Eschatology and Cosmology: Models and Problems

Abstract: The paper argues that through the Presocratic period, and after, there were two major models governing discourse on the relationship between the soul and the cosmos: the ‘journey’ model and the ‘portion’ model. The two models integrated the soul in the cosmos in different ways; they had their respective advantages, but both left important questions unanswered. An examination of Orphic fragments suggests that the ‘portion’ model, favoured by more Presocratic philosophers, could also be used to express eschatological concerns. Plato’s Phaedo, on the other hand, shows that one could opt for the more traditional ‘journey’ model thanks to metaphysical and ethical arguments. As both models had their respective advantages, there were attempts to employ both. This can be seen in fragments of Empedocles and in the Derveni papyrus. Finally, the doctrine of the soul in the Timaeus can be understood as a successful integration of the two models.

In questo lavoro si sostenne che durante il periodo presocratico, è oltre, la relazione fra anima e cosmo veniva espressa mediante due modelli fondamentali: il ‘modello del viaggio’ e quello ‘parcellare’. I due modelli miravano, per vie diverse, a integrare l’anima nel cosmo, ognuno aveva i propri vantaggi, ma entrambi lasciavano senza risposta questioni importanti. Un esame dei frammenti orfici indica che il ‘modello parcellare’, privilegiato dalla maggior parte dei filosofi presocratici, poteva essere piegato anche ad esprimere preoccupazioni eschatologiche. Il Fedone platonico mostra d’altronde che, in base a considerazioni etiche e metafisiche, era possibile adottare il più tradizionale ‘modello del viaggio’. E poiché ciascuno dei due modelli aveva i propri

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The history of the development of psychological ideas in archaic Greece is a theme that has received thorough scholarly attention since at least the end of the nineteenth century. The studies of Erwin Rohde, Bruno Snell, David Furley, Jan Bremmer, and David Claus, just to mention a few of the most important authors, have analyzed in great detail the process of transformation through which Homeric psychological terms received new meanings in the works of poets and philosophers. Most recently, André Laks discussed the psychology of the Presocratics in his entry to the Cambridge Companion to Early Greek Philosophy, where he emphasized the double movement of unification and differentiation that characterizes the psychology of the period.

Nevertheless, the reason for which I propose to come back to this theme is to discuss one aspect of ancient psychology that, it seems to me, has received comparatively little emphasis. Most of the above-mentioned studies concentrate on the interrelation of psychological concepts within the individual, i.e., how the different psychic functions are distributed among the different parts of a human being, and whether they are integrated under a more unified concept or kept apart as distinct and independent functions for which distinct and independent parts of a human being are responsible. This approach is entirely justified as far as it reveals to us the process through which a representation of the human psyche, more familiar to us, has emerged. Yet, what the actors themselves were more interested in, it seems to me, is not how the bearers of psychic and cognitive functions are related to each other but rather how they are related to the world — and not just to the world that constitutes our immediate environment, but also to the world at large. The thesis I would like to defend is that the relationship between the soul and the cosmos is a crucial facet of ancient psychology. In this respect, the central question is how the soul and the mind are integrated in the cosmos during the life of the individual and eventually after it. It was just as important, I shall maintain, to find the soul's place in the cosmos as to determine the anatomical location of the psychic organs within the human body.

More specifically, I shall suggest that there were two major models which were developed in the Presocratic period and by which the soul-soul relationship was conceived and expressed by the great majority of individual theories and representations. A detailed analysis of individual doctrines would not be possible within the confines of one paper. My aim here can only be to offer, through the mention of some significant examples, the rough outlines of an interpretative framework within which I hope to analyse the individual theories in future studies. In this paper, I shall first give a brief characterisation of the two models and then examine the way they can interact with each other.

The 'journey model'

I shall call the first of the two models the 'journey-model'. It does not need a detailed demonstration that the journey of the soul after the death of the human being is an ubiquitous theme in Greek culture. Even though Greek eschatological ideas show a very large degree of variation, the journey motif is one of the most constant elements from Pindar's poetry to the Charon images on white ground lekythoi, from the Orphic gold plates to Aristophanes' 'props, from Pherecydes to Empedocles. The authoritative status of this model is grounded in the frequent mentions of the post mortem journey of the soul to Hades in Homer. A point that needs emphasizing in this respect is that, as Homeric scholars have demonstrated, the different strata of the epic show a gradual complexification of the journey image. In the Iliad we are told, most often without any further details, that the winged soul of the deceased passed to Hades (cf. e.g. II., 16, 856 and 22, 362: ἔλυεν σπειράς Χορόν ἁρπαξάτης άνδρα προσπελεύει). The journey is presented as quick and the integration in Hades depends on whether or not the body received proper burial. This can be contrasted with the much more elaborate description of the passage of the souls of the Suitors to Hades in Od. 24, which is generally agreed to be a later addition to the main body of the epic.

