The limits of the soul: Heraclitus B 45 DK. Its text and interpretation

GÁBOR BETEGH
Central European University, Budapest

I

The standard text of Heraclitus’ fragment B 45, as it figures in DK and in almost all current editions, runs as follows:

ψυχῆς πείρατα ἰῶν οὐκ ἄν ἔξευροι πάσαν ἐπιπορευόμενος ὁδὸν· οὕτω βαθὺν λόγον ἔχει.

A preliminary translation, based on the standard text, can be:

You will not find out the limits of the soul when you go, travelling on every road, so deep a logos does it have.

Our only source for the fragment is Diogenes Laertius 9.7. In this chapter Diogenes gives the preliminary, general (καθολικῶς) part of the doxography of Heraclitus, which is sandwiched between the section on the character, book, and style of Heraclitus on the one hand, and the detailed doxography starting in 9.8 on the other. The text of 9.7 is as follows:

In general he held the following doctrines. All things are set together out of fire and it is into fire that they dissolve. All things come to be according to fate (εἰμαρμένη) and are fitted to each other by turning into oppo-

* The paper benefited much from the discussion at the Symposium, and in particular from remarks by David Graham, Carl Huffman, Catherine Osborne, and David Sider. I received further help from Judith Horváth, Serge Mouraviev, and Malcolm Schofield. I am very grateful to Tiziano Dorandi for the information he kindly offered about the manuscript readings of Diogenes Laertius 9.7. Special thanks should go to Enrique Hülpsz for being a wonderful host. I received support from the NKTH BETEGH09 grant.

1 One notable exception is Serge Mouraviev (Heraclitea, II.A.2, T 705, pp. 590–592; cf. 612*) who inserts a καὶ before ψυχῆς, on which see below.
site directions (ἐναντιοτροπίς MSS. ἐναντιοδρομίας Diels: ἐναντιοτροπίας Kranz); and everything is full of souls and daimones. He also spoke about what happens to all the things which are set together in the cosmos, and that the sun has the dimensions it appears to have. It is also said (λέγει δὲ καὶ MSS: λέγει δὲ καὶ Lipsius: λέγει τάδε καὶ Mouraviev) that you will not find out the limits of the soul when you go, travelling on every road, so deep a logos does it have (B 45). He also said that conceit (ὁνησίς) is a sacred disease and seeing is being deceived (B 46). In his writing he sometimes throws out things in a brilliant and clear manner, so that even the most sluggish understands it and obtains an elevation of the soul; the compactness as well as the heaviness of his exposition is incomparable.

There does not seem to be much structure in this passage, or too much connection between the individual statements as they follow one another. It appears more a collection of notes than a continuous text. The most one can say is that the account starts with the material principle, then comes a brief reference to Heraclitus’ physical and cosmological doctrines, interestingly including a mention of souls and daimones, followed by epistemological statements with some skeptic slant. The passage finally wraps up with remarks about Heraclitus’ way of expression. The provenance of this section, and whether or not it goes back to a single ultimate source, is unclear.

It has been maintained that this preliminary, general presentation of Heraclitus’ doctrines, just as the detailed doxography immediately following it, goes back to Theophrastus. It may of course ultimately go back to Theophrastus, but I do not find Diels’ arguments to this effect particularly strong. Deichgräber’s conclusion that even this part of Diogenes’ account follows Theophrastus closely seems to me very unlikely. The Stoic touch in this stretch of text is unmistakeable. The role accorded to heimarmenê is a clear indication, but one can also refer to the fact that the Stoics defined oiésis as an illness (SVF 3.103.6 and 104.35). It has also been suggested that at least parts of this section of Diogenes’ doxography go back to Aenesidemus. This theory could ac-

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2 I left the word logos untranslated for the time being, because the rendering of that term will be crucial for the interpretation of the whole fragment.

3 For a recent discussion of the passage, see Mouraviev (1987), 14–15.

4 So also Kirk (1954), 9.

5 So Marcovich (1967), 575 ad loc. Bollack and Wismann (1972), 165 ad loc. also speak of a sceptic source.
account for the Stoicizing elements, in so far as Aenesidemus’ interpretation of Heraclitus also has a Stoic stratum. This could also fit well with the possibly sceptical turn in B 45. However, it is unlikely that Aenesidemus is the source of the chapter as a whole. Just to mention one reason, Aenesidemus—as most recently Roberto Polito (2004) has shown— took air, and not fire, to be Heraclitus’ material principle. This is contradicted by the first sentence of the general doxographical account, which states that Heraclitus’ principle is fire. It is also notable that the assessment of Heraclitus’ way of expression is fundamentally positive here, which stands in contrast with the Theophrastean evaluation in the previous chapter. This suggests that the general account, or at least parts of it, comes from a source sympathetic to Heraclitus. To complicate things further—and to have the complete list of Hellenistic schools—there are at least two points where Epicurus comes into the picture. First, it was a well-known Epicurean doctrine that the sun’s actual size is, more or less, equal to its apparent size (Pyth., 91, cf. Lucr., 5.564ff; Cleomed., 2.1.4; Cic., De Fin., 1.6.20). Second, the Gnomologicum Vaticanum, 743 no. 294 = fr. 224 Usener) attributes to Epicurus the view that ‘conceit is a sacred disease’ (Ἔπικουρος ὁ φιλόσοφος τὴν οίησιν ἱερὰν νόσον ἔλεγεν).  

It is a notable feature of Diogenes’ general doxography that it prefers interpretations to quotations. For all that we know, the statement that ‘the sun has the dimensions it appears to have’ has its origin in Heraclitus’ fragment B 3. Now B 3 says either simply that the size of the sun is one human foot in width (ἕδρος ποδός ἀνθρωπείου) as is reported by Aëtius, or, if we accept that column 4 of the Derveni papyrus preserves the original wording then that

the sun ... according to nature is a human foot in width

ἲλι[ος ...]. οὖ κατὰ φύσιν ἄνθρωπ[ηλίου] ἕδρος ποδός [ἐστι]

In either case to arrive at the statement that ‘the sun has the dimensions it appears to have’ we have to add the further premise, which does not seem to be mentioned by Heraclitus, that the apparent size of the sun is one foot. It is only with the addition of this premise, unobvious and empirically questionable, but well-documented in antiquity from

6 Mouraviev, Heraclitea, II.A.4, T 1070; cf. also T 1060, T 1061, T 1063.
Aristotle onwards (*De an.*, 3. 428b 2, and *De somn.*, 458b 28), that one can infer that according to Heraclitus the sun’s actual dimensions are equal to its apparent dimensions.\(^8\) Diogenes’ source thus provides an interpretation and not a quotation of Heraclitus.

