working (Messerschmidt, 2014d). Yet, this idea was rejected by the European Commission (2014).

AfD frames the problem in a somewhat similar way as DF and PVV. Even though the party actually promotes the entrance of qualified migrants to Germany, it “strictly rejects” immigration “into the German social systems” (AfD, 2014b: 11). Highlighting the EU-entrance of particularly Romania and Bulgaria as problematic, the party argues that: “The long-term threats are an overburdening of the social budgets and the erosion of the welfare state” (AfD, 2014a: 15). Moreover, the party warns that it must not be possible to employ “false self-employment” as a way to obtain social benefits, thus indirectly stating that this kind of behaviour takes place already (AfD, 2014a: 15). Social benefits should thus only be given to people, who have paid German taxes, or whose parents have done so, and if a given migrant does not have the sufficient income to live in Germany, he or she must return to the sending country. Furthermore, like DF, AfD also only wishes to pay child benefits for children, who actually live in Germany. These statements clearly also turn AfD into a welfare chauvinist party in regards to social policy.

Despite the fact that many of the people, Jobbik opposes, have lived in Hungary for generations, i.e. the country’s Roma minority, the party’s line of argumentation is very similar as DF, PVV and AfD’s. It argues that Roma women only

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10 Another very telling statement regarding DF’s stance on the issue of welfare provisions is the following, given by Messerschmidt in 2014: “The child benefits are closely harmonized with what it costs to have children in Denmark. It is far more expensive to have your child looked after and to buy food here than in Poland. Consequently, it is a good business for a Pole, who has I-do-not-know-how-many-children in Wroclaw, or wherever it might be. It creates a huge imbalance, when there is such a big difference between the benefits in east and west” (Messerschmidt as cited in Mortensen, 2014).
give birth in order to receive family benefits, and in this way exploit the Hungarian welfare system. Hungary’s ‘demographic crisis’ is thus partly due to “the demographic explosion of Gypsies, who are unable to integrate into the society” (Jobbik, 2014e: 28). The party wishes to solve this problem by changing the family allowance system, for example by freezing the cash benefits, in order to curb this development. The system should be replaced with better controlled and delimited benefits, which infers the introduction of state paternalism for the poor, particularly the Roma. Another proposal is tax subsidies instead of family benefits after the third child, a solution that would direct the welfare regime towards those, who are in the workforce, and limit it for those, who have no employment, of which the Roma population forms a large share. Hence, the party calls for different policy measures, in order to curb the welfare abuse by Roma people, but simultaneously ensuring that it is beneficial for the native population to have children (i.e. promoting a pro-natalist welfare state).

The Eastern European labour migrants (PVV and DF) and the Roma minority (Jobbik) are thus perceived as a burden to the welfare states in financial and socio-economic terms, and financial assistance and social benefits should be reduced. AfD argues along similar lines, and particularly highlights the migrants’ need to integrate on the labour market. Both PVV and DF have argued for the solution that their respective countries must have control of own borders, in order to curb the labour migration, and to ensure that the Dutch and Danish workers have the main priority in regards to obtaining employment (read more on this in the conclusion).

Related to this wish to protect the autochthonous workers, both PVV, DF and LN have pointed to the problem of social dumping, seeing as the migrant workers are willing to work for lower wages than the national citizens. Thus, both PVV and DF have referred to the down-grading of wages, and the crowding out on the labour market, due to cheaper labourers from Eastern Europe, which leads to unfair competition. The PVV-MEP Maeijer has been especially vocal on this topic in the EP. She has for instance posed a question in relation to the ECJ decision that Turkish citizens did not need to apply for a work permit to obtain work in the EU. She thus asked whether the Dutch requirement to have a work permit revolted against EU Law, and whether

overturning the permit requirement will promote a massive influx of workers, who will take jobs that could otherwise have been taken by indigenous workers, with the consequence that in future everyone in the Netherlands will be at home unemployed, while the whole of Africa can get jobs at rock-bottom wages thanks to dubious arrangements?” (Maeijer, 2014a)

The Italian LN party has also discussed labour migration in relation to the issue of unemployment, and specifically focuses on helping the Italian labourers and unemployed. In an EP-debate on Youth Unemployment, the LN-MEP Bizzotto questioned Juncker’s assertion that the EU needs 50 million labour migrants, when there currently were 25 million unemployed EU citizens. The LN-MEPs generally present themselves as representatives of those citizens, who are most likely to be affected by the unfair competition on the labour market, mainly due to Eastern European immigration. Yet, this is not framed as a critique of intra-EU mobility as such, but rather against the European Commission’s policies as a whole, as they have led to “increased unemployment, increased taxes, increased costs, increased poverty, there is no work! Illegal immigrants are everywhere! Increased diseases!” (Buonanno, 2014). Moreover, so Salvini (2014) continues, now “We are taking care of the losers of the entire world, of the poor of the entire world. We are not taking care of ours at home”. Bizzotto (2014) also accuses the EU for having implemented “the wrong monetary policy, the fixed budget parameters imposed by the European treaties, and a worldview which helps immigrants and not the European citizens”.

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11 This issue has also been discussed by left-wing parties, which were concerned about all workers in this regard, and not only the autochthonous people (see e.g. the Danish People’s Movement against the EU).
Asylum seekers and refugees

Moreover, in recent years, most of the radical right wing parties of this report have started voicing dismay of the high intake of refugees to their respective countries, and the strains this poses on their national financial systems. Thus, in Spain, the Netherlands and Denmark, right-wing radical groups not only perceive the refugees as a cultural threat, due to their perceived religious incompatibility, but also as a financial threat, due to their accommodation costs’ strains on the state budget. This thus makes the line of argumentation somewhat similar to the migrant workers’ economic strains on the welfare systems, as discussed above, yet, their diagnoses and especially prognoses differ to some extent from above. Whilst DF has become increasingly subdued in its critical utterances, the PVV rhetoric is rather harsh. Wilders thus talks of ‘Eurabië,’ refers to a ‘tsunami’ of migrants, and depicts them, and other migrants, as ‘fortune hunters’.

PVV and DF criticise the EU for spending too much money on the refugees, and argue that the Union should change its policy in this regard. DF also calls for a lowering of the numbers of asylum seekers and people united by family reunifications (DF, 2014a), and they accuse the Syrian refugees of a “gross exploitation” of the Danish immigration system, because of the short processing time of reunification applications in Denmark (Røndbjerg-Christensen, 2014). The solution to this is to shorten the asylum residence permit from 5 to 1.5 years. According to Henriksen, the authorities should thus signalise that: “If you are entitled to help, then you will get help, but at some point, you will be sent back home” (Jensen, 2014).

Also, both parties wish for it to be left in the hands of each member state to devise a policy on the matter. This is already the case in Denmark, due to the country’s judicial EU-opt-out, which infers that asylum policy has remained a national matter. However, Denmark still receives asylum seekers, and their costs are also discussed as a problem by DF, which proposes that they must work and contribute to the Danish society, because a lag of productivity would drain the Danish financial resources (DF, 2014b: 5). The financing of particularly asylum seekers “is money, which must be taken out of the amount that one would otherwise spend on elderly, hospitals and the education system” (as cited in Brandt Petersen, 2014). Thus, as Vistisen (2014a) states, “(...) the Danes must have the right to say no (...) After all, Denmark counts the most”. In the case of the Netherlands, PVV MP Meijers argues somewhat similarly:

> While our government’s cuts harm our country and close the elderly homes, shelters for asylum seekers emerge. It cannot go on like this. The inflow must be stopped, the borders must close and we have to make an effort for the reception of refugees in their own region. That is the only way to prevent tragedies on the sea and to clamp down the mass immigration. (Maeijer, 2014b)

Thus, as a solution, PVV wishes to give aid to the developing countries as a means to stop the massive influx of migrants to Europe. This stance is shared by DF, who also argues that solving the problems in the sending countries will solve the problems in the receiving, as it will curb the necessity to flee in the first place. In regards to the joined police action Mos Maiorum, the DF-MEP Vistisen thus states that: “What you actually should have done was to have (...) a refugee policy, which would deal with helping the greatest number possible for the available resources, i.e. help the people in their adjacent areas” (Vistisen, 2014b). AfD also wishes to help the people close to their own countries, yet, it frames this as a way to ensure that the financing reaches the highest possible number of people, and to prevent the refugees from having to “uproot” their lives completely (AfD, 2014a: 16).

Since June 2014, Jobbik has also adopted a very harsh rhetoric towards the asylum seekers, problematizing the ‘plight of refugees’, a ‘flood of refugees’ and ‘the refugee tsunami’. The party mainly alludes to the huge financial costs that the refugees pose. However, somewhat differently from the other parties, Jobbik, or at least Morvai, emphasizes that the problem should be dealt with by Western Europe, due to their history of colonization, but also because Hungarian citizens are depicted as a sort of second-class European citizens, who are not much better off than the asylum seekers. Morvai thus holds that the EU should be concerned with the welfare of EU citizens, before thinking about the asylum
seekers, and that Hungary is not able to take care of the refugees, as it already struggles to finance its own population (Krizsán & Amon, 2015).

Interestingly, very different from the other radical right parties studied, AfD presented itself as a very migrant- and refugee-friendly party during the electoral campaign of 2014, as it “advocates an open and foreigner-friendly Germany”, due to the need for foreign labour (AfD, 2014a: 16). The party framed migrants as contributors to the labour market and in need of protection. Hence, politically persecuted people should be able to get asylum in Germany, and they should have the right to work as well, both as a humane act, but also because it “prevents ghettoization, averts costs and in case of a positive ruling [on the asylum claim] it promotes a quicker integration” (ibid: 16). Yet, whilst having an open door policy to politically persecuted people, AfD-MEP Pretzell underlined that this policy did not apply for economic refugees, as the current need to admit and protect war refugees should entail that others’ entrance ought to be denied (Pretzell, 2014).

**Sending MS as being ignored by the EU**

In opposition to the above framing of intra-EU mobility by the receiving countries, the radical right parties of the sending MS also identify problems in relation to this topic. This is framed as a matter of EU ignorance of the Eastern European workforce. Moreover, Morvai from Jobbik also draws attention to the fact that many migrant women, who are faced with discriminative or illegal practices, actually come from within the EU itself, namely from Eastern Europe (see the Gender section for more on this).

Jobbik estimates that 500.000 young Hungarians have moved abroad to find work, due to low wages and high unemployment rates in Hungary. They are depicted as economic migrants, who are forced to leave because of Hungary’s bad situation. The party uses the Hungarian exodus as a way to emphasize the dichotomy between Western and Eastern Europeans. The party argues that the EU strengthens the distance between the two parts of Europe, as it encourages migration from third countries, instead of securing jobs for the people already living within the Union. Morvai also alludes to this double standard of the EU, as it promotes the labour rights for third country citizens, but neglects the rights for women and labourers in the European semi-periphery (i.e. Eastern Europe). She sees this as problematic, because Hungarian women can become poor, despite working fulltime and having an education. Jobbik generally portrays Hungarian citizens, who move to Western Europe, as being exploited, and facing a ‘slave destiny’ in the EU, which is depicted as a sort of empire:

[The pro-colonization stance] accepts that Hungary is the backyard of the European Union where the servants and the cart-pulling animals live, whose only job is to provide cheap labour; and, having saved up the little money they have, to buy the expensive (and often bad-quality) foreign products, which are produced, quite controversially by us; and to tolerate that their environment is being used as a dumpster. (Jobbik, 2014e: 9)

Jobbik thus argues that Hungary only has managed to enter the ‘servants’ hall’ of the EU. The party wishes to solve this situation by finding new export countries, by renegotiating the agreements with the EU, and by creating new jobs in agriculture. Furthermore, on the national level, Jobbik has proposed that the Hungarian wages should rise to the overall EU levels, as a means to sway people from going abroad. Moreover, when the UK proposed to restrict the free movement of EU citizens within the Union, Morvai made an EP-statement, calling for an end to the free movement of capital as well then. British businesses like Tesco should be removed from Hungary, which would give “more opportunities for our farmers, for our small shops, for our small businesses, and that would be a deal” (Morvai, 2014).

Like Jobbik, Tomašić from HSP AS also criticizes the EU for the high level of emigration. Yet, pointing to the policy of curbing youth unemployment through intra-EU mobility, she accuses the EU of just being interested in statistical indicators, and not the actual effects on the poorer MS. She proposes that youth unemployment should be dealt with at the national levels, and not by the EU as such, as this could lead to an “economic and demographic breakdown” of the poorer states. Tomašić thus also creates a dichotomy between the poorer and wealthier EU member states, by
criticizing the obvious power relations within the EU, and implying that the EU supports the wealthier MS’ benefits, which they receive at the expense of the poorer ones. Instead, the youth from the poorer MS should be given the chance to “survive in their own country, close to their nearest”. The two parties thus frame the issue somewhat differently, yet, both are dissatisfied with the large exodus of labourers, and both see the EU as the main culprit.

**Intra-EU migration as a demographic/family threat**

The sending MS have also framed the issue of intra-EU migration as a problem in regards to the demographic sustainability of the sending countries. Jobbik has for instance problematized that some Hungarian children are deprived of their right to be raised by two parents, because their fathers have to work abroad:

> The 10-year balance of the EU membership of our homeland is hundred thousands of families torn apart. This is how many parents were forced to leave their home and children as economic refugees in the hope of a better livelihood so that they could get a job and could take care of their family. (...) Families torn apart are conducive to a society torn apart and a nation torn apart. (Jobbik, 2014c)

The Hungarian migrants are thus portrayed as victims of the EU-accession, as they are forced to leave their country in order to be able to provide for their families. Morvai even compares the economic migration with migration from third world countries. Moreover, she also points to the women left behind with their children and elderly relatives in the Hungarian countryside, who are more prone to fall victims of violent crimes, because “the men” have migrated to Western Europe (Morvai, 2014). Also, the party problematizes the exodus of young citizens, and proposes the introduction of social policies that should encourage the young citizens to stay in the country, such as direct subsidies for young couples to buy their own homes and to start their own families.

Similarly to Jobbik, HSP AS also frames the issue around demographic sustainability, as the high number of young Croats leaving the country is seen as a negative trend. One party candidate, Tepeš, portrays intra-EU mobility as both an opportunity to gain better education in Europe, which the youth can employ in Croatia upon their return, but also as a long-term threat, as some of these youngsters might stay in the given country (HSP AS, 2014b). This again makes the issue one of demographic sustainability, and the survival of the nation. Tomašić also points to the brain drain and the negative demographic consequences for Croatia, if the EU-citizens are encouraged to move to more prosperous member states for employment. She thus fears that “young people leave because it does not pay off to stay here; that Bulgarians, Romanians, and the Chinese come instead, so we won’t be able to say anymore that ‘we are on our own land,’ but that ‘the alien is on my land’” (HSP AS, 2014a).