1 From the recent literature, see e.g. Waer 1989 and Sourvinou-Inwood 1995, 44-103.
As Sourvinou-Inwood emphasized, the more elaborate topography and the emergence of a need for a guide for souls - i.e. Hermes - are indications of the growing complexity of the journey. This, in turn, is a sign of the growing importance of the journey image in eschatological representations. The introduction of Charon, the first attested appearance of whom is in the epic Ἔρμης, dated to the end of the seventh or to the beginning of the sixth century, is a further step in the gradual construction of the description of the journey. The appearance of Charon brings with itself a diversification of the water system of the Netherworld as well. It might very well be the case that the popularity of the ἱστοκίνησις literature had an impact on the elaboration of the details, as Erwin Rohde has maintained. Yet, the ἱστοκίνησις narratives and what I call the journey model are just two sides of the same coin.

Another crucial feature of the development of the journey motif is that the possible destinations of the deceased became multiplied. The first step in this process is the distinction between Hades and Elysion, which is mentioned in one isolated passage in the Odyssey (τὸ κατά τῆς ἑδερίνης τῆς Μενέκης). The diversification of afterlife destinations becomes even more pronounced in the Hesiodic image of the Isle of the Blessed (Op., 157-169). It is a common feature of traditional cosmographies that they distinguish between great cosmic regions - the Olympus, the earth, Tartarus, Hades, etc. - in such a way that these different regions are intrinsically value-laden and structure the world not only topographically but also along an axiological dimension. It is intrinsically good to be in some and bad in others. The diversification of afterlife destinations into better and worse places then paves the way for a retributive eschatology that we find prominent in some later religious and philosophical texts. Retributive eschatology can, moreover, take another form coupled with doctrines of metempsychosis that posit a hierarchy of life forms, where one to some extent can influence what sort of body one's soul will next be incarnated in.

1 ROHDE 1925, 236-237.
2 Cf. 4, 561-5: αύτο τοῦ ἑθοστοῦ ἐστι, ἀναπόθετον ἐστι, ἐν γαμφείᾳ ἂν ἐμελείαν. / Ἀργεῖ ἐν ἀγγελοθείαν διάκειν καὶ γάμον ἐπετελεῖν / οὐαναί αἰν Πόλεος πεπολυγμένος καὶ νεοτίᾳ
νεότατον περίκλειον, τό ἄκολος τριάδος ἀνακάκλισιν.
3 Cf. e.g. BARNES (982, 472-477); WRIGHT 1990; O'DELL 2001, 169-172.

2. The 'portion model'

I shall call the second of the two models the 'portion model'. According to this model, the soul (or the thing which is or things which are responsible for some or all of the psychic functions of a human being) is a portion of one or more specific stuffs that also have cosmic functions. It has been often maintained that the Presocratic psychological theories are predominantly, or even exclusively, physicalist. It is also true that, in the case of the Presocratics, the 'portion model' overlaps to a large extent with physicalism in the sense that the bearer or bearers of psychic functions is or are made of some material component of the world. Yet, the 'portion model' as formulated above does not require physicalism, but it is also compatible for instance with some form of substance dualism. Thus, the Anaxagorean theory would still fit the 'portion model' if the Mind were immaterial. Irrespective of the metaphysical status of Mind, More than that it is sufficient for our purposes that there are larger and smaller portions of it (59 B 12: οὐς δὲ τὰς ἀκατασκευάζοντας καὶ τὰ μεταφυσικά and that specific portions of it inhere in living beings and are responsible for certain cognitive functions of these beings). The point of view of the 'portion model', the criterion is not the metaphysical status of the bearer of psychic functions, but the fact that the stuff responsible for psychic functions in human beings plays cosmological roles as well. Accordingly, I shall use the term 'stuff' in a loose sense that does not imply any ontological commitment.

Another point to be stressed is that although the 'portion model' can easily take the form of the microcosmos-macrococmos analogy, there is no total overlap between the two. So for example, a theory in which there is a structural isomorphism between the cosmos and the soul of the human being, without reference to their respective constitutive stuffs, is a case of the microcosmos-macrococmos analogy, but is not an instance of the 'portion model'. On the other hand,
not all instances of the 'portion model' are cases of the microcosmos-macrocosmos analogy. So if stuff S has the propensity to φ-ing, then the fact that S φ-s both when it is part of a human being and when it participates in cosmic processes, does not mean in itself that we are dealing with an instance of the microcosmos-macrocosmos analogy. It is not analogy, but one aspect of a unified and reductionist view about the constituents of the world. Indeed, the language of microcosmos-macrocosmos analogy is sometimes used too loosely, and one should specify in each case what the terms of the positive analogy and what the terms of the negative analogy are.

Obviously, the 'portion model' allows a great number of individual variations depending on the general psychological and cosmological theories it is part of. So the stuff that is responsible for one or all of the psychic functions can be one of the elements, one particular type of atom, a particular mixture of the opposites, 'the hot and the cold, the dry and the moist', or a particular mixture of the four elements and so on. The most important variable is the cosmological role attributed to this stuff. It is a general tendency that in these doctrines where one of the elements has a privileged position, the soul is considered to be a portion of that element. In such cases, the same element is called divine and has a fundamental role in the maintenance of cosmic order. In this way, the qualitative difference among the elements is supplemented with axiological distinctions; and the element with which the soul is identified is the most valuable of the elements. This is the case in Heraclitus, Diogenes of Apollonia, and most probably also in Anaximenes, even if the details of 13 B 2 are hotly debated. The privileged element can take further functions. Heraclitus and Diogenes explicitly link it with rationality. And, as Aristotle emphasizes in De Anima, 1, 2, there is also a

...tendency to make the soul that element which is responsible for movement in the world at large.

