

**Values and the Legacy of Communism:
Comparisons between Eastern and Western Mass Publics¹**

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ABSTRACT

The paper analyses cross-national survey data to explore how the legacies of communism may influence political attitude differences between East and West European publics, and how lasting these differences might be. It is hypothesized that communist regimes, due to the sweeping, comprehensive, and ideologically justified social changes that they championed, as well as the extraordinary propaganda effort and political repression that they mobilized to buttress the impact of these social changes on social values, may have achieved a lasting transformation of political attitudes in Eastern Europe in the direction of increased support for socialist economics, gender equality, and secularism. However, these effects – if they ever were present at all – may have been counterbalanced, for a while, by the short-term impact of an anti-communist backlash in the early 1990s. If so, then the original, intended effects of communism on values must be even more visible around the millenium than in the early 1990s. It is also expected that communism had some unintended effects on social values: by simply suppressing free public discourse both on political and more ordinary social issues, it probably led to a fossilization of social values in domains like family values, marriage and moral permissiveness, where, under normal circumstances, one would have expected major value changes to take place in these societies simply because of the sheer amount of industrialization, urbanization etc. that have occurred in Eastern Europe between the end of WW2 and the fall of communism. If so, then Eastern Europeans of today should have a more traditionalist outlook in these domains than we would expect based on their level of religiosity and economic development. Such East-West value differences, however, are expected to have diminished in the 1990s as free public discourse on all social issues ushered in the former Soviet bloc countries. The paper uses regression analyses and 1990 World Values Study data, European Values Study data from 2000, and European Social Survey data from 2002 to determine whether observed value differences between Eastern and Western Europe follow the patterns anticipated by the above hypotheses.

By 2008, two successive waves of enlargement will have added ten former communist countries of Eastern Europe to the European Union. Although the combined population of all these countries barely exceeds that of the united Germany, they will have a rather more significant voting power in EU decision-making bodies (cf. Hix forthcoming).

There are many reasons to believe that significant differences in political orientations and underlying social values divide the previous 15 member states of the Union and the new Eastern and Central European members. Almost all the latter have a much lower level of economic development than the poorest of the fifteen pre-2004 members states, Portugal. Nearly all went through a very deep and painful recession in recent memory, i.e. in the early 1990s, while the rest of Europe – with the initial exception of Finland, which, like Eastern Europe, was hard hit by the collapse of the Soviet economy – reached previously unprecedented levels of affluence. Moreover, the new Eastern members share the legacy of a unique – and rather long-lasting – social, economic and political experiment with communism. This too must have had at least some impact on popular attitudes.

Hence, the citizens of the new Eastern members may be expected to display lasting and significant differences in their social attitudes from the citizens of the former EU-15. If this expectation were correct, then this difference will almost certainly have an impact on the policy-making process in the EU. Obviously, some shift in policy demands is to be expected in the EU citizenry from the addition of the new members, and the exact degree and way attitude differences may contribute to this shift need to be better understood. Conflicts over some policy issues may even generate a new East-West cleavage inside the Union, and it would be interesting to know which dimensions of human values such a cleavage – should it occur – might be anchored in. Both for practical reasons and from the perspective of social theory, it would be highly interesting to discover which East-West value differences – if there are any – are relatively transient and which ones may be quite long lasting. Are they merely a reflection of the differences in socio-economic development that may well shrink within the Union over the coming decades and are the specific legacies of the communist experience ephemeral? Alternatively, is it history, i.e. the way that a society developed in the past rather than its current state – in terms of socio-economic modernity and so forth – that leaves the strongest mark on prevailing social attitudes? Is it conceivable at all that a political system could instill an enduring transformation of human values? If yes, was the change in the direction intended by the regime or quite to the opposite? Surely, it would be interesting to learn the answers to these questions. And whatever the answers are, the East-West attitude differences, if they really exist, will significantly add to the complexity of coalition- and policy-making in Europe.

The basic thrust of the above speculations seems to be confirmed by the results of the 2004 elections to the European Parliament. The distribution of votes between parties belonging to the EP's different party groups was remarkably different in the new Eastern member states than in the EU-15 (see Table 1). According to Hermann Schmitt's calculus, the Party of European Socialists and the Greens each received roughly seven, and the Left Socialists three percent less support in the East than in the EU 15. In contrast, the European People's Party and the Europe of Nations group each received about four percent more of the vote in the eight new Eastern member states than the rest of the Union. This seeming pattern of higher right-wing and lower left-wing vote in the

East than EU-wide appears to call for an explanation in some systematic terms, should that refer to values, political cycles or something else.

To be sure, some of the differences in EP election outcomes may be easily explained with reference to the Eastern member states' recent entry in the Union and their relatively new party systems. For instance, parties that do not belong to any party group in the EP did much better in the East than in the rest of the Union. Similarly, the differential electoral performance of the Party of European Socialists and the European People's Party in the East and the West might be explained by a transient factor unique to the 2004 election. This ephemeral factor is that the biggest of the new member states - Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary – just happened to be governed, at the time of the 2004 election, by center-left governments, and they were badly hit by a mid-term blues. Thus, we probably do not need to look for any deeper explanation than this coincidence for the weakness of the left in the East in 2004.

Be that as it may, the factor that matters most is probably not the impact of the Eastern enlargement on the party composition of the European Parliament, but rather the social values that impact the policy preferences of MEPs coming from different national contexts. For example, the debate about the European constitution showed Polish socialists far more likely than French socialists to support the inclusion of references to Christianity in the preamble. It seems almost trivial to explain this glaring difference between the behavior of MEPs of the same party federation with differences in the national cultures they are coming from: highly religious in Poland, but very insistent on secularization in France. Consequently, the present paper explores East-West differences in social attitudes that may well have an impact on policy preferences, rather than through an analysis of election returns and their possible causes. The key question leading the analysis is whether the observed regional differences can be related to the shared legacy of communism in the East.

1. Contrasts with previous studies

The topic of East-West value differences became especially salient after 1989 (cf. Gerlich, Plasser and Ulram 1992; Jowitt 1992; Schöpflin 1990a, 1990b, 1991, 1993, 1994; Sztompka 1996). Yet, the previous literature on this issue and the possible role of communism in its making is surprisingly patchy. Most comparative survey studies carried out in Eastern Europe in the 1990s did not even involve comparisons with non-East European samples (cf. Barnes and Simon 1998; Evans and Whitefield 1995; Hayo 1997, 1999; Hofferbert and Klingemann 1999; Kitschelt et al. 1999; Miller, Reisinger, Hesli 199x, 1993; Miller, White and Heywood 1998; Rose, Mishler and Haerpfer 1998; and Tóka 2000 for a comprehensive survey of these studies), notwithstanding the East-West comparative inferences only too frequently drawn from them (see e.g. Bardi and Schwartz 1996; Miguel and Berlund 1992; McIntosh et al. 1994; Mondak and Gearing 1998; Plasser and Pribersky 1996). Explicit East-West comparative studies often involved very small sets of countries (e.g. Dalton 1994; Kohn and Slomczynski 1990; Weil 1993), or global comparisons (Abramson and Inglehart 1995; Inglehart 1997). Either way, the explanation of the specifically East-West differences within Europe could not be taken very far.