The Alliance for Croatia also problematizes the emigration of Croatian workers, stating that “Croats must earn their bread in their own Homeland!” (Alliance for Croatia, 2014), and that the children must not be forced to go abroad. The migration is seen as a threat to the nation’s survival, especially in regards to the departure of young and educated people, which leads to a brain drain. This is problematic, as they are perceived to be the ones, who should help Croatia recover from the crisis (Šipić, 2015). Yet, unlike Jobbik, this is not blamed on the EU, but rather the Croat governments since 2000, who are seen as ‘immoral’, ‘corruptive’ and ‘incompetent’ (STV, 2014). The EU is actually portrayed positively, as the EU funds are seen as a financial resource to tackle the problem with, and the EU as a role model for the state to follow in order to overcome the economic crisis.

The Italian LN party and the Spanish PxC also see migration as a threat to the demographic viability of their respective countries. Yet, this is voiced somewhat differently than Jobbik and HSP-AS. Whilst the parties do not express concern about the emigration of their national labour force, they express a fear founded in nationalism instead, where the argument goes that the national birth rates must be improved through policy measures, as a means to curb immigration. The parties thus problematize the country’s demographic deficit, whilst simultaneously pointing at the need to end the call for an external labour force. LN proposes better welfare provisions and the facilitation of parenthood for the autochthonous population, which subsequently should lead to increased birth rates. This is for instance visible in the bill proposal aimed at improving the national social system by introducing free of charge
kindergarten and general birth subsidies. The proposal was given as “an answer to the people, who support the idea that migrants are the only warranty for this country” (Giorgetti, as cited in Lega Nord, 2014). Similarly, PxC criticizes other parties that “pretend to substitute the lack of births of Catalan children by the arrival of more and more immigrants, who are supposed to cover the demographic deficit” (PxC, 2010: 18). Instead, a plan should be devised, with the aim of promoting child birth for the Spanish citizens (van den Broek & Suárez-Fernández, 2015).

**Asylum seekers and refugees as a security threat**

The fear regarding the security threats that refugees and migrants may pose were long present on the agenda of the radical right. With the growing intake of asylum seekers and refugees from mainly Syria, the sentiments have rose and have also been uttered in the EP, especially after the 2014-elections.

However, the PVV has warned against the Jihadists amongst the asylum seekers for a much longer period, since 2001, in fact. The argument goes that the Jihadists enter the EU amongst the refugees, and pose a security threat, due to the risk of an attack. Recently, MEP Maeijer has continued this line of argumentation, and has for instance posed questions about the risk of terrorists moving freely within the Schengen area, and proposed to close the national borders and reintroduce border controls. This has also been proposed by DF, all in the interest of national security. Similarly, Balczó from Jobbik has stated that “there is no international agreement or legal obligation that would be more important than Hungary’s security and peace”.

Moreover, Maeijer also wished for the MS on the EU’s external borders to turn back the migrant boats arriving there, in order for the refugees and their smugglers to lose interest in attempting to reach the European shores. Again, she pointed to the need to hand back responsibility of the migration policies to the member states themselves, and she has also alluded to the failure of Mos Maiorum in alleviating the problem (Maeijer, 2014b), just as the DF-MEP Vistisen has done. Tomašić (HSP AS) frames the problem of refugee smuggling in the Mediterranean similarly as Maeijer, and refers to it as a ‘human tragedy’, which must be dealt with by the EU, together with the ‘third countries’ that have become ‘centers of criminals’ (Tomašić, 2015). Yet, like PVV, she also does not wish to make it possible to legally migrate into the EU, due to the financial and security threats that this will pose. Messerschmidt from DF also refers to the criminal records of the refugees, when he complaints about the rise in foreign criminals in Denmark, who consist of: “African drug dealers, pimps and prostitutes and professional Roma-conmen and scam-beggars,” but also the “scam-refugees”, who “pour in through the airports” (Messerschmidt, 2014c). In order to curb this problem, the Danish immigration policy ought to be “normalized and get back on track, so that we can regain our security!” (Thulesen Dahl, as cited in DF, 2014d: 3). Jobbik also points to the need to ‘defend our borders’ (Jobbik, 2014a). The refugees are depicted in rather unfavourable ways, such as potential terrorists, criminals, carriers of dangerous diseases, and even as prone to harass Hungarian women. The party proposes the introduction of ‘closed camps’ for the refugees, and, like DF and PVV, to make the border control stricter.

LN also opposes the supposed ‘European solidarity’. Salvini has for instance made a statement in the EP, where he referred to the EP as the “palace of hypocrisy and lies”, as it held a minute of silence for the people drowned in the Mediterranean, when the only right thing to do, would be to sway them from leaving the African continent in the first place (Salvini, 2014). LN thus wants to introduce stronger intergovernmental police cooperation, whilst limiting the role of Brussels at the same time. The party signed a transnational strategic alliance with Front National regarding the redistribution of asylum seekers across the EU. All of these statements and opinions show rather little compassion and understanding for people in desperate need of aid. It also clearly demonstrates how the right-wing populist radical parties put national interests ahead of all other deliberations, whilst simultaneously dehumanising the refugees rhetorically (‘tsunami of...’, ‘wave of...’, etc.).

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12 This ‘normalisation’ refers to the fact that the Social Democratic government of 2011-2014 loosened the asylum policies, due to EU pressure.
**Partial Conclusion**

Interestingly, whilst there are differences between the Northern, Southern and Eastern European radical right-wing parties, most of their overall stances in regards to diversity and migration are alike. All parties thus oppose immigration and/or certain parts of their minority population, mainly from Muslim countries, but also from Europe itself and the Roma population (Jobbik).

This can also somewhat explain the fact that practically all of the analysed parties wish to reintroduce border controls (albeit this only being a request voiced by Jobbik after the high levels of Syrian refugees started entering Hungary). In fact, currently, of the countries explored in this study, Denmark, Hungary, Croatia, Germany, and the Netherlands have tightened their border controls, with Hungary and Croatia even employing wires and fences in the endeavour (FROM). Nevertheless, PVV, DF and LN have actually pushed for stricter controls for several years by now, and thus also in the electoral campaign of 2014, and in the ensuing period. The strong pressure on the EU’s borders have therefore supported the anti-EU discourse of some of the radical right parties, which have cleverly adapted their nationalistic discourse to criticize the lack of a workable EU policy response to regulate the current refugee and migration crisis. They thus frame the intake of asylum seekers as either a financial or a security threat, as explained above.

This has been particularly visible in the LN-party’s rhetoric. LN-MEPs have proposed the suspension of the Schengen Treaty as a way to counter Islamic terrorism and the spread of diseases such as Ebola across Europe. After the Charlie Hebdo massacre in Paris, Bizzotto (2015) immediately asked for suspending the Schengen Treaty “because Europe has proven to not know how to protect their citizens”. Similarly, the party has supported the Motion for a European Parliament resolution on the suspension of the Schengen Agreement in order to block the return of jihadists, who have gone to fight in the Middle East (23/10/2014, B8-0184/2014).

DF has also made a strong case for the reintroduction of border controls and a departure from the Schengen Agreement, due to the heightened level of “international terrorism, illegal immigration and border-crossing crime” (DF, n.d.). This border-crossing crime is not only a reference to people from third countries though, but also Eastern Europeans, who allegedly take advantage of the open borders to burglar houses and drive back home, without being checked. Thus, in the words of Messerschmidt (2014b): “the border control should return, so that we can properly counteract the criminals.” Recently, the PVV politician De Graaf has argued that it is vital for the Netherlands to have control of own borders, in order to curb the labour migration, and to ensure that the Dutch workers have the main priority in regards to obtaining employment. It is thus framed as an issue of protecting the national citizens vis-à-vis the European: “It is not an issue of ‘can’ close, but we must close the borders”.

However, this section has also clearly shown the great differences between the expressions of discontent by radical right parties across the EU. This is most visibly seen in the dichotomy between Eastern and Western European parties that either perceive their citizens as intruded upon by migrants (Western), or as forced to migrate (Eastern), due to EU policy (both). Moreover, as will be shown in more detail in the Family section, certain of the parties use the frame of demographic sustainability, as they worry about the pressures that migration may cause (Jobbik, HSP AS and PxC), whilst practically all parties frame migration around its financial strains on the welfare systems. Many of the arguments can be traced back to the parties’ nationalist and/or anti-EU stances. In the cases of the Northern and Southern European parties of this study, the preservation of the national sovereignty, culture and values, and the ensuing refusal of external policy interference, can thus be seen as the overarching rationale for the fight against the immigration of non-‘native’ citizens. This claim does not hold completely true for the Eastern European parties, as whilst they do wish to preserve their national culture and values, they can accept EU policy interference, yet, often perceive is as inefficient and unfair.
Moreover, when considering the integrative measures that the migrants and refugees must abide to, almost all of the European parties express the necessity to contribute to the labour market, and some even point out that the migrants only should be allowed to come, if there is a labour shortage.

Regarding the overall topic of this work package, namely gender policy, there are not many of the parties that take an explicit stance on rights for third-country migrant women, or problematize issues such as migrant care work, minority women, etc. This is not so surprising, when considering the xenophobic and anti-foreigner stances of most of the parties, which would make it paradoxical, if they were to take a specific stance on these issues. However, as will be further explained in the following section, the oppression of female Muslims is often highlighted in their discourse about migration, as a way to exacerbate the incompatibility of Islam and European values.

The same general picture holds true on the issue of intra-EU mobility. It is hardly ever expressed in gender terms. When a gender is mentioned, the receiving countries talk about the male workers, who come to a given country to earn money and/or receive benefits, and who compete with the national citizens, whilst the sending countries, or at least Morvai from Jobbik, highlights the toll on the working women. As will be further discussed in the conclusion, this (non-)mention of gender problems could potentially also be part of the party strategies in regards to the emotions they wish to evoke in the electorate.

**Israel**

As already mentioned above, due to Israel’s immigration policy as described in the *Law of Return*, which permits all Jews to return to the country, this is one of the main points in the policy discourse of the two parties. Yet, the growing number of Sudanese and Eritrean asylum seekers has also been a topic of contention.

**Integration Policy**

*The Jewish Home* is guided by a religious-Zionist ideology, and thus wishes to strengthen the Jewish identity of the Israeli state, promoting “Jewish education” in regards to history, bible studies and teaching on the country’s legacy. However, the party also declared its support for minority rights, including for the Arab minority, which is defined as Arab citizens, who identify with the State of Israel. In regards to the Jewish diasporas, the coalition agreement of 2015, which the party signed with the Likud party, includes funding outreach and education programs for Jewish communities in the Diaspora, aiming to prevent the assimilation of Jewish communities (Knesset, 2015; Kam, 2015).

As mentioned in the *Country Contexts* section, the *Israel our Home* party’s website states that there are “three basic principles,” which are “the cornerstones of our worldview: Unity of the Nation; The State of Israel as the National Homeland of the Jewish People; and No Citizenship without Allegiance” (Yisrael Beytenu, n.d.b). Particularly the two latter principles are relevant here. Like *The Jewish Home*, the party also wishes to preserve the Jewish identity of Israel, and, as the second principle infers, it does not wish for the country to be perceived as “a state of all its citizens,” but just for the Jews (ethnic nationalism). Thus, when democratic values clash with Israel’s Jewish character, then the latter takes precedence, meaning that the *Law of Return* does not make Israel less democratic. The third principle correlates with the worldview of several of the European radical right parties, as it is based on the idea that all Israeli citizens have the same rights and obligations, inferring that minority groups also must prove their allegiance to the state, and the Arab minority ought therefore also to be legally obliged to do military service (Yisrael Beytenu, n.d.a). The party is also vocal in regards to the *Law of Return* and the Israeli Diasporas abroad, which assimilation to the host society it wishes to curb. It thus focuses its policies on promoting the return of Jews to Israel, the absorption of newly arrived Jews, and the Jewish Diasporas abroad (Yisrael Beytenu, n.d.b). The party has brought these issues up in the last Knesset, leading to policies on the return of Israeli scientists living abroad; assistance to Jewish immigrants from France, Ukraine and Venezuela; support in regards to the absorption of Ethiopian immigrants in Israel; funds to support small and medium businesses for new immigrants and returning citizens, etc. (Yisrael Beytenu, n.d.a).
Asylum Seekers

In regards to asylum seekers, The Jewish Home has had a central role in shaping the Israeli discourse on this matter. It is very explicit in its opposition to the wave of "infiltrators" into Israel, and in its efforts to “safeguard the Jewish demographic character of Israel”, the party opposes how “The Israeli state has become the employment bureau of the African continent (...) in addition to building fences; their work should become fully illegal” (The Jewish Home’s electoral platform, as cited in Gal & Halevy, 2015: 12). The party has been very active in both the Knesset, mainly on the work of the Anti-Infiltration Law of 2013, but also on the street level, as the party for instance held a public hearing in South Tel Aviv on the social problems in the neighbourhoods, which the asylum seekers are perceived as causing. The solutions discussed were to remove the given asylum seekers from the neighbourhoods (by deportation or by sending them to different areas of the country for temporary work), and to establish an Authority for Neighbourhood Renewal. Moreover, in the formal coalition agreement of 2015 between The Jewish Home and the Likud party, it is stated that “the Israeli government will act to send the infiltrators back to their home countries or other destinations, as well as to rehabilitate South Tel-Aviv’s neighbourhoods” (Knesset, 2015; Kam, 2015).

Israel our Home has not been as vocal on this particular issue, and certain segments of the party do not see asylum seekers as such a great threat. However, the party was unsupportive of an agenda protecting the rights of refugees and asylum seekers during the 19th Knesset (2013-2015), and also generally see most asylum seekers as "infiltrators," rather than in real need of asylum (Open Knesset, 2014). Certain members have been more lenient towards the asylum seekers though, and Liberman for instance criticized that a ‘festival’ was made “around the deportation of asylum seekers” (Zilberman, 2012). In 2012, the party’s Knesset member Rotem also argued that the Jewish character of the Israeli state could be upheld, even if it absorbs 50,000 asylum seekers (Cohen, 2012).
5. Gender

Gender equality is an important element in right wing populist discourses. Importantly though, arguments around gender equality rarely emerge as primary objectives here, but they are rather subordinated to other objectives, such as nationalist sentiments, demographic sustainability, or forms of Euro scepticism. Meanings of desirable gender relations taken up by right wing populists vary according to domestic gender regimes, religious regimes, variants of nationalist exclusion, as well as political opportunity structures prevailing in the country at the given period of time.

