

Party Appeals and Voter Loyalty in New Democracies

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Introduction

Some parties obviously have a more stable electoral basis than others. Is this so because of differences in the way they appeal to their voters? If such is the case, does it help explain why some countries have less volatility (that is, voters changing their vote or voting intention between two points in time) than others? Supposing that all these questions can be answered in the affirmative, why would the factors cementing the party loyalty of voters be relevant for empirical democratic theory? These are the questions confronted in this essay.

The first section discusses the theoretical and practical significance of electoral volatility. What is argued is not that political parties aim at low volatility, but that it may improve the quality of democracy if they nevertheless achieve that. The second section briefly indicates that the most frequently marshalled explanations (party allegiances inherited from a distant democratic past, instability of institutions, party fragmentation, the organizational style of parties) leave unexplained some of the noteworthy variations in electoral volatility between Poland, the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Slovakia. The balance of the paper investigates whether the way parties appeal to their voters may offer an explanation of volatility or its opposite, party loyalty.

The third section elaborates on this often heard but so far untested explanation, and I develop some related hypotheses. The fourth section presents an empirical test of some aspects of the theory. Following an innovative study by Oddbjorn Knutsen and Elinor Scarbrough, several alternative types of party-voter linkages are distinguished conceptually and empirically. The Knutsen-Scarbrough methodology is further developed to estimate the extent to which an individual is a 'cleavage', 'value' or 'structural' voter. Finally, panel data are utilized to assess which of these three voter types are most likely to be steadfast supporters of their parties.¹

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¹ The data used in this study, unless otherwise noted, come from a series of mass surveys conducted by the Central European University (CEU), *The Development of Party Systems and Electoral Alignments in East Central Europe*, Machine readable data files (Budapest, Department of Political Science, Central European University, 1992–96). The surveys have been carried out since Fall 1992 with the assistance of one of the major commercial political polling institutes in each country: CBOS in Poland, STEM in the Czech Republic and Slovakia, and Median in Hungary. The samples were representative for the non-institutionalised adult population of the respective countries. In Poland we used clustered random sampling, with sample sizes of 1149, 1188, 1468, 1209, 1162, 1173, and again 1173 in the successive waves. In the Czech Republic and Slovakia we

The Implications of High Electoral Volatility

Aggregate level or *net* volatility means half the sum of the absolute percentage differences between the votes received by each party in two consecutive elections. Suppose that there are three parties contesting the first of two elections. The first two receive 40% of the vote each, and the third gets 20%. If the last one goes out of business by the time of the next election, and the remaining two receive 60 and 40% of the vote, respectively, then the total volatility between the two elections was $(|60 - 40| + |40 - 40| + |20 - 0|) / 2 = 20\%$. *Individual* level or *gross* volatility means the percentage of 'voters' (e.g. survey respondents who expressed a party preference) changing their voting preference from one point in time to another. Theoretically, individual level and aggregate volatility may vary independently: movements of voters into various directions may cancel out each other on the aggregate, and temporal changes in the composition of the active electorate may cause net shifts even in the absence of any gross change. However, a recent review of the available West European data and a computer simulation concluded that empirically they are closely related (their Pearson correlation is between 0.60 and 0.70).²

Volatility is an important dimension of party system stabilization and institutionalization.³ The lower it is, the more likely that in the electoral arena the established party labels (brand names) have some value independent from the appeal of the parties' present leaders, issue positions, record, and scandals. Consequently, disgruntled political entrepreneurs and interest groups need to work through the established parties, whose elites are likely to have already developed some commitment to – and stakes in – the existing political system. In contrast, high electoral volatility cannot help suggesting to the elite that there is no positive payoff on sticking to a currently unpopular party label. The easy access to the media by parliamentarians and other notables, the skills of a well-paid campaign staff, the personal appeal of some new faces, anti-establishment rhetoric or the attraction of a well selected bundle of positions on some topical issues may all prove more important electoral assets than does an established trade mark.

Historical experience suggests a negative relationship between democratic consolidation and electoral volatility. In West European elections between 1885 and 1985, average aggregate volatility was 8.6%.⁴ New or unstable democracies have usually had much higher volatility. In the first elections after authoritarian rule, postwar Germany, Italy, Greece, Portugal, and Spain experienced a 13–19% volatility.⁵ In the elections in the Weimar Republic aggregate volatility was 32, 27, 10, 13, 22, 21, 6, and 11 (beware that the three lowest figures in the

started with clustered random sampling but switched to quota from 1993. The Czech sample sizes were 815, 939, 1117, 1562, 1515, 1291, 1569, 1443, and 1595, and in Slovakia the samples included 712, 920, 871, 845, 757, 1213, and 1027 respondents. In the Hungarian studies the Ns have been 1200 (1196 in June 1995), and the method of sampling clustered random route. The dates of the surveys are shown in the tables.

² Bartolini and Mair, *Identity, Competition, and Electoral Availability*, pp.27–34.

³ Here much of my reasoning follows P. Mair, 'What is different about post-communist party systems?', *Studies in Public Policy*, 259. (Glasgow, University of Strathclyde, Centre for the Study of Public Policy, 1996).

⁴ Bartolini and Mair, *Identity, Competition, and Electoral Availability*, p.69. Elections in Portugal, Greece and Spain are not included.

⁵ P. Mair, 'What is different . . . '.

series are based on the comparisons of the two 1924, the two 1932, and the November 1932 and March 1933 elections respectively, each pair of which were separated only by a few months).⁶ A similar pattern was observed in Latin America. In legislative elections between 1970 and 1990 the average aggregate volatility was below 20% in those countries that, by around 1990, had developed relatively stable democratic institutions, in contrast to a level above 30% in the more fragile democracies of Bolivia, Ecuador, Brazil and Peru.⁷

Precise data from contemporary Eastern Europe are hard to come by as the vote returns for the smaller parties are usually not available in accessible sources. But the few available estimates paint a rather dramatic picture. Estonia, with a 54% net volatility between 1992 and 1995, is in the same league with the Peru of the 1970s and 1980s. Poland, with 34.5% net volatility between 1991 and 1993, looks similar to Bolivia or Ecuador. Somewhat more stable are Hungary, with 28.3% net volatility between 1990 and 1994, the Czech Republic, at 22.0 and 31.4% 1990–92 and 1992–96 volatility, respectively, and Slovakia, with 23.1 and 23.8% 1990–92 and 1992–94. Nevertheless, all of these countries are, by the standards of consolidated democracies, simply off the mark.⁸

It has been powerfully argued that party institutionalization, and a consequently low electoral volatility, is a critical independent variable influencing the pace of democratic consolidation.⁹ A recent paper on the Spanish, Portuguese and Greek transitions to democracy, as well as an analysis of the four Visegrad countries took issue with this view and suggested that democratic consolidation may be a cause of (and thus precede), rather than a consequence of (and therefore preceded by) party institutionalization.¹⁰

For reasons that were detailed elsewhere, I believe that volatility and democratic consolidation are not very closely related in east central Europe.¹¹ Indeed, a very low electoral volatility may signal polarization caused by an extreme emotional hostility between the main party camps, or a high frequency of elections – neither of which is normally associated with high political legitimacy. But it seems widely accepted that the accountability of elected office holders and their responsiveness to their constituents are strengthened by party institutionalization. The latter means some stabilization of the party alternatives and their respective shares of the electoral market. A very low electoral volatility and the virtual certainty that no new party can possibly expect success may

⁶ Bartolini and Mair, *Identity, Competition, and Electoral Availability*, Appendix 2.

⁷ S. Mainwaring and T. Scully, 'Introduction: Party Systems in Latin America', in S. Mainwaring and T. R. Scully (eds), *Building Democratic Institutions: Party Systems in Latin America* (Stanford CA, Stanford University Press, 1994), p. 8.