The analyses of the studies that probably supplied the best fuel for such explorations often remained merely descriptive overviews of question-by-question differences across countries and the two halves of Europe (see Ester, Halman, and de

Moor 1993; Times Mirror 1991). The more analytical studies typically focused either on overtly general values (e.g. materialist vs. post-materialist value orientations as in Inglehart 1997); or on attitudes towards the democratic system that may well be more strongly influenced by performance evaluations than by lasting value differences (Hofferbert and Klingemann 1999; Klingemann 1999; Tóka 1995); or on highly domain-specific indicators with little obvious implication for policy preferences (e.g. Hofstede 2001). Either way, they left many open questions about whether and what kind of lasting and relatively specific differences in political orientations may obtain between the East and the West of the European Union when it comes to practical political issues.

In this study, the focus will be on attitudes that, in a rather straightforward way, can lead to differences in policy preferences between Eastern and Western member states of the EU. Both the degree and the causes of these differences will receive attention. The analytically richest previous studies along these lines focused on a single value or cleavage domain each (cf. Evans and Kelley 2002; Klingemann 1999; Klugel, Mason and Wegener 1995; Lipsmeyer and Nordstrom 2003; Meulemann 2004; Tomka and Zuhler 1999). Instead, this paper will rather follow the footsteps of Renwick and Tóka (1998), who studied East-West attitude differences along many relatively specific dimensions in order to obtain a better understanding of what differences may be caused by differences in level of development (and other exogenous variables preceding communism), and what, if anything, may be the specific result of communist legacies in Eastern Europe.

2. Hypotheses about the impact of communism on values

The more plausible causal mechanism can be postulated between communist legacies and observed East-West differences, the more likely that the latter was caused by the first, rather than by some other factor that also differentiates the East from the West, such as the level of economic development, or pre-communist history, or some consequences of communist legacies as they materialized in the course of the 1990s. Plausibility is highly subjective, though, and can itself be affected by the knowledge that certain propositions are apparently more in line with the given data than others. Besides, an imaginative social scientist could, with some effort, explain nearly any observations with nearly any independent variable.

This paper will employ the simplest and safest method of assuring the readers that the hypotheses presented were unaffected by the findings obtained. Namely, the theoretical expectations that are tested here are based on ideas spelt out by Renwick and Tóka (1998) well before the present analysis was conceived and the EVS 1999/2000 and ESS 2002 data used for their testing were collected. These hypotheses have all been suggested by obvious defining features of communist regimes, such as their adherence to a dictatorial political system, to collective property, to bureaucratic – rather than market-driven – allocation of goods, income equality, and atheism.

Surely, one could add some further hypotheses to the present list. For instance, the possible impact of communism on ethnocentrism and nationalism was not covered by Renwick and Tóka (1998), because no comparative data on the matter was available at the time. Yet, in order to maintain the strict independence of the hypotheses analyzed here from the findings that emerge from the analysis, I refrained from adding anything new to their propositions. For simplicity, instead of an original section on theory, I merely insert here an extensive quote from that article.

“As regards the legacy of communist rule, we can identify four mechanisms through which it may have had an impact upon current attitudes: those of indoctrination, repression, change in social structure and the post-communist backlash.

Indoctrination was widespread in the communist countries, particularly in the fields of economic policy, egalitarianism and the role of women, leading us to expect more left-wing economic policy attitudes, more favourable attitudes to egalitarianism, and more acceptance of the role of women in the workplace than might otherwise have been the case. It would also be expected to lead to weaker religious beliefs and, because of the emphasis placed on industrial progress, to less concern for the environment.

Repression took place on several fronts. Public debate on many social issues was often suppressed, and the activities of the churches were severely curtailed. The lack of public debate could be expected to lead to slower attitude change over time, to a fossilisation of those traditional values not affected by indoctrination, and thus to a tendency towards conservatism. This needs, however, to be set against the effect of suppressing the churches, which might be expected to weaken the role of traditional moral teachings over such matters as sexual norms and the place of women.

Radical *social change* was deliberately promoted in numerous spheres. For example, the employment of women was both boosted and celebrated, and education levels greatly increased in many communist countries. The greater employment of women could be expected to lead to increased acceptance of a role for women in the workplace, and raised education levels might be expected to have a broad range of liberalising effects.

Finally, it is important to remember that there has also been a substantial *backlash* against communist rule in all of the post-communist countries considered here. The backlash has tended to be strongest in those areas where the message or impact of communism was clearest - so we might expect it to promote inegalitarian views and right-wing attitudes towards economic policy. It may also lead to increasingly anti-authoritarian views on other issues.

Of course, the effects of these different mechanisms upon social attitudes may at times be contradictory. For example, when it comes to religious values, the effect of repressing religious teachings under communism must be weighed against the likely consequences of a backlash against such repression. And while a growth in religiosity after the collapse of communism might promote conservative attitudes towards marriage, these sit uneasily alongside some of the likely effects of social change and an anti-authoritarian backlash.”

In a nutshell, the communist legacies argument leads to the expectation that in some domains East Europeans show rather more left-wing attitudes than would be expected on the basis of the level of development of their societies. These domains include gender equality and religion in particular, but, more generally, any domain where attitude change in a leftward direction was explicitly promoted by the communist regimes with a wide range of policies as well as by propaganda.

In other value domains, like environmentalism or social liberalism, one may, however, expect rather less progressive views from East Europeans than a developmental theory of values would suggest from societies at a comparable level of development.

On economic policy issues and redistribution, one might also expect that, with the possible exception of a period of anti-communist backlash in the early 1990s, public opinion in former communist countries is more left-wing – or, if you will, statist and anti-

individualistic - than their level of development may imply. Several aspects of these hypotheses, most clearly those regarding religiosity and support for high levels of government spending, were broadly supported by the previous analysis of ISSP data in Renwick and Tóka (1998) as well as other analyses published since (Lipsmeyer and Nordstrom 2003; Meulemann 2004; Norris and Inglehart 2004; Tomka and Zulehner 1999).

3. Data on value differences and research design

The data used in this paper come, above all, from the 1990 wave of the World Values Study and the 1999/2000 European Values Study. For the time being, only such questionnaire items are included in the analysis that were present in both studies. Then, the same analysis is replicated, to the extent that this is possible, with the 2002 European Social Survey data and ISSP data.

