

SAVING THE PEOPLE

Relles	-0.287***	0.226*	-0.060	-0.010	-0.008
reloath	-0.101	0.307*	0.070	0.020	0.135*
Prsttv	-0.027	0.034	-0.077*	0.031	0.004
chlegis	-0.219***	0.349***	-0.060	-0.130***	0.046
prvotv	-0.070	0.197***	-0.057	-0.243***	0.022
gdevil	0.001	-0.024*	-0.005	-0.000	0.007
minopin	0.011	-0.000	-0.013	-0.008	-0.002
disfree	-0.012	-0.005	-0.020*	-0.006	-0.011
_cons	3.647***	-0.211	2.678***	1.398***	1.095***
N	1919	1919	1919	1919	1919

Source: author's own calculations on the basis of the dataset provided by Polskie Generalne Studium Wyborcze (2011).

Notes: all models are Poisson regressions with robust standard errors, using multiple imputation of missing data (m=10).

in Nadia Marzouki, Duncan McDonnell,  
Olivier Roy eds. (2016), Saving  
the People: How Populists Hijack  
Religion. London: Hurst & Co.  
129-147. (notes: 132-236)

'THE GOD OF HUNGARIANS'

RELIGION AND RIGHT-WING POPULISM IN HUNGARY

Zoltán Ádám and András Bozóki

*A magyarok istenére esküszünk,  
hogy rabok tovább nem leszünk!*

'We swear on the God of Hungarians  
that we won't stay as slaves any more!'

Sándor Petőfi, *Nemzeti dal* (National Song), 1848

Religious interventions into politics and the role of the Church in shaping policy decisions and even political strategies have long represented an important topic for academic research.<sup>1</sup> In this chapter, however, we argue that the relationship between populism and religion in Hungary is not particularly strong, and only contextually significant. The traditional Christian Churches—Catholic and Hungarian Calvinist—provide a societal basis for right-wing populist parties, with the latter making religious references to signal their traditional social values and identification with the societal mainstream. Yet, as Hungary is not a particularly religious society, and most people ignore all

Churches, right-wing populist parties make sure that they are not hijacked by religious thinking or controlled by any Church.

Right-wing populism does not necessarily contain an important religious element, as, for instance, the Dutch case demonstrates.<sup>2</sup> In a secular country like Hungary, in fact, right-wing populist parties could refrain from making significant recourse to appeals to religious identity. Yet, even under such structural conditions, right-wing parties tend to refer to religious values and to seek religious legitimation, as we will show in the case of two Hungarian right-wing populist parties. In this sense, a link between right-wing populism and religion has been created in Hungarian politics over the past twenty-five years, which in fact follows longstanding historical traditions. Meanwhile, left-wing parties are associated with the communist past, which promoted a secular ideology. The divide between leftist and anti-communist forces thus basically refers to the classic secular versus confessional cleavage.<sup>3</sup>

In this chapter, we will first discuss the role of right-wing populism in Hungary and its dominance of the country's political landscape since the end of the 2000s. Second, we will examine the role of religion in the formation of the politics of the governing right-wing Fidesz party and its far-right opposition, the Movement for a Better Hungary (Jobbik Magyarországért Mozgalom—usually known simply as Jobbik). In so doing, we will compare their usage of religious references in competitive party politics.<sup>4</sup> Third, we will analyse the role of religion in Hungarian society and politics, arguing that—despite its longstanding historical roots—it remains comparatively limited.

### *The Populist Takeover of Hungary*


The rise and consolidation of right-wing populist and extreme nationalist movements across Europe has puzzled democratic theorists and observers alike as a trend that would seem to be incompatible with the purportedly liberal democracies in which they are taking root. In the nearly three decades since the collapse of communism in the former Soviet bloc, countries in East Central Europe have struggled to create a democratic legacy and propel their societies towards democratic futures. Although the Round Table Talks of 1989 led to a democratic arrangement and non-violent transition from communism to a market economy and democracy in Hungary,<sup>5</sup> many Hungarians have become disillusioned by their post-transition situation. A sense has arisen that democracy was 'stolen' from Hungarians and that a new transformation must be undertaken if the country is to be truly vindicated from centuries of

indignity under various imperial powers and then many decades of communism. Hence, according to a 2009 Pew Research report, 77 per cent of Hungarian respondents were frustrated with the way Hungarian democracy had worked during the 1991–2009 period, and 91 per cent of Hungarians thought that the country was not on the right track.<sup>6</sup> Approval of democracy in Hungary immediately following the fall of communism was 74 per cent, whereas by 2009 this figure had fallen eighteen percentage points to 56 per cent.<sup>7</sup>