It is true that apart from our B 45 the stretch of text from τὴν τε οἶησαν up to ψευδεσθαί figures as a verbatim quotation in Diels-Kranz—this is fragment B 46.\(^9\) But the authenticity of B 46 as a whole has not found many supporters. Most editors, including Marcovich, Bollack and Wismann, Kahn, Robinson, Conche, Pradeau, treat it as spurious. With good reason, I think.

This, then, leaves us with B 45 as the only original fragment in Diogenes’ general doxography. But even in this case there are some complications. For according to all MSS, B 45 is introduced by the phrase λέγεται δὲ καί. Different translators have tried to give back the Greek, but as far as I can see all of them are forced to add or twist it a little bit to get the required meaning.\(^10\) The problem becomes even more evident when we compare the λέγεται with the εἰρήκε in the previous and the ἐλεγέ in the subsequent sentence. But no matter how one translates the phrase, it remains a fact that, as a TLG search shows, Diogenes Laertius uses λέγεται 72 times in his book, and apart from this case, he simply never ever introduces a verbatim quotation or a fragment with this form of the verb of saying.\(^11\)

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\(^8\) For an overview of the tradition, see Barnes (1989).

\(^9\) Diels originally held that οἶησαν is authentic, but from the 1912 3rd edition of *Die Fragmente der Vorsokrater* he excluded οἶησαν from the fragment. It was then Walther Kranz who rehabilitated οἶησαν, and this is why we have it in our Diels-Kranz.

\(^10\) Hicks and Robinson (1987), 167, render the phrase as ‘Another of his sayings is’, whereas Kahn has the variant ‘Another saying of his’—but these are not quite what the Greek says. Among the numerous translations I have checked, Mondolfo-Tarán’s ‘È detto anche’ is the most literal, but it perpetrates the semantic problem. A further suggestion is from Jacques Brunschwig who writes: ‘On y trouve également dit’, but then we don’t quite know what the ‘y’ refers to. Ambrosius, the earliest Latin translator of Stephanus’ text, translates dicitur et but then he is forced to supplement a sensisse.

\(^11\) The closest Diogenes gets is in 4.54 where he writes: ὁ γὰρ Βίτιον ἐίς τῶν συμήθων αὐτῷ [sc. Βιόν] πρὸς Μενεδήμου ποτέ λέγεται εἰπεῖν and here comes the quotation. But in this case we have a full subordinate construction with the subject in nominative and another verb of saying in the infinitive to complete the λέγεται. Moreover, what Diogenes then reports is clearly an anecdote about Bition and not a quotation from a written work.
An easy option is to emend the text into λέγει δὲ καί. This was suggested first by Lipsius to be followed by Hermann, Cobet, Bywater and Deichgräber who says that the λέγεται is sinnlos. It is also the emended version that Marcovich prints in his edition of Diogenes. Note that this suggestion introduces a present tense into the sequence of past tense words. Mouraviev, for his part, suggests λέγει τάδε· καί, because, I assume, it is paleographically closer to λέγεται δὲ καί. But on this solution even the text of the fragment is modified, because the καί must already be part of the quotation. Other current editors of Diogenes —Hicks, H. S. Long, etc.— and many Heraclitus scholars who quote Diogenes' doxography do not adopt the emendation suggested by Lipsius, because it is clearly a lectio facilior with no manuscript support.

B 45 thus occurs in a stretch of text which does not otherwise use quotations, and, according to all manuscripts, is introduced in a way which is non-standard, and indeed, unparalleled in Diogenes.

II

Let us now turn to the text of the fragment itself. Apart from the variants βαθόν, βαθός, and βαθύ in the last colon, which do not substantially modify the sense, there are two basic textual problems; one concerns the words πείρατα ἰὼν, the other the verb ἔξευροι.

The now standard version, πείρατα ἰὼν, is not attested but is the result of two emendations. The most important manuscripts B and P have πείρατον, whereas some others, including F and P⁴, have πείραται ὅν. These two can also be combined into πείρατον ὅν, supposing haplography, and this is what Stephanus prints. But then it remains unclear what the ὅν refers to.

12 I suppose Kirk (1954), 9 translates the emended text when he writes 'And he said too...'
13 Deichgräber (1938), 26, n. 21
14 Serge Mouraviev per lit. confirmed that my assumption was correct.
15 According to the information provided by Tiziano Dorandi per lit., B has πείρατον, but the ε is in rasura from the hand of the corrector of B (= B⁵). As to P, 'Le texte primitif de P a été corrigé après grattage; ce qu'on lit aujourd'hui πείραται ὅν est le résultat de la correction (probablement de P⁴). A l'origine il y avait probablement πείρατον (tel est la leçon de ms. Q = Parisinus gr. 1758, copié sur P avant les corrections de P⁴)'.
16 Stephanus' version does not figure in any of the critical apparatuses I have consulted.
The most important manuscripts thus have a form of the verb \( \text{peirávomai} \) which syntactically goes well with the genitive of \( \psiυχής \). The good Heraclitean credentials of the verb are assured by B 1. It seems clear that the main, or indeed, only reason why Hermann emended the received text into \( \text{peíræta} \) is because of the variant in Tertullian, which has \( \text{terminos animae} \) at this place. (On Tertullian's Latin version, see more below.)

The corruption of \( \text{peíræta} \) into the various attested forms is paleographically easy (provided one can explain the origin of \( \text{on or eon} \) at the end), and it is understandable that someone found the talk about the limits or end-points of the soul striking and consciously or unconsciously substituted it with a good Heraclitean verb.