In this section, we discuss how gender equality features on the agenda of radical right politicians. The main goal is to identify various diagnoses regarding gender equality, determine what prognoses regarding the EU’s role are envisioned by those different diagnoses, and finally identify frames that order together the diagnoses and prognoses. Based on our analysis of the materials produced predominantly during the 2014 electoral campaigns, and during the first six months of the parties’ presence in the EU parliament, the three main frames of gender equality emerge in the programs of the radical right parties: 1) Gender equality as a non-EU matter, 2) Gender equality as a relative measure and 3) Gender equality as a threat to social values. In the second part of this section, we analyse similarities and differences in the frames, as they emerge in the rhetoric of the parties.

5.1 The Frames of Gender Equality

1) Gender equality as a non-EU matter
This frame emerges from a strong Eurosceptic approach. Within this frame the issue of gender equality or gender related policies are outside of the EU’s competences, and instead defined as internal matters of the member states. Thus, the EU’s interventions are discouraged. Parties using this frame do not put any gender equality related issues into their electoral programs, when running for the EP. Furthermore, once in the parliament, those parties’ MEPs express little interest in the issue. This frame never occurs alone. One or more of the substantive frames discussed below go with it.

2) Gender equality as a relative measure
The most dominant diagnosis element in radical right framing of gender equality is the coupling of gender equality/inequality with ethnic, national or citizenship based divisions, which allows for introducing distinctions between different sub-groups of women, and for making gender equality relative depending on these distinctions. A variety of sub-frames emerge here, all of which have this exclusive and relativistic diagnosis of who suffers from gender inequality in common. Meanwhile, the somewhat similar diagnosis brings diverse prognoses. We make a distinction between four sub-frames:

   The first sub-frame (also identified by the literature (Roggeband & Verloo, 2007; Montoya & Agustín, 2013; Meret and Siim 2013a) finds that gender equality has already been achieved for the autochthonous or citizen women, unlike the culturally determined unequal status of minority women (be it Muslim or Roma). This frame brings a prognosis (mainly compatible with the national context, but might also emerge in the EU policy context) in which gender equality objectives should primarily or exclusively target minority women. Despite this agreement, the parties have different solutions to whether and how policies should be directed towards ethnic minority Muslim or Roma women.

   Along the same lines of culturally determined supremacy of some groups over others, the second sub-frame recognizes women in Western and particularly Northern MS to be more equal than those from other MS, particularly Eastern and Central Europe. A highly Eurosceptic prognosis to this diagnosis is dismissal of EU level intervention.

   The third sub-frame yet again finds women from Eastern and Central Europe as less equal compared to their Western peers, due to intentionally designed and perpetuated structures of inequality. Yet, importantly, this version of the frame allocates a role to the EU in stopping these patterns of discrimination by active interventions, and equalizing the situation across Europe, rather than investing money (efforts) in culturally alien women (inside or outside of Europe).
The fourth sub-frame, also compatible with a Eurosceptic frame as above, extends the diagnosis of gender inequality to women in developing countries targeted by EU development policy. The prognosis here allows for EU interventions into gender equality exclusively in the development context.

3) Gender equality as a threat
This frame sees gender equality as part of a larger project often called “gender ideology,” which has detrimental consequences for the fundamental social values. The threats presented by gender ideology include a demographic crisis, the emergence of competing family models to replace traditional monogamous heterosexual couples with children, blurred lines between the sexes, adoption by same-sex couples, the availability of abortion, or the masculinity crisis. This frame proposes an interventionist role for the EU and the member states. The objective of policy interventions here is to cancel existing laws and policies that are informed by the gender equality principle, oppose gender equality as part of the educational curriculum, and to stop spending EU or state funds on gender projects. It further encourages educational programs, or policies that counteract gender ideology.

5.2 The Frames of Gender Equality as Employed by the Parties

Gender equality as a non-EU matter
The first frame is most clearly articulated in the agendas of the Danish DF and the Dutch PVV. Both parties share the belief in the right of the national parliaments to decide their own gender equality and family policies. Regarding the role of the EU and the gender equality principle, the DF’s spokesperson commented:

“We basically believe that we are nation states that cooperate. And how each single state handles the different challenges it currently faces, that has to be up to each single state. And this is because I think one has to respect that the given state is a nation state, because otherwise one does not respect the democratic choices of those nation states. (...) This is why I do not think that the EU should interfere at all.” (Adelsteen, 2015)

For this reason, the DF and PVV issued very few or no statements on these themes during the electoral campaign in 2014. Hence, the authors of the reports have assumed a continuation between the parties’ politics on the national and EU levels, and accordingly reconstructed the parties’ stances on gender matters and family policies (next section) based on the parties’ materials produced predominantly for the domestic audience during other periods than the 2014 elections. Speaking in very general terms, neither gender equality, nor any policies addressing women, belong to the parties’ core agenda on the national level and are almost absent on the EU level. They are at best of secondary importance when compared with, for example, the theme of elderly care. This results from two intertwined assumptions. The first one is the parties’ general postulation of separating the national and EU politics. The second assumption relates to the parties’ definition of gender and family policies as domestic matters, thus exempted from the EU interference and resolved at the national levels (Siim & Nissen, 2015; Knijn & van Maaren, 2015).

The Croatian Party of Rights dr. Ante Starčević brings variations of the framing of gender equality as a non-EU matter, in so far as it calls into question the competences and capacity of the EU institutions to bring about fairness between the sexes. Although Tomašić believes that counteracting gender-based violence should be the EU’s priority (hence it should be an EU matter), she firmly argues that the member states ought to design their own strategies to deal with the problem, tailored for their specific circumstances. The particularities of different contexts, according to Tomašić, will not be properly detected by the bureaucratic EU machinery as it is currently known, and consequently, it is inefficient with handling the issue (Šipić, 2015). While still serving her first term in the EP, Tomašić argued during the plenary session on counteracting violence against women:

I hold that the informative and educational campaigns should be an integrative part of the education system and the EU public space in general. However (...) I am not sure that the piling up of regulations and regulating bodies at the EU level will be helpful. The fight against violence against women is taking place in every street, at the level of a city block or a
village, among the people, and not in the corridors in Brussels. This fight must be taken at the lower levels and we should act according to the local specificities, and in that field the competencies of the member states are much higher than those of the European Union.” (Tomašić, 2014b)

The Croatian MEP’s overall assumption about the current lack of proper EU resources to handle gender issues on the national levels translate into her minimal interest and initiative in this area during her second term in the EP (Šipić, 2015).

**Gender equality as a relative norm**

The second frame emerges in the agendas of all of the researched parties, and has several sub-frames.

**Gender equality as achieved for the autochthonous women**

The Danish DF and Dutch PVV are the most consistent in employing the first sub-frame. Both parties are explicit in stating that the level of gender equality for the autochthonous women in their respective settings is overall satisfactory, and requires rather small interventions; perhaps with respect to equal pay, career options for women, paternity leave, or the gendered division of household duties (DF, 2009). However, both parties argue that the problems can be solved by the women/families/employers themselves, and strongly object the imposition of any proactive policies to remedy those problems and oppose quota systems in business and politics, as this is seen as condescending towards professional women (Siim & Nissen, 2015; Knijn & van Maaren, 2015). In case the EP proposes to introduce new regulations or directives for encouraging gender equality, the Dutch PVV fiercely opposes such projects, as was the case with, for example, positive discrimination of women through quota (Knijn and van Maaren, 2015). Thus, the PVV’s and DF’s objections are anchored in the belief in gender equality as already achieved, and in the notion of gender equality as a non-EU matter (the first frame).

In the rhetoric of the Danish DF and Dutch PVV, the assumption about gender equality as an achieved project for native women is supported through comparisons with the situation of minority women, who are residents and citizens within the borders of the respective states. In the rhetoric of the DF, referencing the plight of minority female citizens (mostly, but not only, Muslims) or non-European migrants residing in Denmark (again mostly, but not only, Muslim) is part of a larger discourse on the incompatibility of the Muslim and Danish cultural values. The DF’s sharp culturalist stance on perceived discriminatory gender patterns in the Muslim communities is to flag a burning problem that does require a corrective measure through the state’s intervention. Whereas the Danish women are perceived as generally well integrated in the existing legal system, in education and on the labour market – thereof the state’s intervention is not recommended - the migrant women are portrayed as lacking educational and job possibilities due to being trapped by their oppressive patriarchal culture and religion (Siim & Nissen, 2015). The DF’s main stance is adequately summarized in the following quote: “there needs to be focus on equality for and amongst foreigners in Denmark” (DF, 2009). In such cases, the DF sees the state as instrumental in educating the migrant women or minority women in Denmark on gender equality as part of a larger scheme of integration on the labour market and in education and of assimilation to the Danish culture, language and values (DF, 2013). One of the proposed solutions to the Muslim women’s problems is the integration into the Danish society through women’s active participation in the labour force. The Danish welfare and gender model is premised on a high level of women active on the labour market (mothers with young children included). Thus, Muslim women migrants’ professional employment is often posited as the main prerequisite to their alleged liberation from the patriarchal norms, their adaptation to the local norms, but also their active contribution to the general societal well-being, in contrast to simply obtaining social assistance [kontanthjælp] (DF, 2013). The policy of constraining social assistance for migrants, as proposed by the DF, is to mobilize minority women to seek employment outside of the household, and to ease their integration:

> It is obvious that if you troop up in a scarf or – even worse – a niqab and list a long row of reservations about not wanting to get in contact with pork, or shaking hands with men, then most employers will say no thank you in advance. This is because it is possible to make yourself so difficult that benefits are the only alternative (...) As long as it is possible to live
your life without lifting a finger, many migrant families will lean back, and that is an attitude, which will be transmitted to their descendants for many generations. In other words, the integration will best be furthered by the sound of a till being slammed shut” (DF, 2014c).

The Dutch PVV’s assessment of migrant women or non-native women echoes the one of the DF. The PVV remarks on gender equality exclusively in a context of the Muslim population and embraces a culturalist assimilatory position, arguing that gender equality policies should target females deprived by their culture (Knijn & van Maaren, 2015). Further, the DF’s and the PVV’s stance on the welfare state and migrant and non-native women’s assimilation is somewhat contradictory. Those women who reside legally in the countries are encouraged fair treatment as well as their complete integration. At the same time both parties endorse exclusive welfare nationalism claiming that the Danish or Dutch welfare states should be preserved mainly for the Danish or Dutch native citizens respectively with strong emphasis on the needs of the elderly (Siim & Nissen, 2015; Knijn & van Maaren, 2015).

The cultural practices “forced on” the Muslim women appear in all the far right parties’ agenda as a way to point to the incompatibility of Islam and European/Christian heritage. However, the parties analysed here fail to propose comprehensive solutions to either how to overcome this problem or how to assist women whose rights may be jeopardized within the domestic patriarchal milieu. Instead the parties’ suggested policy measures are vestigial and focused predominantly on the prohibition of Muslim symbols and practices, which are perceived as degrading for the women. Consequently the PVV, DF and PxC have called for bans on the burqa and head-scarves. The PVV and DF even state that if Muslims are to oppose this ban, they can just return to their home countries. The PVV and DF stand out as exceptions to a small extent, since they have called for an increase in the marriage age for migrants to 24 years and strengthening of the laws on fake and forced marriages. Thus, it is only DF that formulated any policy measures to foster the assimilatory integration of Muslims into the Danish society (cutting unemployment benefits and promoting their labour market participation in general).

In some cases the first sub-frame emerges in a fragmented or alternated form. The German AfD argues that the idea of gender equality for women is already achieved. However, the party does not draw further comparisons with non-German minority women, but rather puts forward arguments against implementing any forms of positive discrimination “from men’s perspective,” as this will deepen the biases against the male sex.

The Spanish radical right landscape is divided over the issue as to which extent equality between women and men has been accomplished. The extremist Spanish FE-JONS and Democracia Nacional also assume that gender equality has been achieved, and that the positive discrimination of women has resulted in unfairness towards men. On the other hand, the radical populist Plataforma per Catalunya serve as a counterexample, with its implicit acknowledgment of existing biases against women (for example mothers of small children on the labour market), and support of the state’s policies and measures, which would help women to combine professional work with maternal duties, for example by eliminating the pay gap resulting from women’s reproductive choices. However, PxC does keep linking the phenomenon of gender based discrimination and gender based violence predominantly to Islamic immigrants and Muslim minority groups, listing problematic cultural practices experienced by women within these communities (polygamy, veiling, genital mutilation, forced marriages) and assuming that acts of violence against migrant, minority or native women are committed by mainly foreign men. To remedy the situation, the party proposes changes in the national Criminal Code to sanction any actions, which may lead to women’s discrimination.

While in the EP, the Lega Nord’s MEPs rarely, but nevertheless, acknowledges existing inequalities between men and women, for example the pay gap or the scarce of women in the top managerial positions. During such rare instances, the Italian party does ask about the EU’s measures to remedy the situations, implying the gender equality is also an EU matter and as such must be addressed in a transnational manner. At the same time, the party argues gender base violence particularly affects women under the spell of a patriarchal Islamic law. Regarding femicide in Italy, the LN calls the EU for undertaking raising awareness campaigns, ensuring more efficient protection of women (with no
further specifications), providing data on the phenomenon across EU, working out the overall transnational strategy to counteract the phenomenon and staying in regular contact with and providing support to the member states affected by these problems. Further, the Italian party makes the EU (European Commission) responsible for implementing uniform actions to prevent other “barbaric” and “fundamentalist” forms of violence against non-European women (children brides, veil, and FGM) from spreading across Europe in migrant communities. Also the LN MEP Bizzotto, together with seven other female non-inscrit MEPs from the French Front National, signed a motion in order to ban the wearing of the Islamic veil in public in Europe. Thus, in the LN rhetoric, problems occurring within the borders of individual member states are redefined as trans-European phenomena that call for the transnational, coordinated EU interventions on behalf of both minority and non-minority women.

An interesting alternation of the first sub-frame is to be found in the rhetoric of the Hungarian Jobbik. The Hungarian party does acknowledge gender equality principle is far from being achieved in Hungary in general. At the same time Jobbik distinguishes between Hungarian women and Hungarian Roma women pointing at the latter as particularly affected by discrimination, low participation on the labour market or gender-based violence. The difference between the levels of gender equality available for Hungarian women and Hungarian Roma women are to serve as an indicator of the general cultural backwardness of the Roma community. However, in contrast to the DF’s rhetoric, such comparisons are not to call for the state’s intervention on behalf of minority women, but to draw attention to assumed high social and economic costs resulting from the poor assimilation of the Roma population that are paid by the Hungarian society. The major difference emerges in the rhetoric of the Danish right wing party vis-à-vis Jobbik. The former sees the state as an actor bringing about gender equality exclusively for minority women. The latter envisions the state as a force bringing about gender equality predominantly for native women, while minority women’s situation serves to mobilize a somewhat different project of minimizing expenditures generated by the Roma population’s asocial conducts. Contrary to the DF, Jobbik does not embrace an assimilatory project, but keeps pointing at insuperable differences between Hungarians and Roma Hungarians.