At the June 2009 European Parliament (EP) elections, the right-wing Fidesz party gained 56 per cent of popular votes, while the far-right Jobbik received 15 per cent. In the following year's general election, Fidesz received 53 per cent, while Jobbik obtained 17 per cent, representing a noteworthy increase in radical right-wing representation in Hungarian elections. Due to the dominance of single mandate districts, Fidesz's electoral victory was transformed into a two-thirds parliamentary supermajority. Left-wing and centrist parties together gained fewer than 20 per cent of parliamentary seats. The full takeover by the right was thus completed politically, ideologically and culturally, and an openly anti-liberal regime was established.<sup>8</sup> Using its two-thirds parliamentary majority, Fidesz altered the entire constitutional system. Not only did the party introduce a new Constitution, but it changed electoral rules and fundamental laws regulating the relationship between government bodies and between the government and the citizenry.<sup>9</sup> The new Orbán regime, named after Prime Minister Viktor Orbán, proved to be very flexible in several ways but constantly moved in an authoritarian direction. At the beginning, it was a majoritarian democracy, but it subsequently became an illiberal, populist one. Moreover, since the 2014 general elections, it has been an increasingly autocratic hybrid regime.

This authoritarian turn was carried out by the two-thirds parliamentary majority, without any meaningful concession to the opposition and without a referendum or any other institutionalised form of popular approval for the new Fundamental Law that replaced the 1989 Constitution. Precisely because of this, some observers have argued that the Fundamental Law suffers from a critical lack of legitimacy, and hence will be relatively easy to modify by a future liberal democratic majority.<sup>10</sup> However, perhaps the most shocking aspect of the Fidesz takeover from a liberal democratic viewpoint has been the fact that even this restricted legitimacy seems to possess a seemingly larger, more extensive, popular political appeal than the pre-2010 liberal democratic regime did.

Fig. 9.1: Share of Votes for Party Lists (as Percentage of Total Votes)



Source: National Election Office.

Notes: far-left: Hungarian Socialist Worker's Party/Worker's Party (1990–2002; 2014: 0.6 per cent); left: Hungarian Social Democratic Party (1990), Hungarian Socialist Party (1990–2014); centre: Agrarian Alliance (1990–1994), Centre Party (2002), Fidesz (1990–1998), LMP (2010–2014), Alliance of Free Democrats (1990–2006), Entrepreneurs' Party (1990); right: Fidesz (2002–2014), Independent Smallholders' Party (1990–2002), Christian Democratic People's Party (1990–1998), Hungarian Democratic Forum (1990–1998, 2006–2010), far-right: Hungarian Justice and Life Party (1998–2006), Jobbik (2010–2014).

### Fidesz

Founded in 1988 during the mobilisation of radical liberal student activists, Fidesz has undergone a profound ideological and policy shift since the mid-1990s. Led by Viktor Orbán and his college friends, Fidesz entered the national political arena as a fresh, young, alternative liberal party in 1989–1990. Its name was an abbreviation of Federation of Young Democrats (*Fiatalkorú Demokraták Szövetsége*), and the party espoused an anti-clerical political stance. In the mid-1990s it took a right-wing turn and gradually transformed itself into the leading centre-right party. It developed an essentially traditional right-wing political stance, one that includes reservations about liberal democracy and Western influence in Hungarian internal affairs. Though the evolution of Fidesz was nuanced and complex, the party has consistently and conspicuously adopted increasingly nationalistic policy stances as it rose to power.<sup>11</sup>

Already at the turn of the millennium, when Orbán was prime minister for the first time (1998–2002), his government pursued ideologically driven policies such as the creation of a 'Civic Hungary'. It also sought to enlist the conservative cultural elite as a political ally, so that Fidesz could claim to be the political representative of the traditional 'Christian-national middle classes' that played a dominant role in inter-war Hungary.<sup>12</sup> In order for his party to become the leading force of the right, Orbán needed historical and cultural symbols, and had to eliminate his right-wing rivals, the traditional agrarian Independent Smallholders' Party (FKGP—*Független Kisgazdapárt*) and the 'old school', anti-Semitic and far-right Hungarian Justice and Life Party (MIÉP—*Magyar Igazság és Élet Pártja*).<sup>13</sup> Although the turn from anti-clericalism to an openly positive stance towards religion never played a very important role in the history of Fidesz, Orbán himself regularly participated in the festive Catholic processions known as *Szent Jobb Körmenet*, held on the anniversary of the foundation of the Hungarian state (20 August). He started openly to identify his own political camp with 'the Nation' and to cast his opponents as serving 'foreign interests'.