⁸ On volatility in the four Visegrad countries see G. Tóka, 'Political parties and democratic consolidation in east central Europe', *Studies in Public Policy*, 279 (Glasgow, University of Strathclyde, forthcoming in February 1997). Note that from the herein reported Czech, Slovak and Polish volatility figures mere changes of party labels were discounted.

⁹ Cf. Mair, 'What is different . . .'; Mainwaring and Scully, 'Introduction: Party Systems in Latin America'.

¹⁰ L. Morlino, 'Political Parties and Democratic Consolidation in Southern Europe', in R. Gunther, P. N. Diamandouros and H. Puhle (eds), *The Politics of Democratic Consolidation: Southern Europe in Comparative Perspective* (Baltimore MD, The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1995), pp. 315–388; Tóka, 'Political parties and democratic consolidation'. The two studies also agreed that the direction of the causal relationship may be contingent upon the initial legitimacy of the democratic regime and the international environment of democratisation.

¹¹ Cf. G. Tóka, 'Political parties and democratic consolidation'.

cause political *immobilisme*. A moderate amount of volatility, which is enough to cause shifts of governmental and legislative power, is clearly important for making party leaders responsive to their broader following. But new democracies appear to have much more volatility than that, and this excess can also undermine electoral accountability. For the ordinary voters, it is next to impossible to monitor (not to speak about anticipate) the voting record of individual legislators,¹² and independent-minded legislators are often uninterested in re-election anyway.¹³ On these counts, new parties may be fairly similar to independent legislators. At the very least, they cannot be judged on the basis of their previous record. Consequently, the credibility of their promises is difficult to evaluate. The higher the underlying volatility is believed to be, the more new parties are likely to be started; the more votes are cast for new parties and independent candidates, the weaker the electoral accountability of incumbent office-holders.

New parties, however, do not necessarily bring in new faces. A low expected payoff from sticking to old labels may lead veteran politicians to undermine electoral accountability by constantly regrouping under ever-new flags. Furthermore, if volatility is exorbitant while party ideologies remain largely stable, politicians may lose whatever little faith they used to have in the electoral impact of their policy offerings. I know of no evidence that would suggest that a 10% electoral penalty for a financial or sex scandal would make politicians more risk averse than a 1% loss. It seems plausible that the more severe these penalties are, the less easy it is for politicians to appreciate the electoral impact of policy choices. Quite clearly, an extremely strong party loyalty in large parts of the electorate may make any alternation of government and opposition unlikely. But given the above cited evidence about electoral volatility in new democracies, this theoretical possibility is sufficiently remote that it need not interest us in the present context.

To conclude this section: High volatility may occasionally be an instrument of electoral control, and some scepticism is warranted regarding its alleged regime-destabilizing potential. Yet, a constant and predictable weakness of party loyalties may undermine the accountability and responsiveness of elected office-holders. Hence, parties and party systems can make an unintended contribution to the quality of democracy by so behaving that the expected electoral volatility is kept on a low level.¹⁴

Conventional Explanations of Volatility

This section summarizes briefly some findings on whether the age and organizational style of parties, the level of party fragmentation, and the stability of

¹² M. Fiorina, 'Party Government in the United States: Diagnosis and Prognosis', in R. Katz (ed.), *Party Government: European and American Experiences* (Berlin and New York, Walter de Gruyter, 1987), pp. 270–300.

¹³ K. Prewitt, 'Political ambitions, volunteerism, and electoral accountability', *American Political Science Review*, 61 (1970), 5–17.

¹⁴ That is, on the lowest possible level which still keeps the probability of an alternation of government and opposition on a level providing sufficient incentives for politicians to court the electorate.

electoral institutions can influence electoral volatility.¹⁵ Before we can assess the importance of these variables, the cross-national differences in voters' party loyalty (that is, the dependent variable) have to be clarified. Given the differences in the electoral calendars of different countries, individual level data about gross volatility offer an arguably more reliable and detailed picture than do the aggregate net level election outcomes.

Table 1 shows survey data about the temporal stability of electoral preferences in east central Europe. Although these data somewhat overstate stability (see the notes to Table 1), the displayed figures are nevertheless much lower than those found in Western democracies.¹⁶ In the way of intra-regional comparison, the table suggests a relatively clear ranking of the four countries. At least for most of the 1992–95 period, Czechs and Slovaks had more stable party loyalties than Hungarians, and Hungarians more stable ones than Poles (compare any two rows referring to surveys taken in different countries after similarly long times after elections).

How can we account for this ranking of the countries? Obviously, the age of the democratic system may go some way to explain, in general, why new democracies tend to have unusually high volatility. But the number of elections since the recent transition to democracy and the sheer passing of the time do not explain all the between-country variations apparent in Table 1. Note, for instance, that in June 1991, just a year after the first election, there was no more gross electoral volatility in the Czech Republic than in June 1995 in Hungary, a year after the second election.

A similarly plausible reason for the weakness of party loyalties in east central Europe could be the novelty of most parties. Mainwaring and Scully note that in the early 1990s, in all of the better institutionalized party systems in Latin America the percentage of lower chamber seats held by parties established before 1950 was between 56 and 98%, whereas in the more volatile party systems of Brazil, Bolivia, Peru and Ecuador such parties only controlled 0.6–40% of the seats.¹⁷ The east central European countries appear to be closer to this latter group. Among the presently significant parties, only the Polish Peasant Party (PSL), the Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia (KSCM), and the Christian democratic Czech People's Party (CSL) have maintained significant continuity of organization since the late forties. This factor alone was no guarantee of social entrenchment. The similarly 'historical' Czech Socialist Party (CSS) and the Polish Democratic Party (SD) retained just a minimal electorate and were soon discontinued after the transition to democracy.

Yet, columns two and three of Table 1 show that the constituencies of the historical parties showed greater party loyalty than other voters throughout the entire period covered by the CEU surveys. Since the three historical parties are, certainly not by chance, also the only real mass parties in the region (their membership figures are by far the highest), it is difficult to tell whether a party's historical continuity or the organizational encapsulation of its voters is more effective in stabilizing a (narrow) electoral basis. One or the other apparently

¹⁵ This section is a heavily condensed and somewhat modified version of sections 3 to 6 of Tóka, 'Political parties and democratic consolidation'.

¹⁶ See I. Crewe, and D. Denver (eds), *Electoral Change in Western Democracies: Patterns and Sources of Electoral Volatility* (Beckenham, Croom Helm, 1985).

¹⁷ Mainwaring and Scully, 'Introduction: Party Systems in Latin America', p. 13.

TABLE 1. *Surveys of Party Loyalty in Four New Democracies

Survey date	% Standpatters among voters of:			Months since election
	All parties	New parties	Historical parties	
<i>Czech Republic</i>				
Dec. 90	70	67	82	6
June 91	69	67	74	12
Dec. 91	66	64	71	18
Sep. 92	78	75	90	3
Apr. 93	67	65	76	10
Nov. 93	65	64	70	17
Apr. 94	61	58	72	22
Nov. 94	60	56	72	29
June 95	61	56	81	36
Jan. 96	66	61	85	43
Apr. 96	61	59	68	46
May 96	58	54	70	47
<i>Slovakia</i> (All parties treated as 'new')				
Dec. 90	—	75	—	6
June 91	—	57	—	12
Dec. 91	—	63	—	18
Sep. 92	—	76	—	3
Apr. 93	—	65	—	10
Nov. 93	—	61	—	17
Apr. 94	—	60	—	22
July 95	—	79	—	10
Apr. 96	—	77	—	19
<i>Poland</i>				
Oct. 92	51	48	71	12
Jan. 93	60	53	93	15
Aug. 93	43	40	63	23
Apr. 94	76	71	88	8
Dec. 94	73	70	80	16
June 95	59	56	68	21
Dec. 95	49	51	42	27
<i>Hungary</i> (All parties treated as 'new')				
Sep. 92	—	50	—	29
Jan. 93	—	51	—	33
Dec. 93	—	47	—	44
Apr. 94	—	44	—	49
June 95	—	69	—	13

