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Table and figures at the end.

Conceptualising and Measuring European Citizenship and Engagement

David Sanders, Paolo Bellucci, Gabor Toka, and Mariano Torcal

There are clearly many alternative ways of thinking about the idea of citizenship. From a legal perspective, citizenship is something that can be formally conferred upon an individual in virtue of her/his possession of certain characteristics, and which typically engenders the acquisition of certain rights. For some political theorists, the notion of citizenship is intimately bound up with the idea of the *active* citizen, the individual who participates in the *demos* – the political system – in order to fulfil her/his political obligations to the community. Our approach to citizenship in general, and to European citizenship in particular, focuses primarily on the views of the citizens themselves. Just as national and European Union laws recognise the co-existence of ‘national’ and ‘European Union’ citizenships, so we also recognise that individuals can think of themselves, to varying degrees, as citizens both of their own country and of the EU. Accepting this potential ‘duality’ of conception on the part of the individual, we follow Benhabib (2002) and distinguish among three key components of citizenship at the national and European levels:

- *Identity* – the extent to which the individual identifies her/himself as a member of the (national or European) *demos*;
- *Representation* – the extent to which s/he feels her/his interests are represented by (national or European) political institutions; and
- *Scope of Governance* – the extent to which the individual considers (national or European) political institutions should be engaged in policymaking and implementation in different policy areas.

In this chapter, we describe and justify a range of European and national-level indices level that we have developed for measuring individuals’ feelings of Identity and Representation, and their assessments of Scope of Governance. We also describe how we measure the related notion of ‘EU engagement’, which we conceptualise as involving both behavioural and attitudinal components. Part 1 of the chapter provides the necessary contextual background and outlines the survey of mass opinion in sixteen European countries that we use in order to measure the different dimensions of European (and national) citizenship and EU engagement. Part 2 describes a series of factor analyses that we conducted using these data. The results show that, throughout the countries surveyed, citizens’ attitudes map very clearly onto the three conceptual dimensions of Identity, Representation and Scope to which we have referred. In Part 3, we show that there are consistent country-by-country variations in the levels of these three measures, and that these variations are linked systematically to the time at which different countries joined the EU. Finally, in Part 4, we describe our measures of ‘EU engagement’, in which we focus on turnout in EU elections and overall ‘support for the EU’.

In subsequent chapters, we develop models that seek to account for individual- and country-level variations in these various perceptions and behaviours.¹

The contextual background and the sixteen-nation survey

The creation of the European Economic Community in 1957 was fundamentally an elite-driven project. The elites of the member states who supported the EEC were largely convinced by the neo-functionalists' ideas of 'spillover'. The core notion was that functional cooperation at the supranational level in certain pivotal policy areas – such as coal, steel and agriculture – would prove so successful that businesses, interest groups, and perhaps even public opinion, would press for the extension of supranational decision-making in other policy areas. The gradual extension of supranational policy competence did indeed develop in line with neo-functionalist expectations. It was reinforced, moreover, by a series of intergovernmental agreements – the Single European Act in 1986, the Maastricht Treaty of 1992 and the Amsterdam Treaty of 1999 – that aimed to broaden and deepen the policymaking capabilities of (what had become) the EU. For much of the late twentieth century, public opinion in most member countries (with the notable exceptions of the UK and, to a lesser extent, Denmark) was broadly supportive of the European project. As revealed in a long-running series of Eurobarometer surveys from 1970 onwards, mass publics broadly recognised the benefits that the EEC/EC/EU had brought. When asked, large majorities of the populations of most member states clearly proclaimed their approval of the EU and their sense that, on balance, their countries – and often they themselves – had benefited from EU membership.

In the twenty-first century, however, public opinion towards the EU has not been quite so positive. The accession of new member states and the extension of the scope of the Union's policy competence appear to have raised doubts, among some EU mass publics, about the wisdom of further extending the European project. This decline in EU support among mass populations has thrown into relief the disparity between mass and elite opinion about the future course of European integration. But even if support for the EU has dipped in recent years, it does not necessarily follow that the EU's citizens do not feel a sense of allegiance to the EU. This is what our analysis tries to explore. The populations of all EU member states automatically became EU citizens as a result of Maastricht, gaining common rights that were formally extended at Amsterdam. What we examine here is if these citizens by default actually think of themselves as citizens of the EU.

As indicated above, the theoretical notion of citizenship that we employ derives from the work of Benhabib (2002). In these terms, subjective feelings of citizenship towards any given *demos* consists in a combination of a sense of identity, feelings of representation, and beliefs about the proper scope of government attributable to the *demos*. A *demos* is typically defined as the political system, traditionally a nation-state, that exercises sovereignty – decision-making and judicial authority – over the population living within its borders. In an age of multi-level governance, the notion of the *demos* necessarily becomes more fluid. In principle, it could be applicable at sub-national, national and supranational levels simultaneously in a

¹ Unless otherwise noted, all data presented in this chapter refer to the complete set of 16,133 respondents from 16 EU countries interviewed for the IntUne survey in Spring 2007. For question wording, weighting and missing data issues the reader is referred to the technical Appendix of the book.

given geographical area – depending on the extent to which these three differing levels of government exercise some sort of judicial and political authority over the people living within that area. Citizens have a relatively strong subjective sense of citizenship if they identify with the *demos*; feel that their interests are strongly represented by the decision-making authorities within the *demos*; and believe that the competence of those authorities to make policy in different areas is appropriate. Their subjective sense of citizenship is relatively weak in the absence of any or all of these three characteristics.