'We need to win only once but with a big margin,' Orbán famously said in 2007 after having lost two general elections in a row in 2002 and 2006. He knew that Fidesz could transform the entire constitutional system via a two-thirds parliamentary majority, and thus fulfil the anti-liberal agenda that the traditional right had been nurturing since the regime change of 1989. Using an enormous amount of public financial resources, constraining opposition parties' access to national media and manipulating electoral rules, Fidesz has won all national and European Parliament elections with huge margins since 2010. It has built a centralised and personalised political system in which Orbán plays the role of a populist leader, based on his personal charisma, unchallenged both within and outside his party. The 'national Christian' political identity of Fidesz has played an instrumental role but conveyed no substantial religious content. When Hungary was admitted to the European Union (EU) in 2004, Fidesz joined the centre-right, conservative grouping of the European Parliament, the European People's Party (EPP). However, religion has not been a significant part of Fidesz's identity and policies, not even after it embraced a nationalist-populist stance on most policy issues. Hence, a recently published semi-official history of Fidesz did not even discuss the role of religion in the formation of party ideology.<sup>14</sup>

## Jobbik

Fidesz's overwhelming political dominance in recent years has been based on its capacity to describe social reality in its own terms, ideologically unchallenged by the left. However, since the end of the 2000s, Fidesz has been increasingly challenged by its far-right opponent, Jobbik. Founded in 2002 via a conservative university movement, Jobbik describes itself as a

principled, conservative and radically patriotic Christian party. Its fundamental purpose is protecting Hungarian values and interests. It stands up against the ever more blatant efforts to eradicate the nation as the foundation of human community.<sup>15</sup>

Jobbik's ideology is that of a right-wing, radical party 'whose core element is a myth of a homogeneous nation, a romantic and populist ultra-nationalism directed against the concept of liberal and pluralistic democracy and its underlying principles of individualism and universalism'.<sup>16</sup> In addition to this nationalist rhetoric, Jobbik has an underlying economic appeal that blames globalisation for Hungary's troubles. The party has been clear about its radical far-right nationalism from the beginning. It arose from relative obscurity<sup>17</sup> by harnessing deeply held anti-Roma sentiment following the countryside lynching of a non-Roma teacher by a group of Roma in a remote north-east Hungarian village in October 2006. Jobbik uses its ideology to address what it calls 'gypsy crime', an issue the party portrays as the fundamental problem in Hungarian society. Its solution is to establish jobs, education and vocational training in addition to harsher punitive sentences. Jobbik has thus managed to establish itself as a radical, nationalist and blatantly anti-Roma party that believes in law and order as the solution to the issue of 'gypsy crime'.

In addition to its evocation of rampant Roma criminality, Jobbik gained further notoriety—and followers—with the formation of a paramilitary force. The August 2007 founding ceremony in Budapest of the Hungarian Guard (*Magyar Gárda*) caused further concern among those alarmed by the burgeoning radical right in the country. Gábor Vona, chairman of Jobbik and a co-founder of the Guard, stated: 'The Hungarian Guard has been set up in order to carry out the real change of regime from communism and to rescue Hungarians.'<sup>18</sup> This theme of 'rescuing Hungarians' is consistent with Jobbik's self-conception as the saviour of Hungary and the radical redeemer of what its members consider a failed transition. One of the most prominently displayed pledges in Jobbik's manifesto on the party's official website is the '[completion of] the change of the political system' and 'creating a more just society than the current one'.<sup>19</sup> In 2008, the 650-member Guard wore black uniforms

inspired by traditional Hungarian national dress with the ancient Árpád banner as their symbol. The symbolism seemed obvious: a homage to Mussolini, if not Hitler, and to the fusion of race, state and national unity. The Árpád stripes are a part of Hungary's coat of arms, but are now associated with the far right, as the Nazi-inspired Arrow Cross regime, which ruled the country in the winter of 1944–1945, incorporated the stripes into its flag.