At this point the context in Diogenes may offer some further cumulative evidence for the reading \( \text{peíræta} \). As we have seen, the previous item on Diogenes' list of Heraclitean \( \text{doxai} \) is an interpretation of B 3 about the size of the sun. Hermann Fränkel already tried to connect these two apparently disconnected but juxtaposed parts of the doxography to come up with a single fragment: ‘Die Sonne hat die Breite eines Menschenfusses; der Seele Grenzen (aber) wirst du nicht finden usw.’17 With all other interpreters I find the idea of a single fragment improbable. Yet, it seems to me that the connection pointed out by Fränkel, even if not quite in the way he thought it to be, may very well be the reason for the juxtaposition of the two fragments. This is even more so if we accept on the basis of the Derveni papyrus that B 3 originally formed a single statement not with B 45, but with B 94:

The sun according to ... nature is a human foot in width, not transgressing in size the proper limits of its width. Or else, the Erinyes, the guardians of Justice, will find it out, so that it does not make any transgression...

\[ \text{ὅλος ... ὁσον κατὰ φύσιν ἀνθρωπον ἐφυρός ποδός [ἐστι]} \]
\[ \text{τὸ μὲν ἤγερσος ὑπὲρβάλλων εἰκότας ὄμφρους ἐφύρουσ} \]
\[ \text{[εὖς: εἰ δὲ μὴ Ἰρινὺς[ς] ἐν ἓξευμήσουσιν, Δύκης ἐπίκουροι]} \]
\[ \text{[ὅπως δὲ μὴ δὲν ὑπὲρβατὸν ποτὶ κ特朗 P. Deru., col. 4.7-9]18} \]

By the addition of B 94 we have not only the idea of limits, expressed here by the word \( \text{oúρους} \) (which, incidentally, chimes nicely with the

17 Fränkel (1962), 433, and (1960), 271.
But what about Diels’ further emendation, the ἰῶν after πείρατα? This word is more doubtful than πείρατα. To begin with, there is nothing corresponding to it in Tertullian’s Latin version, which, as we have just seen, is the major, if not the only, reason to accept πείρατα. Moreover the position of the participle in the sentence may be problematic. Wilamowitz, for example, thought that ‘so gestellt ist ἰῶν undenkbar’. Wilamowitz, moreover, adds that the parallel from Pindar ναυσίν οὐτε πεξός ἰῶν that Diels evokes in order to support his reading only proves that ἰῶν cannot stand in this position with the required meaning. Jonathan Barnes apparently had similar problems with the same construction when he wrote in his Mind review of Charles Kahn’s book that ‘the orthodox πείρατα ἰῶν is surely wrong’. Yet epic poetry seems to offer numerous examples of the interjected participle ἰῶν (cf., e.g. Il., 1.138).

On the other hand, the ὁν or ὁν completing the πειράται in the manuscript versions, and which Diels emended into ἰῶν, are explainable by the fact that the corruption of πειράτα into some form of the

19 The doxa that precedes the one about the dimensions of the sun states that everything is full of souls and daimones. Now the columns that surround the quotation of Heraclitus in the Derveni papyrus are indeed full of Erinyes, souls, and daimones. The Derveni author’s focus is on the Erinyes as we can see it from the mentions of them in the badly mutilated columns 1 and 2. He then explains that the souls of the dead become daimones, and that the daimones are called assistants of the gods. This is how we get to the Heraclitus text in which the Erinyes are called the assistants of Dike. So, for someone who reads Heraclitus in the eschatological way, somewhat along the lines of the Derveni author, there can be a perfectly good connection between the statement that ‘everything is full of souls and daimones’ and the next statement about the size of the sun. To put it in another way, there is a reason to mention the size of the sun sandwiched between two statements speaking about souls or the soul. This, of course, does not need to correspond to the line of thought in Heraclitus’ book, but may well reveal the association of these doxai in Diogenes’ ultimate source.

20 Wilamowitz (1927), 276.

21 Wilamowitz’s suggestion is more complicated. He claims that ἐπιπορευόμενος is late, so he suggests replacing it with ἰῶν.

22 Barnes (1982), 121.
verb \( \pi\epsilon\rho\alpha\omicron\mu\alpha \) would result in a syntactically impossible construction without such a relative pronoun or ending.

To sum up, the participle is not attested in the manuscripts, it does not have the support of Tertullian, and does not seem to add much to the meaning, and its syntactical position may be problematic. So even if one accepts Diels’ emendation, because it explains the received text at the lowest cost, these are good reasons at least not to build too much on the presence of \( \iota\omicron\omicron\nu \) in one’s interpretation, as for example Bollack and Wismann do.

This brings us to the main verb of the sentence: \( \acute{e}\xi\epsilon\upsilon\rho\omicron\omega \) — or something like that. There is bit of a confusion around this verb and the manuscript attestation of it. Let me first summarize the situation before Marcovich’s edition of Diogenes Laertius. According to the apparatuses of the different editions \( \acute{e}\xi\epsilon\upsilon\rho\omicron\omega \) was first suggested by Carel Gabriel Cobet’s 1850 Didot edition of Diogenes Laertius. The same apparatuses tell us that the best manuscript B (Codex Borbonicus) and the second best manuscript P (Codex Parisianus Gr. 1759) have the third person aorist optative \( \acute{e}\xi\epsilon\upsilon\rho\omicron\omega \). The third best codex is the Florentine, F, which is a direct descendent of a, the common archetype of B and P. Generally F is less reliable, but sometimes offers good readings — to mention one example from this part of the text, it is the only codex that has the reading \( \beta\alpha\theta\omicron\nu \) in B 45, which is accepted by all scholars. F at this place also has the third person, but without the prefix: \( \epsilon\upsilon\rho\omicron\omega \).

Earlier editors from Stephanus onwards adopted \( \acute{e}\xi\epsilon\upsilon\rho\omicron\omega \) — after all this is the version attested by the two best MSS and is supported by the third best. Cobet then introduced \( \acute{e}\xi\epsilon\upsilon\rho\omicron\omega \) — or at least this is the story we get from the apparatuses. The notorious problem with Cobet’s edition is that it not only has no apparatus, but it also lacks a Prolegomena to explain the sources and reasons for introducing alterations in the text. (Actually, Cobet promised such a Prolegomena to his editor, but never submitted it.) What one can nevertheless clearly see from his choices is that he followed F, the Florentine ms, whenever possible. To quote Marcovich on Cobet: ‘codicem inferiorem F omni pretio sequitur’ (Marcovich [1999] XVII). However, this is clearly not what he does in this case, because, as we have just seen, Cobet has \( \acute{e}\xi\epsilon\upsilon\rho\omicron\omega \), whereas F has \( \epsilon\upsilon\rho\omicron\omega \). I have been unable to find out Cobet’s ultimate reason for accepting the alternative \( \acute{e}\xi\epsilon\upsilon\rho\omicron\omega \). Be that as it may, subsequent editors of Diogenes, just as well as almost all Heraclitus scholars, accepted Cobet’s version and credited it to Cobet. Even in the apparatus of Marcovich’ Heraclitus, we are told that B and
P have \( \epsilon\xi\epsilon\upsilon\rho\omicron\upsilon \), and \( \epsilon\xi\epsilon\upsilon\rho\omicron\upsilon\upsilon \) comes from Cobet and was then accepted by Diels.