The contrast between the two models

The tension between the two models, as I take it, is the following. As we have seen, in the 'portion model' the bearer of psychic functions is defined as a certain quantity of some stuff or a mixture of different stuffs. By identifying the soul's constitutive stuff as something that exists in the world around us, the soul gets integrated in the world and is able to fit in the sense that we get an account about the way the soul is related and interacts with the other ingredients of the world. As Aristotle clearly, it allows also an explanation of perception and thinking in terms of interaction between the soul and the other components of the world. But apart from its epistemological ramifications, what is more important is a unified theory in which the bearer of the psychic functions is an exception to the general behaviour of cosmological stuffs and takes part in cosmological processes as well. Malcolm Schofield has analyzed this aspect of Heraclitus' theory of the soul with admirable lucidity starting his discussion from 22 B 36:

οὐκ ἀλλὰς ἀλλαὶ ἡμέτερα, ἰδιωταὶ δὲ ἰδιωτοὶ γὰρ γενέσθαι, ἐκ γὰρ δὲ ἰδιωτοῦ· ὁ δὲ ἰδιώτης ἐξ ἰδιωτοῦ.

For souls it is death to become water, for water it is death to become earth, for earth water becomes, from water soul.

For the integration of the soul in the cosmos there is a price to pay, however. For, in this model, it remains problematic what provides the unity of the individual soul conceived as a portion of some stuff. As Aristotle is quick to remark in his criticism of earlier psychological theories in De Anima, 1, 5, it is unclear why and under what conditions a certain portion of air or fire will form such a unity that can then act as the bearer of psychic functions. Moreover, the 'portion model' in this form is unable to provide a persistent unity, a fixed core, which is able to carry responsibility and memory.
By contrast, the soul's unity is not a problem, but a fact in the journey model. Indeed, it is a central feature of this model that the soul is treated as an atomic entity that retains its identity throughout its passage. What is more, the model contains at least an implicit concept of personal identity. Remarkably, both of the two major traditional aspects of personal identity, memory and personal responsibility, are present in traditional versions of the journey model. A further important corollary of the assumed basic unity of the soul in the journey model is that the soul is always clearly distinguished from its environment. The soul is contrasted with the body that it leaves behind or takes in a next life. Similarly, the soul does not substantially interact with the cosmic locations it travels to. In this sense, the cosmic regions offer a static stage on which the drama of the soul can unfold, while the bodies are costumes or garments in which the soul is cloaked. The bodies and the locations can cause suffering to the soul, but there is no deeper, physical or substantial interaction between the soul and the body, or the soul and its cosmic environment.

What remains unexplained, then, is what the soul is and how it is related to its environment. The soul is integrated into the cosmos not in the sense that it is an integral part of cosmic processes, but in the sense that in its different states it intrinsically belongs to certain regions and not to others.

What needs emphasizing is that the journey model is perfectly compatible with the presence of cosmological elements. Richard Seaford in his seminal article *Immortality, Salvation, and the Elements* has shown that eschatological representations often use the language of the physical elements, and that the journey of the soul is often described as a passage through the different elements. Thus, even though the cosmological masses can be understood in terms of elements, the soul is not analysed in these terms. Furthermore, there are rules that govern the behaviour of the souls, but what these rules regulate are not the qualitative changes of the soul or the way it interacts with different elements, but the way the soul can move between different locations, where it must go and where it cannot go.

We get a theory of 'natural places' for the soul, but these 'natural places' function in terms of axiology and not in terms of physics.

To sum up, the two models integrate the soul in the cosmos in two different ways. The first one can give an account of how it interacts with the other constituents of the cosmos, but is unable to explain the unity and self-identity of the individual soul. The other takes the self-identity of the soul for granted, but then is unable to analyse the soul in relation to the other ingredients of the world.

The two models in the Orphic fragments

It would be tempting to think that religious movements with strong eschatological interest would prefer the traditional 'journey model', and explain the fate of the soul in terms of the various stages of its journey. But let us consider the evidence collected in Alberto Bernabei's edition of Orphic fragments. The last section in the first volume bears the title *Fragmenta de animae naturae origine et fato*. It contains sixteen F fragments (many of which however do not contain an explicit reference to Orpheus or the Orphics), plus the inscriptions of the Olbia bone plates, plus the *vestigia*, or V. fragments, listing well-known texts primarily from Pindar and Empedocles. (So the first volume does not contain the gold plates which have recently been published in the second volume.) When one takes a closer look at this body of evidence, one finds a more varied picture, which in fact includes both models.

