Chapter 8

The Survival of the Fittest: Party System Concentration in Hungary

Zsolt Enyedi

Introduction

The Hungarian party system is characterized by the combination of decreasing fragmentation, high polarization, bipolar competition and lack of new entries. Still qualifying as volatile according to the standards of late twentieth century Western politics, Hungary has produced one of the most consolidated party systems in the post-communist world. The present chapter tries to answer the question about the role of institutional conditions, socio-structural underpinnings, organizational techniques, alliance-building strategies and ideological formation in the development of this relatively high degree of consolidation.

The Identity of Hungarian Parties

The relative simplicity and stability of the Hungarian party system is well illustrated by the fact that the post-communist history of the parliament can be retold, even using a generous definition of relevant parties, with no more than seven party-names. These are the Independent Smallholders’ Party (FKgP), the Christian Democratic People’s Party (KDNP), the Hungarian Democratic Forum (MDF), the Party of Hungarian Justice and Life (MIÉP) and the Fidesz on the right of the political spectrum, and on the left: the Hungarian Socialist Party (MSZP) and the Alliance of Free Democrats (SZDSZ). It is noteworthy, however, how much the ideological profile of some of the parties has changed during the past fifteen years.

The Independent Smallholders’ Party (FKgP) was the largest party of the short democratic period between the Second World War and the communist takeover. It

1 Next to these parties one more must be briefly mentioned, the Workers’ (or Labor) Party. It was established in 1989 by the orthodox wing of the Hungarian Socialist Workers’ Party. It tried to combine nostalgia for the Kádár era with the rhetoric of the anti-globalist movements, without much real success. This party used to collect around 3 per cent of the vote at the national elections, but gained no political relevance otherwise.
resurrected itself in 1989 as an agrarian-populist organization, distinguishing itself from the other parties by its relentless campaign for the restitution of land to its original owners. During its post-communist career the party has vacillated between two options: portraying itself as a traditional peasant-party or following a radical protest-party strategy. Nationalism, traditionalism and anti-communism characterized the Smallholders in all these phases, but the party was better defined by its specific social clientele and by the personal appeal of its charismatic leader than by its political programme.

The rationale and the clientele of the other historical party, the Christian Democratic People’s Party (KDNP), is even more one-dimensional: the party identifies itself with Christian/Catholic values and interests. It could be described as a true subcultural party (Enyedi 1996). The party expresses strong reservations against unregulated capitalism. In this regard its position is best labelled as ‘Christian-social’. With the exception of a short, radical nationalist period, the Christian Democrats have cultivated a pro-European image. Although the party’s anti-communism is more muted than that of the Smallholders, its right-wing identity has never been in question.

The third major party of the right, the Hungarian Democratic Forum (MDF), used to be and partly still is, a more complex construct than the already discussed two organizations. It had no historical predecessors, but it was firmly anchored in the reform circles of the eighties. The Forum (not having yet the status and identity of a party) was organized in 1987 mainly by writers and historians who were particularly concerned about the grievances of Hungarians living in the neighbouring states and about the perceived weakness of national identity. From its original orientation, which is best described as democratic nationalist, it turned into a Christian democratic and conservative party in 1990. During the following years it continued to include Christian democratic, national liberal and populist wings, however its anti-communism became gradually more pronounced. Conflicts between liberal and populist, moderate and radical right-wing groups have been wrecking the party throughout its career. Neither the popularity, nor the unity of the Forum was saved by the simultaneous expulsion of some of the liberal and far right members in 1993.

The intensifying competition between the Forum and the other major centre-right party, the Fidesz, triggered two, diverging ideological reactions from the leadership of the Forum (MDF). The minority opted for a more traditionalist, populist and nationalist message, but the representatives of this group were soon marginalized. The mainstream decided to strengthen the moderate conservative image of the party, emphasizing that the Forum is the only genuine centre-right organization according to the Western sense of the word (Hanley 2004): it combines moral conservatism with pro-capitalist policies and with a moderate style.

The bulk of the expelled right-wing faction resurfaced as the radical nationalist Party of Hungarian Justice and Life (MIÉP) in 1993. Anti-Semitism, chauvinism, anti-globalization, anti-communism, anti-liberalism and clericalism characterize
the ideology and rhetoric of this party. The MIÉP is strongly opposed to the influence of multinational corporations and international organizations. Among the seven listed parties, the Party of Hungarian Justice and Life is the only one that has unequivocally opposed Hungary’s integration into the EU and the NATO.

Fidesz\(^2\) is the largest and newest member of the right-wing party family. It was established in 1988 based on the network of university colleges, as the counter organization of the communist youth organization. At that time it described itself as ‘radical, liberal, and alternative’ (Bozóki 1989), and in terms of values and style it resembled Western left-libertarian parties. From 1990 onwards, in order to become more electable, it began to downplay its ‘alternative’ features, portraying itself rather as a mainstream, pragmatic, and professional party. In this period liberalism was its dominant ideology. The party was against the restitution of the nationalized property to its original owners: it was anti-clerical and criticized the nationalism of the government parties.

In 1993, and especially after 1994, Fidesz started its journey towards the right-wing and conservative corner of the Hungarian party system. It embraced ideas and slogans like ‘Christianity’, ‘family’ and ‘fatherland’. By 1995/1996 it had accepted all the ideological tenets of the traditional right-wing forces. In 2000 the party left the Liberal International and one year later it joined the European People’s Party. After completing its move to the right-wing pole on the cultural dimension, it began to shift to the left on economic issues. Étatism, criticism of privatization or of the privileges of the banking sector was always part of the traditionalist right-wing repertoire, and this discourse was finally embraced by Fidesz as well. As a culmination of this strategy, the party supported the referendum to stop privatization in health care and it proposed a complete halt of any privatization in 2004. In spite of its leftist turn, the party continues to demand lower taxes, particularly while in opposition.