*Note: Table entries in the first column from the left show the proportion of respondents who expressed a voting intention – 'if there were an election next weekend' – for the same party that they voted for in the last parliamentary election, in percentage of all voters in the last election. The third and second columns show the same figure for all historical and for the other (that is, the new) parties, respectively. The 'historical' parties are defined by the uninterrupted continuity of their grass-roots organization, and thus they are the Czech People's Party (CSL), the Czech Socialists Party (CSS), the Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia (KSCM), and the Polish Peasant Party (PSL). In Hungary and Slovakia there are no historical parties. The respondents who would have rather not voted, or did not know which party to support 'if there were an election next weekend' are excluded from the computation of the percentages. The same applies for respondents who did not tell or did not know which party they voted for in the last election. The data on participation and vote in the last election are based on the respondents' recall, and are thus likely to overstate the percentage of 'standpatters'. Those respondents who ('next weekend') would have voted for a (new) party (e.g., in Poland, Freedom Union, UW) which had absorbed the party (e.g. the Liberal Democratic Congress, KLD, the Democratic Union, UD) they had reportedly voted in the last election are counted as standpatters. Similarly, the Czech respondents who recalled voting for the Liberal Social Union (LSU) in 1992 and named the Agrarian Party (ZS) or CSS as their current preference, or recalled voting for the Left Bloc (LB) in 1992 and at the time of the survey preferred the KSCM were counted as standpats. In the 1990 and 1991 Czech data responses naming the Civic Forum (OF), Liberal Democratic Party (LDS), Club of Non-partisan Citizens (KAN), Civic Democratic Party (ODS), Civic Movement (OH), Civic Democratic Alliance (ODA), and Romani Civic Initiative (ROI) were collapsed; so were references to the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia (HZDS), Public Against Violence (VPN), Independent Hungarian Initiative (FMK) and Civic Democratic Union (ODU) in the 1990-1991 Slovak data.

Source: The 1990-91 data come from surveys of clustered random sample of the adult population of Slovakia and the Czech Republic by the Prague-based STEM research institute. All other data come from the Central European University (CEU) surveys.

does the trick, and it is also clear that the communist regimes deprived virtually all parties of both. Equally clearly, these criteria cannot account either for Poland's relatively high volatility, or for the similarity between the Czech and Slovak volatility figures.

Using a multivariate framework, Bartolini and Mair's monumental study identified five factors as important determinants of the magnitude of electoral change:¹⁸

- institutional changes (that is, of the electoral system and franchise)
- significant changes in turnout
- the number of parties
- religious and ethnic heterogeneity and
- the membership of left-wing parties.

Taken together, these factors go a long way towards explaining the unusually high electoral volatility of east central Europe in general, and of Poland in particular. Among the four Visegrad countries left party membership is the highest in the Czech Republic, and Slovakia is the only one which has a noteworthy ethno-religious heterogeneity (with 11% Hungarian population). In contrast, while Poland can claim absolutely negligible ethno-religious heterogeneity or party membership figures, it has the most significant changes in election law and the highest fragmentation of parties in any of the four countries. Clearly, the greater the number of parties, the more likely that voters will find an ideologically proximate party for the sake of which they can abandon their previous partisanship (no matter how strong it was). In the 1991 and 1993 Polish elections, the fractionalization of the vote was excessive by any standards. Hungarian, Czech and Slovak elections did not differ a lot in this respect, they all produced a lesser fragmentation of the vote than the two Polish elections, but appreciably more than the post-war average in any West European democracy.¹⁹

However, the volatility-boosters identified by Bartolini and Mair fail to explain why Slovak parties had more loyal voters than did the Hungarian parties in the 1992–95 period. Even if we assume that the ethnic cleavage reduced the volatility of minority voters in Slovakia, their proportion in the total population and the impact of ethnic-heterogeneity on volatility – according to Bartolini and Mair's analysis²⁰ – are so small that this factor cannot possibly explain why Hungary had greater electoral instability than Slovakia, despite Hungary's arguably greater stability of electoral institutions,²¹ similar party fractionalization, and much smaller change of turnout.²² Similarly, the

¹⁸ See Bartolini and Mair, *Identity, Competition, and Electoral Availability*, pp. 254–85.

¹⁹ Cf. Tóka, 'Political parties and democratic consolidation'.

²⁰ Cf. Bartolini and Mair, *Identity, Competition, and Electoral Availability*, pp. 276 and 229 on the controlled effect and the bivariate relationship, respectively.

²¹ The marginal changes in the electoral law were a little more significant in Slovakia than in Hungary. Furthermore, the emergence of entirely new parties and the total disappearance of others generated more movement of votes in Slovakia and in the Czech Republic than in Hungary (cf. Tables 2 and 4 of Tóka, 'Political parties and democratic consolidation'). Similarly, almost all the more significant Slovak parties that were founded or reborn in 1990–91 eventually split along a line dividing more radical nationalists and moderates, while the Hungarian six party system remained proverbially 'stable'.

²² Turnout increased by 4% in Hungary between 1990 and 1994 and by 9% in Poland between the 1991 and 1993 elections, but decreased by 12% between 1990 and 1992 and by another 8–9% between 1992 and the third elections in both the Czech Republic and in Slovakia.

voter/member ratio may give a highly plausible explanation of the stronger loyalty of the voters of the Czech than of the Hungarian ex-communists. Yet, the propositions that have so far been put on the table hardly account for why the entirely new or discontinuous-historical Czech parties have more stable voters than do their Hungarian counterparts.

Cleavage and Value Voting

One of the most frequently heard assertions about electoral politics in east central Europe goes like this: '... [the Czech party system] is anchored neither in a social nor in an interest structure, and that is why the parties do not have regular voters ... This unanchored system of parties will for a long time not be a support, but rather a danger for democracy'.²³ This section addresses the proposition that the stronger (A) the mobilization of cleavages, and/or (B) value voting in a country, the less volatile are voting intentions.

At the heart of both propositions is the intuition that certain motives or causes of individual voting decisions are likely to cement party attachments more firmly than others. This intuition is clearly captured in the concept of 'cleavage', and this, indeed, may well be *the* reason why this obscure concept has become so popular among analysts of electoral behaviour and political parties. There is little agreement in the scholarly literature about precisely what 'cleavage' means,²⁴ but there is an apparent consensus on what its most important consequence in electoral politics can be. Simply by talking of 'cleavage' instead of the more ordinary alternatives like 'division' or 'opposition', most scholars seem to stress that there is something puzzling in the persistence and intensity of some political conflicts, which cannot be explained by reference solely to the instrumental rationality of the individual actors.

The persistence of social structures can be one source of this endurance of partisan attachment. Quite obviously, conflicts between rich and poor are likely reproduced over and over again, at least as long as income taxation is a major source of government revenues. But ever since the publication of Lipset and Rokkan's classic essay, 'cleavage' has meant more than merely the persistent reproduction of a conflict line through current issues over a long period of time. The much cited, though excessively enigmatic *freezing* hypothesis (that is, that the party systems of the 1970s reflected, 'with few, but significant exceptions' the party systems of the 1920s) was to stress exactly that the mobilization of cleavages made West European party systems resistant to sweeping social

²³ Brokl, Lubomír, 'Between November 1989 and democracy – antinomies of our politics', *Czechoslovak Sociological Review*, 28, Special Issue (1992), 33.