In order to establish how far European citizens exhibit a sense of EU citizenship, we conducted interviews with representative samples (N~1000) of the populations of sixteen EU member states. The interviews were conducted by telephone in March 2007 by TNS-Gallup, using random digit dialling in order to identify respondents. The data were weighted to ensure that the each national sample was demographically representative of the population of the country surveyed. Each respondent was asked a series of questions designed to elicit the extent to which s/he exhibited a sense of European, as well as national, citizenship. They were also asked a range of other questions relating to possible factors that could influence citizenship at these different levels. These other questions, and the theories that underpin their use, are discussed in the next and subsequent chapters. The questionnaires and the weighting and general measurement procedures that we use in order to analyse the data are described in Appendix. These procedures include the use of multiple imputation techniques for substituting item-non-response missing data with sensible estimates. These techniques enhance the representativeness of the overall sample analysed because they ensure that individuals with relatively weak or uncertain views on particular issues – those who answer ‘don’t know’ or ‘no opinion’ or ‘refuse’ in response to a particular survey question – are not excluded from the analysis. For any given variable, multiple imputation techniques use all of the information in the dataset to estimate the most likely ‘active’ response category for each of the individuals who would otherwise be recorded as ‘missing data’ on that variable. The use of these techniques means that there are no missing (don’t know; no opinion; refusal) cases in the survey measures that we report here – even though the original survey questions, as outlined in the Appendix, did allow for such responses by respondents.

In the remainder of this section, we describe the survey questions and responses that we use to measure our three core concepts of European identity, representation and scope. In providing this descriptive account, we do not discuss the *structure* of these attitudes or the way in which the *response patterns differ* across different EU countries. These are tasks that we undertake, respectively, in Sections 2 and 3 below.

<Table 2.1>

Table 2.1 describes the range of measures that we used to assess the extent of each individual’s sense of *European Identity*. We asked our respondents, first, about the extent to which ‘being a European’ mattered to their everyday lives. As Panel (a) of the table shows, just under half of our respondents (48 percent) considered that it mattered either ‘somewhat’ or ‘a great deal’; over half intimated that ‘being a European’ mattered ‘not very much’ or ‘not at all’. In response to a more indirect question about European identity, some 72 percent of our respondents felt that they were affected by ‘what happens to Europe’. This higher level of identification with Europe was also reflected in the responses to a question that we asked about people’s attachment to Europe – as opposed to their local, regional and national attachments. The relevant marginal distribution in Table 2.1 indicates that two-thirds of respondents felt either ‘somewhat’ or ‘very’ attached to Europe – a figure slightly higher than

that observed in surveys conducted in both 1991 and 2003. The average score on a 1-4 scale reported by Westle (2007b) from the Eurobarometer series is 2.46 in 1991 and 2.64 in 2003, while with our 2007 data the equivalent score is 2.77. Finally, as Panel (b) of Table 2.1 shows, when asked explicitly to compare their sense of national identity with their sense of being European, well over half of respondents indicated that they saw themselves as at least partially European and some 4 percent saw themselves as being ‘European only’. As can be observed in this same table, this 2007 distribution is almost identical to that observed in previous EU-wide surveys conducted in 1992 and 2003. It suggests that levels of EU identity have remained relatively stable over at least the last decade and a half. Taken together, these measures suggest that there is a reasonably enduring sense of European identity among European mass publics, although it is clearly neither fully developed nor universal. As we discuss below, this sense of identity is in fact consistently structured across the full range of types of EU member state.

<Table 2.2>

Table 2.2 describes our measures of *EU Representation*. Panel (a) focuses on two of the key EU institutions, the Commission and the Parliament. We asked our respondents to indicate, on a 0-10 scale, how much they trusted each of these institutions ‘to usually take the right decisions’. The response patterns show most respondents clustered around intermediate levels of trust. In later chapters, we compare these levels of EU institutional trust with people’s trust in their own national political institutions. Here we merely note that the average level of trust for the (democratically elected) EU Parliament was virtually identical to that for the (appointed) Commission: both received a mean score of 4.8 on the trust scale.

Panel (b) of Table 2.2 reports the results of asking our respondents a series of more specific questions about EU decision-makers. Their overall views were mixed. A clear majority (62 percent) agreed that EU decision-makers are ‘competent people who know what they are doing’. However, clear majorities also felt that decision-makers ‘do not care much what people like me think’ (68 percent) and that they ‘do not take enough account of our country’s interests’ (67 percent). Finally, Table 2.2 Panel (c) shows quite a high level of satisfaction with the way democracy works in the EU, with some 64 percent of respondents saying that they are either fairly or very satisfied. This compares favourably with an average of around 50 percent satisfaction for the period between 1973 and 1990 and an average of around 55 percent between 1998 and 2005 (Bellucci, Memoli and Sanders forthcoming). Taken together, these results suggest that while EU citizens are broadly satisfied with the general representative functioning of the EU, they have reservations about the responsiveness of the European institutions to their own and to their countries’ interests.

<Table 2.3>

Our respondents’ attitudes towards the proper *Scope of EU Governance* are shown in Table 2.3. Panel (a) reports people’s preferences for regional- or national- versus EU-level governance in six relatively high-salience policy areas. The majority of respondents preferred regional or national decision-making in each area, though this preference was stronger in the Unemployment and Health policy domains, where, respectively, 73 and 76 percent preferred regional or national solutions. The preference for EU-level policy was strongest in relation to the Environment (43 percent supported EU solutions) and Immigration (41% support). Surprisingly – given the prominent role of the CAP in EU spending – only 28 percent favoured EU-level policymaking for Agriculture.