While there are certainly true believers in Jobbik's nationalist ideology, the party has really only been able to grow in an environment where the population is radicalised, not by nationalism or racism but by anger at the economic and political situation. In this sense, the far right in Hungary is not to be confused with the radical parties that exist in Western Europe, for the far right in Central Europe differs from its Western counterparts in its choice of enemies. As an *Economist* article put it: 'In the West it thrives on immigrant-bashing. In the East it dwells on more atavistic grievances: ethnic minorities, old territorial disputes [...] and, naturally, Jews. Hatred of the Roma has become a defining issue. Everywhere economic anxiety is exploited. Even a decade of growth has left plenty of poor and disaffected people. Many hark back to an era when the state protected them from crude market forces. This produces a far right that likes nationalization and dislikes the market.'<sup>20</sup>

*The Role of Religion in Hungarian Right-Wing Populism*

The new Fundamental Law adopted in 2011 was the result of a unilateral governmental process, which did not reflect a national consensus. It was approved by Fidesz MPs only, and is therefore often called the Fidesz Constitution. Although the Fundamental Law kept several portions of the 1989 Constitution, it represents a clear break with its spirit.<sup>21</sup> It lumps individual freedoms together with communal interests, not valuing individual freedoms in their own right. Moreover, rights are not separated from duties, and the latter are derived from Christian worldviews. The Fundamental Law refers to Hungary as a country based on Christian values. Although it formally maintains the form of governance as a republic (in one sentence only), it changes the official name of the country from 'the Republic of Hungary' to simply 'Hungary'. The text increases the role of religion, traditions and so-called 'national values'. It speaks of a unified nation, yet certain social minorities are not mentioned with the same degree of importance. In its definition of equality before the law, it mentions gender, ethnicity and religion, but it does not extend this to legal protection against discrimination based on sexual orientation.

In contrast to the 1989–1990 democratic constitution, the Fundamental Law of 2011 serves as the expression of a secularised national religious belief system: a sort of paganised, provincial, particularistic understanding of the universalistic spirit of Christianity. It is a vow in which Hungarians are meant to list all of their sources of pride and hope and pledge to join hands and build a better future, parallel to Orbán's 'System of National Cooperation', announced immediately after the 2010 general elections by the new Parliament. The political fusion of nationalism and Christianity is clearly presented in the preamble to the Fidesz Constitution: 'We recognise the role of Christianity in preserving nationhood.'<sup>22</sup> The signing of the Fundamental Law by the President of the Republic took place on the first anniversary of the electoral victory of Fidesz, which happened to be Easter Monday, 25 April 2011, a date symbolising the alleged rise of Hungarian Christianity and statehood; and drawing a bizarre parallel between the resurrection of Jesus and the new Fidesz Constitution.<sup>23</sup>

Fidesz uses religious symbols in an eclectic way in which references to Christianity are often mentioned together with pre-Christian pagan traditions. This refers to the idea of 'two Hungaries': the Western Christian version and its Eastern, pagan and tribal counterpart. When Orbán talks about the reunification of the Hungarian nation, he means that he intends to build bridges between the two camps. He aims to 'Christianise' pagan traditions—or paganise Christianity to accommodate the needs of the Hungarian right—when he brings together seemingly incompatible religious symbols. In his speeches, the Holy Crown of St Stephen, the first Hungarian king, can easily appear side-by-side with the mythical Turul bird, a symbol of ancient Hungarians. The concept of political nationhood has thus given way to the ethnic idea of national consciousness. On inaugurating the monument of 'National Togetherness', Viktor Orbán voiced his conviction that the Turul bird is the ancient image into which the Hungarians are born:

From the moment of our births, our seven tribes enter into an alliance, our St-King Stephen establishes a state, our armies suffer a defeat at the Battle of Mohács, and the Turul bird is the symbol of national identity of the living, the deceased and the yet-to-be-born Hungarians.<sup>24</sup>

Orbán conjectures that, like a family, the nation also has a natural home—in Hungary's case, the Carpathian Basin—where the state-organised world of work produces order and security, and where one's status in the hierarchy defines authority. The legitimacy of the government and the Fundamental Law is not only based on democratic approval, but is approved by God, and

features the spirit of Hungarians represented by the Turul. These concepts have replaced an earlier public discourse whose central categories were liberal democracy, market economy, pluralism, inalienable human rights, the republic, an elected political community and cultural diversity.

As Éva Balogh observes, Orbán's references to nation, nationalism and Christianity are abundant. Orbán claims that 'Christian culture is the unifying force of the nation', it gives 'the inner essence and meaning of the state [...] that's why we declare that Hungary will either be Christian or not at all.' He has also asserted that Hungarians are Europeans, not because Hungary is geographically part of Europe, but again 'because we are Christians.'<sup>25</sup> Both Fidesz and Jobbik politicians believe in the homogenised and ethnicised concept of culture, both use religion as complementary to nationalist ideology and both prefer a strongman's rule to liberal democracy. Both parties use or support discriminatory policies against the Roma minority, and both display a claustrophobic approach to foreigners. They differ, however, as regards their position on the Islamophobia-anti-Semitism axis: Fidesz is openly Islamophobic but it rejects anti-Semitism, while Jobbik is anti-Semitic and openly anti-Roma.