The left is dominated by the Hungarian Socialist Party (MSZP). This party was formed by the reformers and the technocrats of the communist party (Hungarian Socialist Workers’ Party, MSZMP). The link to the dissolved ex-ruling party endowed the MSZP with a well-developed infrastructure and a relatively large membership, but it also undermined its democratic legitimacy. The early 1990’s were dominated by tensions between the liberal wing and the leftist faction linked to the trade unions. The mainstream supported the cautious social-democratization, modernization and liberalization of the party’s profile. As a result, and also because of the successful transformation of the old nomenklatura elite into the dominant faction of the new business elite, the Socialists not only accepted the logic of the capitalist transformation, but they proved to be ready to implement

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\(^2\) FIDESZ was originally an abbreviation, meaning Alliance of Young Democrats. In 1995 the party changed its name to Fidesz-Hungarian Civic Party, and in 2003 to Fidesz-Hungarian Civic Union. The word ‘Fidesz’ was kept partly because it was an already established brand name, and partly because the Latin word ‘fides’ has an appealing meaning. For the sake of saving space, I will call the party Fidesz throughout the text.
radical, and at some points rather ruthless, economic reforms. On moral issues they gradually accepted the anti-nationalist and morally permissive agenda of the liberals, though they are more ready to make compromises with the right on these issues. The popular appeal of the party lies mainly in its pragmatism, promise of competence, and in friendly relations with neighbouring countries.

The last significant party to be mentioned, the Alliance of Free Democrats (SZDSZ), considers itself to be the heir of the ‘Samizdat’ movement that was launched at the beginning of the seventies by human rights activists. By the end of the 1980s these activists were joined by liberal economists, and the two groups established the party in 1988 as the most radical opposition to communist power. The party was composed of social democrats, liberals and radical anti-communists. Gradually social democrats and anti-communists dropped out, and the liberals prevailed. The once fiercely anti-MSZP and anti-communist Free Democrats, judging the right-wing parties to be hostile to liberal democracy, joined the Socialists in the 1994-1998 government. Since then the party is considered as part of the left-wing bloc, although some of the Free Democrats see the ideological differences that distinguish them from the Socialists not less relevant than those that pit the party against the conservative right.

The Structure of the Ideological Space

During the early nineties the attitudes of the Hungarian public produced a fairly weakly organized ideological pattern, in accordance with the fuzzy programmatic profile of most of the parties. But in terms of cultural issues the parties provided distinct alternatives already at that time (Kitschelt et al. 1999). Karácsony (2003) identified two attitudinal dimensions for predicting the party choice. The first was based on clericalism, anti-communism and nationalism, dividing the socialists from the right-wing parties, with the liberals (SZDSZ, Fidesz) in the middle. The other dimension separated the Christian democrats and the socialists from the liberals (SZDSZ, to a lesser extent Fidesz) on the basis of anti-communism, pro-market orientation and social liberalism. The dynamics of the last decade was characterized by the virtual disappearance of the second dimension, by the growing relevance of the first dimension and by the increasing attitudinal similarity between the Free Democrats and the Socialist Party on the one hand, and of the traditional right-wing parties and Fidesz, on the other. Anti-communism, nationalism, and clericalism are the issues that correlate best with the left-right identification and partisanship among both voters and MPs (Enyedi and Todosijevic 1999, Tóka 2004).

The victory of cultural issues over economic ones contradicted the expectations of many scholars, who anticipated the crystallization of economic polarization as democratic politics began to consolidate. Evans and Whitefield (1993), for example, predicted Western style, redistribution-centred competition for ethnically homogeneous countries like Hungary.
The prominence of cultural issues is an elite-driven phenomenon that can be traced back to the decisions of the parties. Within the population at large, the crystallization of cultural positions is not significantly more robust than that of the economic positions (Tóka 2004). But since the party elite polarizes almost exclusively along the former issues, the collective political identities were built around cultural elements, and the gap between electorates has grown therefore on cultural, not economic issues.

As far as the reasons of parties for embarking on a cultural struggle are concerned, one may suspect the role of particular political traditions, the roots of parties in rival circles of intelligentsia, or, as Kitschelt does, the constrained space in economic policies (Kitschelt 1995). Economic attitudes do play some role in party choice, but, since typically the current government parties are seen as more pro-market than the opposition (Tóka 1997, 2004), this does not lead to a stable differentiation among parties.

The secondary role of economic issues means that the semantics of the left-right terminology acquires a strong cultural colouring. ‘Right-wing’ stands for Christian-nationalist, morally conservative and anti-communist orientation, while ‘left’ is associated with communist legacy and with a libertarian-cosmopolitan orientation.

Since anti-communism, nationalism, and clericalism are the principal elements of the overarching attitudinal divide, they deserve a closer inspection. Anti-communism seems to be the most consequential element of this ideological package. The defeat of the (reformed) communist party at the 1990 election did not remove the questions related to the past regime, elite-replacement and retroactive justice from the agenda. Actually, the role of this attitude dimension is, if anything, increasing, refuting rationalistic expectations (Kitschelt 2001). This counter-intuitive phenomenon has at least two sources. On the one hand, the communist nomenklatura, exactly because of its reformist orientation, could convert its political influence into economic capital more smoothly than in many other ex-communist countries. On the other hand, the right-wing parties, coming from various backgrounds (urban and rural, religious and non-religious, conservative and liberal) can identify their common core, and can question the legitimacy of their largest competitor, the MSZP, by emphasizing anti-communism.

The second element, clericalism, is less fundamental for mass political behaviour, but it is highly salient for the party elites. The Hungarian right is clerical in the sense of calling for the privileged treatment of the so-called historical churches, demanding higher financial support for them and elevating Christian symbols into the official state discourse. The left is regarded to be anti-clerical partly for rejecting all these proposals and partly because of its association with communist rule which repressed churches and religion.

Finally, the central role of nationalism (i.e., issues linked to national sovereignty and national identity) deserves special attention. In Hungary the discourse of the right-wing parties posits a sharp divide between a camp ‘with national sentiments’ and one without them. While leftist politicians routinely reject
this dichotomy (or portray their opponents as extreme nationalists), the prevailing public discourse takes the existence of a national(ist) – cosmopolitan polarization as given. The centrality of this dimension requires explanation, since Hungary, unlike many of its neighbours, is not a newly created state and has no large ethnic minorities.

In fact, in Hungary the nationalist divide has a long tradition. The initial, nineteenth century alignment reflected the conflict over the ties to the Hapsburg monarchy, and it evolved around the so-called ‘homeland versus progress’ dichotomy. In the second (interwar) party system the conflicting approaches to nationalism and national identity manifested themselves in the attitudes to the ‘Jewish question’ and to the ‘irredenta project’ (i.e., the plan to re-incorporate the lands lost after the WWI). During the third party system, between 1945 and 1948, the issue of the sovereignty vis-à-vis the Soviet Union re-emphasized the centrality of this dimension. Since 1989 the ‘nationalist’ agenda has called for the strengthening of national identity, after the decades of internationalist communism, and for a more aggressive protection of the interests of Hungarians living across the borders. The ‘cosmopolitan’ side rejects these demands as conflicting with the superior project of westernization (Márkus 1996).