²⁴ As Meisel once noted, in their 1967 classic on cleavages, Lipset and Rokkan use 'cleavage' interchangeably with 'contrast', 'conflict', 'opposition' and 'strain'; see J. Meisel, *Cleavages, Parties and Values in Canada* (Beverly Hills, Sage, 1974), p. 6. Very often cleavage means any persistent issue dimension that divides the parties in a country and which keeps being reproduced (through different issues) over a longer period of time (see e.g. I. McAllister and S. White, 'Democracy, political parties and party formation in post-communist Russia', *Party Politics*, 1 1995, 49–72). Others equate cleavages with group-based political divisions – cf. those studies which try to explore the influence of cleavages on electoral behaviour by looking at the strength of association between various socio-demographic criteria and party choice (see e.g. M. N. Franklin, T. Mackie, H. Valen with C. Bean *et al.*, *Electoral Change: Responses to Evolving Social and Attitudinal Structures in Western Countries* (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1992)).

changes, even though the latter 'have made the old established alternatives increasingly *irrelevant*'.²⁵

What could make electoral alignments relatively immune to social change? To spare the concept from inflated use, both Bartolini and Mair and Knutsen and Scarbrough have recently advocated a more faithful following of what they believe Stein Rokkan's implicit definition of a *cleavage* to have been.²⁶ Both Bartolini and Mair, on the one hand, and Knutsen and Scarbrough, on the other, ended up with a three-dimensional definition which incorporates socio-structural, normative and organizational elements. In other words, they argue that it is only admissible to talk of a *cleavage* if an enduring organizational form is given to a politically mobilized opposition between such members of relatively closed social groups who have distinct values, beliefs and identity. The requirement of social closure implies that only a few quasi-demographic differences (class, ethno-religious or regional identity, urban-rural residence) can serve as the bases of cleavages.

A great advantage of this definition is that it immediately explains why cleavages could produce more electoral stability than what would be expected in their absence: the temporal stability of value preferences, organizational encapsulation, and the relative political homogeneity (in terms of party preferences) of the social environment may make some voters resistant to impulses that would otherwise be sufficient to bring them under different banners. Knutsen and Scarbrough stress, in particular, the role of value conflicts in the making of cleavages: and this helps one to understand persistence too, since the general value conflicts can be invoked daily, even also on issues where only a few voters are sufficiently strongly affected in terms of their immediate interests so as to make them alarmed.²⁷ Value references and invocation of group solidarity can thus help to keep a substantial part of the mass following in a more or less constant state of ideological mobilization along a given cleavage line.

The equally obvious disadvantage of these complex definitions stems from the problems they pose for measurement. Bartolini and Mair are forced to give up making any attempt at measuring the normative aspect of cleavage strength ('the cultural distinctiveness' of the values characterizing the consciousness and identity of any given group), and they do not manage to design an appropriate measure for the social (as opposed to the organizational) basis of the class cleavage. Since they work with survey data instead of long term trends in aggregate electoral statistics, Knutsen and Scarbrough can utilize supposedly appropriate data on both the social and the cultural-ideological (that is, value) homogeneity of the various parties' electorates. Furthermore, they reject the idea that the relationship between the three elements of cleavage could be additive. Bartolini and Mair allow for the possibility that 'the three elements

²⁵ S. M. Lipset and S. Rokkan, 'Cleavage Structures, Party Systems and Voter Alignments. Introduction', in S. M. Lipset and S. Rokkan (eds), *Party Systems and Voter Alignments. Cross-National Perspectives* (New York, Free, 1967), p. 54, emphasis added.

²⁶ Bartolini and Mair, *Identity, Competition, and Electoral Availability*; O. Knutsen and E. Scarbrough, 'Cleavage Politics', in J. van Deth and E. Scarbrough (eds), *The Impact of Values* (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1995), pp. 492–523.

²⁷ Suffice here to refer to D. Sears, C. Hensler, and L. Speer's work on the symbolic aspects of political issues, see their 'Whites' opposition to "busing": self-interest or symbolic politics?', *American Political Science Review*, 73 (1979), 369–84.

[of cleavage] may vary quite autonomously in the cases of both existing and emerging cleavages. For example, it is possible that a cleavage may become enfeebled in terms of its social-structural basis without necessarily experiencing a similar decay at the ideological or organizational level.²⁸

Knutsen and Scarbrough counter that this 'set[s] no limits on how far any, or all, of the three elements may vary before a form of cleavage politics ceases to constitute cleavage politics and becomes some other form of politics'. They posit a multiplicative relationship between the three elements: 'cleavage politics entails that members of an identifiable social group adhere to the values associated with that group and vote for a party identified with that group and advocating those values'.²⁹ They submit that the structural bases of cleavage politics – that is, the impact of class and religion on voting preferences – have been declining in the process of social and technological modernization, and an individualistic 'value voting' has been on the rise. However, they add, what really declines is 'pure structural' voting – workers voting for left wing, Catholics voting for the Christian party, or middle-class voters opting for liberal or conservative parties, even if their values would not make that choice any more likely than others. Parallel to this, 'pure value' voting is rising, that is, party choice becomes more congruent with values even if neither are reinforced by membership in a relatively closed socio-demographic group in which their values and partisan preference are dominant. But as long as the normative (value), structural (demographic) and organizational (party) elements of a cleavage remain correlated, the two processes counterbalance each other and the strength of the old cleavages may remain practically unaffected.

From this, Knutsen and Scarbrough proceed to develop a novel measurement of 'cleavage', 'structural' and 'value' voting that will be utilized in the next section. Note at this point that their reasoning implies two explanations for a puzzle of east central European electoral politics – namely why comparatively high levels of aggregate electoral volatility and frequent complaints about the weak embeddedness of political parties in the system of societal conflicts go together with relatively strong correlations between a number of demographic variables and party choice.³⁰

Firstly, Klingemann and Wattenberg argued that voters in the new east European democracies can much more easily collect and process credible, reliable and consistent information about the socio-cultural background of the elites of the various parties (e.g. in terms of their generational, religious, or professional background) than about their policy commitments, competence, etc. Thus, even though the latter may be the more salient information, its short supply makes people vote more congruently with their demographic background than with their broadly conceived policy preferences. As more, and more credible information about party policies becomes available at affordable prices, voters will change their loyalties accordingly. Thus voters may shift allegiance based on who candidates *are* to what policies candidates *stand for*. A high initial volatility of the vote can thus be the result of the same factor that

²⁸ Bartolini and Mair, *Identity, Competition, and Electoral Availability*, p. 210.

²⁹ O. Knutsen, and E. Scarbrough, 'Cleavage Politics and Value Conflicts'. Paper presented at the meeting of Group 4 of the 'Beliefs in Government' project of the European Science Foundation in Paris, 1993.

³⁰ See G. Tóka, 'Parties and Electoral Choices in East Central Europe', in P. Lewis and G. Pridham (eds) *Stabilising Fragile Democracies* (London, Routledge, 1996), pp. 115–7.

caused the relatively strong impact of demographic variables on party choice previously.³¹

The second explanation offered by the above conceptualization of cleavage is that only certain socio-demographic divisions can become the social basis of cleavages: religious denomination, ethnicity, social class, the urban-rural differentiation, and probably not much else. The argument is that religiosity (conventionally measured by church attendance), education, and age, for instance, lack that kind of social closure and/or temporal stability which are necessary preconditions for the functioning of the freezing effect. On this latter score, both Knutsen and Scarbrough and Bartolini and Mair fully agree. Incidentally, their examples (church attendance, age, education) are exactly those background variables that are the most likely to be important correlates of party choice in these early years of the democratic experiment in east central Europe.³²

Thus, high electoral volatility and relatively strong correlations between some socio-demographic variables and party choice do not necessarily preclude each other. What about 'pure value voting'? While they do not address the question of volatility, Knutsen and Scarbrough's argument points to the proposition that cleavages do and 'pure value voting' probably does not turn voters into a captive audience. For instance, they stress that 'in our view, materialist-postmaterialist opposition is about value conflict unencumbered by the immobilities of cleavage politics. Whereas the cleavage model suggests a relatively robust structuring of mass politics, the "new politics" perspective points to the more fluid, volatile relationship between social groups, value orientations, and party preferences which might be expected of a politics unanchored in cleavages'.³³

All in all, my reading of the cleavage literature suggests the following hypotheses:

(1) *Group Membership and Party Loyalty*: a probabilistic relationship between membership in a social group and party preference will lend above average endurance to the initial party preference of those individuals, whose party preference, at the beginning of the observed period, did not contradict but rather strengthened this probabilistic relationship between group membership and party choice (hypothesis 1). The rationale of this proposition is twofold. First, group conflicts have some persistence, and membership in a social class or church is more stable than say voters' positions on particular issues or their personal evaluations of the competence of various party leaders. Second, Bartolini and Mair argue that the closure of social relationships – that is, that individuals belonging to a given class, religion, and place of residence, are exposed to interaction with people who tend to have the same partisanship – cements party preferences beyond the degree that could be explained by the direct appeal of the parties to the individual voters. Indeed, previous American scholarship points to some environmental influences on the direction of the

³¹ See H. Klingemann and M. Wattenberg, 'Decaying versus developing party systems: a comparison of party images in the United States and West Germany', *British Journal of Political Science*, 22 (1992), 131–49.