In addition to asking about the proper scope of *contemporary* EU policy, we also asked our respondents to think about their preferences ‘over the next ten years’. The results are reported in Table 2.3, Panel (b). Here, a rather different picture emerges. Clear majorities of respondents favour ‘a unified tax system for the EU’ (56 percent support); ‘a common system of social security’ (74 percent support); ‘a single EU foreign policy’ (73 percent) and more EU regional aid (86 percent). This suggests that in certain critical policy areas, the EU’s citizens would welcome more EU involvement in decision-making – even if they are not yet ready to abandon regional and national decision-making in some of those same areas. Finally, as Panel (c) of Table 2.3 shows, we also enquire about people’s preferences for the geographical scope of the EU itself. Here, the picture is relatively straightforward. A majority of Europeans are in favour of a larger EU, as long as that larger EU excludes Turkey.

Where does this leave us? In essence, this brief review of the empirical referents of our three conceptual dimensions of EU citizenship produces a mixed picture of the ‘European citizen’. A majority of our survey respondents display some sort of European identity. In terms of representation, a majority considers EU policymakers to be competent, but they are broadly neutral in their view of EU institutions – and on balance negative in their assessments of EU policymakers’ responsiveness. With regard to policy scope, the majority prefers regional and national decision-making now, but they would favour greater EU involvement in several key areas in the future. Given this rather mixed picture, how confident can we be that the survey results we have presented reflect a genuine set of political attitudes? Is there a clear empirical structure that underpins the collection of responses that we have described – and which corresponds to the simple identity/representation/scope schema that we deploy? We explore these questions in the next section.

The structure of European mass attitudes towards the EU

There are numerous statistical techniques available for exploring attitude structures – including uni- and multi-dimensional scaling, unfolding, and correspondence analysis. Here, we employ one of the simplest and most straightforward techniques: non-orthogonal exploratory factor analysis. There are two main reasons for choosing this approach. First, we are interested in determining whether or not the latent structure of our citizenship data corresponds to the broad theoretical categories of identity, representation and scope implied by Benhabib’s (2002) conceptual analysis (see above). Exploratory factor analysis imposes no prior expectations on what dimensions of citizenship are identified in the data. A non-orthogonal solution also allows for the possibility that the different dimensions of citizenship are correlated with one another.

<Table 2.4>

Table 2.4 reports the results of an oblimin factor analysis of the 22 survey items that were described in Tables 2.1 to 2.3. The table suggests a six-factor solution that can be interpreted very easily because each measured variable loads highly on just one factor (cf. the loadings printed in **bold**). Thus, for example, the four *identity* measures – Feels European, Attachment to Europe, Europe affects me, and European versus national identity – all load over $r=.61$ on factor 4 and below $r=.29$ on all other factors. Similarly, the two *geographical scope* variables – Favours EU enlargement and Favours Turkey in EU – load highly on factor 5 and weakly on all other factors. This pattern extends to all six factors, suggesting that the solution is well-determined. Note also that the relative contribution of each factor to the total amount of variance in the model – as measured by the rotation sums of squared loadings – is fairly

similar across all six factors, with the sum of squared loadings after rotation ranging between 1.6 and 3.0 for each factor. This suggests that the ordering of the factors (in particular, of the first four factors) is not especially significant – rather, that they are all of broadly similar statistical importance.

In substantive terms the implications of Table 2.4 are clear. European public attitudes towards EU citizenship are structured in a manner that corresponds broadly to Benhabib’s conceptual distinctions of identity, representation and scope – though with one or two additional wrinkles. As anticipated, there is certainly a single *European Identity factor* – Factor 4 – which underlies respondents’ answers to all four of our survey questions about European feelings identity. In terms of *Representation*, there are clearly two factors or ‘sub-dimensions’. The first representation sub-dimension concerns *confidence in EU decision-making*, as reflected in the loadings on Factor 1, where high loadings are observed for trust in the EU Parliament and Commission, for satisfaction with EU democratic processes, and for the competence of EU decision-makers. A second representation sub-dimension relates to a general sense of *political (in)efficacy* at the EU level, as reflected in the loadings on Factor 6. This factor clearly reflects people’s feelings about the responsiveness of EU policymakers to their own needs and to their country’s interests.

In relation to beliefs about the *scope of EU governance*, three sub-dimensions emerge. The first, picked up in Factor 2, concerns attitudes towards the proper *scope of EU policymaking now*. Here, respondents’ attitudes across six different policy areas (environment, crime, unemployment, health, agriculture and immigration) are clearly underpinned by a single pro/anti EU dimension: people who favour EU involvement in any one policy area tend to favour EU involvement in the others. The second scope sub-dimension is reflected in Factor 3 and concerns attitudes towards the *future policy scope of the EU*. Here, respondents’ views are underpinned by a general preference/aversion for an *extension* of EU policy scope over the next decade or so. The final scope sub-dimension is picked up by Factor 5, which, as noted, summarises respondents’ attitudes towards the geographical enlargement of the EU. In short, Table 2.4 shows that European mass attitudes towards EU citizenship have a single Identity dimension; two Representation sub-dimensions (Confidence in Institutions and Political Efficacy); and three Scope of Governance sub-dimensions (Policy Scope Now; Policy Scope Future; and Geographical Scope). In the following discussion we explore the robustness of this 6-factor characterisation of mass attitudes and describe the cross-national variations in the average scores observed on these different factors.