The analysis covers six substantially different attitude dimensions in total: support for socialist economics, environmentalism, religiosity, moral permissiveness, attitudes towards traditional ideas about marriage, and the role of women. The minimum and maximum values on the six corresponding attitude scales are set as 0 and 100, respectively. The measure for the Support for Environmentalist Ideas is based on a single item, which has the disadvantage that the observed cross-national variation on this scale may be unduly influenced by unknown differences in the connotation of this single questionnaire item in the different languages. In the case of the other attitude dimensions, this problem was ameliorated by the use of additive scales. These scales were based on multiple items that tap relatively similar attitudes.²

Only those European countries are included in the analysis of the 1990 World Values Study and the 1999/2000 European Values Study data that both study covered. However, the analysis is not confined to EU-members and confirmed members-to-be like Bulgaria and Romania. Iceland, Russia and Belarus are also included in the analysis since they are relevant West and East European cases, respectively, for the assessment of the impact of communism. For reasons that are probably obvious already, the Eastern and Western provinces of Germany are treated as separate countries – after all, East Germany used to be a separate state with one of the most doctrinaire and oppressive communist regimes in Eastern Europe from the late 1940s up to late 1989. Northern Ireland, in its turn, was left out of the analysis because of small sample size. The weighted size of each national sample remaining in the analysis was set at 1000.

A number of different tests can be used to provide fresh answers regarding the impact of communist legacies using these data. First, if communist legacies have no effect of their own once level of development is controlled for, then a dummy variable standing for communist legacies must have no significant impact on values once GDP per capita is controlled for. Of course, attitudes need not be a perfect linear function of

² The scalability coefficients of the different scales in the various national samples will be presented in Appendix 3 (yet to be added). Obviously, country-by-country factor analyses of the relevant items would have produced scales with higher within-country reliability coefficients. However, the reliance on this method would have made the assessment of East-West differences a meaningless exercise due to the differential construction – and thus possibly different substantive meaning - of the scales in the various countries.

development. Therefore, it may be prudent to allow the impact of GDP per capita to increase or decrease together with the level of development. In practice, this means simultaneously entering in the estimated regression equations both GDP per capita and its squared value as independent variables.

Secondly, one would expect that most differences between Eastern and Western Europe caused by level of development increased between the early and late 1990s, for the simple reason that the post-communist recession increased the developmental gap between the two regions. At the same time, the presence of communist legacies probably diminished over time – this is at least what we would expect on the basis of socialization theory and given the changes of ideological climate and socio-economic structures in Eastern Europe in the 1990s. Belarus can offer a particularly interesting test case for this over-time comparison because of it experienced the deepest postcommunist economic recession in all Eastern Europe, but otherwise the socio-economic and ideological change of the 1990s remained the smallest there.

Note that in some instances East-West differences caused by communism may have actually increased over the 1990s. Suppose, for instance, that communist systems, partly through their explicit propaganda, and partly through the subtle and complex impact of sweeping socio-economic changes that they introduced, increased support for income equality and state intervention in the economy, while reduced trust in private business and market forces. However, in the early 1990s many East Europeans probably blamed the communist system for poor economic performance, while ten years later, following the controversial privatization of productive assets, the painful post-communist economic recession and so forth, they probably shifted back to the anti-capitalist attitudes for which the communist systems created a fertile ground. Thus, in the attitude domains where a short-term, but then swiftly vanishing anti-communist backlash was at work in the early 1990s, GDP-adjusted East-West attitude differences may have become more consistent with the intended effects of communism by the end of the decade.

This pattern of change would make it difficult to separate the impact of communism from that of socio-economic development in those attitude domains where their effect is expected to run in opposite directions. Yet, an analysis of the youngest age cohorts can help determining which effect has been most important. If economic development in the formative years of one's development had a bigger impact on East-West differences than communist legacies, then we would expect that in the 1990/2000 studies the East-West regional differences are even bigger in the youngest cohort. If, however, communist legacies are the most important explanation, then the youngest cohort should show the smallest regional difference in 2000.

Unfortunately, things are a bit too murky for a study like the present one to obtain unambiguous answers to the kind of complicated questions asked in this paper. For instance, there are many other factors besides level of development that may also show correlate with the presence of communist legacies across European countries and may, at the same time, offer plausible explanations for whatever East-West attitude difference we might observe. These other factors can include anything that preceded the emergence of communism – such as the different religious heritage of the different countries, or the relative size of their agricultural sector – as well as things that can be considered path-dependent consequences, rather than part of communist legacies. The post-communist recession could be an example of such path-dependent consequences.

In other words, the obstacles to controlling for the effect of such influences in our analysis is both technical and theoretical. The technical issue is that precedent and consequences of communism are just too strongly correlated with the actual presence of communist legacies in a given country. The theoretical problem is that given our current knowledge about the determinants of value systems, we may not be able to develop very clear expectations about what attitudes are most likely to be affected by one or another factor from a potentially very long list of possible – and possibly intercorrelated – determinants that may matter.

In the presence of clear theoretical guidelines to model selection, a theory-blind comparison of East and West Germany can provide for a natural experiment that may be a more reliable test than multivariate statistical analyses of multiple countries. While this exercise does not offer a perfect control for all other possible influences but the presence of communist legacies, the two parts of Germany share many elements of pre- and post-communist history, which makes it easier to argue that the differences observed between them are indeed somehow related to communist legacies. Thus, the closer the size of regional differences within Germany are to the East-West differences between the former communist and non-communist parts of Europe, the more support the communist legacies hypothesis receives. Conversely, small differences between parts of Germany compared to the East-West differences within Europe should suggest that the latter were probably caused by something else than communism per se.

The present version of this paper presents a preliminary empirical analysis, with virtually no individual level variables (like age and its interactions with the year of interview, see above) included in the analysis. Yet, the estimations are carried out at the individual, rather than at the country-level, and without weighting for the different population size of the countries included. For simplicity, all national data sets are pooled from the two waves of the study in the analysis. The estimated standard errors are not corrected for clustered sampling. All these technical weaknesses should, of course, be addressed in later versions of the paper. Alas, no separate analysis of the intra-German differences and the intriguing case of Belarus is presented in this version. Further refinements that could be added to the analysis would include multiple imputation to replace missing values on the attitude variables in stead of the simplistic mean-substitution employed in the present version in order to assure that cross-national differences in rates of selective non-response do not complicate the analysis of East-West attitude differences.

The empirical analysis involves regressing individual respondents' scores on these six attitude scales on (A) the GDP per capita of their country in the year of the survey; (B) a dummy variable called REGION which distinguishes between post-communist Eastern Europe and Western Europe; (3) a second dummy variable distinguishing between the 1990 and 1999/2000 observations; (4) the interaction between the last two variables, which allows us to model whether East-West differences increased or decreased over time; and (5) religiosity. This last variable is the only individual-level variable included in the analysis, and the purpose of including it among the control variables is to see whether the effects of communist legacies on values can be exclusively attributed to cross-national differences in individual-level religiosity (which, in turn, may have been caused either by communism itself or may predate that regime).