Now comes Marcovich’s edition of Diogenes Laertius. Unsurprisingly, the main text has \( \epsilon\xi\epsilon\upsilon\rho\omicron\upsilon\upsilon \). The surprise comes in the apparatus: Marcovich reports that the first hands of both B and P wrote \( \epsilon\xi\epsilon\upsilon\rho\omicron\upsilon\upsilon \), while \( B^2 \) and \( P^4 \) apparently wrote \( \epsilon\xi\epsilon\upsilon\rho\omicron\upsilon\upsilon \). The favourite of previous editors, \( \epsilon\xi\epsilon\upsilon\rho\omicron\upsilon \), does not even appear in Marcovich’s apparatus. What has happened here? From the status of the best attested version, \( \epsilon\xi\epsilon\upsilon\rho\omicron\upsilon \) has become completely unattested and indeed is not mentioned at all. Where did all the previous editors, from Stephanus to Long get that \( \epsilon\xi\epsilon\upsilon\rho\omicron\upsilon \) was in B and P? Serge Mouraviev apparently had a similar perplexity in face of these contradictory attestations; this is why he reports in his apparatus of B 45 what we find in the apparatus of Marcovich’s Diogenes, but then Mouraviev adds, with a question mark in parenthesis, that B and P have \( \epsilon\xi\epsilon\upsilon\rho\omicron\upsilon \).24

According to the information I received from Tiziano Dorandi, who has re-examined the MSS, the actual situation is as follows. The first hand of B probably wrote \( \epsilon\xi\epsilon\upsilon\rho\omicron\upsilon\upsilon \), which is also the reading of the first hand of P — the reading is thus not the invention of Cobet as previous editors reported. \( \epsilon\xi\epsilon\upsilon\rho\omicron\upsilon \), on the other hand, is what the corrector of B (\( B^2 \)) writes, and the same text can be found also in the editio Frobeniana (1533) and its manuscript model Z (= Raudnitzianus Lobkowicensis vi F c. 38, s. xv ex.); this must be the ultimate source of the different editions prior to Cobet. So it is not the case that \( \epsilon\xi\epsilon\upsilon\rho\omicron\upsilon \) is not attested, as Marcovich’s apparatus indicates. F indeed has \( \epsilon\upsilon\rho\omicron\upsilon \). Finally, \( \epsilon\xi\epsilon\upsilon\rho\omicron\upsilon\upsilon \), that Marcovich attributes to \( B^2 \) and \( P^4 \), does not appear in the manuscripts at all, and is an emendation by Wilamowitz.

At this point it is important to stress the value of the corrections of \( B^2 \). As has been emphasized by Tiziano Dorandi in a recent general assessment of B,25 the primary scribe of B was not educated and apparently did not understand the text he was copying. He left stretches of parchment blank, because he was unable to decipher the original, and he was prone to write ‘lettres sans separation et sans aucun sens, des mot sans esprits ou sans accent’.26 \( B^2 \) (probably a 12th century contem-

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23 The only exceptions known to me are Bollack and Wismann and Lassalle.
24 Mouraviev’s apparatus to the fragment presents all the (partly contradictory) reports of various editors.
porary of B¹), who had in front of him the exemplar of B and who apparently understood what he read, often filled the lacunae left by B¹, corrected his errors, added the missing breathings and accentuations. This is what seems to have happened in this case as well: B¹ did not indicate the word division after ἐξεύροι and the breathing on ὄ, which was then supplied by B². The correction of B², together with the corroborative evidence of Z and F, makes a strong case for the third person reading.²⁷

Apart from the often mistakenly reported readings of the manuscripts, commentators cite only one reason for preferring the second person ἐξεύροιο against the third person ἐξεύροι, and this is once again Tertullian’s Latin version. The text as printed in the edition of Reifferscheid and Wissowa, and quoted by Marcovich in his apparatus of B 45, is as follows:

terminos animae nequaquam invenies omnem viam ingrediens.

The second person future invenies can indeed provide a reason for adopting the second person ἐξεύροιο. This is also the reason Bollack and Wismann mention in support of ἐξεύροιο, which, by the way, they ultimately do not accept: ‘Malgré l’adaptation de Tertullien, De anima, 2, 6 (... inuenies) etc’. And this is also the main reason for Mouraviev: ‘la deuxième personne de ἐξεύροιο et presque tout le reste est confirmé à la fois par Tertullien inuenies et le text parallel de Sophocle: ἀλλ’ οὐ γὰρ ἂν τὰ θεῖα κρυπτόντων θεῶν μάθοις ἂν, οὐδ’ εἰ πάντ’ ἐπεξελθοῖς σκοπῶν. Το my mind, the Sophocles passage (fr. 919.2 Radt) is not conclusive, if for no other reason, because it comes from a dialogue in which one character addresses another, and where the use of the second person is only natural. This leaves us with Tertullian. But if we take a look at the apparatus of Tertullian’s text, it becomes clear that invenies does not have any early authority, but is a conjecture of the editors. The textual transmission of this part of Tertullian’s De anima is especially poor. The only extant manuscript of the treatise is the codex Agobardinus (Parisinus Latinus 1622). The trouble is that the first part of the De anima, down to chapter 6, and thus including the passage that interests us, is missing from this codex. We, however, have the complete work, including our passage in the 1545 edition by Jean de Gagny and Martin Mesnart, usually marked as B. The text of Gagny and Mesnart is appar-

²⁷ One may find the substantive composed of the definite article and the participle awkward. But see B 16: τὸ μὴ δινών ποτε πῶς ἂν τίς λάθος.
ently based on a now lost complete manuscript coming from the same
camily as our extant but incomplete Agobardinus. The Gagny-Mesnart
edition of Tertullian’s De anima, however, has not the second person
invenies but the participle inveniens. The second earliest edition of
Tertullian’s De anima, only five years younger than the Gagny-Mesnart,
is in the edition of Tertullian’s works by the Czech philologist Sigismund
Gelenius. It also contains the parts missing from the extant Agobardinus
codex, but I have been unable to find out what text Gelenius used for
his edition of the De anima. (Apart from Rhenanus’ 1539 edition, which
does not include the De anima, Gelenus apparently used the Codex
Masburensis, which does not have the De anima either —so where did
he get the De anima from?) Whatever his source was, at the crucial
point Gelenius prints the infinitive invenisse. This is also the reading
Waszink adopts in the most recent authoritative edition of the text. If
so, there is no early authority for the use of the second person in Ter-
tuallian’s Latin.