Gender equality as more achieved in the North-Western MS than in the rest of the EU

The second sub-frame emerges most clearly in DF’s rhetoric in which the assumption about the proper level of gender equality for native Danish women is further strengthened by comparisons with other EU countries (e.g. Romania or Italy) that are allegedly behind with bringing about the equality between women and men. However, in the spirit of the belief that the gender issues are entirely domestic matters, the DF objects any interventions of the EU into the affairs of the member countries, even if from outside a situation calls for improvements. Thus the EU should withdraw from providing any educational or other activities to any member states regarding gender equality. Hence the DF’s general position on this issue is a mixture of the “courteous” paternalism and culturalism and can be summarized as: “If it works for them, who we are to interfere.” Whereas the discourse on gender inequality in the Muslim communities serves to illustrate the civilizational clash between Denmark and Muslim culture, the difference in the levels of gender equality as achieved in Northern European countries compared with Eastern and Southern European settings is portrayed as a matter of degree. Gender equality is instrumentalised here to support the notion of the backwardness of the Central, Eastern and Southern EU members vis-à-vis the Northern European countries (more civilisationally advanced) that nonetheless should not necessarily be reformed (Adelsteen, 2015).

Eastern and Central European Women as less equal than Western, due to structures of inequality

The third sub-frame is to be seen in the materials of the Hungarian Jobbik. During her electoral campaign and in the EUP Kristina Morvai has introduced a category of a vulnerable female EU citizen discriminated based on her sex and citizenship. During the FEMM committee’s meeting in July 2014 Morvai argued: “We cannot speak about European women in general, since a Hungarian woman is in a very different situation than a German woman in almost every

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aspect of her life” (Jobbik, 2014d). She often employs an image of an Eastern European female migrant in another member state who is underpaid and not protected by the law of a host country. Thus, similarly to the DF, the Hungarian MP does recognize Eastern and Western European women enjoy different levels of equality (the second sub-frame), however she provides dissimilar explanation for this state of matter. In place of the notion of cultural superiority of one setting over another, Morvai points at structural inequalities in the EU and aims at unmasking the unequal power relations between the EU member states and on-going, intentional, colonial like exploitation of the “East” by the “West”. Thus improving a plight of a vulnerable Eastern European female (often migrant) vis-à-vis Western European women is an EU matter and an ultimate litmus paper to test the EU commitment to both the principle of gender equality and the principle of equality between the member states. According to Morvai’s discourse one cannot talk about gender equality as an accomplished project in any of the EU setting as long as the principle applies to all EU women at once regardless they reside in their native country or migrate to other EU state. In Morvai’s rhetoric the EU’s role is defined in contradictory ways. On one hand, the EU is depicted as a colonizer that should respect the sovereignty of Hungary. On the other hand it also emerges as a credible actor that is supposed to intervene in women’s rights issues – on the national and transnational levels, albeit too weak to fulfil its role. Similarly to Tomašić from The Croatian Party of Rights dr. Ante Starčević, Morvai points at the weakness of the EU mechanisms regarding their ability to force the member states to bring gender equality policies (see the previous section). However, contrary to Tomašić, Hungarian MP does not call for the exclusion of gender politics from the EU’s scope of competences, but rather she is hopeful for appropriate reforms of the EU structures. Another difference between Morvai’s and Tomašić’s stance on the EU is that the latter rejects an image of a vulnerable migrant woman, a product of the systemic structural problems, and instead emphasises opportunities that migration may create for hardworking women.

Gender inequality of women in developing countries targeted by EU development policy

The fourth sub-frame assumes gender equality as achieved in Europe, and as being absent in non-European contexts. In the materials produced by the analysed parties, this sub-frame most often appeared as part of the debate on European civilizational superiority, and about the incompatibility of the European and Muslim cultures. The fourth sub-frame strongly emerges in the Italian Lega Nord’s electoral campaign, in a context of the discussion on Turkey’s accession to the EU. Turkey’s Muslim tradition, with its weak protection of women’s rights among other things, is posited as the main challenge to the Judeo-Christian European civilisation. The rare occasions the Lega Nord handles inequalities between men and women within the EU (2) stands in contrast to the number of occasions when the Italian party focuses on the violence against women outside of the EU (13). LN argues it is an EU’s role to end “barbaric” practises of violence against women outside of Europe.

The Lega Nord’s approach to Muslim women outside of Europe resembles the one embraced by the Croatian MEP Tomašić. In the Motion for a Resolution on Iraq: kidnapping and mistreatment of women (2014/2971(RSP)) and in the Joint Motion for a Resolution on the situation in Iraq and Syria, and the ISIS offensive, including the persecution of minorities (2014/2843(RSP)) submitted by the ECR group, Tomašić together with other MEPs denounced the inefficiency of local legal and social structures to protect women and assure their access to employment or participation in politics. The motions also pointed at practices of forced marriage, domestic violence, and genital mutilation as tools of exercising male power over women who are portrayed as victims of patriarchal Muslim cultural practices. The motions argue that assuring gender equality and safety of women and girls in Iraq and Syria ought to be the EU’s priority. Thus the EU is positioned as a humanitarian force to implement civilizational values, specifically gender equality assumed as present in Europe and absent in the contexts under consideration (Šipić, 2015).

Gender equality as a threat

The frame of gender equality as to be counteracted is most clearly employed by the Alternative for Germany. The party defines gender mainstreaming as a “battle of the sexes” with detrimental consequences for the social climate
(AfD, 2015). The overall aims of the party are defined as annihilation of the “leftist domination of terms” and reestablishment of “natural order of gender” (Kemper, 2015).

To accomplish these goals the AfD argues for annulling gender mainstreaming “as a guiding principle and cross sectional task on all levels of government” as well as for elimination of “all laws and regulations decreed in the spirit of gender ideology”. Consequently, the acts as the Federal Equality Law and the General Equal Treatment Act should be eradicated. Further the AfD calls the authorities for withdrawing from subsidizing any measures that promote gender ideology and for abolishing positions for equal opportunities officers, termination of diversity offices in all type of establishments regardless they operate according to the public or private laws, and cancellation of funding for gender studies followed by the removal of the chair holders (AfD, 2015). It also opposes gender quota assuming that they would inevitably lead to discrimination of men. The latter assumption is further accompanied by the argument about gender ideology as being against nature and as such it prevents the German nation from counteracting the negative demographic tendency (Meuthen & Jongen, 2015). The party also opposes abortion. It supports homophobic campaigns and requests the removal of education on sexual diversity from school curricula. At the same time, in the context of the debate on the influx of Muslim immigrants, the AfD argues that Christian values protect both women and homosexuals in the best possible way because Christianity is founded on the respect towards every individual human. The current rise of gender ideology undermines the very basis of the Christian civilisation and undermines the basis of women and homosexuals’ safety. Thus gender equality is portrayed as against the Christian, European civilization, but also against those it claims to protect.

The Lega Nord also argues that gender ideology is not compatible with the Jewish and Christian roots of the European civilisations and denounces the European Union as actively involved in the diffusion of the immoral ideology. Thus Brussels’, very broadly and vaguely defined, interference in gender related matters is perceived as unwanted and as part of EU’s larger project of cultural homogenization (globalization) of European diversity. At the same time women and men equality and LGBT rights are defined as part of the European civilisation and as such they must be protected against other cultures (Muslim) and function as a mean to stress civilizational differences between Europe and non-European settings (Muslim). The Lega Nord’s stance on the negative impact of the EU on the morality of the member states through its promotion of gender ideology stands in odds with the party’s position on the EU as responsible for designing and executing transnational policies to assure the equality between migrant women and men within EU and women and men outside of Europe, as described earlier.

During the electoral campaign Croatian candidate Tomašić spoke against gender ideology as a system of beliefs that promotes one groups’ democratic rights by defying rights of other groups. Tomašić denounces gender equality on the two main grounds. First, she believes it is a system within which men’s and (unborn) children’s rights are infringed at the expense of women’s rights. Second, gender equality assumes women’s reproductive freedom, including their right to abortion (to murder), which is defined in terms of civilizational regress (Belak Krile, 2014). Tomašić offered most comprehensive account of her understanding of discrimination in the context of the debate on sexual and reproductive rights:

Discrimination is a problem for which it is hard to find a universal solution. I hold and deeply believe that all citizens must be equal before the law and that we must respect human rights. However, I am getting an impression that certain groups want to be more equal, which is a journey in a completely wrong direction. Discrimination is discrimination whether it is positive or negative, and as such it is unjust and undesirable. One’s rights must not go at the expense of others and that is the simplest and only correct formula that should be followed. I must express my sadness and disappointment that this topic was put on the agenda since I believe that the members of the Parliament clearly and unambiguously said what they think about it. I am afraid that certain political forces cannot completely perceive democracy so they use violent methods in order to enforce their ideological position to all of us. And, madam president, we all know that it takes a woman and a man to conceive a child. When there comes a time when a woman will be able to conceive a child on her own, without the help of a man, then she can decide about her child on her own (Tomašić, 2014).
Thus it is proposed the EU must prevent further spread of this ideology by, for example, rejecting “biased” reports on the relevant issues, as was the case with the Estrela or Zubert reports during the 7th Parliamentary session. On both occasions Tomašić voted for rejecting the reports.

Partial Conclusion

Out of the three frames identified in the materials produced by the parties, the frame of gender equality as a relative idea is the most frequent one. The most significant diagnosis of the second frame is that women’s experience of gender equality is predominantly conditioned by their ethnicity, nationality, citizenship or cultural belonging. Consequently, the parties differentiate between the following sub-categories of women: 1) “Western” European native women, 2) “Eastern” European women 3) minority women within the EU member states, 4) migrant women from the third countries residing in the EU, and 5) women from outside Europe. The second frame assumes gender equality spectrum: from gender equality as an already accomplished project to the absence of gender equality with phases in between the two ends. There is a shared agreement that Western European women, particularly in the Northern countries, experience gender equality whereas women from the other sub-groups experience lower levels of equality or its absence. Different locations on the gender equality spectrum call for different type of solutions from the EU and state members. In case of the assumption that gender equality has been already achieved it is argued that implementation of any polices to further this process is unnecessary or may even trigger negative consequences. There might be some acknowledgment of existing imbalances between citizens based on sex, but their magnitude is downplayed or their type is presumed as not suitable for either the EU’s or the national state’s interventions. In case of assumed gender inequality experienced by “other” women the frame encourages the EU’s intervention inside and outside of the EU borders on the grounds of bringing corrective measures to gender injustices (thus gender equality becomes an EU matter) and/or supports the state’s interventions into the gender norms of so-called non-conforming populations. The diagnosis produced within the second frame overwrites the prognoses outlined by the other two frames (the first and third) in so far as it contradicts the notion of gender equality as a non-EU matter as well as the notion of gender equality as a threat to be fought against.

Israel

In the case of Israel, the gender equality statements were scarce during the electoral campaign, and formulated predominantly in the context of the debates on the number of female candidates on the parties’ electoral lists. Before the most recent national elections, The Jewish Home supported the rule that there should be at least one woman on every five places on the list. The party also made a conscious effort to establish itself as promoting gender equality, despite its distinctively religious profile (Bendet, 2015). Similar efforts of presenting itself as supporting women’s participation in politics were made by Israel our Home (Azulai, 2015). However, despite a considerable number of women in the first places on the lists of both parties, gender equality does not feature prominently on their agendas. The Israel our Home website states that the party promotes equal employment opportunities and the principle of equal wages for both sexes. In addition, it endorses the tax policies that would acknowledge child caring expenses (Yisrael Beytenu, n.d.a). In the parliament, the party supported the lengthening of maternity leaves for mothers of hospitalized newborns, and establishing a call center for women and men, who had been sexually offended.
6. FAMILY

The framing of family can be seen as another distinctive element in radical right politics, even though not equally prominent across the different radical right parties in Europe. When featured, this theme appears on the agenda of the analysed parties as a rhetorical tool rather than a separate policy area, with the exception of Jobbik. Thus, instead of coherent frames, in this field, we deal mostly with fragmented frames, or elements of frames. Our analysis points at a common core of ideas, but also some important variation, especially in terms of proposed interventions.

A critical difference between the parties is the salience assigned to questions related to the family. There is a considerable discrepancy between how much attention parties actually devote to the subject in their programs during the EP electoral campaign and in the EP. Whereas for the Central and Eastern and Southern European parties family relations are a fundamental aspect of their ideology, their Nordic counterparts hardly mention this issue, and their stance on family relations can only be captured indirectly. Jobbik stands out, as it is the only party that proposed a coherent family policy, albeit this being subordinated to the party’s nativist agenda, as the analysis will show.

6.1 The Perceptions of Family

There are three dominant proposals on ‘family’ emerging in the agenda of the parties: 1) The family free from either state or/and EU interventions; 2) The traditional family model under attack; and 3) The weakening of the family as a cause of the demographic crisis. Policy interventions into family matters vary across the different analysed parties. Some support a strongly interventionist role for policymakers at the domestic as well as the EU level, others do not see the legitimacy of any EU intervention in the field, whilst in the Nordic countries, interventions are not proposed, yet normative positions taken by the parties (for example on reproductive technologies or adoption procedure) indirectly indicate the need for them. The objective of policy interventions (which can sometimes only be derived indirectly from the analysis) is twofold. First, it is to promote and prioritize the model of the family seen as traditional through a variety of fiscal and cultural policies, as well as through favouring legislation and through preventing or cancelling policies, which aim at levelling the status of alternative families. Second, it is to overcome the demographic crisis, by boosting the birth rates of ‘native Europeans,’ while maintaining narrowly defined parameters of ‘proper’ reproduction.

The analysed populist right wing parties define “family” as a heterosexual union between a woman and a man (preferably married) with between two (e.g. PVV) to three children (e.g. AfD). Such a defined family is often designed as the “traditional family”, the “cornerstone of modern society” (Lega Nord), the “fundamental societal institution” (PxC), or as the base of “traditional social structures” (Jobbik, 2014b). Importantly, the parties either promote the mother’s employment, or do not perceive the partaking of mothers, even of small children, in the paid labour force, as incompatible with the definition of the traditional family. Thus, the model of a husband/father breadwinner and a wife/mother home maker, once associated with the so-called traditional family, has been replaced with the model of double (or one and a half) income families. Moreover, most parties do not endorse, at least not explicitly, the gender division of labour within the domesticity (AfD is an exception). It is an open question to which extent they have acknowledged the on-going social processes in their definition of the family, or rather strategically overlook the controversial issues. As will be shown in the subsequent sections, the parties vary with respect to the extent they recognise employed mothers’ burdens through relevant policies to foster the work-family balance.