4. Findings about value differences

An obvious difficulty encountered in this analysis is the strong correlation between GDP per capita and communist legacies. Graphs 1 to 6 give visual illustrations of the problem. Each of these graphs shows the relationship between GDP per capita and the mean values of the 54 national samples (i.e. each of 27 European countries observed twice) on one attitude scale used in the analysis. The horizontal axis of the graphs shows level of development, and the coloring of the individual bars indicates whether the bar shows the mean attitude score of Eastern or Western countries. Because of their level of economic development the former communist countries all crowd on the left-hand side of the graphs, while the West European countries on the right.

Yet, Graphs 1, 3, 4 and 6 – which are indeed the only charts that hint at some East-West differences – suggest that there is a way to tell apart the impact of communist legacies and level of development. In Graph 1, support for socialism seems to decrease with the level of economic development, and does so both across Eastern and Western countries. If we draw an imaginary straight regression line first across the Eastern and then across the Western cases, then the two lines would seem to run parallel with each other. However, at comparable levels of affluence we find higher support for socialist economics in Western than in Eastern countries. In other words, it seems that post-communist countries display less support for socialist economics than we would expect just on the basis of their level of economic development.

Similarly, Graph 3 suggests that religiosity declines with level of development in the East and to some extent, and somewhat non-linearly, maybe in contemporary Western Europe too (cf. Norris and Inglehart 2004). Yet, it also shows that the citizens of former communist countries are generally less religious than we would expect given their countries' level of development. A similar eyeballing of Graphs 4 and 6 seems to suggest that – paradoxically – both support for family values and moral permissiveness is higher in the East than we would expect on the basis of GDP alone. Hence, in this respect too, communism may have had a distinct effect over and above the impact of socio-economic development.

Most of these ad hoc and subjective inferences from the visual inspection of graphs are confirmed by the statistical tests reported in Tables 2 to 7. All these tables report three parallel analyses in their three columns: one each for the 1990 and 1999/2000 data – pooled across countries – separately, and one for all data sets pooled together. The upper panel of these tables shows the fit of various models to the data, while the lower panel shows parameter estimates for Model 7, which also controls, where appropriate, for the possible effect of Religiosity.

An important feature of these regression analyses is that they, unlike the graphs, allow us to assess whether the East-West gap changed over time. This is done through the inclusion of a YEAR times EAST interaction among the independent variables in the model for which parameter estimates are presented.

The first startling finding is that support for left-wing economic policies generally drops with level of economic development, but former communist countries have a rather more right-wing opinion climate on these issues than Western Europe. In the course of the 1990s, Eastern values apparently shifted to the left significantly (see the positive impact of the YEAR*EAST interaction in Table 2), but this effect is not as large as the general negative effect of communist legacies. The size of the East-West difference, after controlling for GDP per capita, by the end of the 1990s can be simply assessed as the sum

of the negative impact of EAST and the positive impact of the YEAR*EAST interaction. Since the result is still negative (data not shown), we see nothing of the expected indoctrination effect of communism. Instead, the backlash anticipated by our theory is visible. It is only in line with expectations that the backlash effect is reduced over time, but it is somewhat surprising that some of it is still there after ten years. In other words, the anticommunist backlash, in this analysis, appears to have a more lasting impact than anticipated.

Contrary to what we may have expected, GDP per capita appears to have a negative – albeit tiny – effect on support for an environmentalist orientation. In spite of this result, and entirely against our expectations too, former communist countries actually show stronger support for environmentalism – or at least they did so in the early 1990s – than would have been expected based on their level of economic development. This again suggests that the backlash against communist policies – indiscriminate support for industrialization, in this case – was stronger than whatever opposite effect communism could have had. In the course of the 1990s, however, public opinion shifted away from Support for Environmentalist Ideas. The significant negative effect of YEAR suggests that this change also occurred in Western Europe, but the additional negative impact of the YEAR*EAST interaction underlines that this shift was even more pronounced in recession-ridden Eastern Europe.

Similar findings are echoed in Table 6. Despite both communist propaganda and some policies – stemming mostly from the unlimited demand for labor in planned economies – to promote gender equality, the Eastern European countries fail to show the expected egalitarian impact of communism in 1990. Yet, possibly following an initial anti-egalitarian backlash against communism, Eastern public opinion became more favorable towards women's emancipation in the 1990s. Indeed, in the 1999/2000 data we can already observe a positive effect of the EAST variable on support for women's liberation.

As we would have expected, both level of development and communism have a large negative effect on religiosity. Quite unexpectedly, however, in the course of the 1990s there seemed to be a net shift towards higher religiosity – relative to the increase of GDP per capita – in Europe. Probably even more counter-intuitively, this shift occurred not in the East but the West (see the opposite effects of YEAR and YEAR*EAST in Table 4). In this domain, therefore, East-West differences were maintained or even increased in the 1990s.

Regarding support for family values, women's liberation, and moral permissiveness, cross-national differences seem to be driven, to some extent at least, by the underlying differences in religiosity. This makes good sense and establishes the expectation that East European public opinion should be relatively liberal on these issue dimensions. Just as our argument about the conservative effect of communism on social values anticipated, the findings show that Eastern opinions were, at least in 1990, actually more conservative – at least with respect to family values and women's liberation – than we could expect given their relatively low religiosity. By 2000, however, Eastern publics became relatively more liberal along these three attitude dimensions. This, although not explicitly anticipated by Renwick and Tóka (1998), is perfectly in line with their theoretical argument about why – through the lack of free discourse – communism had a conservative impact on social attitudes. Logically, the free discourse conditions of the

1990s had to exercise a liberal push on Eastern values in the dimensions where communism fossilized traditional attitudes.

Finally, a brief look is due at tables 8 to 12, which present a partial replication of the above analyses with the 2002 European Social Survey data. This survey used different attitude items, and did not feature any item that would seem to be a good measure of support for environmentalist ideas or women's liberation. However, more or less adequate equivalents of the other four attitude indices seen above could be constructed from the ESS data too. Eastern and Western Germany are once again treated as if they were separate countries.

This analysis is simpler than the previous one to the extent that the ESS data is only available for one time point. Thus the YEAR variable and its interaction with EAST do not appear among the independent variables. The results are largely consistent with the picture that we saw above. Once again, it seems that the citizens of former communist countries are less religious, but on moral issues nevertheless more conservative than citizens of the EU-15. The observed effects of economic development level and religiosity are also much the same in this analysis as before.

The only noteworthy difference from the previous findings is that here the Eastern countries seem to be less different from the EU-15 in terms of their Support for Socialist Economics – though the difference is still statistically significant and the same direction as before, i.e. the publics of the new Eastern members tend to be less socialist than citizens of the EU-15. However, even this is consistent with the findings reported above. Those suggested that in the course of the 1990s the citizens of the former communist countries increasingly turned away from supporting capitalist market economies. A simple extrapolation of this trend might suggest that by 2002, the year when the ESS data was collected, the most economically advanced (and the most thoroughly reformed) of the former communist countries should show nearly as much support for socialist economics than the citizens of the EU-15. This is indeed what the ESS data – from where the less developed East European countries included in the WVS/EVS data analyzed above are missing – show.