Jobbik members and voters have exhibited blatant anti-Semitism<sup>26</sup> and the party has been criticised for its members' intentionally intimidating stance towards the country's significant Roma population, as well as for its paramilitary wing in the Guard. It has led the charge to restore Hungary to its former glory, utilising old national symbols and foundational myths to construct the image of a unified, homogeneous, Christian nation that must retrieve what has been taken by centuries of foreign domination, communist rule and a weak post-transition democratic state. Pirro identifies Jobbik by its clericalism, by its irredentism, by its social-nationalist economic programme and by its anti-Roma, anti-corruption and anti-EU stances.<sup>27</sup> From its early documents, it is clear that the party believes that 'national morality can only be based on the strengthening of the teachings of Christ', and Jobbik promotes the spiritual recovery of the Hungarian people. This is to be achieved by returning to traditional communities (the family, the Churches and the nation).<sup>28</sup>

As self-described 'Christians', Jobbik politicians have consistently taken a pro-Arab stance against the Jews and the state of Israel, underlining the alleged similarities between the situation of the Palestinian people in Israel and of Hungarians in Europe. Anti-Semitism thus overrides Islamophobia within the party. In 2012, for instance, Csanád Szegedi, an influential Jobbik politician and former member of the European Parliament, had to leave the party after he discovered his Jewish origins.<sup>29</sup> On the other hand, a former leader of the

Hungarian Guard, the paramilitary organisation closely connected to Jobbik, was active in helping Syrian refugees to enter Hungary in 2015. This is, of course, another point that distances Jobbik from the far-right parties of Western Europe, for the party has displayed relative openness to Islam. Its leader, Gábor Vona, embraced a new Eastern alliance for Hungary (instead of the North Atlantic one) based on neo-Turanism,<sup>30</sup> a historical ideology that aspires to the unification of the "Uralo-Altaic" race, including the Turks of Turkey, the Turkic peoples of Central Asia, Tatars, Hungarians, the aboriginal tribes in Siberia and even distant Mongolians, Manchus, Koreans and Japanese.<sup>31</sup> Some Jobbik politicians thus claim that their party stands out among the European radical right-wing parties through its close relationship with Islam.<sup>32</sup> This reinforces our observation that anti-Semitism is the glue that connects the parallel pro-Islam and pro-Christian stance of the party.


Jobbik has thus been vehemently pro-Christian (even installing crosses in several Budapest squares). However, while it enjoys the support of certain members of both the Catholic and the Calvinist Church—the two largest Hungarian religious congregations—neither Church in general approves of Jobbik. Despite its manifestly Christian self-identification, Jobbik is seen by many clerics as representing an essentially pagan, anti-Christian cultural tradition.

#### *Religion and Populism in Hungarian Society*

Despite all of the differences discussed above, Fidesz and Jobbik are not real political enemies. Rather, their convergences in ideology and policy have opened up a space for the far right in the Hungarian political mainstream. As Jobbik has ventured further into the political mainstream and boosted its core constituency, Fidesz has adopted policies further to the right in an effort to strengthen its position on the right and consolidate its power under the auspices of a strongly nationalist populism.<sup>33</sup> This political space has opened up an opportunity for Fidesz to adopt increasingly illiberal policies while maintaining its political dominance and a parliamentary supermajority.<sup>34</sup> In a sense, the political centre shifted further to the right, polarising left and right and making it more difficult for political moderates to appeal to the majority of the electorate. Due to this shift, we can say that Hungary not only has an extreme-right party, but an 'extreme centre'.

From our perspective in this chapter, the most important question is whether the politicisation of religion has played a significant role in this further shift to the right. Our short answer is no. Hungarian right-wing pop-

Fig. 9.2: Percentage of Respondents Attending Religious Services other than Weddings or Funerals at Least Once a Week



Source: Eurobarometer, spring 2004.

ulism, enacted by Fidesz and Jobbik in an increasingly similar ideological fashion, has used limited religious references in the post-1989 era. The most important reason for this, we would argue, is the limited role of the Churches and religion in Hungarian society.