³² Tóka, 'Parties and electoral choices'.

³³ Knutsen and Scarbrough, 'Cleavage Politics', p. 497.

vote.³⁴ What is not clear, however, is whether these environmental influences can also stabilize voting intentions over time. Also unclear is whether the political homogeneity of the immediate environment must reach a critical threshold before its effect starts to be felt, or whether just about any probabilistic relationship between membership in a macro-group (like class or church) and vote can generate such environmental influences. My counter-hypothesis is that, given the fragmentation of the east central European party systems alone, no large social group is likely to sustain the kind of environmental influence, that is, the political homogeneity of the social environment, that would make party loyalties enigmatically stable. Thus, 'pure structural' voters (as defined by Knutsen and Scarbrough) are just as volatile in their preferences as anybody else because they lack the reinforcement that comes from sustained interaction with like-minded people.

(2) *Value Homogeneity and Party Loyalty*: Bartolini and Mair further argue that value homogeneity – that is, 'pure value voting' – among the supporters of a party can also cement their party loyalties (hypothesis 2). They do not seem to be very clear about the psychological mechanism at work, but it seems plausible that for the voters themselves their own 'value voting' may appear richer in substantive and enduring political meaning. It is likely too that most voters prefer listening to such sources and communicating with such fellow citizens who appear to share their values, irrespectively of whether or not these also share their party preference and social background. Through these two mechanisms, value homogeneity may be more effective than social homogeneity in stabilizing a party's constituency. The counterargument would be that both the voters' value orientations and the parties' programmatic appeals are so fluid – at least in new democracies undergoing rapid and radical economic, cultural and political changes – that pure value voting will not lead to below average volatility of voting intentions. Voters may hold steadily to their value commitments, while seeking a compatible party among a shifting partisan landscape.

(3) *Cleavage Mobilization and Party Loyalty*: Knutsen and Scarbrough seem to suggest that cleavage mobilization – that is, a simultaneous appeal to group interests and identity on the one hand, and to the values that distinguish the targeted social group on the other – is more likely to cement party loyalties than are either 'pure structural' or 'pure value' voting. Why this kind of party appeal may be particularly effective in recruiting a captive audience can be best explained with the example of the Czech Liberal Social Union (LSU). Their case suggests that an appeal for 'pure structural' and 'pure value' voting can be combined with the opposite of what Knutsen and Scarbrough mean by cleavage mobilization. The LSU was the 1992 electoral coalition and short-lived parliamentary club comprised of the Czech Agrarian Party (ZS), the Czech Socialist Party (CSS), and the Greens (SZ). The coalition combined an appeal to post-materialist, culturally liberal values, and, in effect, to the young, urban, educated part of Czech society, on the one hand, with an appeal to the narrow economic interests and group identity of the farming population (which

³⁴ B. R. Berelson, P. F. Lazarsfeld, and W. N. McPhee, *Voting: a Study of Public Opinion Formation in a Presidential Campaign* (Chicago IL, The University of Chicago Press, 1954), p. 120; R. Huckfeldt and J. Sprague, 'Social Order and Political Chaos: the Structural Setting of Political Information', in J. A. Ferejohn and J. H. Kuklinski (eds), *Information and Democratic Processes* (Urbana IL, University of Illinois Press, 1991), pp. 33ff.

is usually not very post-materialist or culturally liberal), on the other. Therefore, if considered in isolation, neither the voters' values, nor their socio-demographic traits were strongly related to support for LSU. The noticeable impact of both on LSU vote becomes apparent only if they are considered simultaneously.

It is easy to conclude that it may be troublesome to lead a party like this to electoral success. Indeed, the LSU itself was soon disbanded, and its various successor organizations ended up in electoral oblivion in the 1996 election. And it seems plausible that few voters can display more than half-hearted commitment and stable support to such a party. Thus, 'cleavage voting' (to borrow Knutsen and Scarbrough's term) increases, while 'negative cleavage voting', which was apparent in the case of the LSU, undermines the supporters' party loyalty (hypothesis 3). The counterhypothesis is that the confusion in the appeal of parties like the LSU might depress the level of support for the party, but will not do anything to undermine the loyalty of its (probably few) voters, once their support was won. Since 'cleavage voting' does not have its own mechanism to cement party loyalties, but merely combines the mechanisms underlying structural and value voting, its capacity to stabilize party preferences is intermediate between, and not greater than that of the two other types (hypothesis 3a).

(4) *Party Organization and Party Loyalty*: Bartolini and Mair make an obviously plausible point in suggesting that the organizational encapsulation of voters by their parties may also provide for an above average endurance of party loyalties (hypothesis 4). The apparent explanation is again that the political homogeneity of the everyday social environment makes the politically relevant stimuli received by the encapsulated voters extremely skewed towards those which are likely to reinforce their preferences.

Quite obviously, organizational encapsulation and 'cleavage', 'pure value' and 'pure structural voting' are likely to be promoted by different party strategies and different party appeals. If the argument of the second section of this essay about the relationship between the quality of democracy and volatility was correct, then the following section should offer some insight about which, if any, party appeal is likely to make the greatest contribution to democratic control via the reduction of the astronomic electoral volatility of some new democracies.

Empirical Analysis

The data considered in this section come from seven panel studies of electoral preferences. The analysis is carried out for each panel separately, which also means that we hold election laws, ethno-religious heterogeneity, left-party membership and party fragmentation constant, and concentrate on some of the variance in party loyalties that these factors leave unexplained. The final dependent variable is whether or not the party preference of a respondent changed between the two waves of the respective panel. In the April–May 1994 Hungarian, the May–June 1996 Czech, and the August–October 1993 Polish panel, the two interviews were only separated by three to seven weeks. In the 1992–93 Slovak and Czech, and the December 1993–May 1994 Hungarian panel, the two interviews were separated by several months, and in the September 1992–May 1994 Hungarian panel by 20 months. In the 1992–93 Czech and Slovak panels, the current voting preference in the second wave was

compared to the current voting preference in the first. In all other panels, the voting preference revealed in the first interview was compared to the actual vote as reported one to three weeks after the next election.

The final dependent variable (*Stability*) has just two values: '2' if the voting preference remained unaltered between the two interviews and '1' otherwise. The respondents who, in the first interview, revealed no preference or named a very small party as their most likely choice are excluded from the final analysis. To increase the number of cases included in the analysis, some smaller parties were merged (see the Appendix).

The three independent variables (*Cleavage*, *Value* and *Structure*) of the final analysis were constructed solely on the basis of information available from the first wave interviews. They measure the extent to which the individual respondents, given their party preference, values and demographic traits seemed to be 'cleavage', 'value' or 'structural' voters. The testing of the hypotheses involved regressing *Stability* on *Cleavage*, *Value* and *Structure*. Since *Stability* is a dummy variable, logistic regression was employed.