The present results about the East-West value differences are largely consistent not only across the EVS, WVS and ESS data sets, but also with Renwick and Tóka's (1998) own findings based on ISSP data from the first half of the 1990s. In light of the differences in question wording, time period, and the range of countries covered across these data sets and analyses, this is quite reassuring regarding the robustness of the above reported findings.

The net result of this is that despite the negative impact of communism on religiosity – which, as we saw, was probably the only effect of it on values that was in line, rather than against the intentions' of the regime -, the Eastern enlargement probably strengthens, rather than weakens the position of Christian-conservative policies in the European Parliament. This is so partly because of the numeric dominance of the unusually religious Poles in the population of the new member states, and partly because of the – at least partly unintended - fossilization effect of communism on social values in Eastern Europe. It should be stressed again that where we should expect their political expression is probably less the distribution of seats among European party groups, but rather the socially somewhat more conservative profile that most MEPs from the new member states will probably display from their EU-15 counterparts – whichever party group they may be a member of. At any rate, not the least because both the East and the

West of the Union are so heterogeneous internally, the overall East-West differences that obtain as a result are likely to be rather minimal.

5. Conclusions

Overall, the findings show rather small differences between Eastern and Western European values. Except for its large negative effect on religiosity, the effects of communism appear to have been largely unintended, or even of the backlash-against-communism type.

This is probably most impressively shown by the very similar overall levels of support for socialist economics in Eastern and Western Europe. On account of their lower level of economic development, the former could be expected to show higher support for socialist policies, but the unintended negative impact of communism on support for socialism basically cancels out this effect.

The only significant intended effect of communism suggested by the present analysis is on religiosity. Yet, paradoxically, since the biggest new EU member state (Poland) happens to be an extreme outlier in terms of average religiosity, even this biggest impact of communism makes the population-weighted average of the new member states only more alike the West European average than it would be otherwise (data not shown). Thus, while the findings are consistent with the proposition that the lack of free public discourse under communism made East Europeans somewhat unexpectedly conservative on some social issues, it seems that this gap between Eastern and Western values rapidly started to erode following the arrival of civic liberties in Eastern Europe. The remaining value differences per se, except for Poland's outlier status in terms of religiosity, probably cause very little difference between old and new member states. This is at least what is suggested by the meager R-squared values obtained with Model 3 in the case of all but one attitude scale (see Tables 2 to 11). The exception is Support for Conventional Family Values (see Table 5 and 10), where the gross East-West attitude difference is sizeable in itself and accounts for a rather large part of all the cross-country differences within Europe. However, a quick look at the R-squared values obtained with Models 4 and 5 as well as the standardized coefficients from Model 7 shows that over the course of the 1990s these East-West differences declined rapidly.

Again, it needs to be pointed out that several possibly relevant value dimensions could not be considered in the present analysis for lack of data: attitudes towards national identity and the like stand out as an obvious example. However, as far as the values considered here are concerned, they do not seem to offer much of an explanation for the differences in EP-election outcomes between East and West. Therefore, the preliminary results of the analysis seem to support situational accounts of these differences, for instance in terms of party system age, or in the incumbency of left-wing parties. These results may sound less interesting than the usual hypotheses about how communism may have transformed the value systems of East Europeans. Nevertheless, they imply a probably more upbeat conclusion about the prospects of integrating the new members in the EU without generating new divisions and increasing the complexity of decision-making inside the Union.

Obviously, the results have implications for the current arguments about the possibility of Turkey joining the EU too. If communist regimes largely failed to transform human values the way they intended to, why would Islam be more successful in that? This question surely belongs to a different analysis than the present one, and

there is nothing in the present analysis that would foreclose the validity of possible economic or political arguments against Turkish membership. Yet, the present findings, indirectly, raise a cautionary note regarding the often-heard cultural arguments against Turkish EU-accession.

Appendix 1: Data sets, cases, variables and scales used in the analysis of WVS/EVS data (see Tables 2 to 7 and Graphs 1 to 6)

The analysis relies on the integrated cross-national data sets from the second wave of the World Values Study included in the February 2000 public release by the ICPSR archive and the 2003 public release of the 1999/2000 European Values Study by the Zentralarchiv and Tilburg University. Non-European countries and countries that were not included in both of these waves of the WVS/EVS surveys were excluded from the analysis. Cases with missing values were excluded from the reported analysis listwise.

In the description below all variable names like v128 etc. follow the variable names appearing in the original World Values Study 1990 dataset. The variable names in the 1999/2000 European Values Study are different, but the wording of the questions and the response categories were the same, except for a minor difference in the case of the church attendance and changes in the coding of party preference, which for most of the time merely followed changes in the respective national party systems between 1990 and 1999/2000.

Independent variables:

Country dummies: one dummy variable each for every country but one included in the analysis, coded 1 for all respondents from the given country and zero otherwise.

East: A dummy variable coded 1 for Belarus, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, East Germany, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Russia, Slovakia, and Slovenia.

GDP: Gross domestic product (at purchasing power parity) per capita in one thousand 1995 USD in the year of the study, i.e. 1990 for the 1990 WVS data and 2000 for the 1999/2000 EVS data. Source: World Development Indicators (internet edition as of August 2004). Note that no 1990 data were available from the source for the Czech Republic and Slovenia, and these missing values were substituted with a subjective estimate that set the 1990 figure for these countries at 120 percent of the respective World Bank estimate for 1993. Similarly, since the source does not report East and West German GDP separately, the figures for the two parts of Germany were estimated from the figure reported for Germany as a whole in the given year, using the assumption that the difference in PPP GDP per capita between the two regions remained the same throughout the entire period and equal to the ratio between the 1989 PPP GDP per capita estimates provided by the 1990 CIA World Fact Book.

Year: A dummy variable coded 1 for all respondents to the 1999/2000 EVS study and zero otherwise.

Religiosity: see below.

Dependent variables:

Support for Socialist Economics: an additive scale calculated as $v_{128} - v_{127} + v_{126} - v_{125}$, where the V_i variables are the original scores of the respondents on the respective V_i variables. The question wording was as follows. “Now I'd like you to tell me your views on various issues. How would you place your views on this scale? 1 means you agree completely with the statement on the left; 10 means you agree completely with the statement on the right; and if your views fall somewhere in between, you can choose any number in between. V125. Incomes should be made more equal OR We need larger income differences as incentives for individual effort. V126. Private ownership of business and industry should be increased OR Government ownership of business and industry should be increased. V127. The government should take more responsibility to ensure that everyone is provided for OR People should take more responsibility to provide for themselves. V128. Competition is good. It stimulates people to work hard and develop new ideas OR Competition is harmful. It brings out the worst in people.” In the 1999/2000 data the scale is altogether missing for Belgium, Bulgaria, Denmark, East and West Germany, Hungary, Latvia, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia and Sweden. The scores on the resulting scale were linearly transformed so as to fall in the 0 to 100 range.