Although Hungary is certainly not an extremely atheistic society, a clear majority refuses to join Churches and to participate in institutionalised religious activities. This is a relatively recent development, dating back to the post-World War II period in which Hungary went through a process of urbanisation and industrialisation while Churches were severely repressed by the communist regime. Although a revival of churchgoing has taken place since 1989, a large part of society still distances itself from Churches and religious references. Hence, for a political party, appearing to be overly religious may alienate a substantial part of the electorate. In fact, while József Torgyán's FKGP renewed the historic party slogan of 'God, Fatherland, Family' in the 1990s, Christianity itself played a limited role even in its relatively old-fashioned right-wing populism.<sup>35</sup> As representatives of current right-wing populism, neither Fidesz nor Jobbik defines itself in terms of religious identity, although in their respective party manifestos both claim to be 'Christian'. However, Christianity in this context signifies a degree of social conservatism and traditional nationalism rather than any substantive religious reference. Research proves that Jobbik's pro-Christian stance simply indicates

that the party should be interpreted as ‘non-Jewish’.<sup>36</sup> By using this discourse, Jobbik simply creates an identifiable reference to its anti-Semitism. In fact, despite Jobbik’s self-definition as a Christian party, Jobbik voters are the least religious citizens in Hungary.

Table 9.1: Answers to the Question ‘How Religious Are You?’ Among Voters of Parliamentary Parties (Percentage of the Particular Party’s Total Electorate)

	<i>‘religious, and I follow the guidance of the Church’</i>	<i>‘religious in my own way’</i>	<i>‘not religious’</i>	<i>‘cannot tell whether I am religious or not’</i>	<i>Refuse to answer</i>	<i>Total</i>
Fidesz-KDNP	22	51	22	5	1	100
Jobbik	6	43	41	9	1	100
MSZP	15	57	21	7	1	100
LMP	4	51	35	9	1	100

Source: Political Capital Institute research, Budapest, 2012.


Although followers of Churches seem to represent the highest share among Fidesz voters, their ratio is a mere 22 per cent, followed by 15 per cent among Socialist voters. Again, Church members represent a conspicuously low figure of 6 per cent among Jobbik voters. At the same time, explicitly non-religious people represent the highest share among Jobbik voters (41 per cent), and their share, interestingly, is lower among Socialist voters (21 per cent) than among the Fidesz electorate (22 per cent). Fidesz has probably been the preferred political party of Christian Churches since at least the beginning of the 2000s, and Prime Minister Orbán has identified himself as a Christian believer on numerous occasions. Fidesz has also formed a strategic alliance with the Christian Democratic People’s Party (KDNP), historically a dominantly Catholic party, since 2002. As part of this agreement, the KDNP receives enough seats to form its own parliamentary faction and is also allocated a generous number of government positions when the parties are in power. In exchange, the KDNP has effectively given up its separate political identity and become a Fidesz satellite, endorsing its ‘Christianity’ by its mere name.

Although certainly not disliked by the Catholic Church, Fidesz probably has closer ties to the Calvinist Church, Hungary’s second largest congregation. Orbán himself is a Calvinist and one of his closest political confidants, Zoltán Balog (minister of human resources), was a Calvinist pastor before becoming a professional politician. Orbán likes to attend religious ceremonies and to

deliver semi-public speeches in churches. Correspondingly, Fidesz’s relationship with the Churches is friendly but not strongly institutionalised. However, Christianity in general serves as a broad ideological reference, and this reference becomes more concrete at some politically prominent moments. For instance, in the new Memorial to the German Occupation of 1944–45 on Szabadság tér, a central square in Budapest, Hungary is represented as Archangel Gabriel being attacked by the German imperial eagle. This is a highly controversial new memorial that seeks to modify public discourse on Hungary’s role in World War II, depicting the country as a victim rather than a perpetrator. In this context, Hungary is represented by the Archangel, providing an obviously religious reference for national identity politics. Nevertheless, Fidesz generally refrains from advocating hard-core religious ideas that may alienate people. We explain this by the fact that Fidesz is a large umbrella organisation, ‘the party of power’, and its voters typically do not nurture strong religious identities. Therefore, while using religion to justify its populist policies, Fidesz must also strike a delicate balance.

Jobbik does not appear to be a representative of religious interests either. In contrast to other right-wing populist parties of the region, such as Law and Justice (PiS) in Poland, it does not cast itself as the protagonist of religious values. Rather, it sometimes seems to nurture pagan affiliations, cultivating a longstanding relationship between far-right or Nazi political culture and pre-Christian paganism. However, just like Fidesz, Jobbik also has its own direct

Fig. 9.3: Share of Religious Congregations in Hungary (Percentage of the Total Population)



Source: Hungarian Central Statistical Office, Census data.

links to the Calvinist Church, with one of Budapest's most prominent pastors, Lóránt Hegedűs, being an explicit supporter, while his wife, another Calvinist pastor by profession, is a Jobbik MP. The particular congregation run by Hegedűs is located on Szabadság tér in Budapest, about fifty metres from the Memorial to the German Occupation. On the staircase of the church, on private property but facing the square, is a bust of Admiral Horthy, governor of Hungary from 1920 to 1944, a far-right political icon.<sup>37</sup> This is how religious ideas and (semi-)public religious spaces meet radical right politics in present-day Hungary: typically they do not themselves create political identities, but both Fidesz and Jobbik use them as references to secure their positions and enhance their legitimacy as protagonists of the illiberal, right-wing political cause.