However, the conflict around nationalism is not a Hungarian specificity, but is rooted in the modernization process of the European peripheries. The peripheral societies are split between groups closely linked to the interests and values of the continental centre and groups searching for alternative patterns of modernization. This division closely resembles the centre-periphery division that Stein Rokkan studied so assiduously, but it has only feeble links to actual geographic or occupational status, and it functions more as an attitudinal divide.

**Elections and Governments**

Although the party labels have been more stable in Hungary than in most post-communist countries, the rank-order of the parties changed substantially during the first fifteen years, virtually turning upside down. While the first election was dominated by the struggle between the Hungarian Democratic Forum and the Alliance of Free Democrats, by the second part of the decade these two parties were eclipsed by the Hungarian Socialist Party and Fidesz.

The present, 2002-2006, parliament contains only four parties. Given that the two major parliamentary factions possess close to 90 per cent of the seats, Hungary is closer to a two-party system than most European countries (see Tables 8.1 and 8.2). The original menu of parties used to be, of course, considerably wider: on paper, around one hundred, in reality about three dozen parties competed for the support of Hungarian citizens in the first free parliamentary election. But the results of that election elevated only six of the competing parties into the parliament. The most consequential outcome concerned the communist successor party: the Socialists received a dismal 11 per cent, and this result opened the way
to a clean break with the past at the level of government. The election was won by
the Hungarian Democratic Forum, against its main competitor, the Alliance of Free
Democrats. The former party’s deeper roots in local society and its perceived
moderateness proved to be more appealing than the radicalism (both in anti-
communism and in economic reform) of the Free Democrats. Together with the
Smallholders and the Christian Democrats, the Hungarian Democratic Forum
formed an oversized centre-right government after the election. Although in 1992
the Smallholders left the coalition, the government could retain its legislative
majority because three-quarters of the Smallholder MPs remained faithful to the
Prime Minister.

Despite this relative stability at the level of the government, the popularity of
the coalition vanished already by the end of 1990. The shift of the government
parties towards a more radical right-wing direction facilitated cooperation between
the parties of the opposition, especially between the Free Democrats and the
Socialists. Until then the ex-communist Socialists were treated as pariahs by the
other parties.

Table 8.1 The distribution of list votes in Hungarian parliamentary elections,
1990-2002 in per cent

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>FIDESZ</td>
<td>8.95</td>
<td>7.02</td>
<td>29.45</td>
<td>41.07*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MDF</td>
<td>24.73</td>
<td>11.74</td>
<td>2.80</td>
<td></td>
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<td>FKgP</td>
<td>11.73</td>
<td>8.82</td>
<td>13.14</td>
<td>0.75</td>
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<td>KDNP</td>
<td>6.46</td>
<td>7.03</td>
<td>2.31</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>MIÉP</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1.59</td>
<td>5.47</td>
<td>4.37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MSZP</td>
<td>10.89</td>
<td>32.99</td>
<td>32.89</td>
<td>42.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SZDSZ</td>
<td>21.39</td>
<td>19.74</td>
<td>7.57</td>
<td>5.57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>15.85</td>
<td>11.07</td>
<td>6.37</td>
<td>6.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*joint list

Table 8.2 The distribution of seats in Hungarian parliamentary elections,
1990-2002 in per cent

<table>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>FIDESZ</td>
<td>5.7</td>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>38.3</td>
<td>42.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FKgP</td>
<td>11.4</td>
<td>6.7</td>
<td>12.4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KDNP</td>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>5.7</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MDF</td>
<td>42.5</td>
<td>9.8</td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>6.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MIÉP</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MSZP</td>
<td>8.5</td>
<td>54.1</td>
<td>34.7</td>
<td>46.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SZDSZ</td>
<td>24.1</td>
<td>17.9</td>
<td>6.2</td>
<td>5.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
In 1994 Hungary witnessed the landslide victory of the Socialists (reaching absolute majority in Parliament), the collapse of the Hungarian Democratic Forum (sinking below 12 per cent) and the failure of Fidesz to increase its share of votes (despite being the number one party in the opinion polls during 1992 and 1993). While the relative position of the parties changed, the overall menu did not: the same six parties cleared the electoral threshold as in 1990.

In order to strengthen the national and international legitimacy of the government, the Socialist Party, although in position to govern alone, made a generous offer of partnership to the Free Democrats. The coalition between the (ex)communists and the (ex)anti-communists was facilitated, among other factors, by the liberal economic programme of the former.

In the third election, in 1998, neither the Christian Democrats nor the Hungarian Democratic Forum was able to pass the legal threshold, but some former Christian Democrats were elected on the Fidesz-ticket, and – thanks to a comprehensive electoral pact with Fidesz – enough Forum-candidates were elected in the single-member districts to form a parliamentary caucus on their own. The election ended with a Fidesz victory, and, together with the Forum and the Smallholders, and following the ‘tradition’ of the previous two governments, Fidesz formed a surplus majority government. The subsequent years ruined the Smallholders popular credibility by revealing their nepotistic character. As a result, the Smallholders suffered a heavy defeat in the 2002 election, not even being able to gain 1 per cent of the vote.

The decline of these two parties is somewhat unexpected, since they occupied a relatively well-defined social niche. Neither of them was satisfied, however, with the fragile status of a small party, and both experimented with strategies targeting voters beyond their natural constituency. The charisma of Mr Torgyán, the Smallholders’ President, and his inflammatory and populist rhetoric seemed to provide the right answer to the challenge, substantially increasing the popularity of the party during the mid-1990s. In that period the Smallholders’ Party was the most popular right-wing organization. But the voters deserted the party as soon as the voters could choose another party, the Fidesz, which was almost as radical but reliable and able to govern.