The comparison of two references from roughly the same period, one by Plato, the other by Aristotle, can already show this diversity. In the famous passage in the *Meno* (81a-d), Plato refers to the logos that certain priests and priestesses, customarily identified as Orphic, attach to their ritual practices. According to this logos the soul does not die with the body, but comes to life again in another world.
body and experiences all things in this world and the underworld. This view, quoted together with a fragment (133 Snell-Maehl) by Pindar—whose poetry contains ample references to the post mortem wanderings of the soul—seems to be a clear case of the 'journey model'. The unmistakable references to the soul's journey on many of the gold plates can only reinforce this image (see esp. the gold plates from Hippodion = 474 F Bernabé, Entella = 475 F Bernabé, Petelia = 476 F Bernabé, Phalaris = 477 F Bernabé).

Aristotle in De Anima, 410b27 (= 421 F Bernabé), by contrast, refers to the logos expressed in the so-called Orphic verses in connection with the physical theories of his predecessors. Aristotle reports here that according to this logos the soul, which is carried by the winds, enters us as we breathe. This formulation does not commit the holders of the view to identify the soul with any of the physical elements; in principle, it would be compatible, for example, with Democritus' view according to which the soul atoms are (like) fire atoms, moving in our surroundings like motes whirling in shafts of light (de An., 403b25-404a16). However, what is clear from Aristotle's formulation and criticism of the Orphic view is (1) that what the soul in us is is a portion of something which exists also dispersed in the world at large and (2) that it is problematic how and why it is capable to function as the bearer of psychic faculties once it has entered the human body.44 So apparently the Orphic practitioners known to Aristotle supplemented their practices with a 'different' account about the soul than the ones Plato refers to, one which at least closely resembles instances of the 'portion model'.

Other three of the sixteen soul fragments in Bernabé's collection are even more explicit in this sense. These fragments say that the soul comes from aither, is of aither and returns to aither: a clear application of what I have been calling the 'portion model'. Indeed, one of the fragments in the group, quoted by Clemens of Alexandria, is an obvious reworking of Heraclitus B 36 (cf. 66a Marcovich), quoted above as a paradigmatic example of the 'portion model':

44 The view referred to by Aristotle appears in a fragment quoted by Vettius Valens, 317, 19 Pingree = 436 F Bernabé: άτομος <πελ> γαία, το δ' ζε γαίας πάλιν άτομο, δι' άτομος <πελ> άλλαξάτας αλλάξουσα. (437 F Bernabé)

Without any attempt to say now anything about the sources of the 'portion model', I identified the soul according to its constitutive stuff, and thereby integrated it into its physical environment.

But what appeal could the 'portion model' have in the eyes of the Orphics? If the salvation of the individual soul is at stake in Orphicism, why would an Orphic apply a model in which the status of the individual, personal soul is so problematic? Let me suggest an answer along the following lines: the 'portion model', just as the 'journey model', operates with strong axiological assumptions. As we have seen, in the great majority of the examples of the 'portion model', from Heraclitus to Diogenes of Apollonia and further, the stuff that the soul is identified with, is treated as the finest and most valuable type of stuff. For an Orphic, this feature of the 'portion model' could offer a means to express the body-soul relationship by saying that the body is of a less valuable type of matter, whereas the soul is of the highest, finest form of matter. Even more importantly, most, if not all, of the authors I have evoked consider the stuff of the soul, or the purest form of it, something 'divine'. Thus, the 'portion model' offers not only an account of the relationship between the soul and the body or the soul and the cosmic processes, but also of the relationship between the soul and the divinity. The relationship between the individual soul and the divine was a major concern for the Orphics. The claim

46 Another fragment by Vettius Valens (317, 19 Pingree = 436 F Bernabé): άτομος <πελ> γαίας πάλι: άτομος <πελ> χάλαρα, could provide a possible link between Aristotle's testimony and the fragment quoted by Clemens. It is tempting to think that the word aither in this group of fragments is used in its archaic sense to denote a pure form of air. As I have argued elsewhere, it seems to me that the souls are airy also for the author of the Derveni papyrus. On this, see more below.

47 Cf. e.g. the texts listed in the apparatus of 436 F in Bernabé's edition.
that the soul of the deceased initiate comes from divine origin and is now assimilated to the gods. This is a striking feature of the gold leaves.17 Seen from the point of view of traditional religion, this is pure hybris. The Orphic therefore might find it important to explain how it is possible that the individual soul can be assimilated to the divine. One possible explanation might be the famous and much discussed Orphic anthropogony, if it really existed.18 But the ‘portion model’ offers an excellent alternative, because it can show that there is an original kinship between the individual soul and the divinity. Moreover, in so far as the corresponding physical doctrine allows for the qualitative change of elemental stuffs, the Orphic can also explain how and why purification works: purification is the process through which the stuff of the individual soul attains its purest form, and thereby gets assimilated to the divine. The ‘portion model’ thus has considerable explanatory potential for the specific concerns of an Orphic. And this is a point where Heraclitus can become highly interesting. In so far as the doctrines about the nature of the soul were not unchangeable dogmas in Orphism, some Orphics had good reasons to opt for the ‘portion model’ — a model which, for different reasons, appealed to many philosophers of the Presocratic period as well.