The robustness of the 6-factor structure of citizenship attitudes

It is possible that the sort of factor solution shown in Table 2.4 could describe an overall, pan-European, pattern that conceals significant variations at a lower level of aggregation. For example, the structure of attitudes among publics in Western Europe could be very different from those observed among the more recent member states in the East. Similarly, the attitude structure of men could be very different from that of women, or that of older people very different from that of the young. We tested a range of different possibilities by estimating the factor model shown in Table 2.4 for subsets of East and West European countries, for subsets of countries grouped according to the time period in which they joined the EEC/EU, for a range of different socio-demographic variables (men *versus* women, young *versus* old, and so on), and for each country sample individually.

<Table 2.5>

An illustrative set of results is reported in Table 2.5. The column labelled 'All' reports the pattern of significant loadings shown in the six-factor solution from Table 2.4. Thus, the loading (.886) for 'Trust in EU Parliament' in the 'All' column in Table 2.5 is the loading of that variable on the Representation – Institutional Confidence factor from Table 2.4. Similarly, the loading (.671) for 'EU should make policy – Environment' is the loading of that variable on the 'Scope of EU Policymaking – Now' factor from Table 2.4; and so on. Two key features of Table 2.5 should be noted. First, each disaggregated grouping (west/east, men/women) produces the same 6-factor solution as the overall, aggregated sample. Second, the *pattern* of factor loadings is virtually identical across all the different groupings – including when similar disaggregated analyses are run for Accession Wave (to the EU), age cohort, education level and religion.

Very similar results are obtained, in analyses not reported here in detail, when factor solutions are estimated for 'Accession wave' of joining the EU (Founder member; joined in 1970s; Southern Wave; Post-1994); for 'old' (45 and over) *versus* young respondents; for 'high education' (A-level qualifications or higher) *versus* 'low education' (below A-level or equivalent); and for Religion (Catholic, about half of the sample, *versus* not). Even when separate factor solutions are estimated for each country individually, the same broad pattern is observed. In ten of the sixteen countries sampled (Bulgaria, Denmark, Estonia, France, Britain, Greece, Italy, Portugal, Slovakia and Slovenia), exactly the same 6-factor solution as that reported in Table 2.4 is observed. In Belgium, Germany and Spain, a 7-factor solution is observed, with five of the factors identical to Table 2.4, but with the 'EU policy scope – now' factor split into two sub-dimensions. In Hungary and Poland, a comparable 7-factor solution is also observed, though here the Representation – Institutional Confidence factor split into two sub-dimensions. Finally, in Austria, a 5-factor solution is found, in which Institutional Confidence and EU Efficacy combine to form a single Representation factor. The details of these various solutions, however, are less important than the overall picture they portray. The broad pattern of EU citizenship attitudes characterised in Table 2.4 is extremely robust to variations in sample specification. As anticipated in our earlier discussion, citizenship attitudes across the EU would appear to be very clearly structured in terms of Identity, Representation and the Scope of Governance.

Variations in the levels of EU identity, representation and scope

We noted earlier that an oblimin factor solution of the sort shown in Table 2.4 allows for the possibility that the different underlying factors may be correlated with each other. This was certainly the case with our 6-factor solution. Table 2.6 reports the inter-correlations among our six citizenship dimensions. Note that we do not use the factor scores derived directly from the factor solution itself in order to construct these inter-correlations. Although factor scores have some attractive features (for example, they all have means of zero) their ranges can in principle vary quite widely, which means that comparing scores across factors and cases can be misleading. In the analysis here, we accordingly use 'constant range scales' – one such scale corresponding to each factor – as described in the Appendix. These constant range scales are constructed by combining the variables that load highly on each factor in a way that ensures that each scale has the same 0-10 range. The correlations between the constant range scales and the original factor scores are all greater than $r=.95$. The huge advantage of constant range scales is that country A's average score on scale X can be directly and usefully compared either with country B's average on X or with A's average score on scale Y. The inter-correlations among the constant range scales in Table 2.6 show that, although the factors

are related, they are only weakly correlated with each other. Even the strongest correlation – between Representation–Institutional Trust and EU Identity is only $r=.37$; the remaining inter-correlations are all below $r=.3$. Clearly, if an individual scores unusually high (or unusually low) on one citizenship dimension, it does not follow that s/he will also be very distinctive on another. In short, although there are likely to be some connections among the different dimensions of EU citizenship (as, indeed, we show in later chapters), those dimensions are certainly sufficiently distinct and distinctive to merit separate, differentiated, analysis here.

<Table 2.6>

<Figure 2.1>

Figure 2.1 reports the EU and West/East Europe average scores, across the 16 countries surveyed in the IntUne mass survey, on our six ‘constant range’ measures of EU Identity, Representation and Scope. Several conclusions are suggested by the figure. First, although levels of EU Identity are roughly the same as the level of EU Representation–Institutional Confidence (both average around 5 on the 0-10 scale), the second measure of EU Representation – Political Efficacy – is noticeably lower, averaging around 3.6 on the 0-10 scale. EU citizens, in short, exhibit reasonable levels of confidence in the rectitude of EU institutions but they do not feel commensurately efficacious in determining political outcomes. Second, EU citizens display a variegated pattern of preferences in respect to the EU’s Scope of Governance. They are generally reserved about the policy areas in which the EU ought to be involved *now* (average score = 3.4), but they are fairly comfortable about extending its policy scope in the future (average score = 6.3). In terms of the geographical expansion of the EU, their views are midway between these two ‘extremes’ (average score = 4.9). A third set of conclusions from Figure 2.1 relate to the differences between East and West Europe. The differences between East and West are relatively modest on all six citizenship measures, with EU Identity and Political Efficacy being slightly higher in the West, and Institutional Confidence and Preference for Geographical Expansion being slightly higher in the East. Given their longer membership of the EU, it is perhaps not surprising that Identity and Efficacy levels should be higher in western European countries. Similarly, given their relatively recent accession to the EU, people in the eastern states are more likely to be sympathetic to the inclusion of people living in new candidate states whom they might expect would share similar aspirations.