Support for Environmentalist Ideas: this scale was calculated as $v_{38} * -1$, with the scores on the resulting variable linearly transformed so as to fall in the 0 to 100 range. The question wording for v_{38} was as follows. “I am now going to read out some statements about the environment. For each one I read out, can you tell me whether you (1) agree strongly, (2) agree, (3) disagree or (4) disagree strongly? (READ OUT EACH STATEMENT AND CODE AN ANSWER FOR EACH) V38. I would agree to an increase in taxes if the extra money were used to prevent environmental damage.” The scale is altogether missing for Poland and Romania in the 1990 data.

Religiosity: an additive scale calculated as $((v_{135}-1)/3 + (v_{181}-1)/6 + (v_{182}-1)/2 - 3)*(-100)/3$, where the V_i variables are the original scores of the respondents on the respective V_i variables. The question wording was as follows. “I am going to name a number of organizations. For each one, could you tell me how much confidence you have in them: is it (1) a great deal of confidence, (2) quite a lot of confidence, (3) not very much confidence or (4) none at all? [...] V135. Church(es).” “V181. Apart from weddings, funerals and christenings, about how often do you attend religious services these days? [CODING: (1) More than once a week, (2) once a week, (3) once a month, (4) only on special holidays, (5) once a year, (6) less often, (7) never practically never.] V182. Independently of whether you go to church or not, would you say you are...(READ OUT) (1) ... a religious person; (2) not a religious person; or (3) a convinced atheist?” Note that in the 1999/2000 European Values Study the church attendance scale was coded on an 8-point scale, and hence the above formula was altered so that the equivalent of $v_{181}-1$ was divided by 7. The scores on the resulting scale were linearly transformed so as to fall in the 0 to 100 range. The scale is altogether missing for Estonia and Lithuania in the 1990 data.

Support for Conventional Family Values: an additive scale calculated as $v_{94} - v_{92} - v_{93}$, where the V_i variables are the original scores of the respondents on the respective V_i variables. The question wording was as follows. “V92. If someone

says a child needs a home with both a father and a mother to grow up happily, would you tend (1) to agree or (2) disagree? V93. Do you think that a woman (1) has to have children in order to be fulfilled or (2) is this not necessary? V94. Do you (1) agree or (2) disagree with the following statement? (READ OUT): "Marriage is an out-dated institution"?" The scores on the resulting scale were linearly transformed so as to fall in the 0 to 100 range. The scale is altogether missing for Belarus in the 1990 data.

Support for Women's Liberation: an additive scale calculated as $v99 - v98 - v96$, where the V_i variables are the scores of the respondents on the respective V_i variables. For V98 and V99 the responses were coded as (1) strongly agree, ... (4) strongly disagree, and for V96 they were recoded as (1) approve (2.5) it depends (4) disapproves. The question wording was as follows. "V96 If a woman wants to have a child as a single parent, but she doesn't want to have a stable relationship with a man, do you approve or disapprove?" "For each of the following statements I read out, can you tell me how much you agree with each. V98. A working mother can establish just as warm and secure a relationship with her children as a mother who does not work. V99. Being a housewife is just as fulfilling as working for pay." The scores on the resulting scale were linearly transformed so as to fall in the 0 to 100 range. The scale is altogether missing for Poland in the 1990 data and Austria and Ireland in the 1999/2000 data.

Moral Permissiveness: an additive scale calculated as $v197 + v198 + v199 + v200 + v201$, where the V_i variables are the original scores of the respondents on the respective V_i variables. The question wording was as follows. "Please tell me for each of the following statements whether you think it can always be justified, never be justified, or something in between, using this card. [READ OUT STATEMENTS. CODE ONE ANSWER FOR EACH STATEMENT ON A 1=NEVER JUSTIFIABLE ... 10=ALWAYS JUSTIFIABLE SCALE.] [...]V197. Homosexuality. V198. Prostitution. V199. Abortion. V200. Divorce. V201. Euthanasia - ending the life of the incurably sick." The scores on the resulting scale were linearly transformed so as to fall in the 0 to 100 range. The scale is altogether missing for the Czech Republic, Denmark, Slovakia in the 1990 data and Belgium, Bulgaria, Denmark, Estonia, France, Hungary, Latvia, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia, Sweden in the 1999/2000 data.

Appendix 2: Data sets and variables used in the analysis of the 2002 ESS data (see Tables 8 to 11)

The analysis relies on the integrated cross-national data sets from the first, 2002 wave of the European Social Survey. All data from non-EU states - Israel, Norway, Switzerland – covered by the ESS data are excluded from the analysis. The data are weighted by the product of the population proportional and design weights provided with the data set. Missing values on the value variables were replaced with the weighted mean value of the given variable in the given country. The data were subjected to a discriminant analysis as described in the main text, with the following variables included in the analysis. The variable names B14, B43, etc. below refer to the numbering of the questions in the ESS1 main questionnaire.

Support for Socialist Economics: an additive scale calculated as $((B43-1)/4 + (5 - B44)/4 + (5 - B45)/4) * 100/3$, where the B_i variables are the original scores of the respondents on the respective B_i variables. The question wording was as follows. B43: "[Do you agree or disagree that] The less that government intervenes in the economy, the better it is for [country]?" B44: "[Do you agree or disagree that] The government should take measures to reduce differences in income levels?" B45: "[Do you agree or disagree that] Employees need strong trade unions to protect their working conditions and wages?" Responses to all three items were originally recorded on a 5-point agree-disagree scale. Missing values were substituted with the weighted sample mean on the respective variable. The scores on the resulting scale were linearly transformed so as to fall in the 0 to 100 range.

Religiosity: an additive scale calculated as $((C13/10) + (7 - C14)/6) * 100/2$, where the C_i variables are the original scores of the respondents on the respective C_i variables. The question wording was as follows. C13: "Regardless of whether you belong to a particular religion, how religious would you say you are?" (10-point scale from "not at all religious" to "very religious".) Missing values were substituted with weighted sample mean. C14: "Apart from special occasions such as weddings and funerals, about how often do you attend religious services nowadays?" (7-point scale from "not at all religious" to "very religious".) Missing values were substituted with weighted sample mean on the respective variable. The scores on the resulting scale were linearly transformed so as to fall in the 0 to 100 range.

Support for Conventional Family Values: an 0-100 scale calculated as $100 * (B46-1)/4$. The question wording was as follows: B46: "[Do you agree or disagree that] Gay men and lesbians should be free to live their own life as they wish?" The responses were originally recorded on a 5-point agree-disagree scale. Missing values were substituted here with the weighted sample mean on the respective variable. The scores on the resulting scale were linearly transformed so as to fall in the 0 to 100 range.


Moral Permissiveness: an 0-100 scale calculated as $100 * (B47-1)/4$. The question wording was as follows. B47: "[Do you agree or disagree that] Whatever the circumstances, the law should always be obeyed?" The responses were originally recorded on a 5-point agree-disagree scale. Missing values were substituted here with the weighted sample mean.