However, the relationship between right-wing populism and religion can also be interpreted in another way. Just as in other dominantly secular European countries such as the Netherlands,<sup>38</sup> in which the state has been firmly detached institutionally from any Churches, populism itself can be seen as playing a semi-religious role. In the particular Hungarian context, this is a highly nationalistic surrogate-religion in which the nation itself becomes a sacred entity and the process of national identification carries religious attributes. Admittedly, from a serious religious perspective, such an approach represents a kind of worldly paganism, and as such should be dismissed on truly religious grounds. Nonetheless, this kind of surrogate religion is able to draw a sizeable crowd of followers in Hungary, as well as in other countries. However, this has little to do with actual religious beliefs, even if populism uses religion in general, and Christianity in particular, as a source of legitimacy and political endorsement.

Interestingly, Judaism can also play a similar politically instrumental role. Fidesz has sought to establish a special relationship with the Orthodox Jewish community (although relations between Reform Judaism and Fidesz are less friendly). Jobbik, as a representative of the anti-Semitic radical right, has not, of course, sought a friendly relationship with any factions of Judaism. Nonetheless, even the leader of Jobbik has met Orthodox Rabbis publicly. In a sense, this is not very difficult to explain: Orthodox Judaism is socially conservative, internally closed and politically indifferent enough to be appreciated even by some on the radical right. Jobbik's leaders can accept living together with Jews as long as the latter nurture their collective identity as a religion and do not come out of the 'ghetto'.

At the same time, the three large historical Christian Churches—the Catholics, the Calvinists and the Lutherans—are now responsible for admin-

istering an increasing number of publicly funded education and healthcare services. This makes institutional relations between Churches and secular authorities increasingly vital for both sides: Church-run schools, hospitals and even universities are quite generously financed by the state but, in exchange, they need to fulfil certain government criteria. Another effect of the institutionalised participation of Churches in everyday life is the incorporation of religious studies into the national curriculum of elementary schools that the Fidesz government introduced from 2013.<sup>39</sup>

Finally, we should note that Fidesz in government has insisted on approving Church statuses on political grounds. In a high-profile case, the Fidesz government in 2012 introduced a restrictive regime of registering Churches, making it the prerogative of Parliament to recognise a religious community as a Church. However, both the Constitutional Court (in 2013) and the European Court of Human Rights (in 2014) adjudged the new provisions to be unacceptable, forcing Parliament to repeatedly revise the legislation. The new provisions obviously sought to extend government control and to differentiate between 'accepted' and 'non-accepted' Churches. In this way, the ruling Fidesz party attempted to alter the relationship between Church and state, and to strengthen the strategic alliance between the government and the politically preferred, large, historically grounded Christian Churches.<sup>40</sup>

#### *The Presentation of the Ethnic 'Other' during the Refugee Crisis*

The refugee crisis of 2015 brought the deep hostility of the populist right towards non-mainstream cultural patterns and multiculturalism to the surface. Orbán saw in it the opportunity to improve his approval ratings after a number of corruption scandals and a showdown with his long-time business ally and government-preferred oligarch Lajos Simicska.<sup>41</sup> Taking the initiative, Orbán used tough rhetoric on immigration that culminated in an aggressive campaign against immigrants on billboards, proclaiming (in Hungarian) statements such as 'If you come to Hungary you must respect our laws' or 'If you come to Hungary you cannot take the Hungarians' jobs'. These statements were government communications, using the official Hungarian coat-of-arms, and were formally part of the 'national consultation on immigration and terrorism'.

Fidesz, as always, acted instrumentally: its goal was to change course and regain the support of hundreds of thousands of voters who had abandoned the party for Jobbik. The underlying strategy was to reinforce the concept of ethnic nationalism in the context of the refugee crisis, identifying the ethni-



cally constructed Hungarian nation as an 'in-group' (politically represented and defended by the government) against the 'out-group' of immigrants and the EU, which has called on Hungary to accept a small amount of migrants. The division between the in-group and the out-group is based upon ethnicity rather than religion, although it contains references to Europe as a Christian entity, in contrast to the predominantly non-Christian migrants. However, neither government officials nor Christian Churches made any distinction between Christian and Muslim refugees, and the large Christian Churches typically refused to participate in aid efforts for refugees provided by NGOs and volunteers.