In contrast to the Smallholders, the Christian Democratic Party was a prime example of stability during its first seven years. But in 1997 the experimentation with radical right-wing rhetoric and the ensuing scandalous battle between its two wings, shook the popular reputation of the party and it also cost the Christian Democrats the sympathy of the Catholic Church and of its Western sister-parties. Subcultural parties are supposed to be particularly stable, but they heavily depend on the support of other subcultural institutions. The conflict between the sponsor institution, in this case the Catholic Church, and the party may undermine the loyalty of the voters, and this phenomenon certainly contributed to the demise of the Hungarian Christian Democrats. At the moment the party exists as the satellite organization of Fidesz, and its leaders are members of the Fidesz parliamentary faction.
In 1998 the radical right-wing Party of Hungarian Justice and Life also became a parliamentary party. In the following four years it occasionally supported the government, but nominally stayed in opposition. In these years it retained the support of its core voters, but due to the increased turnout, fell short again of becoming a parliamentary party again in 2002.

At this fourth election, Fidesz and the Hungarian Democratic Forum campaigned with a joint list. The number of votes cast for the list did exceed the number of votes received independently by the two parties earlier, but since none of the other right-wing parties survived, the left wing opposition, that is, the Socialists and the Free Democrats, could form a government for the second time. By this time the Free Democrats became a minor party, hardly being able to clear the 5 per cent threshold. But their influence in the new government was not necessarily smaller than their leverage on the previous one, since the government’s majority now depended on their support.

As a result of the third and fourth election the party system fragmentation has declined. The number of effective electoral parties has dropped from 6.7 to 2.4, the number of parliamentary parties from 3.7 to 2.2 (Table 8.3). While in 1990 the two largest parties commanded just 46 per cent of all list votes, the same figure, according to the opinion polls and electoral results, has been around eighty-ninety per cent since 1999. The major parties stabilized their electorate: Fidesz and the Socialists hover around 35-40 per cent, while the Forum and the Free Democrats are both around 4-5 per cent. This is the pattern that was reproduced by the country’s 2004 European Parliament election as well.

The decline in fragmentation followed a different course in the two camps. The leftist bloc became concentrated early on with the rise of the Socialists. The right, however, used to be fragmented, and the arrival of the Fidesz to this part of the spectrum increased fragmentation further. In 1994 four, almost equal parties dominated this side, plus the MIÉP waiting in the wings. Before the turn of the century it seemed that a Scandinavian type fragmented, though co-operation orientated right, would stabilize itself. But the disappearance from Parliament of the minor right-wing parties paved the way for the integration of the bloc within one large party, the Fidesz.

Hungarian elections are competitive. Until now all nation-wide elections have been won by the opposition. At the same time local and by-elections results following the national elections reveal that public support for the government has lasted longer and longer. No government has managed to get re-elected yet, but the chances for that seem to have increased from election to election.

**Table 8.3 Effective number of electoral and parliamentary parties in Hungary**

<table>
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<tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Electoral fragmentation</td>
<td>6.7</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>4.6</td>
<td>2.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parliamentary fragmentation</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>2.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 8.4 Turnout in Hungarian parliamentary elections

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>1st round, per cent</th>
<th>2nd round, per cent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>65.1</td>
<td>45.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>68.9</td>
<td>55.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>56.3</td>
<td>57.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>70.5</td>
<td>73.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Another important regularity concerns alternation in power: each parliamentary election has been followed by a complete alternation. No incumbent party has ever been seriously considered as coalition partner in a government after an election. A minority government has never been seriously considered as an option either. Oversized coalitions have been the typical form of government, mainly due to the deep distrust among parties, opponents and allies alike.

The pattern of coalition-building and party competition has been institutionalized without the direct involvement of a vast share of its citizens. In Hungary, as opposed to many other post-communist countries, the new elite did not enjoy a honeymoon period: participation at the parliamentary elections was low from the very beginning, and even lower for local elections and for referenda. The low and declining level of participation was reversed only in 2002. In this year one seventh of the society abandoned its traditional passivity and came out to vote (see Table 8.4).

A further ‘tradition’ was broken in 2004. Until that year prime ministers changed only because of death or due to regular elections held at the end of the term. In 2004, however, the prime minister resigned, and the parties of the government installed his successor without the mandate of a new national election.

Institutional Background

Party system concentration and the relative stability of the party labels are both embedded in the general framework of political institutions. Hungary is a unitary, unicameral parliamentary democracy. The power lies at the national and (to a smaller extent) at local (municipal) levels, counties have little relevance. The president is elected by the national parliament for a five year term, and has largely symbolic powers. MEP’s, mayors, local councillors, members of the county conventions, and ethnic minority councils are elected by popular vote. All other officeholders are appointed by the government or by the national parliament.

The electoral system for the national parliamentary elections is a mixed one. Voters have two votes. They can vote for regional party lists and for individual candidates. 176 members of the 386 member parliament are elected in single

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3 For a concise description of the electoral system see Tóka (2004).
member districts, through a French style double-ballot system.\textsuperscript{4} The rest of the mandates are distributed through a proportional list system. 152 of these seats can be gained from twenty regional constituencies, through regional lists, using the Hagenbach-Bischoff largest-remainder formula. Below two thirds of the quota no seats are distributed. Therefore, around one fifth of the 152 mandates are typically not distributed at this stage, but are shifted to the national level. At the national level a minimum of 58 compensatory seats are distributed on the basis of votes that produce no mandates in regional constituencies and in single-member districts. National level candidates are nominated through national lists and the seats are awarded using the d’Hondt method.

The threshold for being eligible for list-seats is 5 per cent. In 1989 the leading parties of the Opposition Round Table aimed at 3 per cent, then agreed on 4 per cent. But by 1994 they had realized that their interests were better served by an even higher threshold: 5 per cent for single parties, 10 per cent for two-party alliances and 15 for larger coalitions.

Candidates in single-member constituencies may be nominated by both voters and parties, but regional and national lists can be submitted only by organizations registered as parties. A national list may be set up by a party which has lists in at least seven regional constituencies. In order to be eligible for a regional list, parties must be able to nominate at least two candidates in the particular region (and in larger regions more). A candidate’s nomination becomes official after collecting 750 endorsements from the district.

The party lists used in national elections are closed lists. The party leadership determines the rank order of the candidates, the voters have no influence over it.

The analysis of the institutional rules indicates that Hungarian parties occupy a powerful position within the political system. The closed party list system is evidently party centred. The 176 single member districts are supposed to make the elections more personality orientated, but they are not able to counterbalance the logic of the list-system. There is a close congruence between the single district vote and the list vote, i.e., there is not much sign of splitting the ballot.