<Figure 2.2>

A similar pattern to that shown in Figure 2.1 is also evident in Figure 2.2, where the average scores on the six citizenship measures are broken down further – by ‘EU Accession wave’. As Figure 2.2 shows, regardless of the time of joining the EU, Identity and Institutional Confidence levels again tend to be ‘middling’ and similar to each other, while Efficacy levels and Future Policy Scope preferences tend to be weaker. To be sure, Identity levels and support for current and future EU Policy Scope are noticeably lower among the 1970s joiners (presumably reflecting the relatively high levels of Euroscepticism in both the UK and Denmark). Nonetheless, there is not much difference among Founder, Southern Wave or Post 1994 respondents in terms of any of the six citizenship dimensions. With the possible exception of the 1970s joiners, therefore, people living in countries that have joined the EU at very different times take a broadly similar view of the EU in terms of Identity, Representation and the proper Scope of Governance. There are, of course, some differences in levels on the various scales but none is particularly marked; there are certainly more similarities than there are differences among the different accession waves.

<Figure 2.3>

Figure 2.3 attempts to clarify the overall position even further. It reports the results of (a) combining the two Representation measures (Institutional Confidence and Political Efficacy) into a single Representation scale, and (b) combining the three Scope measures (Policy Scope Now, Policy Scope Future and Geographical Scope) into a single Scope of EU Governance scale. (Each of these combined scales is calculated as the arithmetic average of the component measures). The three 0-10 scales (Identity, Representation and Scope) are then combined (again as the arithmetic average) into a single 0-10 Citizenship Index. Unsurprisingly, as the figure shows, the Citizenship index averages out the 'highs' and 'lows' on its constituent dimensions. The relatively high average levels of Identity and Scope (both 4.8) are counterbalanced by the relatively low average level of Representation (4.4). The overall Citizenship average for respondents in the East is lower (4.6), though not by much, than the average for the West (4.7). The key conclusion suggested by Figure 2.3, however, is that Identity and Representation levels are clearly higher in the West than they are in the East, while the East's preference for EU Scope of Governance is clearly stronger than that in the West. Being from a country that has been part of the EU family for a longer period clearly engenders both a stronger sense of European identity and a stronger sense that EU institutions can effectively 'represent' people's interests. Being from an eastern, generally post-communist member-state – where domestic political institutions are often seen as weak and unreliable – clearly encourages a stronger preference for EU governance. These are important empirical patterns, which, it turns out, continue to be observed when a range of statistical controls and modelling techniques are applied to the data. We explore them in considerable detail in later chapters.

<Figure 2.4>

Finally, Figure 2.4 presents the average Identity, Representation, Scope, and overall 'Citizenship' scores for each country separately. There are few surprises in the patterns reported. As suggested in relation to Figure 2.3, Representation levels tend to be lower than the corresponding Identity and Scope levels in all the countries surveyed. The countries with the lowest EU Citizenship scores are Austria, Britain, Bulgaria and Estonia, though this pattern is mitigated by the fact that European Identity is relatively high in Austria and the preference for EU Policy Scope is relatively high in Bulgaria. Of the long-standing EU member states, Britain – perhaps because of its imperial legacy and transatlantic ties – remains the most hesitant in developing a sense of European citizenship. The highest Citizenship levels are observed in Belgium (where Identity, Representation and Scope levels are all relatively high) and in Spain and Portugal (where more variegated patterns are evident, with disproportionately strong preferences for EU Policy Scope). We consider the reasons for these country differences in detail in later chapters. However, three simple arguments commend themselves as possible explanations for the upper and lower tails of the overall distribution shown in Figure 2.4. Britain's failure to develop a strong sense of European citizenship probably reflects its lingering imperial pretensions and the continuing transatlantic focus of its political and economic discourse. Belgium's stronger sense of European citizenship could reflect the fact that the EU's institutional home is located in the Belgian capital itself. And the enthusiasm of the Spanish and Portuguese could be a simple consequence of the considerable economic progress that those two countries have made since joining the EU. We attempt to model the impact of these and other factors on Identity, Representation and Scope in chapters 4 through 7. We also examine how all of these things

relate to the extent to which people are prepared to ‘engage with’ and to ‘support’ the EU itself.

Measuring EU engagement: EU support and electoral turnout

There have been extensive scholarly analyses of cross-national patterns of EU support and of turnout in ‘second order’ European elections. The broad conclusions suggested by these earlier analyses are that support for the EU is dependent on a combination of instrumental rationality, party cues and progressive values (see, for example, Gabel and Palmer 1995; Gabel 1998c; Carey 2002); while turnout in European Parliament elections reflects a combination of rationality, affective commitment to Europe and sense of civic duty (see, for example, Schmitt and van der Eijk 2003; van der Eijk and Franklin 2009). Our analysis supplements these studies by providing a more extensive set of measures of European Identity, Representation and Scope that can be used to explain *why* individual European citizens choose to express support (or the lack of it) for the EU and *why* they decide to vote (or not) in elections to the European Parliament. In theoretical terms, we follow Easton (1953) and conceptualise support as a diffuse resource that is targeted primarily at either the regime or the political community or both.