Before assessing the results, we have to turn to the critical question of how *Cleavage*, *Value* and *Structure* were constructed via a discriminant analysis which, except for some inevitable differences in the independent variables, is identical to Knutsen and Scarbrough's model. In that model, the strength of cleavages is measured by the *indirect* effect of *selected* socio-demographic variables on party choice via *value orientations*. In technical terms, this requires separate runs of three models of party choice. The first uses only the socio-demographic variables, the second only value orientations, and the third all of these as independent variables. Beside those measures of religion and social class which were used by Knutsen and Scarbrough, here (perfectly in line with their argument) a variable referring to the urban-rural dimension is also included among the socio-demographic variables. Beside a scale measuring left vs. right wing socio-economic values, indicators of nationalist vs. cosmopolitan, secular vs. clerical, and anti- vs. pro-communist attitudes are included among the value orientations. The independent variables included in the various models are described in the Appendix. Note that to test hypothesis 4, the entire analysis was redone. This replication is called analysis B below. The only difference between analyses A and B was in the independent variables included in models 1, 2 and 3 of the discriminant analyses. Model A, to review a bit, includes church membership, urbanism, education, and occupation. Model B, in the interest of measuring a voter's engagement in organizational networks, adds to these four the frequency of church attendance and communist party membership prior to 1989.

The discriminant analyses utilized the observed statistical relationships between party preference and the independent variables to maximize our ability to 'postdict' correctly the party preferences of the respondents. The immediate results (not shown) were linear combinations of the independent variables (so called discriminant functions) that best explained the observed party preference of the respondents.³⁵

³⁵ The Knutsen-Scarbrough analysis focused on the 'explanatory power' of the three different models, which they believed to warrant inferences about variations across samples (that is, time and countries) in the strength of 'value', 'structural' and 'cleavage' voting. However, a different path will be taken here as their measure of a model's explanatory power (that is, the Wilks' lambda statistics) can in no way be interpreted – as they did – analogously to the *R*-squared statistics familiar from

Each model gives a numerical estimate, for each respondent, of the probability of supporting each of the parties, given the respondent's value on the independent variables in the model and the observed relationship between these variables and party preference. The probability that an individual, given his or her set of demographic and/or value characteristics, would vote for party i , can be used to distinguish the three linkage (and voter) types sketched by Knutsen and Scarbrough. Recall that pure structural voting is exemplified by such working class voters who do not adhere to left-wing values in the socio economic domain, but nevertheless vote for a left wing working class party. Those middle class voters who vote for a bourgeois party without displaying right-wing socio-economic attitudes are another case in point. In contrast, a middle-class person who has socialist value orientations and also votes socialist would be an example of a 'pure value voter'. Finally, cleavage voting occurs if 'structural' and 'value' voting are simultaneously displayed by an individual. An example is an upper-class conservative voter who has right-wing views on economic issues.

In the spirit of Knutsen and Scarbrough's work a minor innovation was introduced to capture such differences between individual voters. For each party i , one variable was generated by the discriminant analyses for each model. Let T_i denote the probability that voters j will support party i given their value orientations and demographic traits on the one hand, and the observed linear relationship between these independent variables and support for the different parties in the sample, on the other. Similarly, let S_i denote the probability that voters j will support party i given their demographic traits only, and V_i denote the probability that voters j will support party i given their values only. If, for instance, values are totally unrelated to party preference, then all V_i variables will have the same (non-zero) value for all voters and all parties, and T_i will always be equal to S_i for each voter and party. Next, the T_i , V_i , and S_i variables (note that there are as many of each of them as parties in the analysis) were replaced with T , V , and S , respectively. The new variable T equaled T_j for all respondents who named party j as their voting preference in the first interview, S equaled S_j for all respondents who named party j as their voting preference in the first interview, and V equaled V_j for all respondents who named party j as their voting preference in the first interview. Consequently, T , S and V were undefined (that is, declared missing) for those individuals who had no party preference, or favoured one of the smaller parties excluded from our analysis. They were not included in the rest of the analysis.

regression analysis. Technically put, a nominal variable (such as party preference) has no variance – not to speak of a normal distribution – in the statistical sense of the word. On this and discriminant analysis in general, see W. Klecka, *Discriminant Analysis* (Beverly Hills CA, Sage, 1980). To clarify this point without recourse to statistical jargon, the problem can be highlighted with an example. Wilks' lambda (and analogous measures like canonical correlation) would suggest a deterministic relationship between party preference and an independent variable if that independent variable had a deterministic relationship with support for one, however small, party. A good example would be an ethnically divided polity where a party speaking for the interests of a small ethnic minority manages to get the vote of everybody belonging to that ethnic group, but obtains absolutely no votes from other ethnic groups. The three Hungarian parties – the Hungarian Christian Democratic Movement, the nationalist Co-existence and the liberal Hungarian Civic Party (MKM, ESWS and MOS, respectively) in Slovakia closely approximate this situation. Yet, if membership in the ethnic group in question does not discriminate between the supporters of the rest of the parties, then there is something obviously wrong in interpreting the data as if ethnicity 'perfectly' explained party choice.

Imagine a two-party system with strong class voting and an equally strong correspondence between conservative vs. socialist values and party choice. The middle class socialists voting for the left wing party will have a high V-value but a low S-value, while those upper-class voters of the right wing party who have conservative values will have a high score (that is, relatively close to 1) on both V and S. If class status and conservatism are correlated, then some of the apparent relationship between class and vote is, of course, spurious, and entirely due to their shared association with conservative values. But to obtain a measure of pure structural and pure value voting, we need just a little more algebra:

- (1) *Structure* = T - V
- (2) *Value* = T - S
- (3) *Cleavage* = T - *Value* - *Structure*³⁶

As a result, the three new variables show the net contribution of the three types of voting to our ability to explain the respondent's party choice. The rest of the analysis is really simple. According to hypothesis 1, *Structure* has a direct positive effect on *Stability*. According to hypothesis 2, *Value* has a direct positive effect on *Stability*. According to hypothesis 3, *Cleavage*'s direct effect on *Stability* is positive and larger than the direct effects of *Value* and *Structure*. Hypothesis 3a contradicts Knutsen and Scarbrough as it posits that the direct effect of *Cleavage* is halfway between that of *Value* and *Structure*.

Finally, hypothesis 4 attributes a key role to organizational encapsulation in stabilizing party preference. If it is correct, then replacing church attendance and former communist party membership with direct measures of attitude in the construction of the *Value* variable must diminish the impact of the latter on *Stability*. Adding church attendance and former party membership to our set of demographic variables seems reasonable on the ground that organizational encapsulation and structural voting are expected to owe their stabilizing effect to identical socio-psychological mechanisms (see above). According to hypothesis 4, this step should increase the observed effect of *Structure* on *Stability*. Therefore, all analyses are done twice. In analysis A, church attendance and former communist party membership are treated as indicators of 'values', while in analysis B they turn into 'structural' variables (see the Appendix too).

Obviously, 'structural', 'value' and 'cleavage' voting do not exhaust the universe of all possible types of party-voter linkages. Evaluations of party leaders, economic conditions, and a host of other factors can just as well influence voting decisions as the voter's values. However, the present analysis does not distinguish among these other types. In effect, the influence of

³⁶ Although this will not be relevant here it has to be noted that the discriminant analyses assumed an equal prior probability of support for each party. Therefore, T_i , V_i and S_i had the same mean for each party in a given sample. This mean was equal to $1/n$ (plus-minus a minor computation error), where n is the number of categories (parties) distinguished on the dependent variable. One divided by n is the random chance of correct classification. This chance element (which is constant across respondents and parties) was automatically subtracted from the values of *Structure* and *Value* when they were defined as in (1) and (2) because T, V and S all incorporated the same chance element. However, since *Cleavage* is defined (theoretically) as in (4), the value of the *Cleavage* variable would not be reduced by the chance element in such an automatic way. Therefore, *Cleavage* was actually computed as:

$$(4) \text{ Cleavage} = T - V - S - 1/n.$$

Cleavage, *Structure* and *Value* on the stability of voting intentions are assessed relative to the combined impact of all these 'other' factors together (see Table 2). If, for instance, *Structure* has a statistically significant positive effect on *Stability*, then structural voting is more, and if the observed effect is negative, then it is less likely to stabilize party preferences than all other possible reasons of party choice combined.