The distribution of seats, due to the low district magnitude and the high thresholds, is far from proportional, hurting minor parties and typically giving a bonus to the largest ones. The smaller parties must, at least for the second round of the elections, join an electoral bloc that has a chance to win most single-member seats (cf. Tóka 1995). The electoral system raises the bar so high for the minor parties that the otherwise liberal regulations concerning the establishment of parties and concerning their registration for electoral competition (e.g., there is no deposit) are without any consequence.

\textsuperscript{4} Candidates having obtained at least 15 per cent of the votes validly cast during the first electoral round may stand for election in the second round. If there are no such three candidates, the three candidates having obtained the greatest number of votes during the first electoral round may stand.
The structure of the legislature is also party-friendly. Corporate interests have no formal role to play, and only parties are entitled to form factions. The rules of party finance provide additional bonuses for the established parties: above 1 per cent of the vote they receive regular public subsidies, and those which have a faction in the parliament are provided with a particularly lavish state support.

The Constitutional Court and the Central Bank can potentially challenge the logic of party government. The term of the leaders of these institutions (similarly to the president of the republic, to the ombudsmans, and to the prosecutor general) does not coincide with the term of the parliament. This provides the opportunity for them to pursue technocratic intentions or to support the agenda of the opposition. Governments have often been particularly frustrated by the decisions of the Constitutional Court, which is one of the most activist ones in the world, creating norms in those areas where the Constitution (which originates in the communist era) is silent. Any Hungarian citizen can attack an existing law or regulation in front of the Court, and both civic organizations and politicians frequently resort to this option.

The above listed veto-players limit the power of the parliamentary majority. But they do not necessarily create party-free zones. Actually, many of the office-holders in these institutions have received nomination after years of direct involvement in partisan politics.

The existence of the above discussed veto-players and the long list of laws which requires a two-thirds majority, confer a consensual character to the institutional framework. But, whereas around the world other countries’ institutional make-up is typically matched with an appropriate elite culture, in Hungary it is not. The political culture is strongly adversarial. The consensual institutions, instead of fostering understanding among parties, often embittered their relations by frustrating the victorious majorities. Each government tried to rid itself of the inherited constrains, thereby gradually bringing the institutional structure closer to the prevailing political culture.

The most important shift towards majoritarianism happened in 1990. As a result of a pact between the leading government and opposition parties (Act XL. of 1990), the right of the parliament to exercise a vote of no-confidence in individual ministers, and the two-thirds requirement for a number of laws were abolished and the institution of constructive vote of no-confidence was introduced. All these changes have strengthened the power of the prime minister. The ministers are responsible only to him5 and his removal requires the consensus of the parliamentary majority around an alternative candidate.

The rules of the electoral competition, of party finance, and of parliamentary politics all favour, though to a varying degree, larger parties. Tóka (2004) forcefully argues that the dominance of the prime minister over the cabinet and over the parliament, guarded by the constructive vote of no-confidence, discriminates against small parties that cannot hope to capture this important

5 Until now only males were elected, or even considered, for this job.
office. The unitary nature of the country means that parties missing the parliamentary thresholds cannot sustain a significant political presence in other decision-making bodies.

While the shift of the decision-making centre towards the cabinet and the prime minister constitutes a major development, it is important to point out that most of the respective changes have happened at the level of informal practices and not at the level of institutions. Actually, the Hungarian political institutional infrastructure (electoral system, prerogatives of the parliament, etc.) is particularly stable. The institutional regime constructed at the Round Table Negotiations in 1989 was largely left intact. It is without doubt that this underlying stability has helped the established parties to consolidate their power. The lack of major changes in the rules of the game and the artificially stable governments have allowed for the crystallization of patterns of alliances and discouraged new party initiatives.

**The Role of Parties in Society and Government**

In Hungary, just like in most Eastern European countries, political parties fulfil a relatively marginal social function. Party identification is at a low level: in the polls taken between the elections more than 30 per cent of the respondents report no party preference, and the voters move in large numbers between the parties. If strong party identification is a prerequisite of stable democracy (Campbell et al. 1960), then the Hungarian democratic regime is fragile indeed. Parties, compared to other political or social institutions, constantly receive negative public ratings (Enyedi and Tóka forthcoming). But the attitudes of the voters are often influenced by party cues. Satisfaction with the political system, with economic conditions and with the country’s future prospects appear to be directly and strongly linked to pro-government or pro-opposition preferences. When their favourite party is in government, voters adopt more pro-market, pro-NATO and pro-EU attitudes (Hann 1998).

Many of the civic organizations are affiliated, at least informally, with parties, but their membership is rather small, leaving the majority of the citizens untouched by direct partisan influence. The inability to mobilize citizens for public activities (indicated, among other factors, by the low turnout at the elections and by the low level of party membership) is a sign of failure in the social functions classically attributed to parties.

The weakness of parties at the societal level is, however, part of a larger pattern of political culture. The syndrome is rooted in the ‘negative modernization’ (Hankiss 1983) of the communist era and can be described by keywords like atomization, erosion of traditional collective identities, lack of new forms of cooperation, lack of social trust and solidarity, cynicism, and privatization of attitudes. People in the Kádár era have learnt that individual strategies are more effective in improving one’s status than collectivist strategies. The regime change
has also happened mainly through elite negotiations, contributing further to the high level of alienation.

The suspicion among citizens towards politicians has probably played a positive role in the consolidation of the new regime by keeping the influence of populist demagogues and the number of industrial actions at a minimal level. On the other hand, it has had a negative impact on the quality of democracy, on the level of participation and on the social role of parties.

According to a survey conducted in 2004, only 13 per cent of the respondents indicate trust in parties. But the level of trust is still slightly above the regional average, and the same applies to the level of trust in the government and in the parliament.

And there are signs indicating that the party system is becoming better rooted in the society. Turnout increased in 2002, surpassing 73 per cent in the second round. Volatility is declining, partly, of course, because there are not many parties left to move between. Aggregate net volatility between 1990 and 1994 was 28.3 per cent, between 1994 and 1998 33.6 per cent, between 1998 and 2002 20.2 per cent. The mobilizational potential of parties has always been larger than that of trade unions, and in 2002 Fidesz managed to organize demonstrations involving many hundreds of thousands of citizens, to initiate a party related movement with tens of thousands of members (the so called Civic Circles) and to increase its own membership.