Why did the Reifferscheid-Wissowa edition of Tertullian introduce
the second person invenies? The answer, I think, is clear. The editors
refer to the source of the Greek original in Diogenes Laertius, for which
they surely consulted Cobet’s edition, which as we have seen, prints
εξεύροιο, and which, as we have seen has no apparatus. They also
refer to the fragment by its Bywater number, and in his edition of the
fragment Bywater followed Cobet’s text. On the basis of the then most
current editions of Diogenes and Heraclitus the editors of Tertullian
had every reason to think that the verb in the Greek was in the second
person, so they emended the received Latin to the second person in
order to accommodate it to its assumed Greek original. Had they made
their edition prior to Cobet, using previous editions of Diogenes, they
would have found εξεύροι and might have emended the Latin accord-
ingly. But they used Cobet, and from that moment onwards the Latin
version, based on Cobet’s text, was thought to give independent confir-
mation for the second person singular. And, somewhat curiously, Hera-
clitus scholars keep using Tertullian’s emended text in order to find sup-
port for the second person in the Greek, even after Waszink published
his philologically superior text of Tertullian, in which he, reasonably
enough, went back to one of the authoritative early editions of Ter-
tuallian and printed the infinitive invenisse instead of invenies. Tertullian,
thus, is no evidence for the second person in Heraclitus’ original.

So much about the paleographical situation. Let me now add some
formal and stylistic reasons that, I think, speak in favour of εξεύροι.
Although it is not mentioned in any of the commentaries I have consulted, it is a striking formal feature of the standard version of B 45 that it is the only instance among Heraclitus’ extant sayings, generally accepted as authentic, in which the verb is in the second person singular. I add the qualification ‘generally accepted as authentic’ because Plato’s version of the river fragment listed under B 91 also uses the second person singular optative: δίς ἐστι τὸν αὐτὸν ποταμῷ ὤκ ἐμβαίνης. Some, e. g. Marcovich and Graham, reject all versions of B 91. But even most of those who take B 91 to be authentic do not think that Plato’s version preserves Heraclitus’ original text; overall preference is given to the more impersonal formulation preserved by Plutarch, which uses the infinitive: ποταμῷ ὤκ ἐστιν ἐμβηναι δίς τῷ αὐτῷ.

One reason to discredit Plato’s version has been exactly the use of the second person singular. Bollack and Wismann (1972), 268, for example suggest that the second person singular is a clear sign of the fact that Plato adopted the original wording to the formal features of the dialogue. To counter this objection, Leonardo Tarán, one of the few recent commentators who defend the wording found in the Cratylus, tries to find support in B 45. B 45 shows, argues Tarán, that Heraclitus sometimes did use the second person singular.28 But, as I have just argued, the use of the second person singular in B 45 is not as certain as it is generally supposed to be.

When referring to human behaviour or the human condition in general, Heraclitus often uses the impersonal and descriptive third person plural (B 1, B 34, B 19, B 56, B 12, B 104, B 110, B 51, B 20), sometimes specifying that he is speaking about the populace (B 2, B 17). For general statements, he can also use the third person singular (B 18, B 87, B 26), or the first person plural (B 21). The first person plural can also be used for statements with a normative force (B 47) as an alternative to impersonal constructions (B 43, B 44, B 80). Only in B 45 would Heraclitus employ the second person; it is the only fragment in which he would directly address someone.

The use of the second person singular imitates the situation of direct teaching, a rhetorical position that is frequent in archaic wisdom literature and philosophical texts. In those cases, however, the direct address is a feature that corresponds to the dramatic framing of the work as a whole. The text as a whole is addressed to someone with definite identity. So we can know that the addressee of Hesiod’s Erga is

Perses, and that Empedocles' instructs a certain Pausanias. And even if the addressee is not named, the goddess in Parmenides' poem speaks to a person about whom we can know at least something. Heraclitus' other fragments, starting with B 1, make it unlikely that Heraclitus worked with such a rhetorical or dramatic device: Heraclitus' logos is not addressed to a fictive or real disciple. Even in those cases where the second person address could perfectly find its place, he prefers an impersonal construction. He does not after all say—or rather write—that 'Listen not to me but to the logos and agree that...'

Let me finally add an admittedly more subjective remark. The direct address and the teaching position would ease the intellectual solitude and isolation of Heraclitus, so pronounced in the rest of the fragments. Heraclitus would have someone to speak to, someone to teach directly. Addressing someone directly would create a more intimate atmosphere, otherwise alien to Heraclitus' stern discourse.

In sum, for all these reasons, philological, formal, and stylistic, I have some preference for the version ἔξευροι ὁ.

The last textual question concerns the entire last colon: ὡς βαθὺν λόγον ἔχει. Some, e. g. Bywater, Zeller and Ramnoux, doubted the authenticity of this part of the text mainly because it is missing from Tertullian's Latin version. Even Serge Mouraviev thinks that the authenticity of this colon 'n'est pas tout à fait certaine'. What may add further force to the argument from the lack of the phrase in Tertullian is that the remark about the deep logos of the soul would fit Tertullian's argument perfectly. Tertullian's reason for quoting Heraclitus is exactly the point that the soul is such a difficult and obscure subject that resists philosophical inquiry, whereas only a few words are needed for the Christian to obtain complete understanding of it.

The best external evidence I found for the authenticity of the phrase comes from Plotinus' treatise On the Impassibility of the Incorporeal (3.6.15), which, as far as I can see, has not been mentioned by Heraclitus' commentators in this context.²⁹ Plotinus has just pointed out that the power of matter is far weaker than that of the soul (ἡ δὲ ἀσθενεστέρα γὰρ ἐστὶν ὥς πρὸς δύναμιν πολλῶν ψυχῆς). Then he continues by saying that ἀλλὰ ἐὰν ποτὲ ἐξεύροι αὐτὴν λόγος βαθύς τις ἐξ ἄλλων ὀντῶν κτλ. I cannot imagine that λόγος βαθύς, together with the verb

²⁹ The parallel has however been noted by Plotinus scholars. Cf. Stamatellos (2007), 161, and Fleet (1995), 250. Surely, this parallel can only show that the last colon was included in the version or versions used by both Diogenes' source and Plotinus.
ἐξεύρωι, and in a context where the soul has just been mentioned, is not an allusion to Heraclitus' B 45—including its ending.