Table 1: Percentage distribution of the popular vote among members of the different party groups represented in the European Parliament

% of popular vote won by members of different party groups by region		EPP	PES	Lib	Green	Left	EDD	EoN	non-alig-ned
EU	15 +	36,3	27,5	8,7	7,4	6,8	2,5	3,7	7,1
Cyprus and Malta									
8	post-communist	40,4	20,1	8,2	0,7	3,7	0,0	7,4	19,5
member countries									
EU 25		36,8	26,8	8,7	6,8	6,5	2,2	4,0	8,2


Row percentages, calculated by Hermann Schmitt (University of Mannheim, Germany), based on the official results by excluding the votes for parties without seats in the new European Parliament from the calculation of the total.

Graph 2: Support for Environmentalist Ideas by communist legacies and level of economic development in Europe, 1990-2000




Note: The graph displays mean values of the given attitude scale by GDP per capita and region. The cases are weighted and each national sample has a weighted N of 1000 (minus the weighted N of cases with missing values on the scale). For explanations regarding the variables see the Appendix.

Graph 4: Support for conventional family values by communist legacies and level of economic development in Europe, 1990-2000



Note: The graph displays mean values of the given attitude scale by GDP per capita and region. The cases are weighted and each national sample has a weighted N of 1000 (minus the weighted N of cases with missing values on the scale). For explanations regarding the variables see the Appendix.

Graph 6: Support for moral permissiveness by communist legacies and level of economic development in Europe, 1990-2000



Note: The graph displays mean values of the given attitude scale by GDP per capita and region. The cases are weighted and each national sample has a weighted N of 1000 (minus the weighted N of cases with missing values on the scale). For explanations regarding the variables see the Appendix.

Table 2: Regression analyses of the determinants of Support for Socialist Economics

Year:	1990	1999/2000	Both years
<i>Model fit statistics (R-squared) for models with various sets of predictor variables</i>			
Model 1: country dummies only	.102	.043	.044
Model 2: GDP only	.031	.016	.001
Model 3: EAST only	.063	.009	.012
Model 4: GDP and EAST	.069	.024	.030
Model 5: GDP, EAST, YEAR	.069	.024	.040
Model 6: GDP, EAST, YEAR, EAST*YEAR		.069	.024 .049
Model 6x: GDP, EAST, YEAR, EAST*YEAR		.060	.025 .041
Model 7: GDP, EAST, YEAR, EAST*YEAR, RELIGIOSITY	.060	.025	.041
<i>Standardized parameter estimates for model 7 (**: $p < .01$, *: $p < .05$)</i>			
GDP	-.15**	-.42**	-.23**
EAST	-.36**	-.30**	-.36**
YEAR	-	-	-.01
EAST*YEAR	-	-	.16**
RELIGIOSITY	-.01	.03**	.00

Note: The cases are weighted and each national sample has a weighted N of 1000 (minus the weighted N of cases with missing values on the given scale). The YEAR and EAST*YEAR variables are, of course, irrelevant when data are not pooled across years. Note that Model 6x and Model 6 are, however, always identical but the first is estimated with fewer cases because of missing values on RELIGIOSITY. For explanations regarding the variables see the Appendix.

Table 3: Regression analyses of the determinants of Support for Environmentalist Ideas

Year:	1990	1999/2000	Both years	
<i>Model fit statistics (Adjusted R-squared) for models with various sets of predictor variables</i>				
Model 1: country dummies only	.050	.080	.051	
Model 2: GDP only	.003	.001	.000	
Model 3: EAST only	.003	.002	.000	
Model 4: GDP and EAST	.003	.003	.003	
Model 5: GDP, EAST, YEAR	.003	.003	.024	
Model 6: GDP, EAST, YEAR, EAST*YEAR		.003	.003	.027
Model 6x: GDP, EAST, YEAR, EAST*YEAR		.003	.003	.025
Model 7: GDP, EAST, YEAR, EAST*YEAR, RELIGIOSITY	.003	.003	.025	
<i>Standardized parameter estimates for model 7 (**: $p < .01$, *: $p < .05$)</i>				
GDP	-.03*	-.06**	-.05**	
EAST	.02	-.10**	.02*	
YEAR	-	-	-.10**	
EAST*YEAR	-	-	-.10**	
RELIGIOSITY	-.02**	.01*	-.00	

Note: The cases are weighted and each national sample has a weighted N of 1000 (minus the weighted N of cases with missing values on the given scale). The YEAR and EAST*YEAR variables are, of course, irrelevant when data are not pooled across years. Note that Model 6x and Model 6 are, however, always identical but the first is estimated with fewer cases because of missing values on RELIGIOSITY. For explanations regarding the variables see the Appendix.

Table 4: Regression analyses of the determinants of Religiosity

Year:	1990	1999/2000	Both years	
<i>Model fit statistics (Adjusted R-squared) for models with various sets of predictor variables</i>				
Model 1: country dummies only	.171	.175	.158	
Model 2: GDP only	.004	.005	.004	
Model 3: EAST only	.000	.000	.000	
Model 4: GDP and EAST	.023	.017	.016	
Model 5: GDP, EAST, YEAR	.023	.017	.019	
Model 6: GDP, EAST, YEAR, EAST*YEAR		.023	.017	.020
<i>Standardized parameter estimates for model 6 (**: $p < .01$, *: $p < .05$)</i>				
GDP	-.28**	-.31**	-.30**	
EAST	-.25**	-.26**	-.23**	
YEAR	-	-	.09**	
EAST*YEAR	-	-	-.06**	

Note: The cases are weighted and each national sample has a weighted N of 1000 (minus the weighted N of cases with missing values on the given scale). For explanations regarding the variables see the Appendix.

Table 5: Regression analyses of the determinants of Support for Conventional Family Values

Year:	1990	1999/2000	Both years	
<i>Model fit statistics (Adjusted R-squared) for models with various sets of predictor variables</i>				
Model 1: country dummies only	.235	.196	.200	
Model 2: GDP only	.126	.112	.125	
Model 3: EAST only	.157	.101	.122	
Model 4: GDP and EAST	.158	.113	.133	
Model 5: GDP, EAST, YEAR	.158	.113	.146	
Model 6: GDP, EAST, YEAR, EAST*YEAR		.158	.113	.148
Model 6x: GDP, EAST, YEAR, EAST*YEAR		.139	.115	.134
Model 7: GDP, EAST, YEAR, EAST*YEAR, RELIGIOSITY	.184	.163	.148	
<i>Standardized parameter estimates for model 7 (**: $p < .01$, *: $p < .05$)</i>				
GDP	.02	-.19**	-.10**	
EAST	.39**	.14**	.29**	
YEAR	-	-	-.09**	
EAST*YEAR	-	-	-.05**	
RELIGIOSITY	.22**	.22**	.22**	

Note: The cases are weighted and each national sample has a weighted N of 1000 (minus the weighted N of cases with missing values on the given scale). The YEAR and EAST*YEAR variables are, of course, irrelevant when data are not pooled across years. Note that Model 6x and Model 6 are, however, always identical but the first is estimated with fewer cases because of missing values on RELIGIOSITY. For explanations regarding the variables see the Appendix.