In spite of these successes in mobilization, parties perform such classical social functions as education, socialization or integration to a very limited degree. But they are well entrenched in power-structures. Hungary is close to an ideal-typical ‘party government’: major decisions are made by elected party officials or by their subordinates and government policies are mainly decided within the parties; parties act cohesively, and officials are recruited and held accountable through parties (Katz 1986).

As far as the selection of political personnel and political representation is concerned, the parties have no serious challengers. Local elections in small settlements are typically non-partisan, but at the parliamentary elections independents stand no chance. Only seven independent candidates have ever been elected to the parliament, six out of them in 1990. Although the citizens are given the choice to vote according to their preferences towards parties or personalities, they consistently vote according to party affiliations. The well-known and highly popular candidates of small parties stand little chance in the single member districts.

Note, however, that having partisan background does not equal party membership. A large number of MPs and ministers are not members of any party, and even the prime minister between 2002 and 2004 was a technocrat. It seems that in Hungary the very notion of party must be extended (somewhat similarly to the

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6 For the last figure the 2002 party alliance ‘Centrum’ is treated as identical with its major component units, the Christian Democrats and the Hungarian Democratic People’s Party, running separately in the 1998 election.
US) to all those public figures who participate in the partisan electoral and governing activities. The borders of parties are also diffuse in another respect: the loyalty of politicians often focusses on the entire political bloc, and not on the individual parties.

The ministers’ activities must nevertheless meet the expectations of the particular party that delegated them. If this happens, they can keep their job even if they are unpopular. The large-scale reshuffles in the ministries after elections, reaching nominally non-political positions, also indicate that the presence of parties is strongly felt in the governmental bureaucracy. Obviously, it is difficult to ascertain whether these replacements represent policy orientated ambitions or are just part of the patronage system, in the centre of which one finds the government, and not the parties.

The strong position of the prime minister can pose a serious challenge to parties. This challenge was particularly visible in those two years when the prime minister was not member of any party. The fact that he resigned because the parties did not allow him to replace one of his ministers, proved, however, that partisan control over the government still exists. On the other hand, the fact that the leading party chose a relative newcomer as his replacement, suggests that it is more relevant whether a candidate has a chance to win the election than whether he was socialized properly in the party culture.

The strong role of parties in the government, the generous state support they receive and their feeble presence in the society may seem to make the cartel party concept applicable to Hungary. Their co-operation in matters like party finance or in the restriction of non-partisan decision making fora seems to justify further this notion. But Hungarian parties are competitive, the party system is polarized, the stakes are high, and the politicians of the government-parties regard the members of the opposition (and vice versa) not as colleagues, but as enemies, whose complete eradication from the public sphere is an unlikely, but worth-trying project. Putting all these features together, the term cartel is clearly a misnomer.

Organization

Hungarian parties, just like most of their regional sisters, are very far from being mass parties. Around 2-3 per cent of the electorate is member (Mair 1997). The organizational weakness is less apparent in other dimensions. Hungarian parties are relatively complex organizations, with an elaborate division of labour. They have a permanent and professional staff, and maintain branch offices across the country. The statutes are taken seriously by the parties, who spend a considerable part of their conference time debating them. Financially, the parties do depend on the state: the bulk of their official income comes from the national budget. But this dependence also means a regular flow of income.

In spite of the large overlap between the parliamentary and extra-parliamentary elites within the parties, there have been numerous conflicts between the majority
of MPs and the party presidents. Since it is the party leadership that determines the list of candidates for the next election, typically the latter group prevails.

Parties are centralized. The parliamentary groups have always been highly disciplined, although in the first two parliaments the large number of defections (reaching one seventh of the MPs) indicated that the legitimacy of the leaderships was very shaky indeed. The professionalization of the politicians (in 2002 around nine tenths of the MPs ran for the new election, Kurtán and Király 2003) certainly helped to generate more loyalty. The general trend of centralization (Machos 1998, 1999) is most spectacular in Fidesz. The party started with collective leadership, and with a decentralized structure, but since 1993 it has become the most centralized, most homogeneous and most disciplined party in the country, under the firm leadership of its charismatic leader. Charismatic presidents have played an even more important role in the Smallholders’ Party, where between 1991 and 2002 the party was dominated by Mr Torgyán, and in MIÉP, where Mr Csurka dominates his party even more firmly, although perhaps less spectacularly.

The Socialist Party, on the other hand, has remained a relatively decentralized party, maintaining well institutionalized factions. In the MSZP, as opposed to other parties, candidates in the single member districts are chosen by the local organizations, without much interference by the party leadership. The relative decentralization of the party is strengthened by its permanent search for a new generation of (non-ex-communist) leaders. This leads to constant fights for the leadership, and reinforces the high level of pluralism within the party.

Although centralization and organizational complexity tend to go together within the general process of institutionalization, the turn of the century was dominated by the competition between a centralized and streamlined (Fidesz) and a decentralized and complex organization (Socialist Party). But Fidesz underwent a radical organization transformation after 2002, as a result of which the organization has become more complex, with a large number of specialized sub-units (Fowler 2004, Enyedi 2005). Interestingly, this transformation has not made the party less electorally orientated. The relevance of branch organizations and regional organizations has declined, the constituency organizations have gained larger importance and the top leadership has preserved its almost dictatorial power over the party.

The role of media campaigns in deciding the electoral outcomes is probably as important in Hungary as in other post-communist countries. But the recent attention given by both Fidesz and the Socialist Party to the direct mobilization of supporters suggests that organizational techniques gain new relevance under the condition of close competition.
Social Structure and Vote

While the explanatory power of political attitudes has increased, the relevance of socio-structural variables has declined in Hungary. Karácsony (2003) has found that in 1994 33 per cent, in 1998 29 per cent, in 2002 17 per cent of the vote could be predicted with the same socio-demographic variables. The decline is, however, largely a function of the declining party system fragmentation. The presence of fewer parties provides less room for mirroring the social structure (Knutsen 1988).

The original, relatively strong connection between social background and party preference was partly due to the presence of the two ‘historical’ parties that used to occupy specific social niches. The Smallholders’ core voters were the uneducated village dwellers, although for some years the party received the support of dissatisfied younger urban groups as well. The Christian Democrats could mainly count on the practicing religious, particularly on the Catholics, and it was disproportionately popular among elderly women. As a result of the close association with religion, the Christian Democrats used to have the most isolated, least permeable electorate within the Hungarian party system (Fábián 1999).