There are some further passages, coming from a Hellenistic Jewish background, which I think echo B 45 together with its ending. At least two such texts are in the Septuagint. One is in the apocryphal Book of Judith 8.14.1 where we read: ὁτι βάθος καρδίας ἀνθρώπου ὦχ εὑρίσκετε καὶ λόγους τῆς διανοίας ὦ διαλήμψησθε which Marcovich quotes only partly and—mistakenly, I think—dismisses its relevance. Another is the Septuagint translation of Proverbs 18.4: ὁδὼρ βαθὺς λόγος ἐν καρδίᾳ ἀνδρός, ποταμὸς δὲ ἀναπηδεῖ καὶ πηγὴ ζωῆς. (I have not found this text mentioned in relation to B 45 in the commentaries I have consulted.) What these parallels and allusions can establish is that by the late Hellenistic age Heraclitus' saying was known with the last colon; they cannot of course remove all doubts about its authenticity. Apart from these textual arguments, one could also add the stylistic consideration that adding the striking punch line οὐτῶ βαθὺν λόγον, without any connective, is quite characteristic of Heraclitus' style.

Opting for the third person reading and retaining the last colon opens up a further syntactic ambiguity: the subject of ἐχει can be not only the soul, but also the one who travels on every road. At this stage, I only mention this result, but will come back to it in the last part of the paper.

Let me now conclude this survey on the text of the fragment. I have argued that there are good reasons to accept the emendation πείρατα, whereas there are reasons to doubt the emendation ιων. Further, there are philological and stylistic reasons to prefer ἐξεύρωι ὧ τὸ ἐξεύρωι. At the very least, it should be kept as a possible source of (intentional) syntactical ambiguity. After all, Heraclitus' supposed original and its early copies did not indicate either word limits or breathings; these early written versions must have been ambiguous on this point. If so, our interpretation also should take into account this possible ambiguity—a well-known stylistic device of Heraclitus. Finally, there are fairly good reasons, although by no means conclusive, to accept the authenticity of the last colon of the fragment. The ensuing provisional text and translation are as follows:

ψυχῆς πείρατα [ιων]
οὐκ ἄν ἐξεύρωι
ὁ πάσαν ἐπιπορευόμενος ὄδὸν
οὐτῶ βαθὺν λόγον ἐχει.
He who travels every road will not find out the limits of the soul [as he goes], so deep a logos does it/he have.
It is time to turn to the interpretation of the text. The complexity and dynamic character of this fragment stem, it seems to me, from the fact that the successive elements of the sentence regularly force the reader to modify the expectations that he or she has built up on the basis of traditional conceptions on one hand, and the previous elements of the sentence on the other. The sentence is composed of four syntactic/semantic units: (a) the soul’s limits, which (b) will not be found out, (c) the traveller, and finally (d) the depth of the logos that the soul, or according to a possible construction of the third person interpretation, the traveller has. On either construal, this final clause is supposed to explain why the traveller will never find the limits of the soul.30

First, what kind of soul is the fragment speaking about? Two distinct lines of interpretation have been on offer. Some interpreters, like Kahn, Bollack and Wismann, and Kirk, Raven, and Schofield, take the reference to be to the common, divine cosmic soul, whereas others like Snell, Marcovich, Dilcher, and Pradeau think that Heraclitus speaks about the individual soul.31 Taking this latter option, we still have alternatives. Heraclitus may speak about individual human souls in general or about some particular soul.

The word, \( \psi υχη \), must naturally evoke in Heraclitus’ audience the traditional conception of the soul from epic and early lyric poetry, and, in the relevant cases, the religious and philosophical ideas of Pythagoras, the Orphics, and the Milesians. Yet the conjunction of the first two words \( \psi υχη\,\,\,\,\,\,\,\,πειρατα \) already bursts this expectation. In the traditional conceptions, it does not make much sense to speak about the limits or end points of the soul. Indeed, a TLG search shows that this construc-

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30 As the grammars tell us, the potential optative with \( \partialν \) in general can express a whole range of modality from sheer possibility to a fixed resolve with future reference. The future reference is retained when an aorist is used, but then the word expresses not a possibility but rather a fact that will, or will prove to, be true. In our case, this consideration is reinforced by the further fact that the potential optative with a negative generally expresses not a possibility, but a strong assertion. So even if the potential optative otherwise normally states a ‘future possibility, propriety, or likelihood, as an opinion of the speaker’ (Smyth, §1824), in this case it is not an opinion and not a likelihood, but a strongly asserted fact that the traveller will not find out the limits of the soul.

tion remains a peculiarity of Heraclitus, unparalleled in the whole TLG corpus. The first syntactic unit of the fragment thus already creates tension and raises questions: what kind of soul does Heraclitus have in mind such that it has limits or end-points? Or, alternatively, what kind of limits or end-points does the soul have? Prima facie, the translations of the word πείρατα may suggest that the limits should be conceived as borders: this is how far the soul is allowed to go. But the LSJ and a TLG search tell us that πέρας or πείραρ, as opposed to words like ὁρος, do not refer to such external boundaries but exclusively to the internal extremities of the spatial extension of a thing, often in the sense of the end point of a forward movement. Accordingly, the πείρατα of the soul, in the first instance must refer to the internal limits of the extension of the soul, possibly in connection with a passage or forward movement within that extension. The soul, after the first two words of the fragment, appears to be something that has extension.

This impression is strongly reinforced by the clear allusion to a typical epic construction with πείρατα. As commentators have often noted, the expression ψυχή πείρατα echoes the epic constructions πείρατα γαίς (Il., 8.478–9, 14.200, 14.301; Od., 4.563, 9.284; Hes., E., 168), πείρατα Ὄκεανοῖ (Od., 11.12), and πείρατα πόντος (Il., 8.478–9). Paradoxically, the fact that the traveller will never reach the limits of the soul only strengthens the force of these parallels, because travellers in Homer often sail or march on the limitless sea or earth. The allusion to the Homeric expressions presents the ψυχή in Heraclitus' sentence as one of the spatially extended cosmic masses, on a par with the earth and the sea. This consideration immediately recalls Heraclitus' B 36 which, once again, treats the soul on a par with exactly the same cosmic masses, water and earth:

ψυχής τάνατος ὄδωρ γενέσθαι,
οὐδατί δὲ τάνατος γῆν γενέσθαι,
ἐκ γῆς δὲ ὄδωρ γίνεται,
ἐξ ὕδατος δὲ ψυχή.

For souls it is to die to become water, for water it is to die to become earth, from earth water is being born, from water soul.