There are different understandings of what the traditional family means, and how important it is to put the family on the political agenda, which is further influenced by the welfare, as well as the gender and religious regimes of the given countries. That being said, the parties analyzed here seem to share a consensus that “the traditional family” – a heterosexual married couple with off-springs – is the most appropriate, or sometimes the only, option of familial organization. The AfD sees this model as the “nucleus for higher human development” (Kraft, 2014). Despite the variation in the definition of the traditional family, as well as in its actual practice, some right wing parties refer to the traditional family’s alleged long lasting historical continuity. This is the case of the LN, which legitimizes the superiority
of the traditional family over alternative arrangements by pointing to the well established presence of this model in the European civilization, and/or to this model’s assumed congruence with Christian values (Caponio et. al., 2015). Meanwhile, other social arrangements (e.g. same sex couple parenting, single parenthood) are rarely or never labelled by the word “family”. Thus, for some of the parties, a strong line between what constitutes ‘a family,’ and what does not, is manifested already on the semantic level. Based on the materials produced by these parties, one may conclude that their understanding of the traditional family emerges most prominently through their attitude towards alternative social arrangements. The traditional family is a not-LGBT relationship, not-informal cohabitation, not-single parenting, and not childless. Furthermore, the traditional model of family is promoted as providing the most favourable conditions for a child’s development. Therefore, single parenthood, patchwork families or LGBT parenting is often denounced as of secondary quality at best, or outright undesirable. It is most clearly articulated on the DF’s agenda, which endorses the nuclear, heterosexual family (married parents) as the best environment for the upbringing of children, “[e]ven though other family patterns can give the children a safe and good upbringing, the marriage is still the natural starting point for the family life, and other forms of cohabitation should therefore not be favoured compared to marriage” (DF, 2009: 92).

While providing further justification for the conservative family as a superior familial model, HSP AS, LN, Jobbik and AfD refer to religious – Christian or Catholic – values (Šipić, 2015; Caponio, Testore, & Santero, 2015; Amon & Krizsán, 2015; Gesterkamp & Kemper, 2015). Meanwhile, religious arguments on the traditional family are almost absent from the PVV and DF’s programs, with one exception, when DF votes against the right to religious marriage for same sex couples (Siim & Nissen, 2015). The presence of religious argumentation in some radical right parties’ programs may indicate the allocation of family matters to the authority of the religious establishments, a denial of separation of secular and religious powers. The absence of religious rhetoric in the PVV’s and DF’s may suggest that those far right parties favour the model of the state being entirely independent in its family policymaking from the EU, and separated from the Church. It may also result from the specificity of the Danish and Dutch contexts, in which the family norm in society is not religious. Furthermore, referencing to Christian values in family matters may also serve the broader project, which those parties have on resolving tensions around the Muslim population within the EU.

6.2 The Perceptions of Family Used by the Parties

The family free from state and/or EU interventions

This framing appears in the agendas of the three parties AfD, DF and PVV, with different degrees of explicitness. The Alternative for Germany posits the family and the state in profoundly antithetical relations. It results from the assumption about the state as being corrupted by gender equality principles. Within this logic, the family is defined as a “stronghold against state ideology”. Until the state does not undertake appropriate measures of self-normalization (as described in the Gender section), the traditional model of the family functions as an antidote to its indoctrinating gender ideology. The AFG’s program is heavily influenced by the ideas of the contemporary masculinist movement. The latter distinguishes it as strongly oppositional towards public and state institutions arguing against their involvement in family matters as patronizing and intruding in the task sharing between adults. Since the EU endorses the principle of gender equality, it should be assumed that AFG does not endorse any specific family policies on the EU level either.

The lack of concern for family policies on the EU level in the DF and PVV’s agendas result from these parties’ overall assumption about family matters not being part of EU competences and competences of national governments. On the national level these parties do not formulate family policies either. The DF accepts the views of other Danish political parties which support national welfare and social policies based on the prevalent dual wage earner family model, including measures such as extended public childcare. It perceives family issues as a matter of agreement between the parties directly involved (for example regarding sharing of care duties). Along these lines DF opposed the
previous government’s proposal of earmarked paternal leave as patronizing and the state’s imposition on the family freedom to organize their own life.

**Traditional family in need of strengthening**

Another recurring framing element presented by some of the parties promotes the belief in the traditional family being weakened by “gender ideology,” “heterophobia,” “Christianophobia,” economic crisis or migration. This framing criticizes the EU or individual member states for being actively involved in the promotion of ideological trends that are undermining the traditional family, or denounces the EU’s passivity or softness in counteracting those trends. LN and Jobbik are most articulate in accusing the EU for spreading gender ideology that promotes “distorted” understanding of the family, and therefore poses a threat to foundational societal values (Caponio et al., 2015; Amon & Krizsán, 2015). The Hungarian Jobbik lists migration of Hungarian workers to other EU states as another danger to the traditional family, which is ruptured by the separation of its members (Amon & Krizsán, 2015).

The parties propose a variety of solutions to strengthen the traditional family, ranging from symbolic endorsement, to financial help, to assuring its superior legal status vis-à-vis alternative arrangements. In the European Parliament, LN MEPs put forward the idea of a European Family Day in the Motion for a resolution on the subject. The appeal to the Commission to introduce a European Family Day was to function as a means to “protect and promote the cultural, educational and social principles of the traditional family” (Bizzotto, 2014b). Further, in order to protect the traditional family the Lega Nord advocates the de-legitimization of policies on anti-discrimination based on sexual orientation. They also urge to protect European citizens from heterophobia and Christianophobia, as well as to protect their rights to express disapproval for the LGBT families and/or parenting (freedom of expression). The Italian party insisted the Commission must act against and prevent cases in which European citizens were deprived of their rights, or faced consequences of expressing themselves freely. The LN complained that as opposed to homophobia, the phenomenon of heterophobia is not recognized either on the transnational or local level. Also in the spirit of protecting parents’ right to bring up their children in accordance with their system of values, LN urges the Commission to limit the impact of the World Health Organization’s standards for sexual education in Europe, because of a “purely materialistic view of the body and physicality” (Bizzotto, 2014a). Thus, the family matters are defined as part of the EU competences.

Next to symbolic strengthening and promotion of the traditional family, the parties advocate for fiscal forms of help for families affected by the economic crisis. In its motion on the economic crisis and the European Family Day, the LN recommends “tax incentives and subsidies for (...) first home and measures in support of motherhood and the work-life balance” for heterosexual couples (Bizzotto, 2014b). The Italian party’s call for the EU to address work-family balance as a systemic problem diverges from the stance of the HSP AS on the same issue. The Croatian party’s model of the family also assumes reproduction as the predominant role of women, however, it does not refer to any problems that women as mothers may face in a larger socio-economic context. Consequently, it remains silent on how state or EU policies should handle this issue. The only policy area where the HSP AS calls explicitly for state intervention is the ban on abortion (Šipić, 2015). In accordance to its overall stance on family as a non-EU matter and not an important matter for public intervention, the PVV remained silent about family policies during the EP election campaign. The only statements the party made in the campaign document of 2012 concerns the social protection of families. Importantly this statement was formulated in the context of the economic crisis as impacting (also) families, not as part of the proposal on the traditional family in crisis. The latter theme does not appear in the PVV’s agenda. The party argues that many families are affected by unemployment resulting from the economic crisis. On behalf of those families, the PVV was against increasing rent prices and the cutbacks in childcare facilities. However, this protection is to exclude families with more children than average, thus introducing a normative preference for certain families. One of the issues in the election campaign was to preserve child allowance and tax deduction to families with no more than two children, the typical Dutch family pattern. Thus, although the PVV expresses concerns about protecting common Dutch people, the party is ambivalent in supporting the most vulnerable parts of the population, who are in need due to family problems (Knijn & van Maaren, 2015). The theme of the fiscal differentiations between
the more and the less deserving families of the state’s support appear also on AfD’s agenda. Solutions such as tax advantages for families (family splitting) or a pension scheme for children and youth assume larger tax free allowances for families with a higher income, while disadvantaging low income households (Kemper, 2014).

Finally, as another means of strengthening of the traditional family, the far right parties oppose levelling the rights of the heterosexual and LGBT couples and parents. The means of prevention are mainly proposals to not grant same sex couples similar recognition of their family rights, limiting LGBT parenting rights, for example the right to marriage or adoption. The weight of measures proposing to discriminate same sex couples depends on the context. In Denmark, where same sex partnership is no longer a controversial issue, the DF strongly opposes adoption and IVF for same sex couples on the grounds of it being a violation of the rights of the children since “the child is deprived in advance of the right to have both a father and a mother” (DF, 2009: 93). For this reason, not only same sex couples, but also single parents are to be denied adoption, “even though we recognize that [other family patterns] can be just as loving and safe families as the traditional nuclear family” (ibid.: 93). DF does not deny the right to marriage for same sex couples, although it opposes the recent legislative change, which allows the Lutheran Church perform religious wedding ceremonies for them, if the priest accepts to do so. Similarly to the Dutch PVV, the DF does not have a family policy and does not employ the notion of ‘family crisis’. The DF-agenda illustrates the contradictory ways the party envisages the role of the state vis-à-vis those processes. The main argument of the DF is that the state should not interfere in family matters. At the same time however it seems to suggest that the state through its policies should clearly define what constitutes the normal family and parenthood.

In contrast to DF, the Croatian HSP AS fiercely opposes granting same sex couples the right to marriage as “ideological” and as violating the democratic procedures, as it is not in line with the results of the 2013 referendum on the constitutional definition of marriage (Šipić, 2015). However, both the Danish and Croatian parties justify the denial of same sex couples’ right to adoption as not in the best interest of a child (Siim & Nissen, 2015; Šipić, 2015). The Croatian HSP AS and Italian LN perceive adoption by same sex couples as being incompatible with Christian values (Šipić, 2015; Caponio et al., 2015). The Lega Nord opposes granting same sex couples the right to marriage. During the electoral campaign the party remained silent with respect to the legalization of same-sex civil unions. Similarly to HSP AS, the Hungarian Jobbik denies both legal marriage and adoption to same sex couples. Jobbik supported the Hungarian Fundamental Law’s definition of the family as a union between a man and a woman, arguing that most Europeans agree that marriage should only be legal in case of heterosexual couples. It also argues that those in favour of same sex marriage discriminate against those who defend the “traditional family model” (Kovács, 2014).

The prognosis offered by radical right populist parties for family matters diverges on grounds of disagreement concerning the role of the EU. The parties that most strongly accuse the EU for undermining the traditional family, like Jobbik and Lega Nord, are also the ones most vocal about the necessity of EU intervention for defending the conservative family values. In such cases, Euroscepticism does not refer to the scope of the EU’s competences, but rather to the insufficiency of the EU’s mechanisms to act. Thus, new strategies, reforms, and improvements within the EU apparatus are proposed and hoped for. Meanwhile, the PVV and DF expect the EU to refrain from any intervention, and ask for the right to set national policies according to particular states’ needs, even if those policies may contradict the EU’s directives (illustrated further in the following part). This version of Euroscepticism does not undermine altogether the EU, but calls for reconsidering the scope of its influence. There are also populist radical right parties like the HSP AS, which, despite its strong emphasis on the theme of the family, does not formulate any position regarding the EU’s role in handling the issue.

The weakening of the family as a cause of the demographic crisis

For some parties the diagnosis on the condition of the family appears as part of a larger debate on the demographic crisis or demographic sustainability within the EU. Thus, the third assumption links the weakening of the family to the
European demographic crisis. The latter is often defined as disproportionality between the low birth rates among the natives vis-à-vis the birth rates of minority populations or migrant populations.

The most elaborated version of this third theme is proposed by the Hungarian Jobbik. The party identifies the ‘demographic crisis’ as an issue of fundamental importance for the EU and Hungary, and its diagnosis of the family appears predominantly in relation to this problem. In the party’s discourse, ‘demographic crisis’ is simultaneously assumed as the biological decline of native Hungarians vis-à-vis the rise of the Hungarian Roma population, but also as the decline of the traditional Hungarian values threatened by “liberals” and the EU supporters. Further, the migration of Hungarian workers to Western Europe is interpreted as adding to the demographic crisis, since it prevents young people from starting their families in Hungary. Thus, Hungary is diagnosed as ‘in crisis,’ due to dropping fertility rates in white middle class families, the high birth rates among Roma, migration, and because of deteriorating societal ideals. Jobbik endorses the state support for deserving families, but also, despite its diagnosis of the EU as undermining Hungarian morals, the party envisions the interventionist role for the EU in counteracting the crisis (Amon & Krizsán, 2015). Rather unusually for a far right party, Jobbik employs a gender equality discourse and proposes to overcome the Europe-wide demographic crisis through the promotion of gender equality in childcare, and on the labour market.

We will help the parents raising children in sharing work within the family, and we make it possible for women to choose whether they want to return to their job or fulfil their destiny as full-time mothers (...). We support the return of women to work, because this was proved to lead to higher fertility rates.” (Jobbik, 2014: 38).

Thus, women’s integration into the labour market and gender equality are subordinated to the objective of increasing fertility rates. This chief objective informs the party’s design of generous family polices, including the principle of equal pay, family-friendly workplaces, family tax subsidies, housing subsidies for young families with children, lowered VAT for childcare products, and family bankruptcy schemes for families struggling with mortgage payment. In the “demographic crisis” rhetoric, Jobbik portrays women as victims in need of protection from men, the state and the EU. However, since women feature predominantly as part of the family in this discourse, their protection means ultimately the defence of family values and reinforcement of the traditional gender roles. Gender equity discourse in Jobbik’s rhetoric on the demographic crisis is implicitly instrumental to its robust nativist agenda. The analysis of Jobbik’s national program, on which it ran in the EP-elections, demonstrates that the party’s family and welfare policies aim at boosting fertility among ‘deserving’, white, working, middle-class citizens, while discouraging Roma from reproduction, and limiting their access to welfare benefits.