Table 6: Regression analyses of the determinants of Support for Women's Liberation

Year:	1990	1999/2000	Both years	
<i>Model fit statistics (Adjusted R-squared) for models with various sets of predictor variables</i>				
Model 1: country dummies only	.088	.063	.039	
Model 2: GDP only	.014	.001	.004	
Model 3: EAST only	.017	.001	.007	
Model 4: GDP and EAST	.017	.002	.007	
Model 5: GDP, EAST, YEAR	.017	.002	.012	
Model 6: GDP, EAST, YEAR, EAST*YEAR		.017	.002	.016
Model 6x: GDP, EAST, YEAR, EAST*YEAR		.016	.002	.017
Model 7: GDP, EAST, YEAR, EAST*YEAR, RELIGIOSITY	.049	.003	.023	
<i>Standardized parameter estimates for model 7 (**: $p < .01$, *: $p < .05$)</i>				
GDP	-.00	.10**	.04**	
EAST	-.14**	.07**	-.11**	
YEAR	-	-	-.15**	
EAST*YEAR	-	-	.12**	
RELIGIOSITY	-.18**	.03**	-.08**	

Note: The cases are weighted and each national sample has a weighted N of 1000 (minus the weighted N of cases with missing values on the given scale). The YEAR and EAST*YEAR variables are, of course, irrelevant when data are not pooled across years. Note that Model 6x and Model 6 are, however, always identical but the first is estimated with fewer cases because of missing values on RELIGIOSITY. For explanations regarding the variables see the Appendix.

Table 7: Regression analyses of the determinants of Support for Moral Permissiveness

Year:	1990	1999/2000	Both years	
<i>Model fit statistics (Adjusted R-squared) for models with various sets of predictor variables</i>				
Model 1: country dummies only	.153	.088	.121	
Model 2: GDP only	.069	.012	.046	
Model 3: EAST only	.038	.005	.021	
Model 4: GDP and EAST	.073	.017	.049	
Model 5: GDP, EAST, YEAR	.073	.017	.052	
Model 6: GDP, EAST, YEAR, EAST*YEAR		.073	.017	.063
Model 6x: GDP, EAST, YEAR, EAST*YEAR		.077	.016	.060
Model 7: GDP, EAST, YEAR, EAST*YEAR, RELIGIOSITY	.229	.185	.218	
Model 8: country dummies, YEAR, EAST*YEAR, RELIGIOSITY	.288	.219	.263	
<i>Standardized parameter estimates for model 7 (**: $p < .01$, *: $p < .05$)</i>				
GDP	.28**	.13**	.22**	
EAST	.04**	.00	-.03**	
YEAR	-	-	.00	
EAST*YEAR	-	-	.11**	
RELIGIOSITY	-.39**	-.42**	-.40**	

Note: The cases are weighted and each national sample has a weighted N of 1000 (minus the weighted N of cases with missing values on the given scale). The YEAR and EAST*YEAR variables are, of course, irrelevant when data are not pooled across years. Note that Model 6x and Model 6 are, however, always identical but the first is estimated with fewer cases because of missing values on RELIGIOSITY. For explanations regarding the variables see the Appendix.

Table 8: Regression analyses of the determinants of Support for Socialist Economics (ESS version)

Year:	2002
<i>Model fit statistics (Adjusted R-squared) for models with various sets of predictor variables</i>	
Model 1: country dummies only	.094
Model 2: GDP only	.004
Model 3: EAST only	.000
Model 4: GDP and EAST	.005
Model 7x: GDP, EAST, and RELIGIOSITY	.008
<i>Standardized parameter estimates for model 7x (**: $p < .01$, *: $p < .05$)</i>	
GDP	-.080**
EAST	-.030**
RELIGIOSITY	.056**

Note: The source of the data are wave 1 of the European Social Survey. The cases are weighted and each national sample has a weighted N of 1000. Since the ESS data are only available for a single point in time, the YEAR variable does not enter this analysis and hence Models 5 and 6, as depicted in Tables 1 to 6, cannot be distinguished from Model 4. For explanations regarding the variables see the Appendix.

Table 9: Regression analyses of the determinants of Religiosity (ESS version)

Year:	2002
<i>Model fit statistics (Adjusted R-squared) for models with various sets of predictor variables</i>	
Model 1: country dummies only	.196
Model 2: GDP only	.004
Model 3: EAST only	.004
Model 4: GDP and EAST	.018
<i>Standardized parameter estimates for model 7x (**: $p < .01$, *: $p < .05$)</i>	
GDP	-.147**
EAST	-.146**

Note: The source of the data are wave 1 of the European Social Survey. The cases are weighted and each national sample has a weighted N of 1000. Since the ESS data are only available for a single point in time, the YEAR variable does not enter this analysis and hence Models 5 and 6, as depicted in Tables 1 to 6, cannot be distinguished from Model 4. For explanations regarding the variables see the Appendix.

Table 10: Regression analyses of the determinants of Support for Conventional Family Values (ESS version)

Year:	2002
<i>Model fit statistics (Adjusted R-squared) for models with various sets of predictor variables</i>	
Model 1: country dummies only	.091
Model 2: GDP only	.038
Model 3: EAST only	.042
Model 4: GDP and EAST	.051
Model 7x: GDP, EAST, and RELIGIOSITY	.102
<i>Standardized parameter estimates for model 7x (**: $p < .01$, *: $p < .05$)</i>	
GDP	-.083**
EAST	.172**
RELIGIOSITY	.227**

Note: The source of the data are wave 1 of the European Social Survey. The cases are weighted and each national sample has a weighted N of 1000. Since the ESS data are only available for a single point in time, the YEAR variable does not enter this analysis and hence Models 5 and 6, as depicted in Tables 1 to 6, cannot be distinguished from Model 4. For explanations regarding the variables see the Appendix.

Table 11: Regression analyses of the determinants of Moral Permissiveness (ESS version)

Year: 2002

Model fit statistics (Adjusted R-squared) for models with various sets of predictor variables

Model 1: country dummies only	.077
Model 2: GDP only	.008
Model 3: EAST only	.019
Model 4: GDP and EAST	.019
Model 7x: GDP, EAST, and RELIGIOSITY	.029

*Standardized parameter estimates for model 7x (**: $p < .01$, *: $p < .05$)*

GDP	-.002
EAST	-.145**
RELIGIOSITY	-.103**

Note: The source of the data are wave 1 of the European Social Survey. The cases are weighted and each national sample has a weighted N of 1000. Since the ESS data are only available for a single point in time, the YEAR variable does not enter this analysis and hence Models 5 and 6, as depicted in Tables 1 to 6, cannot be distinguished from Model 4. For explanations regarding the variables see the Appendix.

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