5. Soul and cosmos in the Phaedo

It could be objected on the other hand that the ‘journey model’ is but a traditional or popular eschatological representation which has nothing to do with a more philosophical conception of the soul. To counter this objection, and to show that the ‘journey model’ has serious metaphysical and psychological implications that can be put into philosophical use, let me now turn to Plato’s Phaedo. It has often been emphasized that Plato’s Phaedo has a central place in the construction of the concept of Presocratic philosophy and of our image of the Presocratic philosopher.19 Now the image of the soul’s post mortem journey is evidently central to this dialogue, and, as it seems to me, forms an integral part of the Platonic critique of Socrates’ predecessors in the domains of both psychology and cosmology.20 From its first pages, the dialogue contains frequent references to ‘departures’ and ‘arrivals’, to a contrast between a ‘here’ and a ‘there’, and in general, to the journey Socrates’ soul will soon undergo.21 But, on the face of it, this might just be a façon de parler or metaphorical language, as when we say that someone ‘passed away’, without any eschatological or metaphysical implication. Yet, there are a number of considerations that invalidate this objection in the case of the Phaedo. First of all, the ontological thesis about the immortality of the soul is intimately bound up with spatial distinctions in both Socrates’ account and his interlocutors’ objections. Thus, the first argument for the immortality of the soul, ‘the cyclical argument’, already presupposes that death and birth are to be explained in terms of a local movement of the soul. As the conclusion of the argument explicitly states,

It seems to be a sufficient proof that the souls of the dead must necessarily be somewhere whence they are born back again (72c6-8).

The reference to this indeterminate other location is then picked up in the next argument, in the statement of the necessary conditions for recollection:

This is impossible unless our soul was somewhere before it took on this human shape (72e7-73a2).

17 For the famous phrase ‘I am the son of the Earth and the starry Skies’, see 474.10 F, 475.12 F, 476.6 F, 477.8 E, 478.3 E, 479.3 F, 480.3 F — where we read ‘daughters’ in place of ‘sons’ —, 483.3 F, 483.3 F, 484.3 F. For the phrase ‘For I proudly declare myself to be of your blessed race’, see 486.3 E, 489.3 E, 490.3.
18 For the last round of arguments, see EDMONDE 1999 and the counter-arguments by BRUNAÚ 2002b.
19 For a recent re-examination, see LAKS 2002, 18-20.
20 On the connections between psychology and cosmology in the Phaedo, see KARPEK 2004.
21 See e.g. 61d-e; 63b; 67b7-c1; 72a; 80d-e.
Again, in formulating his objection, Cebes specifically and repeatedly targets the survival of the soul by denying its existence at another place:

\[ \text{ὅτι μὴ γὰρ ἐν ἡμῖν ἐστὶν καὶ πρὶν ἐς τὸν τόπον τοῦ ζώντα ἐκεῖνος οὐκ ἀναφέρεται μόνο μόνον τῶν χαράκτων τῶν, οἷς ἐπορεύετο ζῶντας ἐπὶ τῶν, πῶς ἰσοπλώτως ἀποδείξεται: ὡς δὲ καὶ ἀποδείξεις ἡμῖν ἐντὸς ἐν τούτῳ, ὡς μὲν διὸν τῷ τόπῳ.} \]

I do not deny that it has been very elegantly and, if it is not offensive say so, sufficiently proved that our soul existed before it took on this present form, but I do not believe the same applies to its existing somewhere after our death (87a1-5).

\[ \text{ φὸν τὴν τοῦ ζῶντος ὑπὲρ πατέραν εἴρηκεν ὡς ἐνάντια ἀποδείξεως ἐν τούτῳ ἢ ἐν τῷ τόπῳ} \]

So we cannot trust this argument yet and be confident that our soul continues to exist somewhere after our death (87c6-88a1).

All these formulations connect the survival of the soul with the existence of a place where it can dwell before and after its period of incarnate existence, while coming to life and becoming dead are understood in terms of changing locations between 'here' and 'there'. The existence of another place and the idea of the soul's passage from this place to another place is part and parcel of the general immortality thesis. If the soul exists before and after the incarnate life of the individual, there must be some other place where the souls can stay between incarnations.

All the previous references to the soul's journey pertain to, as it were, for the full elaboration of the souls' itinerary in the grand finale, in the concluding myth. This part of the text weaves together the different thematic threads of the dialogue. By describing the itinerary of the souls, the myth fleshes out the 'journey model' and gives colouring to the ethically motivated retributive eschatology. Yet, as David Sedley has convincingly shown, the mythical toposlogy is also intimately connected to the critique of Socrates' predecessors in so far as it indicates the lines along which a teleological cosmology should be constructed. But the cosmic arrangement presented in the myth is teleological precisely in so far as it structures the cosmos and the earth into stratified layers of locations where the souls can receive proper punishments, cleansing and rewards. The psychological theory as developed in the previous parts of the dialogue is dependent on two cosmological conditions. First, as we have seen, the metaphysical thesis of the immortality of the soul requires the existence of a diversified topography containing 'other places'. Second, the ethical thesis of post mortem punishments, rewards and purifications requires that there are axiological differences between the different locations. The cosmos as described in the myth fulfils both requirements: first, it is diversified in so far as it creates relatively self-contained 'worlds' and, second, it creates clear value differences among these worlds, so that it is intrinsically better to be in one than in another. The cosmic arrangement is rational and good because there is a perfect fit between the structure of the cosmos and the nature and qualitative differences of the souls.