The Lega Nord’s program is similar to Jobbik’s stance, in so far as the party draws a link between fertility rates and gender equality, and supports coordinated state actions to facilitate parenthood (e.g. creating a more efficient system of kindergartens) (Lega Nord, 2014). However, its design of family policies is far less specific and elaborate than that of the Hungarian party. Similarly, in its program the Croatian HSP AS also briefly refers to reproduction within the traditional model of the family as the answer to the demographic crisis, which is framed as a matter of the Nation’s survival. However, no specific family policy design is proposed. Importantly though during the EP elections, HSP AS was part of a six party coalition under the leadership of HDZ, the main conservative party in Croatia. The coalition issued more specific statement on demographic development and population policy. In the coalition electoral program the issue is defined as of particular importance for the “future and survival of the Croat nation/people and the Croatian state”, as a “question of all questions”. It is located in relation to “national security and planning of economic activities as a part of social and family policies”. Regarding specific policy measures, the coalition proposed: “With the systematic activities in the field of health, protection of motherhood, development of infrastructure and services aimed at the family, it is necessary to increase the level of social security, quality and the way of life of young married couples and families in order to realize the pronatality policy in the Republic of Croatia” (HDZ et al., 2014: 12).

Although the HSP AS differentiates between native (Croats) and non-native citizens within the borders of the state, the party’s stance on demography was not formulated in relation to its ethnicity position. (Šipić, 2015).
Versions of welfare nationalism somewhat similar to Jobbik’s program also emerge in the programs of some other parties. In these cases, the objective is to counteract the demographic crisis without accepting immigrants not only from outside of the EU, but also from other EU MS, who are potential users of welfare provisions. The AfD is such a case. According to Höcke, the reproduction of “organically grown [German] people” is the answer to the demographic problem along with a refusal of immigration (Kemper, 2015). For this purpose, AfD opposes the payment of child benefits for non-German families and is against immigration through family reunion. The Lega Nord also promotes the support of Italian and European families as a solution to overcome the demographic crisis without taking in migrants. However, it does not propose any concrete forms of this support.

The Dutch PVV and the Danish DF have different versions of welfare nationalism, as already discussed in the migration section before. PVV proposes to limit child allowance and tax deduction to families with no more than two children, on the assumption that the ‘real Dutch families’ have usually one or two offspring. The Danish DF proposes to restrict intra-EU mobility and the social and particularly family benefits of EU-citizens working in another EU country, as well as to restrict family reunification legislation for third-country nationals. (Messerschmidt, as cited in TV2, 2014). It must be noted that since neither DF nor PVV have proposed comprehensive family policies on the national level or addressed the demographic crisis. For the DF proposals affecting families mainly consist of providing the support for the elderly or the workers.

The demographic crisis as an EU-wide problem appears in the programs of several of the analysed parties, and is neatly connected with their nativist agenda. However, the parties do not agree with respect to the prognosis. The most striking solution offered to the demographic crisis emerges in the Jobbik program, which employs the gender equity principle as a means to boost the fertility rates of the “deserving” social strata. Its gender equality and women’s rights approaches, albeit subordinated to the nativist agenda, stands in contrast with the vehement opposition of some of the other parties to “gender ideology” and feminism as the primary reasons of the demographic crisis. Although some parties, like the Lega Nord, acknowledge the specific impact of motherhood on women’s professional lives and thus on their reproductive choices, they do not develop comprehensive policies rooted in gender equity, but rather propose “gender neutral” versions of family policies, within which welfare nationalism plays a dominant role. Further, yet again, there is disagreement on the role of the EU in the process of overcoming the demographic crisis. While Jobbik calls for the EU involvement in handling the problem, the PVV, DF or AfG strongly opt for the right of the MS to design their own family policies without the guidance of Brussels’ directives, or in some cases even for no state intervention into family matters at all.

**Partial Conclusion**

The analysed populist radical right parties apparently share the conviction about the traditional model of the family as the preferred familial arrangement, but there are important variations in the meanings and importance they attach to the traditional family and the proposed interventions to promote that arrangement.

For some parties the family is a key issue in their political ideology, while other parties do not put this issue on their political agenda. In case of the Danish and Dutch parties, statements on the family are scarce. This relates to their Euroscepticism and their strong stance that family matters should not be EU matters. Consequently, these parties do not discuss the theme of family or family policies in the EU context. Further, the PVV and DF’s disinterest towards the family in both EU and national politics may also be influenced by the overall egalitarian gender regime and the generally liberal attitude towards alternative familial organizations common in the primary constituency of these parties, the Dutch and Danish societies. In the settings in which non-traditional family models are highly contentious, like Croatia, Italy or Hungary, far right parties devote considerably more attention to it, and employ stronger value-driven rhetorical tools.
Another dividing issue is with respect to the mothers’ engagement in the paid labour force, most likely influenced by the particular welfare and gender regimes or the specific ideological agenda. In the Dutch and Danish contexts there is consensus across the political parties, including DF and PVV, that mothers are obliged to do wage work. Although Jobbik also sees mothers’ participation in the labour force as important, it does not phrase their employment in terms of their obligation, but as a mean to facilitate a robust nativist agenda. Meanwhile LN or HSP AS’s statements on working mothers are ambivalent in that they neither promote nor discourage dual earner family model.

Finally, the parties are also divided on the condition of the family. Jobbik, LN or AfD propose that the particular practice of the traditional family currently experiences some form of crisis, while DF and PVV are not concerned with the crisis of the traditional family or with the demographic crisis. The theme of the crisis of the traditional family may be linked to the problem of low fertility rates within the EU in combination with forms of nationalist fears that prevail in the given context. The later assumption points to the robust nativist agenda of the populist radical right that not only applauds the model of the conservative heterosexual family but also insists on additional parameters of “proper” reproduction within the EU or within the member states (racial, ethnic, national, religious, or class-based). However even if the parties agree on the crisis of the traditional model of the family and the demographic crisis as a trans-European phenomena, the role of the EU in handling these problems seems a bone of contention. The prognoses range from the explicit endorsement of the EU as an entity responsible for providing systemic solutions (Jobbik), to more moderate support for EU involvement (the Lega Nord), to strong opposition to EU’s involvement in designing the family polices (PVV, DF).

Israel

The family was marginally addressed during the Israeli election campaign and afterwards. Similarly to the theme of gender equality, the statements on family were strongly informed by religious argumentation. The Jewish Home endorses the traditional model of family, and is in favor of the existing law, which demands religious, and not a civil, ceremony. Although the party has declared that the supporters of same-sex marriage should not vote for The Jewish Home (Baruch, 2015), its attitude towards the issue is alternating between radical rejection of same-sex partnerships to a moderate proposal of the state’s sanctioned partnerships (not marriages though) as a humans right issue (Gal & Halevy, 2015).

Israel our Home’s stance on marriage diverges from that of The Jewish Home, and it is informed by the specific circumstances in which some of the party’s constituency find themselves under Israeli law. This relates to the status of marriage in Israel: Despite the fact that Israel’s judicial system generally can be considered as secular, family law is regulated by religious law. The institutions of civil marriage and divorce do not exist, and the family is defined according to a patriarchal model, as a marriage of a heterosexual couple with children (Tamir, 2008). Part of Israel our Home’s constituency consists of immigrants from the former USSR, who are defined as non-Jewish, and consequently as not having a religion. As a result, these people are prevented from registering as married in any of the religious institutions in Israel. This is the legal context in which Israel our Home submitted a proposal for a law of a “marriage alliance,” which would enable couples defined as religion-less to register as married. However, the party voted against an extended version of the proposal that included mixed couples (from more than one religion) (Bender, 2010). Furthermore, again reflecting the specific needs of its constituency, many of whom are single-headed immigrant families from the former USSR, Israel our Home supports social policies addressed to primarily single mothers to assist them in entering the labor force or in acquiring professional education. Women, who use these opportunities, will still be entailed to the social benefits available for single mothers (Gal & Halevy, 2015).
### 7. Summary of the Framings of the 7 European Populist Radical Right Parties

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Frames/Parties</th>
<th>Migration</th>
<th>Gender Equality</th>
<th>Family</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Croatia HSP AS</td>
<td>Citizenship based on cultural proximity&lt;br&gt;Migrants as strains on the social cohesion&lt;br&gt; Sending EU-MS as ignored by the EU&lt;br&gt;Intra-EU migration as a demographic/family threat&lt;br&gt;Asylum seekers and refugees as security threats</td>
<td>Gender equality as a threat&lt;br&gt;Gender equality as a relative norm: achieved for the autochthonous women&lt;br&gt;Gender equality as a relative norm: women in developing countries targeted by EU development policy</td>
<td>Strengthening of the traditional family&lt;br&gt;The weakening of the family as a cause of the demographic crisis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark DPP</td>
<td>Citizenship based on cultural proximity&lt;br&gt;Migrants as strains on social cohesion&lt;br&gt; Asylum seekers and refugees as security threats</td>
<td>Gender equality as a non-EU matter&lt;br&gt;Gender equality as a relative norm: achieved for the autochthonous women&lt;br&gt;Gender equality as more achieved in the North-Western MS than in the rest of the EU</td>
<td>The family free from state and/or EU interventions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany AfD</td>
<td>Citizenship based on cultural proximity&lt;br&gt; Migrants as strains on the social cohesion</td>
<td>Gender equality as a threat&lt;br&gt;Gender equality as a relative norm: achieved for the autochthonous women</td>
<td>The family free from state and/or EU interventions&lt;br&gt;Strengthening of the traditional family</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungary Jobbik</td>
<td>Citizenship based on cultural proximity&lt;br&gt; Migrants as strains on the social cohesion&lt;br&gt; Sending EU-MS as being ignored by the EU&lt;br&gt;Intra-EU migration as a demographic/family threat&lt;br&gt;Asylum seekers and refugees as security threats</td>
<td>Gender equality as a relative norm: Eastern and Central European Women as less equal than Western, due to structures of inequality&lt;br&gt;Gender equality as a relative norm: achieved for the autochthonous women</td>
<td>Strengthening of the traditional family&lt;br&gt;The weakening of the family as a cause of the demographic crisis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy LN</td>
<td>Citizenship based on cultural proximity&lt;br&gt; Migrants as strains on the social cohesion&lt;br&gt; Intra-EU migration as a demographic/family threat&lt;br&gt;Asylum seekers and refugees as security threats</td>
<td>Gender equality as a threat&lt;br&gt;Gender equality as a relative norm: achieved for the autochthonous women&lt;br&gt;Gender equality as a relative norm: women in developing countries targeted by EU development policy</td>
<td>Strengthening of the traditional family&lt;br&gt;The weakening of the family as a cause of the demographic crisis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands PVV</td>
<td>Citizenship based on cultural proximity&lt;br&gt; Migrants as strains on the social cohesion&lt;br&gt; Asylum seekers and refugees as security threats</td>
<td>Gender equality as a non-EU matter&lt;br&gt;Gender equality as a relative norm: achieved for the autochthonous women&lt;br&gt;Gender equality as a relative norm: more achieved in the North-Western MS than in the rest of the EU</td>
<td>The family free from state and/or EU interventions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain PxC</td>
<td>Citizenship based on cultural proximity&lt;br&gt; Migrants as strains on the social cohesion&lt;br&gt; Intra-EU migration as a demographic/family threat&lt;br&gt;Asylum seekers and refugees as security threats</td>
<td>Gender equality as a relative norm: achieved for the autochthonous women</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

*The table indicates the most frequent and most elaborated frames in the parties’ programs. Thus, we do not include here the cases in which frames or sub-frames appear only in very fragmentary forms on the parties’ agendas. The frames in **bold** are the dominant ones in the parties’ materials.*
8. CONCLUSION
The overall aim of WP9.7 is to analyse ‘cross-national case studies on gender equality as the focus on national and nativist discourses’. This deliverable is based on the national reports on the rhetoric of populist radical right parties from the seven selected countries and Israel. As mentioned in the introduction, the objective of this synthesis report is to identify similarities and divergences in framing migration, mobility, gender, and family and the implications of these frames for European citizenship.

8.1 Historical Contexts of Political and Cultural Institutions

The importance of very divergent national historical, cultural and institutional contexts emerges as a remarkable result of our analysis. Our sample of parties were from continental, Northern, Central and Eastern European and Southern European EU member states, all experiencing different path dependencies and breaks in their socio-economic, political and cultural institutions, which may be formative for populist radical right agendas. The Central and Eastern European countries of the study have a fragmented development of radical right ideology. Both Croatia and Hungary bring a solid far right tradition from the interwar period, which was radically silenced throughout the 50 years of communist rule, but skilfully revived in the early 1990s. Those early years meant a return to old style anti-Semitic, border revisionist agendas, and in the case of Croatia to war rhetoric, remarkably posed in opposition to the previously prevalent Communist ideology. The modern radical right emerges in the region in the 2000s. In this sense, the break caused by the communist period can be interpreted as the cause of the delayed development of the radical right compared to the rest of Europe, which has led to distinctive forms of framing about family and gender issues, but also migration and ethnicity. Spain’s change after the fall of the Franco regime signals a similar break in point, which distinctively influenced the absence of a political and discursive opening for consolidating strong radical right ideologies and parties. Germany’s World War II legacy is also a strong factor, which has till recently blocked the emergence of a unified German radical right voice to speak about EU citizenship issues. In Italy, the Fascist legacy of the interwar period resulted in a cautious use of nativist discourses in the post-war period, except for the main ideological successor of the Fascist party, the Italian Social Movement (Movimento Sociale Italiano), which continued endorsing certain distinctive elements of the Italian culture, such as the traditional family and its strong ties with Catholicism.

Another interesting aspect of the comparison is the move from the presence of a fragmented radical right to the emergence of modern, unified radical right movements. The strength of these radical right parties is influenced by the national political opportunity structures. We see this move taking place in Italy, where LN emerges from a series of smaller scale regional movements, to become the most prominent radical right party of the country. A process in this direction is also taking place in Germany more recently, but is still not present in Spain, where the focus on regional animosities seemingly still take precedence over unified xenophobia directed towards their growing number of immigrants. The Croatian populist right wing is also extremely fragmented. Indeed, Denmark and Hungary may be the only countries where the populist radical right currently speaks with one voice in Parliament.

There have been remarkable differences in regard to the evolution of gender and family issues. As discussed in the introduction, research has shown that gender and family regimes are quite diverse in the countries of origin of the selected radical right parties. This is confirmed in our analysis, where national differences between re-familialization and de-familialization emerge as key factors influencing the policies of the radical right parties. In our sample, the two CEE countries have witnessed a re-traditionalization and re-familialization of their regimes following the democratic transition, while the Nordic countries have witnessed a remarkable individualization of social rights, along with a strong de-familialization, premised on women’s waged work and gender equality, which almost led to the disappearance of the family as an institution from their policy agenda. Meanwhile, in the case of Italy, Spain and to some extent Germany, the embeddedness of Catholic values keep the family in the centre of their ideology. An interesting convergence can be identified, however, in how all parties in the sample have abstained from arguing for
the traditional division of labour within the family, and the traditional roles for women, and with a variety of nativist rationales in mind instead are concerned about different work-life balance arrangements for women.