32 Constructions with ὁρος are attested from later ages; also cases where ὁρος has the meaning ‘limit’ or ‘boundary’, and not ‘definition’. In such cases it sometimes refers to the boundary between soul and body. From our point of view, particularly notable is Philo, De sobrietate, 6.6: τοῖς ψυχής ὁροῖς μὴ ὑπερβαίνειν, εἰ μὴ νεωτέρων πραγμάτων.
The reference to the soul’s extension and the allusion to the sea and earth speak in favour of the cosmic soul interpretation of the fragment. This reading is entirely in accordance with the cosmological aspect of Heraclitus’ psychology evidenced in the testimonies of Aristotle, the Stoics, and Sextus, and according to which the whole range of exhalations, connecting water to the heavenly fire, can be called air. On this reading, the limits of the soul, if there are any, should be along the vertical directions.

It is true on the other hand that a reference to a more standard, individual soul would guarantee more autonomy to the saying in so far as it would require less reliance on Heraclitus’ cosmological doctrines (or, more precisely, to a certain interpretation of his cosmological doctrines that I tend to favour). So we should certainly keep this possibility open as well.

At this point it seems useful to turn immediately to the final clause of the fragment. Although it is not connected to what comes before with an appropriate connective particle, the final clause functions as a rhetorical punch line that is meant to explain, or at least to add something important to, the impossibility expounded in the first part of the sentence. At first blush, up to the words οὐτω βαθὺν the text seems to reinforce the spatial imagery of the first part of the sentence, and thus also the cosmic interpretation I have outlined above. The word βαθὺς suggests that Heraclitus will say something more about the dimensions of the ὑπάρχῃ: it is because of its vertical dimensions that the limits of the soul cannot be found out.

ἡπτετο γελών τά ἔτερας συμπύπτοντα κτλ. The underlined words may be taken as an echo of Heraclitus B 94. A further link between B 45 and (B 3+) B 94?

Onians (1951) dedicates a full chapter to the discussion of the word πείρατα (Part III, chapter II) in which he argues that the apparently disparate meanings of πείρατα in different contexts can all be rendered consistent by the meaning ‘bond’, as when a rope is knotted and the ensuing loop encircles and delimits what is inside. Marcovich (1967), 367, explicitly claims to follow Onians, but this is not evident in his interpretation or translation.

For a discussion and defence of this interpretation, see Betegh (2007).

In the interpretation of this fragment it is consistently ignored that the word βαθὺς means ‘high’ just as well as ‘deep’. Cf. LSJ sv. Marcovich (1967), 366, first seems to develop his interpretation around the horizontal-vertical opposition, but then gives it a further twist by saying that the word βαθὺς refers not really to the vertical dimension, but to the depth of the human organism, and ultimately the blood, from which soul is born according to a certain proportion (λόγος). It seems to me that this interpretation is hopelessly confused.
Yet, once again, the reader is in for a surprise. For Heraclitus' explanation does not refer to the dimensions of the ψυχή, but to the depth (or the height) of the logos. (This point, by the way, is often ignored by commentators including Snell, who simply equate the depth of the logos of the soul with the depth of the soul, the 'Tiefe der Seele'.) Anyhow, the meaning of the word βαθύς will fundamentally depend on the meaning we give to the word logos. And here, finally, we have to face the notorious problem of the meaning of the word logos. I cannot even touch upon the question of the general interpretation of this term in Heraclitus, and whether or not there is an appropriate translation that can be applied to all occurrences. But concentrating specifically on this fragment, the interpretations offered are still bewilderingly different. Translations and renderings range from ‘proportion’ and ‘measure’ (Marcovich) to ‘law’ (Gesetz, Diels), through ‘rational being’ (vernünftige Wesen, Nestle), ‘report’ (Kahn), ‘formula’, ‘speech’ (discours, Conche), ‘knowledge’ (connaissance, Pradeau), and ‘reasoned thinking’ (Dilcher). I tend to agree with Dilcher that some of these solutions are rendered improbable by the adjective βαθύς: it is unclear what ‘deep measure’, ‘deep proportion’ or ‘deep law’ would mean. Kahn’s shifting treatment of the term in this fragment is a clear indication of these difficulties. He starts out by saying that ‘Most authors have rightly assumed that logos in XXXV [= B 45] must mean ‘measure’. But then he continues by saying that it is ‘vast, subtle and deep’ (1979) 130—but how can a measure be ‘subtle’? Finally, contradicting the interpretation he offers in the commentary, he renders logos as ‘report’ in his translation.

If we take a look at the later occurrences of the expression βαθύς λόγος, its usage is fairly consistent. It refers to a thought, argument, reasoning, or doctrine that expresses some important truth but is difficult to obtain and communicate. We have seen above that Plotinus uses the expression to a type of reasoning that may reveal matter as such; he thus seems to use βαθύς λόγος as a synonym for the ‘bastard reasoning’, νόθος λογισμός, of the Timaeus. Porphyry’s phrase βαθύς ο λόγος και μείζων τής σής έξεως (In Cat., 4.1.75.26 CAG) is another good example for this usage; here the expression refers to the difficulty of finding out what Aristotle means by συμβεβηκότα. In Patristic texts the expression occurs with a high frequency. Origen, Gregory of Nyssa,

36 Snell (1982), 17.
38 Kahn (1979), 129.
Eusebius, and Cyril are especially fond of this turn of phrase. In these texts βαθύς is often correlated with further adjectives like ἀπόρρητος (e. g. Origenes, Contra Celsum, 1.24) or μυστικός (e. g. Cyril, De ador., 68.416.50). Moreover, the adjective often comes in the comparative where the βαθύτερος λόγος describes the more valuable but more difficult doctrine or view that expresses the truth more fully.

On the force of these admittedly much later occurrences, it might be tempting to understand the phrase in Heraclitus in the sense that the soul is a difficult subject —like matter or the concept of συμβεβηκότα— and thus it is particularly difficult to give an account of it. The πειρατα in such a construction could mean those internal limits of the soul which define it —much the way the word ὁφος would later be used. I could not however find a convincing case where the phrase x λόγον εξει means that x is the object of the logos. If so, the expression cannot mean that the account about the soul is so difficult.