As we have seen, different versions of the 'journey model' commonly distinguish among great cosmic regions – the Olympus, the earth, Tartarus, Hades, etc. – in such a way that these different regions are intrinsically value-laden. By the juxtaposition of the critique of Presocratic cosmologies and the eschatological myth applying the model of value-laden cosmic regions, Plato highlights the contrast between this traditional type of cosmic topography and the historic peri physeos type of account, which – at least in Plato's view – makes the cosmic structure essentially value neutral. Moreover, it is the 'journey model' which is compatible with the conclusion of the third of the arguments for the immortality of the soul, the one commonly referred to as 'the argument from affinity' (Phd., 6b-80c). In response to the fear expressed by Simmias and Cebes that the soul might be scattered and dispersed by the winds after the death of the individual, Socrates develops an argument in which he contrasts the soul with the visible and tangible ever-changing and composite physical things, and assimilates it to the invisible, changeless, non-composite and divine things. The soul is infinitely more similar to the latter in being, among other characteristics, an unchangeable simple unity (μονοειδές, 78d5). This characterisation is in full agreement with the characterisation of the atomic soul of the 'journey model', but seems incompatible with the soul of the motion model. 

Thus Plato's preference for the 'journey model' is not simply a sign of traditionalism or a concession to a popular mode of presentation, but is motivated by philosophical considerations. It expresses the conviction that this type of account offers both a more satisfactory description of the soul-cosmos relationship by working with a more clearly value-laden cosmic structure, and a metaphysically more satisfactory concept of the soul by treating it as an atomic unity.

Without pronouncing the ultimate word on the subject, the myth points towards possible answers to the questions with which Socrates entered the field of *hóste peri phýseos*. Thus, we get some sort of an answer to the question concerning the shape and position of the earth, as Sedley has shown, and we also get some sort of answer to the initial question concerning human life cycles, as Karlrik has shown. Remarkably, from the set of questions Socrates puts to the natural philosophers, there is only one to which the myth does not offer any answer:

καὶ πότερον τὸ ἀτλά ἐστιν ὁ φρονομένων, ἢ ὁ ἄγω ἢ τὸ τῶν.

Do we think with our blood, or air, or fire? (96b4-5)

To all the other questions, we receive at least the first approximations of an answer, while this one remains completely unanswered. The reason for this, I suggest, is not that Plato thought this question uninteresting. The reason is rather that the integration of the 'journey model' and the 'portion model' created a problem, and as he had to choose, Plato opted for the 'journey model' answering to his basic metaphysical and ethical theses and dropped the 'portion model' describing the soul's material constitution.

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21 Kingsley 1995 might very well be right about Plato's sources for the myth, but what I think needs equal emphasis is the way in which the application of this model and this particular imagery is integrated in Plato's philosophical project and receives its motivation from philosophical considerations.

22 I take that, for Plato, what we think with (ὁφόνομαι) is the soul and not some other part of a human being.

The juxtaposition of the two models

As I have tried to show, both models have important advantages and non-negligible disadvantages. But could the two models be successfully integrated so that the resulting theory is able both to offer an account of the interaction between the soul and other constitutions of the cosmos and to answer the question as to what constitutes the unity of the individual soul? As far as I can see, we cannot find a clear case of integration of the two models in the Presocratic period. What we find, however, are significant juxtapositions. Let me briefly discuss two examples.

First the Derveni papyrus. The badly damaged first six columns of the existing text contain a commentary on certain ritual actions. This part of the text, the main characters of the Derveni author's explanations are the Erinyes, the Eumenides, certain *daimones* and human souls. This part of the text also contains some strong indications of the presence of the 'journey model'. First, what seems to be an ethical context, the author mentions 'some *daimones* beneath' (λιγυροῦ ἐν θρού πολύ). Later, the author cries out with description in his voice because people do not believe in the terrors of *daimones*. Then in the next column he speaks about *daimones*, whom he identifies with avenging souls, and who are 'in the way' (ἐν ἡδε). Apparently, the souls want to go or should go somewhere, and the *daimones* block the way. It is the special skill of the magi to use and remove the impeding *daimones* by incantations. All these references, and especially the *daimones* blocking the way of the *orchis*, speak for the 'journey model'.

What we find in the larger second half of the text, in the commentary on the Orphic poem, is a cosmogonical story about a cosmic god who gives structure to the world by manipulating the physical elements. The cosmic god is characterized as air and is also called Mind. It has been emphasized by Glenn Most and André Laks, the main interpretative problem the papyrus presents is to find the articulation between the two parts of the text and to give an account of the connection between the eschatology and the cosmology of the Derveni papyrus. I have tentatively suggested elsewhere that the author of the papyrus explained the souls of the first columns as being airy, and

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taught his folk that these airy souls can somehow join the cosmic Air/Mind if they fulfill certain ritual, ethical and epistemological conditions. In making this hypothesis, I could evoke Aristotle's testimony on an Orphic logos on the soul, which we discussed in section 4 above. But apart from such external evidence, one can formulate internal arguments as well: it would have created a severe asymmetry in the Derveni author's theory if the cosmic Mind had been identified with air, but not the individual minds of human beings. Then one can also refer to the fact that the most prominent figures in the philosophical background of the author are Hermocrates, Anaxagoras, and Diogenes of Apollonia—thus exactly those thinkers in whose respective doctrines we find the 'portion model' in its clearest form. The cumulative force of these pieces of admitted indirect evidence can make up a fairly good case for assuming that the author of the papyrus maintained that not only the cosmic divine Mind, but also the cognitive component of an individual human being is, or is of, air. This physical link between the divine Mind and the cognitive part of human beings could then provide the physical aspect of the author's emphasis on the crucial importance of understanding in a religious context.