Let us consider analysis A first. Given the relatively small Ns in the analysis, it is not very surprising that many regression coefficients are insignificant. More important is whether an effect is consistently positive or negative in all the seven panel studies that we can analyse. Out of the seven logistic regression analyses (one for each panel survey), *Value* had a positive, statistically significant effect on *Stability* five times. The exceptions were the first Czech and the third

TABLE 2. The Impact of Cleavages, Structural, and Values Linkages between Voters and Parties on the Stability of Voting Intentions

Analysis A:

	Cleavage	Structure	Values	N
Poland, 1993	8.66 (2.02)	2.45 (0.50)	2.62 (0.74)	640
Czech R., 1992–93	2.75 (2.09)	−0.03 (1.12)	0.71 (0.57)	344
Czech R., 1996	1.75 (1.76)	0.03 (1.86)	1.81 (0.52)	505
Slovakia, 1992–93	0.81 (2.16)	−0.28 (1.36)	2.65 (0.69)	367
Hungary, 1992–94	2.44 (2.47)	1.41 (1.23)	3.85 (0.85)	372
Hungary, 1993–94	1.53 (2.35)	1.40 (1.35)	2.63 (0.69)	356
Hungary, 1994	2.24 (2.12)	−1.48 (1.26)	0.74 (0.76)	349

Analysis B:

	Cleavage	Structure	Values	N
Poland, 1993	7.69 (1.53)	2.31 (0.43)	3.85 (0.94)	640
Czech R., 1992–93	1.39 (1.05)	0.39 (0.59)	1.58 (0.97)	344
Czech R., 1996	2.43 (0.90)	1.12 (0.63)	2.07 (0.96)	505
Slovakia, 1992–93	4.46 (1.31)	1.63 (0.82)	2.13 (0.81)	367
Hungary, 1992–94	4.55 (1.87)	2.48 (0.71)	1.00 (1.41)	372
Hungary, 1993–94	5.91 (1.81)	1.49 (0.73)	1.84 (1.06)	356
Hungary, 1994	0.12 (1.56)	−0.58 (0.74)	2.58 (1.02)	349

Note: The table entries are logistic regression coefficients (standard errors in parentheses). The dependent variable is *Stability* (coded 2 if the respondent revealed the same party preference in both waves of the panel in question, and 1 otherwise). Those respondents who revealed no party preference in either wave are excluded from the analysis. Significant effects (0.10 level) are printed in **bold**. The constant terms of the equations are omitted from the table. The independent variables measure the extent to which individual voters are 'structural', 'value', or 'cleavage' voters. On their construction see the main text. In creating *Cleavage*, *Structure* and *Value*, former communist party membership and the frequency of church attendance were considered indicators of value preferences in analysis A, and as indicators of organisational encapsulation (and thus, a possible cause of 'structural voting') in analysis B. For further details see the Appendix. Data set: seven different CEU panel-surveys, each having two waves of interviews.

Hungarian panel, but even there the effect was clearly positive. Thus, hypothesis 2, which suggests that stable party loyalty is a function of value homogeneity, receives support from the analysis.

In contrast, *Structure* and *Cleavage*'s direct effects on *Stability* were significant just once each (both in the Polish panel). While the effect of *Cleavage* was positive in all other panels, it never reached statistical significance. Hypothesis 1 can be clearly rejected, especially since *Structure* even records three negative, though insignificant, effects across the seven panels: structural voting does not seem to be an unusually strong stabilizer of party loyalties.

Hypothesis 3 suggests that the simultaneous mobilization of group interests and identity combined with values particular to a social group cement party loyalties. Thus, *Cleavage* should have a larger effect on *Stability* than either *Structure* or *Value*. This hypothesis receives no support. Comparing the coefficients in the three columns we can see that in analysis A this proposition was confirmed only in three out of seven surveys. *Cleavage*, on the whole, performs only a tiny bit better than *Structure*.

However, the robustness of these findings has to be checked against a possible criticism. Given the inclusion of membership in certain, politically relevant social networks among the indicators of value preferences in analysis A, one might speculate that it is probably not 'value voting', but the (informal) organizational encapsulation of some voters by the Christian and the post-communist political subcultures that is responsible for *Value*'s positive effect on *Stability*. In other words, hypothesis 2 is probably false and hypothesis 4 has to be supported instead.

Analysis B tests this possibility. This time, church attendance and former communist party membership were moved from among the value indicators among the structural (demographic) traits, and attitude-based indicators of clerical-secular and pro- vs. anti-communist values replace them among the value indicators (see the description of analysis B in the Appendix).

In analysis B, the effect of *Structure* on *Stability* was significant and positive five times, and negative (though insignificant) only once. Indeed, moving from analysis A to analysis B, the logistic regression coefficient measuring the net impact of *Structure* on *Stability* changed in the direction anticipated by hypothesis 4 in each of the seven panels. Thus, there is considerable support for hypothesis 4, holding that the organizational encapsulation of voters by their parties provides for strengthened party loyalties. Thus, we might expect that associating frequently with co-religionists or a history of communist party activism reinforces the effect of structural conditions on voters' partisan attachments.

However, *Value* still had a clearly significant impact on *Stability* in all but the 1992–94 Hungarian panel, and thus hypothesis 2 was still supported: value-based party preferences tend to be more lasting than party choices based on other considerations are on the average. But this time, hypothesis 3 received stronger support than in analysis A as the impact of *Cleavage* was appreciably stronger than that of either *Structure* or *Value* – in every survey (but only in those surveys) where *Structure* too had a significant positive effect on *Stability*. Since cleavage voting is a combination of structural and value voting, this restriction makes a very good sense. It seems, then, that the combined impact of these two voting types on the stability of party choice may indeed be bigger than the simple sum of their effects when they do not work in tandem. When they

work in isolation, though, the stabilizing impact of value voting is probably stronger than that of structural voting (compare the respective coefficients in the two rightmost columns of Table 2), but we have no strong evidence of that.

Summary and Conclusions

In the new democracies of east central Europe, voters' willingness to stay with party preferences over time is a function of their 'value voting' along such dimensions as religious-secular, left-right, and nationalism-antinationalism. This effect of values on voter loyalty is largely independent of status or demographic circumstances. And, when it comes to sustaining commitment to particular parties, values are at least as effective as is the political mobilization of organizational networks. Values are definitely more effective in sustaining party loyalty than are the effects of socio-demographic traits unmediated by those value orientations. Rather than stick with parties whose followers or leaders 'look like them', voters are most likely to stick with the parties with whom they agree on major issue dimensions. If the argument of the opening section about the link between democratic accountability and volatility survives closer scrutiny, then this finding underlines the positive contribution that can be made by parties that differentiate themselves ideologically from one another in new (but probably also in old) democracies. The clarity and sharpness of value-based choices for the voters can help make the often astronomic electoral volatility of new democracies lower. Given the amount of praise that ideological moderation, pragmatism and centrism receive in discussions of democratization, this is not entirely trivial.