At this juncture, it is worth mentioning the epistemological readings of logos advocated recently by Roman Dilcher and Jean-François Pradeau. According to these readings, the final clause expresses that the soul has a deep and penetrating reason, thinking or knowledge (conceived as the result or outcome of such reasoned thinking).39 In a sense, this interpretation of the ending of the fragment would be reassuring in so far as we are accustomed to the idea that thinking, reasoning, and knowledge belong to the soul. We should however remind ourselves that this must have been radically new to Heraclitus' intended audience. First, because of the semi-technical sense this interpretation gives to logos, which must have been an innovation by Heraclitus and made possible by some very recent developments in the semantics of the word. Second, and just as importantly, endowing the ψυχή with the cognitive power expressed by the word logos was just as well a novelty. Interpreters of Heraclitus have rightly emphasized that such an epistemological turn is one of the most radical features of Heraclitus' conception of the soul.40 Thus, for Heraclitus' contemporaries, for whom it was less unusual to think that, like Odysseus, one has to travel to meet ψυχαί than to think that the ψυχή is the centre of cognition, the ending of the


40 Most fully argued by Nussbaum (1972) and Schofield (1991).
fragment must have been not a comforting coda, but a provocative statement raising further the already high level of tension in the fragment.

This epistemological interpretation may be made compatible with some more standard ones. For even if one translates *logos* not as ‘reasoned thinking’ as Dilcher does or as ‘connaissance’ as Pradeau does, but simply as ‘account’ or ‘report’, one cannot think that it is any old account or report, but an account that is essentially true, articulate, intelligent, intelligible, and important. Such a report or account presupposes reason, thinking, understanding, and knowledge, especially in Heraclitus who seems to use *logos* in the singular as a veridical term. A *logos* is a report that a rational being offers other rational beings to learn from. This feature of *logos* is further emphasized in B 45 by the adjective ‘deep’. The soul offers such a true, articulate, intelligent, intelligible, and important, in a word, deep, report, the subject of which may or may not be the soul itself.

Now what do these considerations about the final clause tell us about the identity of the soul? They are, I think, unproblematic for the cosmic soul interpretation, in so far as it is unproblematic to ascribe a deep *logos* to the cosmic divine soul. The *logos* of the cosmic soul may well be the universal *logos* that each of us should listen to. The same point, however, raises important problems for the individual human soul interpretation, at least if one takes the fragment to refer to individual human souls in general. For in view of his very low opinion of the cognitive state of humans, it is highly unlikely that Heraclitus would ascribe a deep *logos* to individual human souls in general. It is true that, as B 116 states, self-knowledge and correct thinking is a *possibility* for every human being (ἀνθρώποι πάσι μέτεστι γνώσκειν ἐωντοὺς καὶ σοφρονεῖν), yet this possibility is realized only by a few —most people are in a deplorable epistemological condition, and their souls are barbaroi. Now if their souls are barbaroi, they do not actually possess such a deep *logos*. Thus, on this reading, *logos* in B 45 can only refer to a capacity, faculty, or potentiality that belongs to every human soul. Yet the word *logos*, as Dilcher’s historical semantic survey shows, does not refer to a faculty, capacity, or potentiality, even in Heraclitus’ reformed usage, but to the actual cognition and the already actualized, rationally articulated contents or results of cognition.

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41 Pradeau makes it explicit that he thinks that the term *logos* in this fragment, but only in this fragment, needs to refer to the ‘pouvoir où faculté de connaitre’ (Pradeau [2002], 282).
The same point may be reinforced by B 115, if authentic: “To the soul belongs a logos which augments itself” (ψυχής ἔστι λόγος ἐαυτῶν αὐξών).42 Surely, B 45 and B 115 show clear and strong affinities. In both cases, and only in these two cases, do we hear about a logos being attributed to the soul. Moreover, in both cases the statement ascribes some sort of quantitative determination to the soul’s logos. On this basis, it has sometimes been maintained that the two fragments express the very same idea. Yet, the strong verbal echoes notwithstanding, the two fragments stand also in contrast to each other, in a way that buttresses my previous point: the deep or extended logos of the soul is not a given but a potentiality.43 It is true of every individual soul that its logos can augment itself, but it is not true of every individual soul that it actually has a deep logos. If we want to take B 45 to refer not to a divine cosmic soul, but to human souls, we still have to admit that B 45 cannot speak about any old individual human soul, but only about the most accomplished souls.

If we accept that the fragment cannot speak about human souls in general, but still want to maintain that it speaks about some human soul, the most natural solution is to think that the reference is to the soul of the traveller. Actually, this makes excellent sense, provided that we take the claim that he travels every road seriously. His soul is accomplished, has such a deep logos, exactly because he travels every road. He is not then someone like Hecataeus, criticised in B 40, who travels to some random far-away places in order to collect a hodgepodge of information on various topics. Instead of being a polymath, our traveller is engaged in an unrelenting systematic search that leads to true experience and knowledge, a deep logos. And the one who takes every road, presumably also takes the famous road up and down —the road, that at least on some ancient and modern interpretations, is the upward and downward path of exhalations, which, as we have seen, was identified by ancient interpreters with Heraclitus’ cosmic soul. The soul of our traveller can have such a deep logos, because he has a comprehensive experience of the world, including also the cosmic soul and the logos of it.44

42 The text is of doubtful authenticity, as Stobaeus, our only source for the fragment, attributes it not to Heraclitus but to Socrates.
43 In this I follow Robinson (1987), 156, even if I am not sure that B 115 should be given a straightforwardly physicalist interpretation.
44 The interpretation I am suggesting has important connections with that of Dilcher, inspired by Snell. But according to the Snell/Dilcher interpretation the fragment is about
Somewhat differently, the same point can be made by the alternative syntactic construal opened up by the third person reading of the fragment. As we have seen above, this text allows, if not favours, the construction in which the subject of the verb ἔχει is not the soul, but the traveller. On this construal the standard meaning of the word logos is unproblematic; indeed, I take it to be a great advantage of this reading that it allows such a natural meaning for logos. Our traveller, as travellers so often, has a ‘report’ or ‘account’. But in so far as he is a systematic traveller, in so far as he travels every road, his account is deep, as opposed to the medley of someone like Hecataeus. And his account will include a report of the road up and down, of his experience about the soul, both cosmic and personal. At the end of the day, the distinction between the cosmic and the personal will not be so important. The logos of such a person will not be so different from the cosmic logos, and the logos of his soul will not be so different from the logos of the cosmic soul.

Consequently, the implication of the fragment is not that one will not find out the limits of the soul, even if one travels every road. It is rather the paradoxical message that only the one who travels every road will not find the limits of the soul. Travelling all these roads is not an idle and necessarily mistaken attempt, going in the wrong direction, as it were, but rather the precondition of having (a soul that has) a deep logos. It is because of one’s ‘travels’, one’s comprehensive experience and understanding of the world, that one’s logos (or the logos of one’s soul) has become so deep, and this is why one will never find the limits of the soul—only such a person will be aware of the limitless-ness of the soul. And at this point the syntactic ambiguity can take effect: you can also become that person.
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