I did not pursue this line any further in my book, but, surely, some serious problems remain. To begin with, it is unclear what the relationship is between the psychai and the daïmones in the first columns on the one hand, and the nouns in the second part of the text on the other. Conceivably, the Derveni author followed Anaxagoras who, as Aristotle complained, used 'mind' and 'soul' indiscriminately. If so, the Derveni author would conform to the general tendency towards the end of the Pre-Socratic period in identifying psyche with the centre of cognition. According to the 'portion model' would apply not only to portions of mind in individual human beings, but also to the souls and daïmones discussed in the first columns. But it is just as possible that the author distinguished between the bearer of cognitive faculties, i.e., the mind, on the one hand, and the surviving soul on the other. In this second case, the 'portion model' would apply to the mind, whereas the 'journey model', as we have seen in the first columns, would apply to souls and daïmones. Obviously, an argument ex silentio has very little force in the case of such a damaged text. It cannot be excluded that the lost parts of the text the author dealt with these questions in one way or another, and explained, for example, how it is possible that portions of air retain their identity as souls or daïmones after the death of the individual. Yet, it is remarkable that the structural and thematic difference between the two parts of the text reflects the co-existence and juxtaposition of the two approaches, whereas any sign of a possible integration between the two has gone lost.

To me, now turn very briefly to Empedocles. The way I presented the Derveni text might already suggest some parallels. What seemed possible in the case of the Derveni papyrus is made explicit in the surviving fragments of Empedocles' 'portion model'. The portion model applies to the bearer of cognitive functions in so far as, for Empedocles, it is the blood that we think, while blood is an equal blend of the four cosmic roots (31 B 105, B 107 with Theophrastus' context, B 129). In conformity with the usual features of this model, the physical analysis of the stuff responsible for thought is also used for the explanation of cognition. It is also relatively uncontroversial that this is responsible for intelligence in us has a cosmic counterpart. Although not contemporaneous with it, the blood in us represents a portion of the perfect blend of the four roots in the Sphairas.

The presence of the 'journey model' is equally evident. The 'unfamiliar place' of B 118, the cave of B 120, the meadow of Ate in B 121, and possibly also the 'extreme place' in 115 of the Strasbourg papyrus are in all probability stages in a journey. To these fragments one might also add B 142, although it speaks about places where the subject of the description could not enter. And, obviously, the most significant text from this point of view is the description of the wandering of the daïmon in B 115. In these fragments we find the characteristics of the 'journey model' together: the bearer of personhood, called here a daïmon, is treated as a unity and remains identical while it goes through a journey; a diverse cosmic geography with clear axiological distinctions; and laws regulating the movement of the bearer of personhood.

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27 Arist., de An., 1, 2 (404a25-66). On the unification of the soul and the cognitive centre in Diogenes and the atomists, see Lair 1999, 252.

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25 For the new readings, see Martin 2003.
26 B 115, and possibly B 142, describe the stages of this journey in terms of the cosmological elements. But as we have seen, this should not cause any surprise in the context of the journey. See pp. 34-35 above.
So just as the Derveni papyrus, the fragments of Empedocles contain both models. This much, I assume, is relatively uncontroversial. But what about the integration of the two models? In view of the explicit ontological statements of B 17, it is more than natural to try to give an account of the daemon in terms of one or more of the six cosmic principles. Although it is just another argument ex silentio, it is nonetheless remarkable that the daemon is never explicitly identified with any of the cosmological stuffs either in Empedocles' surviving fragments or, as far as I am aware, in any of the ancient testimonies. Nor do we get any explanation about the relationship between noema or phron on the one hand and daemon on the other. The two ways in which the bearers of psychic functions are integrated into the cosmos are kept apart. What we find instead are, once again, significant juxtapositions that make us eager to clarify the articulation between the two and to understand the precise nature of the relationship, although we do not receive any straightforward answers from the texts themselves.

7. The integration of the two models in the Timaeus

Let me finally return to Plato to show one possible way to integrate the two models. As is commonly agreed, the Timaeus in many ways responds to the Phaedo's critique of Presocratic cosmology. It presents an account of the cosmos that shows how the addition of concepts developed by Plato can transform the historic peri physios tradition and how the emerging discourse is able to offer answers to problems that, according to the Socrates of the Phaedo, were impossible to deal with in the explanatory framework of his predecessors. What is less often remarked is that the Timaeus can be seen as a response to the Phaedo also in the sense that it returns to the question of the soul-cosmos relationship, and provides an answer to a question left open in the Phaedo.