We measure EU support with a single item which asks respondents to use a 0-10 scale to tell if their opinion is closer to one that holds that EU-integration has already gone too far, or to the other pole that it should be further strengthened. Figure 2.5 reports the average EU support score (5.6) across all the 16 countries surveyed and compares it with the equivalent averages for the different EU accession waves. As the figure shows, the differences among the different waves are relatively small. Support is close to the mean among founders (5.7) and post-2003 accession states (5.5; this drops to 5.3 when Austria is added to the group as in Figure 2.5); below the mean among 1973 and 1995 joiners (5.1 and 4.1, respectively); and above the mean in southern wave states (6.6). Table 7.1 in the subsequent chapter on EU-support shows the more detailed country-by-country pattern and finds that EU support is highest in Portugal, Italy, Greece and Spain, and lowest in Austria and Britain.

<Figure 2.5>

Expressed attitudinal support for the EU, however, is only one aspect of political engagement. We also asked our respondents whether they had voted in the previous round of elections to the European Parliament (EP), held in 2004. In addition, we were asking respondents (in 2007) to recall how they had voted, in a second order election, some three years previously. In asking whether or not respondents had voted in 2004, we were more interested in their *general dispositions towards voting in European elections* than we were in their actual voting records. (In fact, vote recall is known to be an inaccurate measure of previous vote. See for example, Sanders and Price 1995.) Figure 2.6 summarises these dispositions, comparing the overall average reported turnout across our surveyed countries with the equivalent average scores in the different accession waves. The pattern is in fact very similar to that reported for EU support in Figure 2.5. Founders and southern wave joiners score above the EU average, while 1970s joiners and post-1994 joiners score below it. The details of this pattern are also shown in Table 8.1. of our subsequent chapter on turnout, which gives the country-by-country reported turnout scores and compares them with actual turnout in the 2004 European elections. Indeed, reported turnout was higher than actual turnout everywhere, except in Belgium, where voting was compulsory. The highest levels of over-reporting were in the post-1994 accession states, most of which had only joined the EU immediately prior to the 2004

EP elections, giving relatively little opportunity for political parties effectively to mobilise voters to participate. All of this suggests that reported turnout in 2004 can be regarded as an additional – primarily attitudinal rather than behavioural – measure of an individual’s political engagement with the EU.

<Figure 2.6>

Our final (negative) measure of (lack of) EU engagement consists in identifying those individuals who say that they voted in their own country’s previous national elections but that they did not vote in the 2004 EP elections. We wish to distinguish between this group and those respondents who say that they voted in both national and European elections, since the former group are clearly *voters* (as opposed to habitual non-voters) who report that they abstained in the last EP election. This suggests that, although they are politically engaged nationally, these ‘EP Abstainers’ are not (so) politically engaged at the European level. As such, they merit special attention since there may be specific reasons – related perhaps to notions of citizenship as developed here – that lead them to avoid involvement in EU level electoral politics. Table 8.2 in our subsequent chapter on turnout reports the percentages of respondents who reported voting/not voting in national and in European elections. In the IntUne sample as a whole, about 15% reported voting in neither, and 3% in only EP elections. We are not directly interested in either of these sub-groups here. Rather, we are interested in what might distinguish those who vote in elections at both national and European levels (about two-thirds of all respondents) from those ‘voters’ who abstain from EP voting (15% of all respondents).

<Figure 2.7>

Figure 2.7 compares the rates of EP abstention across the different accession waves. The numbers reported represent the percentage of *voters* who abstained at EU level rather than the percentage of *all respondents* – thus, for example, the overall average figure indicates an EP abstention rate among voters of 19% (calculated as 15% of 15%+67%). The differences in EP abstention rates across the accession groups are quite marked. Among Southern wave voters, abstention is only 15% and among founders only 13%. This rises to 22% among post-1994 joiners and to 25% among 1970s joiners. In short, as with EU Support and EP Reported Turnout, EP Abstention rates suggest that founder and southern wave states contain the most enthusiasm for the European project, and that 1970s and post-1994 states contain the least. These are themes to which return in subsequent chapters, where we attempt to unpack what it is about these different groups of states that invoke such differentiated responses towards the EU on the part of their citizens.

Summary and conclusions

In this study we conceptualise citizenship as a multi-dimensional set of beliefs about political institutions and the citizen’s relationship to them. We have shown in this chapter that there is strong individual-level evidence, derived from representative mass surveys in 16 EU countries, that citizens’ attitudes map on to our three core conceptual dimensions of citizenship – identity, representation and scope of governance. Our analysis shows that regardless of individual characteristics (such as gender, age or religion) and regardless of ‘type of EU member state’, the same basic 6-factor EU citizenship attitude structure is observed. This structure consists of a single identity dimension, two representation dimensions (confidence in institutions and efficacy), and three scope dimensions (policy

scope now, policy scope in the future and geographical scope). We suggested that each of these six dimensions can be analysed separately but that, in addition, they can also be combined to produce simpler, aggregate measures of Identity, Representation and Scope, as well as a single, overall measure of the individual's sense of 'EU citizenship'. In subsequent chapters, we develop models that seek to explain why these attitudes vary across countries and across individuals.