Religion emerges as another distinctive factor for the different radical right approaches analysed with special implications for how they approach family and gender matters. We see the marginalization of family and gender on the agenda of the radical right in the two Nordic parties, both Protestant, and both showing the lowest levels of religiosity. Meanwhile, discussions about the sanctity of the family, and the threat of gender ideology, are central to the radical right parties from the more religious and particularly the prominently Catholic countries (Italy, Croatia and Spain, and Germany). Hungary is somewhat different, as it has relatively low levels of religiosity and no dominant Catholic presence. Thus, while protection of the traditional family is central, gender ideology as a threat is less present. Another distinctive aspect that critically distinguishes migration related discourses in Central and Eastern Europe from the rest is the profiling of Islam as a specific threat that marks migrants as culturally incompatible. While religion also plays a role in the case of some out-groups in CEE (Jews in Hungary or Serbs in Croatia), it is not a distinctive element of racism against the Roma, which is the largest target group of racial discrimination in Hungary.

Finally, the position and history of the countries’ EU membership, and their ensuing versions of Euroscepticism, also contributes considerably to influencing the approaches of the radical right parties. This is particularly true in relation to issues of gender, family and intra-European migration, less so for the recently evolving refugee crisis, where restrictive EU action seems to be consensual between all the analysed radical right parties. Late accession countries, like Hungary and Croatia, emerge as moderately critical of the EU, particularly for its efficiency, but not questioning its existence, and its role in supporting “second class” member states and equalizing across Europe. Interestingly, long term EU member Italy and its LN is also envisaging a role for the EU particularly in defending the country from the threat of gender ideology. The PVV and DF emerge as more critical of the EU’s legitimacy, yet, DF has softened its Euroscepticism, and its current membership in the EP’s Conservative group also indicates a more moderate position. Meanwhile, it is important to note a trend towards convergence on Eurosceptic positions as a consequence of the more recent refugee crisis, which has strengthened the trend towards convergence across the radical right in discussions about migration. Whereas Central and Eastern European countries were little concerned about third country immigrants and refugees before the crises, focusing their xenophobic discourses on internal minorities such as Roma, Jews or Serbs (in Croatia), agreement concerning the threat of Islamisation and a possible loss of Christian Europe has emerged across the European radical right parties since the refugee crises erupted.

To sum up: The results of the comparative analysis have pointed towards a series of contextual factors, which can contribute to explain important divergences between the analysed populist radical right parties, some of which are distinctively regional. Meanwhile we also find that major events such as the refugee crises have prompted the reorganization of agendas, marginalization of controversial points, and alignment of these parties on the same platform. Future developments of divergence and convergence thus depend on meeting points between emerging European political opportunities and national contextual factors brought to the European arena by the diverse political parties.

8.2 The Migration, Mobility and Diversity Logic – Economic and Cultural Dimensions

The literature differentiates between an economic and a cultural value dimension in the contemporary populist radical right-wing’s framings (Mudde, 2007). This analysis has also identified different logics in the framing of migration, mobility and diversity, which have implications for gender and the family issues: The economic dimension links migration and diversity to the logic of the labour market and the welfare regime, while the cultural dimension links gender, family and religion to national values and belongings.

Overall, the analysis finds both similarities and differences in the selected parties’ framings of migration and mobility. Important similarities exist between the Northern, Southern and Eastern European radical right-wing parties in their
negative positions on migration and minorities. All parties of this study thus oppose immigration of third-country nationals, mainly but not only from Muslim countries, and these framings resemble the negative attitudes presented by some of the parties towards their own Roma population (for example Jobbik). Welfare chauvinism is a central component of their attitude towards the relevant others, regardless of whether those are immigrants or autochthonous minorities, like the Roma. However, some of the parties also support migration of ethnically similar people to their countries (Croatia, Italy and Hungary).

Despite similarities, it is also important to point towards the variations which exist across the geographical divide between Eastern and Western European radical right parties, especially in relation to internal mobility primarily attached to the economic dimension. In the West, these parties perceive their citizens as “invaded” by migrants from other EU-countries, in the East as being forced to migrate; both positions blaming the EU policies for the welfare problems, their countries experience. However, practically all of the parties frame migration around its financial strains on the welfare systems, the economy and in terms of integration, and almost all of the European radical right parties address the importance of contributions to the labour market.

Across the geographical divide, most of the arguments can be traced back to the parties’ nationalist and/or anti-EU positions with some variation. In the cases of the Northern and Southern European parties of this study, the preservation of the national sovereignty, culture and values, and the refusal of external policy interference, is the main rationale for the opposition towards the immigration of non-'native' citizens. The Eastern European parties also prefer to preserve their national culture and values, but tend to accept some EU-interference, although they criticize it for being inefficient and unfair. The parties are thus rather similar in their concerns about economic viability. Some of the parties in Eastern and Southern Europe are concerned with the demographic viability of their ethnically pure nations.

Gender, family and religious issues, usually attached to the cultural dimension, emerge as secondary to the economic realm, particularly in the Northern European countries (Denmark and the Netherlands). Parties from these countries do not explicitly address third-country migrants in gender terms, for example regarding issues such as migrant care work, etc. The same logic can be identified in relation to intra-EU mobility, which is hardly ever expressed in gender terms. When gender is addressed, it is usually as part of the economic dimension, for example when the receiving countries talk about the male workers, who come to their country to earn money and/or receive benefits competing with the national citizens. The sending countries are primarily concerned about the problems following the emigration of their own workers to other EU-countries.

We find two exceptions, which explicitly address gender and the family as part of migration and mobility: One is the worry about demographic sustainability created by forced migration from Eastern Europe as a family issue (Jobbik, HSP AS and PxC). Jobbik also presents gendered face of outward migration, and presents women migrants as prominently victimized in these exploitative relations. The other is the worry about oppression of female Muslims by their own culture, often highlighted in discourses about migration as a way to exacerbate the incompatibility of Islam and European values.

To sum up: We have found one important variation with the economic rationale being the most prevalent for the Northern European parties, while the cultural rationale is much more present in the case of the parties from the Southern, Central-Eastern and Continental countries alike.

8.3 Gender, Family and Welfare Regimes

In relation to gender and family issues, the cultural dimension is often perceived to be the most important. Here, both similarities and differences exist in the way the selected parties address gender and family issues, often but not only influenced by the national gender and welfare regimes. The most important similarity between most of the selected
parties is the claim that gender equality is a relative idea, since women’s experience of gender equality is predominantly conditioned by their ethnicity, nationality, citizenship or cultural belonging. These parties thus distinguish between: 1) “Western” European native women, 2) “Eastern” European women 3) minority women within the EU member states, 4) migrant women from the third countries residing in the EU, and 5) women from outside Europe.

Northern European parties are not particularly concerned with gender equality, or indeed family issues, since they claim that gender equality has already been accomplished in their country (PVV and DF). All of the parties generally claim that Western European women, particularly in the Northern countries, have already achieved gender equality, whereas women from the other sub-groups lack gender equality. However, the parties call for different types of solutions from the EU and state members. Some parties oppose any interventions in gender equality policies at the national and EU levels (Nordic countries).

The analysed populist radical right parties share convictions about the so-called ‘traditional’ model of the family as the preferred model, but there are important variations in the meanings and importance they attach to the family, and in their proposed family policy. One division concerns the saliency of the family as a political issue, which demands political intervention or not. The PVV and DF’s disinterest towards gender equality and family issues could be influenced by the more egalitarian gender regime and liberal attitude towards alternative familial organizations common in the population, as well as in the constituency of these parties. Their positions contrast with those national contexts in which non-traditional family models are contentious, like Croatia, Italy or Hungary, and where radical right parties devote considerably more attention to support traditional and Conservative family values.

A second division concerns the mothers’ engagement in the paid labour force. In the Dutch and Danish contexts there is consensus across all political parties, including DF and PVV, that mothers should be obliged to do wage work, influenced by the particular welfare and gender regimes. Although Jobbik also sees mothers’ participation in the labour force as important, the party does not phrase women’s employment in terms of an obligation to contribute to the welfare state, but rather as a means to facilitate a robust nativist agenda. Meanwhile, LN, and HSP AS’ statements on working mothers are ambivalent in that they neither promote, nor discourage the dual earner family model.

A third dividing issue concerns the so-called ‘crisis of the family’. Jobbik, LN and AfD propose that the traditional family currently experiences a crisis, for example linked to the problems with low fertility rates. This contrasts with DF and PVV, which are not concerned with the family issues or family crisis. The theme of the crisis of the traditional family and the problem of low fertility rates is often linked to nationalist fears. For some of the parties, this points to the robust nativist agenda which applauds the conservative heterosexual family and insists on a “proper” reproduction within the EU, or within the member states (racial, ethnic, national, religious, or class-based).

Finally, it is worth noticing that the parties disagree strongly about the role of the EU in handling gender and family problems. At the one end, the parties explicitly endorse the EU interventions to provide solutions (Jobbik), at the other end, there is strong opposition to EU’s involvement in designing the family polices (PVV, DF), and some parties express a moderate support for EU involvement (the Lega Nord).

To sum up: Gender, family and religious issues, including women’s and LGBT rights, used to be considered a part of the cultural dimension, but this currently seems to be the exception rather than the general rule. Arguably, some family issues have moved to the welfare dimension, for example ‘working mothers’, which previously was argued by feminists and the Left to be part of gender equality and women’s rights. These issues have become part of a Conservative agenda to secure labour power and the national economy or eventually demographic sustainability. It can be concluded that there is an overall consensus among the selected radical right parties about the instrumental use of gender and family issues, which are either presented as means to secure the welfare state, or as means for solving problems in regards to the family crisis, demographic sustainability, and protecting the national values.
8.4 The Israeli and European Radical Right Compared

The case of the Israeli radical right is an illustrative example of the importance of context and history, when analyzing party rhetoric. Being situated in a strongly religious country founded on Judaism, premised on an ethnic democratic regime, it is not surprising that most of the Israeli radical right parties’ nationalist sentiments are intertwined with a focus on the traditional values of the family as well as a wish to enforce the Israeli Law of Return, and generally strengthening the Jewish character of the Israeli state. However, the two radical right parties analyzed, *Israel our Home* and the *Jewish Home Party*, have different focus areas. In regards to the seven European parties in this report, it is arguably the *Jewish Home Party*, which is the most similar, particularly in regards to its stance on migrants and asylum seekers. The party mainly consists of nationalist orthodox Jews, who have a religious-Zionist take on politics. The party aims to strengthen Israel’s Jewish identity, for example in its call for more education about Judaism and the Jews in the Israeli schools. This form of ethnic nationalism is different from that expressed by the European parties, yet, it does relate somewhat to the calls for stricter citizenship tests, as voiced by e.g. DF and PVV.

In regards to migration, the party both considers e- and immigrants in its policy output. It is thus not only in Israel that the Jewish identity should be upheld, but also amongst the Israeli Diasporas abroad, whose assimilation is to be prevented. Moreover, and much like certain of the European parties (for example Jobbik and PxC), the party wants to uphold the national (Jewish) demographic character of Israel, when discussing the “infiltrating” asylum seekers in Israel (official Israeli term for African asylum seekers). However, differently from AfD, PVV and DF, the party does not want the asylum seekers to take part in the national labour force, at least not in the larger cities. The aim is NOT to assimilate these people to Israel. Whilst agreeing upon the importance of ensuring the well-being of the Jewish Diasporas, and promoting their return to Israel, the *Israel our Home* party has different attitudes towards immigrants than the *Jewish Home Party*. The party takes an ethnic nationalist view on integration, and holds that all national groups should demonstrate allegiance to the Israeli state, urging the Israeli Arabs to participate in the military services. Concerning the asylum seekers, the party is divided. Some join the discourse of seeing them as infiltrators, whilst others are more accommodating.

In regards to gender and family, neither of the two parties have much to say. The Israeli legislation is largely based on the religious sanctity of marriage, which infers that civil marriage and divorce are not allowed. *Israel our Home*’s constituency mainly consists of immigrants from Soviet Russia, who are considered religion-less in Israel. This issue has been a topic of concern for the party, again showing the importance of context when analysing this branch of parties. In relation to gender and family issues the party supports women’s participation in employments and politics, despite its religious character, and supports the traditional model of family, religious ceremony, alternating between anti-LGBT to a more moderate position.

8.5 Reflections and Issues for Further Research on the Changes of the Populist Radical Right

This final section aims to reflect upon some of the most urgent analytical, conceptual, and political questions, which the analysis has only briefly addressed, but which need to be elaborated further by future research. The comparisons aimed to analyse similarities and differences; whether there is a convergence or divergence in the rhetoric and policies of the European populist radical right as expressed in the European Parliament; and what the implications for European integration, EU citizenship and democracies are. This concerns both the economic and cultural dimension of the so-called populist radical right, and inspires reflections about the continuities and breaks in the particular national parties’ rhetoric and policies. The most important finding is that important divergences exist in the gender and family issues across Northern, Southern, and Eastern Europe while convergence is more prevalent in approaches to migration and diversity.

The focus of this Work Package has been to understand the current ideologies and policies in relation to gender and family issues in the rhetoric and politics of the populist radical right parties. The findings have documented that
gender and family issues are salient issues for some parties, especially in Croatia, Hungary and Italy, while the same issues are not put on the agenda by other parties, especially in Denmark and the Netherlands. Arguably, differences in the national parties’ framings of gender and family issues are partly - but not only - influenced by the gender and welfare regimes, which make some issues salient and other issues superfluous, or even counterproductive, in order to gain support among voters, for example the opposition to same sex marriages in the Church.

This leads to complex issues concerning continuities and shifts in the selected parties’ political programs and rhetoric, influenced by mass migration and the European level refugee crisis, but also by the political opportunity structures in the selected countries. The welfare and gender regimes present a path dependency, which may influence the policies of populist radical right parties, but migration intersects with gender and welfare, and may either strengthen or weaken/challenge the welfare and gender models. In addition, more recently there have been important shifts in some of the selected parties’ ideologies, as well as in their relations to the EU and European integration.

The literature generally agrees that these parties have moved from liberal/neo-liberal in the economic sense towards protection of the national welfare state, and the previous characterization as authoritarian law-and order-parties that oppose gender-equality and women’s and LGBT rights is no longer true across the board. Our findings confirm this particularly for the Nordic countries. We add that the most important thing that the selected nationalist parties currently have in common may be their Euroscepticism, combined with what we have called exclusive welfare nationalism – welfare for national citizens and particularly deserving citizens only - support for liberal values and a growing opposition towards migration, and in some cases Islam, which tend to override all other concerns.