As we have seen, the Phaedo applied the 'journey model' and discarded the 'portion model' without answering the question 'What does the soul consist of?'. Now, the psychology of the Timaeus clearly offers an answer to this question – and it does so through the application of the 'portion model'. The individual soul has a cosmic counterpart with important cosmological functions, and the individual souls are made of the same stuff (see esp. 41d). Indeed, the language of 'soul-stuff' and its portioning is very prominent in the description of the production of the soul, much to the embarrassment of interpreters. In conformity with the general model, the analysis of the soul's ingrediens has a central place also in the explanation of the soul's cognitive capacities. Yet, immediately after we learn how the Demiurge created the individual souls from the remains of the original soul-stuff, Timaeus tells us that the individual souls are entities that preserve their identities as they go through a cosmic journey. The journey starts at the soul's native star and leads through a series of incarnations in different animal forms until the worthy souls can finally get back to their original dwelling places (42b-d). As is described more in detail at the very end of the dialogue, the different animal forms are linked to the different elements they dwell in. Moreover, just as in the Phaedo, the different elements characteristic of different regions represent different values. The stars are excellent dwelling places appropriate to the excellent condition of just souls (42b), whereas at the other end of the scale the water is the worst of places. This is why the gods decided that the worst men should become fish:

The text is in this sense highly reminiscent of the way Herodotus describes the 'Egyptian' doctrine of transmigration in 2.123: 'The Egyptians were the first to maintain the following doctrine, too, that the human soul is immortal, and that after the death of the body enters into some other living thing then coming to birth; after passing through all creatures of land, sea, and air (except the Pierre-Peregrine soul) it enters once more into a human body, a cycle which it completes in three thousand years' (trans. Godley).

36 It would make no sense to try to prove on this occasion that the daemon is neither a perfect mixture of the four roots nor a parcel of Love.
nure and pure air; they shoved them into water to breathe in murky depths. This is the origin of fish, of all shellfish, and of every water-inhabiting animal. Their due reward for their extreme stupidity is their extreme dwelling place. (Tim., 92b-c, trans. Zeyl)

Thus, Plato finds a way to integrate into the cosmology of the Timaeus a value-laden cosmic topology and a value-laden theory of elements, without having recourse to a more traditional eschatological imagery present in the Phaedo myth.

The upshot is that in the Timaeus the same soul is described both as a unity travelling through cosmic regions and a portion of a certain stuff that has cosmic functions. Plato’s solution to the integration problem, I would maintain, does not reside in the introduction of substance dualism as opposed to a Presocratic type of physicalism. As I have tried to show, substance dualism in itself is compatible with both models. As a matter of fact, we would get the same problem of unity and identity if the individual souls were mere portions of the stuff coming out of the Demiurge’s mixing bowl, irrespective of their ontological status. Plato’s solution to the integration problem, I suggest, is the same as his solution to so many other problems of physics and cosmology in the Timaeus: the lasting identity of the individual portions of soul-stuff is the result of the imposition of a well-defined mathematical structure. The closed circles of the Same and the Different, functioning as bonds together with their internal mathematical articulation, create a fixed unity with fixed boundaries and provide clear identity conditions for the souls. By adding mathematics, Plato can simultaneously retain the ethically and metaphorically more satisfactory ‘journey model’ and answer the question left open in the Phaedo, namely what the thing that does the thinking in us is made of, and how it is related to the cosmos as a whole. But as Chrysippus’ pneuma theory shows, the imposition of a mathematical structure is not the only way to secure identity in portions of cosmic stuffs – an identity which, in some cases, can persist even after the death of the human being.

GÁBOR BETEGH
Apollo and Other Gods in Empedocles

Abstract: The purpose of this paper is to clarify the relationship between the two components of Empedocles' teachings. On the one hand, there is a myth about the primordial guilt of the daimon, his punishment by a series of reincarnations, and his redemption. This myth is somehow linked to an advocacy of vegetarianism. On the other hand, there is a "presocratic" physics, including a theory of principles, a cosmology, and a biology. It will be argued that the function of the Empedoclean myth is to mirror the cosmic cycle of the physical system in an allegorical way which brings out its impact from a human perspective. Furthermore, among the two or three conceivable models of the Empedoclean myth the legend of Apollo's exile seems to be the one which was not only perceived as such a model already in antiquity but also hinted at by Empedocles himself.

In questo lavoro ci si propone di chiarire il rapporto fra i due versanti del pensiero di Empedocle. Da un lato c'è il mito (in qualche modo legato a una professione di vita vegetariana) di una colpa primordiale del daimon, punito attraverso una serie di reincarnazioni, e infine redento. Dall'altro abbiamo una dottrina fisica di stampo "presocratico", comprendente una teoria dei principi, una cosmologia e una biologia. Si argomenterà che il mito del daimon svolge una funzione di rispecchiamento del ciclo cosmico, in una chiave allegorica che ne estrappa il significato sul piano esistenziale. E si osserverà che, fra i due o tre modelli possibili di questo mito, quello che non solo era percepito come tale già nell'antichità, ma da Empedocle stesso è sugerito, è la storia dell'esilio di Apollo.

The myth of the daimon: crime, culprit, punishment.

In fr. 31 B 115 and related texts the Empedoclean speaker tells a