The final purpose of this chapter was to develop measures of the extent of different individuals' 'engagement with the EU'. Superficially, our measures of engagement appear to involve both an attitudinal and a behavioural component: attitudinal in terms of 'support for the EU'; and behavioural in terms of turnout in (and abstention from) European Parliament elections. Given the limitations of vote recall data, and in particular the lack of correspondence between turnout recall among our respondents and actual turnout in the 2004 EP elections, we prefer to use both the 'EU support' and the 'turnout recall' measures as *attitudinal* measures of EU engagement. Accordingly, we employ three measures of EU engagement. These involve, first, a general measure of EU support that reflects the respondent's views of the impact of the EU on her/his own country and the extent to which the process of European unification should be strengthened. Second, it involves the respondent's reported participation in the 2004 EP elections. Our core assumption here is that those who 'recall' having voted are more likely to be 'engaged' with the EU than those who do not (and *vice versa*). And finally, we use a negative measure of EU engagement that consists in differentiating between individuals (a) who voted in their last elections national elections *and* the 2004 EP elections and (b) who voted nationally but *abstained* from voting in the EP elections. We are interested in this group because they are clearly engaged with national politics but are unengaged with the EU.

In the rest of this book, we employ these different measures variously as dependent and independent variables. Initially, we are interested in *explaining* patterns of citizenship, and we accordingly treat our measures of Identity, Representation and Scope as dependent variables that require explanation. In later chapters, we seek to explore the possible causal connections among these different citizenship dimensions, and as a result we treat them as both dependent and independent variables. Finally, since we are also interested in assessing the possible *consequences* of feelings of EU citizenship, we employ our measures of Identity, Representation and Scope as independent variables in models where we seek to explain patterns of EU engagement and abstention.

Table 2.1: Responses to Survey Questions about European Identity

<i>Panel A</i>	<i>Not at all</i>	<i>Not very much</i>	<i>Some-what</i>	<i>Very much</i>
<i>Question:</i>				
How much does being a European have to do with how you feel about yourself in your day-to-day life?	26.0	26.3	34.7	13.0
How far do you feel that what happens to Europe in general has important consequences for people like you?	7.0	21.0	45.2	26.8
People feel different degrees of attachment to their town or village, to their region, to their country and to Europe. What about you[r attachment to Europe]?	10.7	25.0	42.1	22.7

*Panel B**Do you see yourself as ...:*

	<i>[Czech etc.] only</i>	<i>[Czech etc.] and European</i>	<i>European and [Czech etc.]</i>	<i>European only</i>
1992	39.5	49.7	6.8	4.1
2003	41.2	47.0	7.9	3.9
2007	39.5	48.6	7.9	4.0

Source: Westle (2007) for 1992 and 2003, and the 2007 IntUne survey data.*Note:* Table entries are percentages based on the entire cross-national sample, with demographic weights for sampling bias and equal weight for each country.*Table 2.2: Responses about European Representation*

<i>Panel A</i>	<i>No trust at all</i>							<i>Complete trust</i>			
	<i>0</i>	<i>1</i>	<i>2</i>	<i>3</i>	<i>4</i>	<i>5</i>	<i>6</i>	<i>7</i>	<i>8</i>	<i>9</i>	<i>10</i>
Trust in European Parliament	8.1	2.9	5.9	8.9	10.4	24	13.2	12.8	8.9	2.2	2.7
Trust in European Commission	7.7	3.1	6.2	9.0	10.4	23.7	13.6	12.9	8.6	2.2	2.5

Panel B

	<i>Strongly disagree</i>	<i>Disagree</i>	<i>Can't choose</i>	<i>Agree</i>	<i>Strongly agree</i>
Those who make decisions in the European Union are competent people who know what they are doing	10.0	23.1	4.7	48.3	13.9
Those who make decisions in the European Union do not care much what people like me think	7.6	21.3	3.0	37.7	30.4
Those who make decisions in the European Union ignore our country's interests.	7.0	24.7	4.9	4.3	23.1

*Panel C**Satisfaction with the way democracy works in the European Union:**Very dissatisfied**Dissatisfied**Satisfied**Very satisfied*

8.5 27.1 58.3 6.1

Note: Table entries are weighted percentages based in the entire 16-country sample.

Table 2.3: Preferred Scope of European Governance

Panel A

Which level of government should be currently responsible for each policy:

	<i>EU-level only</i>	<i>EU and some other level</i>	<i>Only some other level or none</i>
Unemployment	21.6	6.0	72.7
Health	19.1	4.5	76.4
Environment	43.4	7.3	49.3
Crime	37.3	7.5	55.3
Agriculture	28.1	5.4	66.4
Immigration	40.5	5.3	54.2

Panel B

Support for future extension of EU policy scope to:

	<i>Strongly disagree</i>	<i>Disagree</i>	<i>Can't choose</i>	<i>Agree</i>	<i>Strongly agree</i>
A unified tax system	19.2	19.6	5.0	31.8	24.5
A common system of social security	8.4	14.1	3.4	40.6	33.4
A single EU foreign policy	7.5	14.8	4.6	42.8	30.3
More regional development aid	3.7	8.2	2.2	44.1	41.7

Panel C

Support for a larger geographic scope of the EU

Turkey's EU-membership is:		<i>A bad thing:</i>	<i>Neither good nor bad:</i>	<i>A good thing:</i>
		49.1	18.6	32.3
Enlarging the EU to include new countries:	<i>Very much against:</i>	<i>Somewhat against:</i>	<i>Somewhat in favour:</i>	<i>Very much in favour:</i>
	12.9	23.2	46.6	17.3

Note: Table entries are weighted percentages based in the entire 16-country sample.