Our findings add to the literature by indicating a general shift in both the cultural and economic dimension. On the economic dimension, we find an on-going shift in the parties’ ideology and policies, since the nationalist parties in our sample generally defend the welfare state, although this can mean different things in the various national contexts. On the cultural dimension, a general shift seems to be underway in the ideologies and policies of some of the national parties from support for authoritarianism to support for the liberal values of gender equality and LGBT rights, particularly for deserving citizens. The findings also point towards a shift in the ideology of other nationalist parties (Jobbik and HSP AS) from support of the traditional conservative family form based on the male bread-winner model to a growing acceptance of women’s labour market participation and concerns about the demographic crisis. This is exacerbated by the refugee crisis, where all parties tend to support their own native citizens, both men and women, against the foreign other or against the country’s own out-group. The findings also add to the understanding of the silences of some parties on gender and family issues, which are subsumed under overarching Euroscepticism and positions on migration.

One controversial conceptual question is what are currently the defining characteristics of these parties? This report has taken Mudde’s definition of the populist radical right defined by nativism, authoritarianism, and populism as a point of departure, but our analysis indicates that not all elements are present in all the selected parties. We have not analysed authoritarianism, but the findings demonstrate important variations in the parties’ ideologies in relation to nationalism/nativism. However, even when these parties are not nativist, they will use various forms of nationalist rhetoric, including exclusive welfare nationalism, and even what Michael Billing called ‘banal nationalism,’ which refers to everyday “ideological habits which enable the established nations of the West to be reproduced” (Mudde, 2010).

One issue, which we could not address in this report, but which emerges from it as important for future research and with relevance for the particular focus of this report, is the general evolution towards a normalization of the populist radical right. Is the success of the Danish Peoples’ Party a model that they all want to imitate, or the exception to the general rule?
The final issue concerns the effects of the current refugee crisis, which may have contributed to exacerbate the economic dimension of migrants being a financial strain on the welfare state and further silencing of gender and family issues. At the same time, religion has been strengthened as a key factor in the framing of the radical right parties, since many migrants and refugees come from Muslim countries or are of Muslim faith. This may strengthen the opposition to migration, but it may also influence the cultural dimension, where some radical right parties have changed their attitudes towards homosexuality from negative to more moderate or even positive attitudes.

Has the refugee crisis pushed the selected populist radical right parties to converge or diverge? This is both a conceptual and analytical question, which needs to be further explored by future research, since the populist radical right is a moving target. The refugee crisis has contributed to exacerbate the economic dimension of migrants being a financial strain on the welfare state and the further silencing of gender and family issues. It has also contributed to strengthening the culturalist understanding of the nation in the Eastern European countries, where anti-Muslim sentiments and a tendency to protect Christian Europe may for the first time be rising.

The trend towards normalization of populist right wing parties has been most visibly in the Danish case, while other parties have moved closer to the centre on welfare and cultural issues. At the same time, the political centre has moved to the Right, for example in relation to Euroscepticism and border control. At the moment, a variety of Eurosceptic, nativist and exclusive (welfare) nationalist positions emerge within the European Parliament. After failed negotiations about profound differences following the last EP-elections in 2014, the radical right parties ended up in different political groupings, The Danish Peoples’ Party and the Alternative for Germany both joined the Cameron-led European Conservatives and Reformist group (ECR) (although the AfD-MEPs were asked to leave the group in March, 2016), and Tomašić joined the same group after she left HSP. PVV and Lega Nord formed The Movement for Europe of Nations and Freedom (ENP) together with Marine le Pen’s Front National, and the Hungarian Jobbik remains a non-affiliated party. In spite of this, there are still disagreements within the political groups about cultural issues, such as anti-Semitism and LGBT rights.

After the refugee crisis, the parties have arguably moved closer together at least in their rhetoric, but where this may lead in terms of support for common policies will depend on the national and European opportunity structures. The refugee crisis has undoubtedly exacerbated worries about welfare and economic issues and the security dimension has been strengthened markedly by the recent terrorist attacks. The diversities in gender equality, the family and gay rights may have become less important, while Euroscepticism, extreme nationalism/nativism, national border control and opposition towards Islam have been increasingly consensual.

We conclude that the impact on EU integration and EU-citizenship of the strengthening of nationalist and nativist parties across Europe in the current refugee crisis is a growing concern. The selected parties all aim to restrict aspects of EU citizenship related to internal mobility and diversity, and some parties propose an ethnic citizenship limited not only to nationals born within the country, but also for diasporas born outside the EU to be included to people born within the country. Thus, the synthesis report has found that EU-citizenship is more contested than ever before, and arguably, the strengthening of the nativist and exclusive nationalist right-wing parties across Europe and in the EP is challenging the EU’s founding principles of free mobility of labour/open borders, as well as the guiding principles of non-discrimination of nationalities, ethnicity and religion. In spite of the differences among the analysed parties across the geographical divide, the parties in different ways support increased border control and thus challenge the principles of internal mobility and the principle of non-discrimination of nationality. Importantly though in this process of contestation gender and family issue seem to play a marginal and a decreasing role. While disagreements among the various parties on these issues might be remarkable the salience of this disagreement does not seem to be very high.
REFERENCES

Country Reports


Other Sources


Yahav, T. (2012, December 18). Shas and Yahadut Hatora: “We don’t have women as party representatives because women have a different role”. Ynet. Retrieved from http://www.ynet.co.il/articles/0,7340,L-4321430,00.html [in Hebrew].


D9.7. Report of case studies on gender equality as a focus point of national and nativist discourses: Cross-national analysis; compatible topic-led discourse analysis of selected sources (social media, policy documents, etc.) by national teams in the countries involved in WP9: Croatia, Israel, Denmark, Hungary, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain and the United Kingdom. (See also Task 9.7) [month 24]

Context

The recent European elections brought to the European Parliament an unprecedented number of extreme right parliamentarians from around Europe. This could lead to a potential radicalization of political debates on issues of core importance for European citizenship such as gender equality, family/motherhood and belonging, and sexuality issues, as well as issues linked to migrant youth and European mobility, which are in the focus of extreme right political parties. The main objective of this task is to look into what this new wave of parliamentarians and their ideas may bring to European debates.

The literature has predominantly focused on similarities between nationalist and nativist parties and debates, both in relation to gender equality, family and sexuality issues as well as in relation to charismatic leadership style. Here we propose that the analytical approach should address the contextual differences between the nationalist and nativist debates related to the different gender, family and welfare regimes focusing on the meeting points and divergences between the different nationally embedded nativist discourses as they are reflected at the European Union level.

The experiences from the RAGE-project: ‘Hate-speech and Populist Othering in Europe through a race, gender and age looking glass’ (2013-2015), supports the importance of a contextual approach to the national and nativist debates, which focuses on tensions and differences between and within the parties and debates. The results indicate that there are important differences in the national debates influenced by different gender, family, welfare and migration regimes. This fits well with the countries involved in WP 9.7, which represent Northern, Continental, Eastern-central and Southern Europe, as well as the UK.
Our objective in Task 9.7 is to see how these contextualized differences and resonances meet at the level of the European Union and channel into European citizenship ideas.

**Topical focus**

In order to do this we will focus on the European Parliamentary electoral campaign of 2014 and the period immediately following that. We will focus on those extreme/populist right parties and persons who were elected to the European Parliament in 2014. We will examine their materials, statements, websites and documents released around the electoral campaign and the first six months of the parliamentary cycle, closing at the end of January 2015.

Through analyzing the campaign and the immediate post campaign discourses of these MEPs, we expect to understand the input of the extreme right to the 2014-2018 European Parliamentary cycle on specific aspects of European citizenship.

We will address four main issues focusing on how their framing potentially limits EU citizenship:

- **Women and gender equality**: how the social and political role of women and gender equality is framed.
- **Family/motherhood**: what is the proposed family conception, what is their position on forms of family, other than the traditional ones? What is the proposed family form? How is opposition to alternative family forms framed if at all?
- **Migration**: framing migrant women, migrant care work, minority women, care work by minority women. How are minority women framed, what context, what role, what kinds of exclusion? How is migrant care work framed?
- **Internal mobility of workers and students within Europe**: How is mobility of workers and students within Europe framed – in a positive or negative way? Is the debate directly or indirectly gendered – does it make a difference whether it is male or female workers and students?
- **Crosscutting all of these**: how is demographic sustainability framed in particular in relation to women’s role in society, to migration and migrant women, and to minority women?
The national reports need to be contextual. They should focus both on which of the four issues have been given priority in the debates, how they have been addressed as well as which of the four issues that have not been debated, i.e. in the Danish case women/gender equality was not a main issue. Contextual information should also give basic background information on how framing of these topics in the EP electoral campaigns relates to domestic rhetoric used by extreme right parties.

**Methods**

Countries involved in WP9.7 are: Croatia, Israel, Denmark, Hungary, Italy, the Netherlands, Germany, Spain and the United Kingdom. This is a good selection of countries, which covers Northern, Southern, Continental, Eastern and Central Europe and the ‘liberal’ Eurosceptic UK.

The WP 9.7 analysis in the countries will be linked as closely as possible to the radical right politicians elected to the EP in 2014 and their parties. Material will cover:

- Political campaigns, including websites, campaign materials, media presence and interviews, facebook pages/newspaper blogs, and other documents selected for the period January 2014 – July 2014, covering the campaign for the EU elections in May 2014.
- Statements, parliamentary interventions (possibly at Committee level as well), website updates for the postelection period (until end of January 2015)
- Interview with respective MEPs

The analysis will be backed by contextual information pertinent to a) the place and role of the radical right within the national contexts, including relations to other political parties/groups, and b) within that the radical right elected to the European Parliament, in each analyzed country.

The analysis should be sensitive to the role of women (and young) extreme right parliamentarians.

**EU level**
We propose that the EU-level should be included in the synthesis report:

- Analysis of the present and past of extreme right parties in the EP (desk research)
- Analysis of patterns of cooperation and debates around forming an extreme right parliamentary group in the EP in the new parliamentary cycle
- Possibly some interviews with key initiators of cooperation on reasons for failure to form a common group, potentials and future of cooperation.

One question to be discussed is what we do about countries like Spain that have not experienced a growth of Right-wing nationalist parties. One possibility would be to exclude Spain from the national reports; another to focus on the small party: VOX, which is a nationalist party to the Right of the Spanish Conservative party. It is a marginal voice, which got less than 2% of the votes: [http://www.voxespana.es/](http://www.voxespana.es/)

**Workplan for Task 9.7**

1. **Guideline and background material for national reports**
2. **Collection of election material of (radical) right-wing politicians elected to the EP in 2014 – all partners:**
   - Political campaigns covering the period January 2014-July 2014.
   - Website updates for the post-election period
   - Interviews with respective MEPs
   - The work starts in November 2014 and ends March 2015

3. **Analysis of the material sensitive to the intersecting categories of women/gender, youth and ethnicity:**
   - Deadline for the national reports: May 30, 2015

4. **Presentation and discussion of the national reports at the general assembly in Croatia June, 2015 – all partners:**
   - Possible revision of reports, Autumn 2015
   - Deadline for revisions, November 15, 2015
5. Synthesis Report: Responsible AAU and CEU

- Collection of material on the EU level of evolution of radical right in the EP, autumn 2015
- Analysis of patterns of cooperation and debates around forming of parliamentary groups in the new EP,
- Possibly interviews with key persons responsible for cooperation and failed formation of a common group, potential conflicts and future cooperation
- Draft report on the EU-level: February 1, 2016
- Connecting national reports with the EU-level: Spring 2016
- Deadline for the synthesis Report: April 1, 2016

Guidelines for the structure of country reports

1. Introduction: background and context

What is the place and role of political parties using nativist political discourses in your country? Short historical background, presence in national and local politics, extent of support by public opinion. Street presence vs. formalized political presence.

What are the main political issues brought up and discussed by these parties in national politics? Are nativist discourses brought up only by these parties or is there a competition for claiming such ideas by other parties as well?

2. European Elections – electoral campaign in 2014

Discuss the candidates run in the EP elections by these parties. Particular attention should be paid to: gender, age, place within the party, is s/he re-elected to the EP, short historical background of political career and political ideas (as much as comes through from media search and secondary analysis). Limit discussion to top candidates, those who have a chance to be elected and pay particular attention to those who were actually elected.
Discuss and analyze the EP electoral campaign of these parties and these specific candidates in 2014, based on media interviews, electronic sources (website, Facebook page) and other material available.

(For analyzing internet sources back in time use: http://archive.org/web/)

Look for direct or indirect articulation of topics around the four priorities set above. Discuss each priority in a separate section, feel free to identify overlaps.

- **Women and gender equality**: how is the social and political role of women and gender equality framed? How is the social problem defined? What policy or political solutions are proposed?
- **Family**: what is the proposed family conception, what is their position on forms of family, other than the traditional ones? What is the proposed family form, how is opposition to alternative family forms framed, if at all? How is the social problem defined? What policy or political solutions are proposed?
- **Migration**: framing migrant women, migrant care work, minority women, care work by minority women (please keep your focus on women, family and youth!). How are minority women framed, what context, what role, what kinds of exclusion? How is migrant care work framed? How is the social problem defined? What are the policy and political decisions proposed?
- **Internal mobility of EU workers and students within Europe**: How is mobility of workers and students within Europe framed - as a positive or negative way? Is the debate directly or indirectly gendered – does it make a difference whether it is male or female workers and students?
- **Crosscutting all of these**: how is demographic sustainability framed in particular in relation to women’s role in society, and to migration and migrant women, and to minority women. What policy or political solutions are proposed?

3. **In the European Parliament**

Discuss the results of the 2014 EP elections and the extreme right presence of your country in the EP.
Analyze statements of the relevant MEPs made in the EU context in the period July 2014-January 2015. Use the four topics identified above to analyse the material. The coordinating team will give support in identifying relevant parliamentary and committee debates where such statements might have been made. (Sources: minutes of Parliamentary meetings, plenary and committee, international media statements)

4. Conclusions

Summarize findings and analyze them in connection to each other. What are the main points that emerge in the EP from these parliamentarians?

How does this relate to the discourse used during campaign or prior to the EP campaign in domestic contexts?

Is there any reaction in the domestic contexts to possible changes in the rhetoric of the Right-wing parties during the EP election 2014 (for example that the rhetoric towards ‘welfare tourism’ has been sharpened)?

Andrea and Birte,

November, 10, 2014