Originally Fidesz and the Socialist Party were also serving a specific clientele, however to a lesser extent than the Smallholders and the Christian Democrats. The voters of Fidesz used to come, and partly still come, from among the youngest age groups. The association between party preference and age could survive, in spite of the huge growth of Fidesz, due to the fact that the other large party, the MSZP, has an old and aging electorate. But the core clientele of the Socialists is best defined politically and not through age: half of the MSZP voters were MSZMP (ex-communist ruling party) members in 1990 (Karácsony 2003). As these two parties were growing they moved towards a more proportionate voting base, but they maintained their strongholds in the named groups. Fidesz and the Socialist voters also differ in the level of urbanization: while Fidesz became disproportionately popular among the village-dwellers at the turn of the century, the bulk of the Socialist voters continue to come from the cities. The Alliance of Free Democrats is an even more urban phenomenon, and it is supported by highly educated groups.

This brief description also shows that one of the more ‘classical’ cleavage variables, urbanization, has a clear relevance in Hungary. Economic transition has sharpened the conflict of interests between agrarian and urban interests throughout the region. Re-privatization of land has often been seen by the social elite as undermining economic efficiency, while the prospect of the integration into the European Union brought up the sensitive issues of agricultural subsidies and the right of foreigners to purchase (cheap) Eastern European land. The tradition of strong peasant parties and the heritage of long standing cultural barriers between the city and the countryside have been accompanied by the perception that the political class has allied itself with urban elites. This view led to a number of initiatives at establishing agrarian parties throughout the region. In case of Hungary the Smallholders’ Party has represented this party family, while Fidesz today only has a loose, but electorally relevant bias in favour of the countryside.
From the Lipset and Rokkan framework religion is the other variable that is relevant in Hungary. Within this dimension (involving religious practice and attitudes towards religion and towards the influence of the church) the Christian Democrats, the Hungarian Democratic Forum and the Smallholders used to be opposed to the non-religious Free Democrats and Fidesz and to the even less religious Socialists (Angelusz and Tardos 1994, Gazsó, F. and Stumpf 1995, 1996, Gazsó F. and Gazsó T. 1993, Róbert 1994, etc.). During the second part of the decade the electorate of Fidesz became significantly more religious and clerical, but the positions of the other parties did not change (Enyedi 2000).

The territorially based centre-periphery cleavage had little room to emerge in Hungary, given the small size and the relatively homogeneous nature of the country. The Socialists have never been able to dominate the richer, more developed Western part of the country, but they have had a strong position in the capital, and therefore the two blocs cannot be clearly identified with either the centre or the periphery.

As indicated by the low relevance of economic issues, the Hungarian party system is not polarized according to class divisions, although from time to time social status or subjective class position is found to be associated with various party preferences. Kitschelt’s (1992) prediction concerning the polarization between the winners and the losers of the transition has not materialized. Most of the absolute losers simply do not vote, and those who do are scattered across leftist and rightist parties.

After the first election Kolosi at al (1991) and Szelényi and Szelényi (1991) interpreted the opposing camps in terms of occupational groups. They claimed that the petty bourgeoisie and the workers in the private economy supported the national-Christian camp, the entrepreneurs and the intellectuals stood behind the liberals, while the nomenklatura and the workers in the state sector constitute the socialist field. But subsequent research has repeatedly found low correlation between social status and party preference. During the early nineties the nostalgia among the worse-off towards the Kádár era did result in their strong support in favour of the Socialists, but the austerity measures introduced by the MSZP-led government in 1995 diminished the party’s working class support. Since then there has been no major party that relies on working or lower middle class voters.

Following Stein Rokkan’s emphasis on critical junctures, the conflicts characterizing transition to democracy should exert a particularly large influence on the structure of East European politics. Indeed, ex-communist party membership (or having a spouse who used to be member of the communist party) is a strong predictor of the vote (e.g. Róbert 1999, Tóka 1998, Angelusz and Tardos 1994), benefiting the Socialists. András Körösényi (1998) argues that the communist nomenklatura can be perceived as a political class. In this perspective the regime divide is not simply an attitudinal cleavage, but a classical social cleavage as well, similar to the class cleavage.

As indicated above, core groups of supporters can be identified on both sides. In 1998, for example, non-religious managers, who used to be members of the
communist party and who were above 45 years old, voted by 95 per cent for the left-wing government. On the other hand, of the religious citizens who had never been members of the communist party, aged between 30 and 60, with a university degree, 75 per cent preferred the opposition. But these core groups are typically small, only 2-3 per cent of the population each (Angelusz and Tardos 1999). And particular parties and party blocs have not only one, but several such core groups with diverging characteristics. Both the left and the right are, for example, supported by lower and higher-class groups. The right is popular among the lower middle classes, but also in the wealthiest districts of the capital, and among the Smallholders in the countryside. The left finds strong supporters both among the university educated and among the workers of large traditional factories.

To summarize this section, it is possible to identify links between social groups and party choice, but these links are weakening, and they have never been strong enough to explain the relative stability and the declining concentration of the Hungarian party system.

Stability and Transformation in the Party System

Based on the analysis above, institutional stability, barriers in front of newly emerging parties, the longevity of governments, the central role of the prime minister, the successful marketing of moral-cultural issues and the recent emphasis on mobilization seem to contribute to the consolidation of the party system and to the decline in fragmentation. Cultural barriers also matter: because of the dominance of Budapest over the countryside, the elitist political culture, and the predominant role of national media. Leaving the parliament equals leaving the political limelight – for good. But the relations among parties, shaped by the conscious acts of party leaders, have also played a decisive role in the process of crystallization and simplification. And this is the factor I will turn to in the remaining part of the chapter.

In 1989 the main divide of the party system was between the Socialists and the rest of the parties, organized into the Oppositional Roundtable (Figure 8.1). But very soon, already in the last phase of the negotiations with the communist party-state, the Roundtable split into a moderate camp, led by the Hungarian Democratic Forum, and a radical bloc, led by the Alliance of Free Democrats.