Furthermore, it was found that 'pure structural voting', on the basis of social class, religion, or place of residence, seldom makes a contribution to the stabilization of critical alignments. Except in Poland, no direct effect of structural voting, unmediated by value orientations, was evident on the stability of party. Several explanations are possible. One is that these countries have rather fractionalized party systems, and therefore very few sizeable groups become homogeneous enough in their party preferences so as to allow 'structural voting' to stabilize party attachments. Alternatively, one could allude to the oft-supposed weakness of group identities after decades of communist rules. In contrast, however, no one has shown that 'pure structural' voting would be particularly instrumental in stabilizing voters' party preferences even in more established democracies. Thus, the burden of proof is now on those who would still like to argue that the frequently demonstrated decline of class voting is leading to an increased (potential) volatility of the western electorates, or that the absence of class etc. voting destabilizes new party systems. Value preferences seem to provide for relatively more solid, stable basis for enduring partisan attachments, at least in these four relatively new democracies. Another factor that is apparently effective in sustaining such attachments is the organizational encapsulation of voters, which is a particularly powerful influence when it is combined with value voting among the supporters.

Much further work can and needs to be done to fill in gaps in the argument presented above. Clearly, it was assumed, but not demonstrated, that the incidence of various voting types in a polity is a function of the kind of appeals that parties use. At best, it is a plausible proposition that direct appeals to group interests and identities (through nakedly redistributive proposals presenting

politics as a zero sum game) induce 'structural' effects on voting, while ideological appeals (calling for improvements in the allocative efficiency and fairness of public policies that, presumably, would make nearly every one better off) invite 'value voting'. The implication of the present analysis is that the latter is more likely to create stable party allegiances in new electorates.

Appendix: Variables, the Treatment of Missing Values, and Effective Ns in the Discriminant Analyses

I: Variables in the discriminant analyses

I.A: The **dependent variable** is current party preference as revealed in the first wave of a panel survey by the responses to the question: 'Which party would you vote for if there were a parliamentary election next weekend [in the elections this May (June, September)]?' References to parties that merged later – as Democratic Union (UD) and the Liberal Democratic Congress (KLD) in Poland, the Civic Democratic Party (ODS) and the small KDS in the Czech Republic, and the Democratic Party (DS) and the Party of Conservative Democrats (SKD, formerly Civic Democratic Union, ODU) in Slovakia – or that joined in an electoral coalition (like the various constituent parts of the 1992 Czech LSU, which, for all practical purposes, became extinct by the time of the 1996 election, or the three Hungarian parties, MKM, ESWS and MOS, in Slovakia) were collapsed. However, the Slovak Green and Social Democratic parties, though merged with each other, were kept separate from the post-communist SDL (their electoral coalition partner in 1994). Respondents supporting parties/coalitions represented by less than 20 supporters in the first wave of the respective panel survey were excluded from the analysis. For the present analysis party preferences were recoded as:

- Poland: (1) Confederation for Independent Poland (KPN); (2) Partia X; (3) Christian-National Union (ZChN) or just 'Christian party'; (4) electoral list of the Solidarity Trade Union (NSZZ Solidarnosc); (5) the Non-Partisan Block for the Reforms (BBWR); (6) UD or KLD; (7) Union of Labour (UP); (8) Polish People's Party (PSL) or just 'peasant party'; (9) Alliance of the Democratic Left (SLD) or just 'left wing party';
- Czech Republic: (1) Christian Democratic Union-Czech People's Party (KDU-CSL); (2) Civic Democratic Alliance (ODA); (3) ODS or KDS; (4) Republicans (SPR-RSC); (5) Civic Movement (OH, (only in the 1992–93 panel) or Free Democrats-Liberal Social National Party (SD-LSNS, only in the 1996 panel); (6) Movement for Self-Governing Democracy-Association for Moravia and Silesia HSD-SMS (only in the 1992–93 panel); (7) Liberal Social Union (LSU) and its socialist, agrarian and green component parts (CSS, ZS, and SZ, respectively) (only in the 1992–93 panel); (8) Czech Social Democratic Party (CSSD); (9) the Communist Party of the Czech and Moravian Lands (KSCM) or the Left Block (LB) electoral alliance which included KSCM (but not the small SLB which happened to use the LB label in the 1996 election and was excluded from the present analysis);
- Slovakia: (1) DS, SKD or ODU; (2) Christian Democratic Movement (KDH); (3) the three Hungarian parties (MKM, ESWS, MOS); (4) Slovak National Party (SNS); (5) Movement for a Democratic Slovakia (HZDS); (6) Slovak

Social Democratic Party (SDSS) or Slovak Green Party (SZS); (7) Party of the Democratic Left (SDL); Hungary: (1) Alliance of Young Democrats (FIDESZ); (2) Independent Small Holders Party (FKGP); (3) Christian Democratic People's Party (KDNP); (4) Hungarian Democratic Forum (MDF); (5) Hungarian Socialist Party (MSZP); (6) Alliance of Free Democrats (SZDSZ).

I.B: Independent variables in Model 1: In analysis A they are church membership (yes or no); respondent's place of residence (population size coded on a four point scale where 1 = 1 to 1.999, 2 = 2.000–19.999, 3 = 20.000–99.999, 4 = 100.000 or more inhabitants); education (four point scale); occupation (five dichotomous variables measuring whether or not the respondent's present or last occupation was 1: farming; 2: professional or managerial job; 3: other non-manual work; 4: manual occupation (agriculture excluded); and 5: whether or not the respondent was self-employed. In analysis B, they are the same as in analysis A plus frequency of church attendance (six point scale running from 1 = never to 6 = more than once a week); and communist party membership before 1989 (yes or no).

Note:

The entire analysis reported in the paper was replicated by adding region (Moravia or not) to the demographic variables in the Czech, and ethnicity (ethnic Hungarian or not) in the Slovak data. Since the results of these replications only influenced the some findings concerning the Moravian regionalist and the Hungarian minority parties that are not dealt with in the paper, but left all conclusions regarding the theoretically relevant hypotheses unaltered, they are not reported here.

I.C: Independent variables in Model 2: In analysis A they were religious vs. secular orientation (measured by a six point frequency of church attendance scale running from 1 = never to 6 = more than once a week); left-right value orientation (a composite index summing the responses to the following items: 'It should be the government's responsibility to provide a job for everyone who wants one'; 'Giving the former state-owned companies into private property is going to help very much in solving the economic problems of our country'; 'Unprofitable factories and mines should be closed down immediately even if this leads to unemployment' on four point agree-disagree scales); nationalist-antinationalist value orientation (a composite index summing the responses to 'Nationalism is harmful for the development of our country'; 'In the case of a politician I prefer a strong patriot to an expert' on four point agree-disagree scales); and former communist party membership (yes or no) as an indicator of attitudes towards the *ancien régime*. In analysis B, they were the same as in analysis A, except that church attendance is replaced with a composite index summing the responses to 'A woman should be allowed to have an abortion in the early weeks of pregnancy, if she decides so', 'The Church has [in Hungary: the churches have] too much influence in our country' and 'Politicians who do not believe in God should not perform public functions' on four point agree-disagree questions); and former communist party membership was replaced with the personal importance rating of 'removing former communists from positions of influence' (9 point scale) as an indicator of attitudes towards the *ancien régime*.

I.D: Independent variables in Model 3: All the variables featuring in models 1 and 2 together.

II. Missing values and Ns

Missing values were substituted by the variable mean on all attitude-items as well as on the education, place of residence, and frequency of church attendance variables. The discriminant analyses only used information from the first wave of the respective panel studies. Respondents were included in the discriminant analyses irrespectively of whether or not they were re-interviewed in the second wave of the panel. As noted above, respondents supporting parties/coalitions represented by less than 20 supporters in the first wave of the respective panel survey were excluded from the analysis. The number of respondents was identical in all discriminant analyses of the same data set, namely 802 in the August 1993 Polish data, 628 in the September 1992 Czech data, 1288 in the May 1996 Czech data, 564 in the September 1992 Slovak data, 713 in the September 1992, 670 in the December 1993, and 619 in the April 1994 Hungarian data set.