Table 2.4: The Dimensions of European Citizenship (rotated oblimin factor loadings)

	Factor	1	2	3	4	5	6
<i>Variables defining the “Representation – institutional confidence” factor</i>							
Trust in EU Parliament		.866	.134	.170	.286	-.146	-.208
Trust in EU Commission		.875	.134	.168	.264	-.141	-.204
EU democracy		.626	.080	.254	.273	-.208	-.184
EU decision-makers are competent		.631	.055	.226	.159	-.250	-.080
<i>Variable defining the “Scope of EU policy – now” factor</i>							
Unemployment		.027	.660	.131	.132	-.089	-.043
Immigration		.136	.609	.176	.114	-.154	-.122
Environment		.122	.671	.111	.166	.008	-.116
Crime		.052	.671	.135	.094	.007	-.026
Health care		.041	.659	.131	.061	-.093	-.070
Agriculture		.122	.645	.119	.157	-.009	-.130
<i>Variables defining the “Scope of EU policy – future” factor</i>							
Unified tax system		.124	.180	.726	.133	-.128	-.088
Common social security system		.176	.169	.780	.133	-.182	-.020
Single EU foreign policy		.251	.152	.695	.209	-.071	-.003
More regional aid		.287	.076	.589	.148	-.391	.127
<i>Variables defining the “EU Identity” factor</i>							
Feels European		.295	.114	.150	.708	-.065	-.207
Attachment to Europe		.354	.140	.227	.684	-.093	-.137
Europe affects me		.089	.048	.092	.627	-.100	.015
Feels European versus national		.189	.231	.136	.608	-.112	-.177
<i>Variable defining the “Scope of EU: geography” factor</i>							
Favours Turkey in EU		.160	.090	.113	.094	-.835	-.119
Favours EU enlargement		.327	.094	.280	.213	-.800	-.069
<i>Variables defining the “Representation – political efficacy” factor</i>							
EU ignore our interests		-.154	-.125	-.033	-.132	.125	.813
EU don’t care about people		-.234	-.079	-.041	-.161	.041	.791

Note: Table entries are factor loadings estimated for the entire 16-country sample.

Coefficients exceeding 0.5 in absolute value are printed in bold.

Table 2.5: Consequences of estimating the factor solution separately for Western vs. Eastern Europe and for Men vs. Women (factor loadings in different subsamples)

<i>Attitude item in the factor analysis</i>	<i>Loadings on which factor</i>	<i>All</i>	<i>West</i>	<i>East</i>	<i>Men</i>	<i>Women</i>
Trust in EU Parliament	Representation – institutional confidence	0.87	0.88	0.88	0.87	0.88
Trust in EU Commission		0.88	0.87	0.85	0.86	0.87
EU democracy		0.63	0.66	0.60	0.65	0.62
EU d.-makers competent		0.63	0.65	0.55	0.63	0.61
Unemployment	Scope of EU policy – now	0.66	0.65	0.67	0.67	0.65
Immigration		0.61	0.61	0.61	0.62	0.60
Environment		0.67	0.65	0.70	0.68	0.66
Crime		0.67	0.65	0.71	0.67	0.67
Health care		0.66	0.65	0.68	0.65	0.66
Agriculture		0.65	0.63	0.68	0.65	0.64
Unified tax system	Scope of EU policy – future	0.73	0.76	0.66	0.74	0.71
Common social security		0.78	0.79	0.76	0.79	0.77
Single foreign policy		0.70	0.69	0.70	0.68	0.71
More regional aid		0.59	0.56	0.64	0.58	0.59

Feels European		0.71	-0.70	0.69	0.72	0.70
Attachment to Europe	Identity with EU factor	0.68	-0.70	0.69	0.67	0.70
Europe affects me		0.63	-0.58	0.69	0.66	0.59
European vs. national		0.61	-0.62	0.59	0.60	0.69
Favours Turkey in EU	Geographical scope	-0.84	-0.84	-0.81	-0.84	-0.84
Favours EU enlargement		-0.80	-0.79	-0.78	-0.80	-0.80
EU ignore country interests	Representation – efficacy	0.81	0.80	0.82	0.81	0.82
EU don't care about people		0.79	0.79	0.77	0.80	0.78

Note: Table entries are loadings, in various subsamples, on the factor corresponding to the concept indicated in the second column. The column labelled 'All' reproduces the bold loadings reported in Table 2.4.

Table 2.6: Correlations among Constant Range Scale Measures of Six Dimensions of European Citizenship

	<i>Identity</i>	<i>Representation – institutional trust</i>	<i>Representation – efficacy</i>	<i>Scope – now</i>	<i>Scope – future</i>
Representation – institutional trust	.37				
Representation – efficacy	.21	.25			
Scope – now	.21	.15	.13		
Scope – future	.27	.29	.08	.26	
Scope – geography	.18	.28	.14	.11	.27

Note: Table entries are bivariate Pearson correlation coefficients; all significant at $p < .001$

Figure 2.1: Average Scores on 0-10 Constant Range Scales for Six Dimensions of European Citizenship; Overall average compared with Western and Eastern European Respondents' Perceptions




Fig 2.2: Average Scores on 0-10 Constant Range Scales for Six Dimensions of European Citizenship; Broken down by Accession Wave




Figure 2.3: Average Scores on Simplified Measures of EU Citizenship, Identity, Representation and Scope; Overall averages compared with Western and Eastern European Respondents' Perceptions




Figure 2.4: Average Scores on Simplified Measures of EU Citizenship, Identity, Representation and Scope; Broken down by Country




Figure 2.5: Average Scores on 0-10 Scale of EU Support; Europe-wide average compared with average scores of each EU Accession Wave




Figure 2.6: Average Reported Percentage Turnout in 2004 European Parliament Elections; Broken down by Accession Wave




Figure 2.7: Percentage of Voters in Last National Election who failed to vote in 2004 European Parliament Elections; by Accession Wave