The split within the anti-communist opposition was consolidated by the logic of coalition building in 1990. The rationale for the coalition of the Smallholders, the Hungarian Democratic Forum and the Christian Democrats was not their common programme, nor the mutual sympathies of their voters, but the contention that they (and only they) formed the Christian-national camp. Ever since then, the parties have based their coalitional choices on cultural dimensions, even when the voters have rated economic issues as most relevant ones.
Figure 8.1 Patterns of Hungarian party competition.
During the first years of the Hungarian party system two interpretations of the political field competed. One emphasized the government-opposition divide, perceived as a religious-secular, traditionalist-modernizer or nationalist-cosmopolitan opposition. The other approach supported the three-polar pattern, according to which the two liberal parties (Free Democrats, Fidesz) were equally far from the Christian-nationalist parties and the Socialists.

The uncertainty concerning the fundamental structure of the party system did not last long. The three-polar pattern collapsed when, in the mid-1990s, the liberal camp split into two. The Free Democrats moved to the left, closer to the Socialists, while Fidesz shifted to the right, towards the traditional right-wing parties. Around 1993-1995 smaller groups moved between the two former allies: the conservative Free Democrats joined Fidesz, while the liberal Fidesz leaders integrated into the Alliance of Free Democrats. The slowly forming two-bloc competition was challenged by groups on the radical right, but these groups soon proved to be more right-wing than radical, and in crucial moments supported the centre-right. The Hungarian parliamentary landscape has become deceptively simple. At the moment the two blocs are composed of one large (Fidesz and the Socialists) and one small (Hungarian Democratic Forum and the Alliance of Free Democrats) actor.

Consequently, the pattern of competition has become predictable. This development somewhat contradicts the expectations regarding post-communist politics. As Peter Mair has argued, the big stakes, the large number of available and newly enfranchised voters and the almost non-existence of civil society is likely to lead to excessive competition in Eastern Europe, hampering stabilization (Mair 1997). Placing party systems on a continuum ranging from complete closure (coalition alternatives are constant, the range of potential governing parties are fixed, and there is a complete turnover in the government) to complete openness (where the outcome of the party competition is unpredictable), the Eastern European party systems must be at the ‘open’ end.

The structure of competition in Hungary is, however, closed. The elections end with complete turnover. Government-membership is restricted to six (at the moment, four) parties. The party alliances have changed somewhat between 1989 and 1994, but the parties’ relations are far from being unpredictable. On the other hand, there are strong attempts on behalf of the parties to isolate each other and to create constraints for the coalition making process. The parties of the left (Free Democrats, Socialists) and the right (Christian Democrats, Forum, Smallholders, MIÉP) mutually refuse to consider a partnership with the organizations from the other side. Instead of promiscuity, strictly enforced fidelity governs the parties’ behaviour in their dealings with ‘their’ side and the ‘opposite’ side.

In order to appreciate this rigidity, one must consider that the social, economic and international environment of the party system which has undergone tremendous changes during the past fifteen years. Different phases of the transition have given rise to different political or economic conflicts. This has placed the party relations under tremendous pressure, and yet, in the last decade the pattern of alliances has remained largely identical and no new party has emerged.
The elites have produced a polarized political space, leaving no room for a centre-force. The most influential intellectuals and ideologues perceive the political struggle in bipolar and extreme terms: democrats versus anti-democrats, nationalists versus non- and anti-Hungarian cosmopolitans, fascists versus communists, etc. This bipolar atmosphere may reinforce even the power of the electoral system. Considering the potential reasons of declining fragmentation, Tóka (2004) points out that even more majoritarian electoral systems fail to reduce the number of parties to the Hungarian level, and consequently he dismisses electoral rules from the list of likely suspects. But the interaction between the electoral system and the polarized atmosphere may still be a relevant factor. Due to the disbelief in the legitimacy of the opponent, the minor parties have been accused of playing with fire: by missing the threshold they are seen as serving the interests of the opposite bloc, and therefore risking the democratic or national character of the country. Following this logic even the Catholic Church names the size of the parties (that is, below or above the threshold) as one of the major criteria voters should base their choice on. The high level of ideological polarization amplifies the impact of the single-member, double ballot element of the electoral system and washes away the diverging impact of the PR.

As a result of the interaction between high polarization, bipolar structure and large number of single member districts, in almost all Hungarian parties there are factions that emphasize the disagreements between the two blocs as opposed to the disagreements between individual parties. These groups are in conflict with those who insist on the specific interests of the particular party. The debates over the degree of cooperation with other parties have emerged as the number one reason of factionalism and splits.

The combination of majoritarian institutional elements, polarization and increasingly one dimensional party-space is probably to be blamed for the failure of the more sectional parties (Smallholders, Christian Democrats). The groups these parties were associated with were too small to form the core of an entire political camp. As described above, both parties tried to break out from their social ghetto with radical-populist rhetoric, but this strategy proved to be too risky.

High polarization and bipolar competition were not predetermined by the attitudes of the citizens. Probably the traditional animosity between groups of intellectuals could not have produced such a clear-cut structure either. The conscious actions of the parties themselves were the most decisive factors. The Hungarian case seems to be a perfect illustration for the thesis of Peter Mair (1989): the coalitional behaviour of parties may determine the stability and the shape of party systems. By rejecting coalition-partners from the other side, the parties have strengthened the bipolar nature of the party competition, undermined the support of smaller parties, and reduced electoral volatility. As long as no party

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7 As Sarah Birch (2001) has shown, thresholds tend to have a particularly large impact on the number of parties in post-communist Europe anyway.
will be willing (and be in the position) to cross the left-right divide in alliance-building, the de-freezing of the party system has no chance to occur.

Conclusion and Caveat

As a closing remark, I must stress again that the stability of the Hungarian party system is relative and fragile. It is based neither on socio-structural underpinnings, nor on the organizational isolation of constituencies. The degree of stability is also relative in the sense that while it is true that the Hungarians did not need to learn new party labels during the last decade, the popularity of parties and their ideological positions have undergone significant changes. Actually, the well-timed shifts in the ideological position of certain parties (particularly of Fidesz) may go a long way towards explaining the survival of the party labels. When the collapse of the centre-right created a vacuum, there was an established party ready to move in. But flexibility in itself would not have done the trick. Fidesz’s move was emotionally and ideologically charged, leaving no possibility for the party to turn back, even if electoral rationality demanded that (Enyedi 2005). The endogenous, political polarization seems to be a powerful restraining factor, disciplining parties more than the social environment does.

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