Cardinal Péter Erdő, head of the Hungarian Roman Catholic Church, even said that providing shelter for refugees would constitute an act of people trafficking, while the Hungarian Catholic Bishops' Conference declared: 'it is with the knowledge of the depth of this historical situation that we express our concern for the fate of our Middle Eastern Christian brethren. At the same time, we must emphasise that it is the state's right and responsibility to defend its citizens.'<sup>42</sup> The implication was that the protection of 'the people' (that is, Hungarian citizens) was a government responsibility, and that the Church must respect the laws of the state, regardless of humanitarian needs.<sup>43</sup> By expressing such views, the Hungarian Catholic Church went against the statements of Pope Francis, and acted as a national organisation loyal to the government before the Vatican. Christianity, as an organised set of principles in the Hungarian refugee crisis, did not play any discernible role in either the state or Church authorities' actions.<sup>44</sup> This can once again be explained by the fact that Hungary is not a particularly religious country and Christianity as a religion plays a limited role even in the integration of the right-wing electorate.

Nonetheless, Christianity as a cultural identity and historical narrative is part of Fidesz's identity politics. Orbán has made it clear that the Christian-national idea is a political creed which he wishes to apply to the whole of Europe.<sup>45</sup> The refugee crisis provided him with an excellent opportunity to promote this theme, and Orbán wasted no time in reinforcing his identity politics, delivering a number of mobilising speeches and statements amidst the crisis. For example, when speaking in the European Parliament in May 2015, he said:

We [Hungarians] are a frank and open people, and we are speaking our mind when we say loud and clear that we Hungarians would like to keep Europe for the Europeans, and we also wish to keep Hungary as a Hungarian country. Both of these goals of ours are legitimate, and I am convinced that both of them are fully in harmony with the core values of Europe and the intentions of the founders of the European Union.<sup>46</sup>

Immigration also ranked high among the topics addressed by Orbán in his 2015 speech at the Bálványos summer open university and student camp, where he usually sets out his ideological visions in a regional context.<sup>47</sup> A year earlier at Bálványos, Orbán had announced his intention to build an illiberal state. This time he positioned himself as the defender of European values and interests against the uncontrolled flow of non-European immigrants. As Cas Mudde argues, Orbán delivered 'the most significant radical right speech in Europe of the past decades', making the radical right agenda his government's official stance and proposing its adoption by Europe.<sup>48</sup> As he said:

The question now is not merely what kind of Europe we Hungarians would like to live in, but whether Europe as we now know it will survive at all. Our answer is clear: we would like Europe to remain the continent of Europeans. [...] We can say we want it, because it depends only on us: we want to preserve Hungary as a Hungarian country.

While Fidesz has its own extreme-right opposition (Jobbik), it has itself become a radical right-wing populist party over the past decade. It no longer matters whether Fidesz believes in what it says or whether its pronouncements are just intended to compete with Jobbik. The reality is that Fidesz's policies reflect a radical right agenda, including the concept of illiberal democracy and a crackdown on left-leaning media and NGOs, as well as the claim that Hungary and Europe need to be saved from the inflow of immigrants.<sup>49</sup>

Representing a strongly majoritarian and illiberal view of the political order, Fidesz believes that social and political minorities should respect the primacy of majority views and adapt their behaviour accordingly. As a radical ethno-nationalist party, Jobbik, in turn, is against the assimilationist policies of classic nationalism. Its leadership is comprised of ethnic separatists who reject the politics of inclusion, regardless of the origin of 'the other' (Syrian or Afghan refugees, Jews or Roma). Their views are perhaps best depicted by Péter Boross, a former prime minister of Hungary and former advisor to Viktor Orbán, who is equally close to Fidesz and Jobbik. In an August 2015 interview, Boross blamed the United States for the rise of refugees coming to Europe and the crisis in the Middle East. He criticised the Americans for maintaining universalistic principles like democracy and God, instead of accepting local democracies and local gods. As he said:

Rome was wise back then. They left the conquered provinces in peace and officially adopted some of their gods in Rome. Washington does the opposite. It wants to impose its own God, Democracy, on the conquered countries.<sup>50</sup>

As an influential figure in shaping the ideas of the Hungarian right, Boross suggests that each nation has a right to create its own state, and political regime (whether it is democracy or autocracy seems to be of secondary importance), and also to choose its own God. While he wants to defend Europe, he displays strong anti-EU sentiments. For him, any supranational entity which bases itself upon general principles beyond the nation state (a universalistic approach to democracy, human rights and Christianity) is wrong. Mass migration is interpreted by him as not a cultural but a biological and genetic problem, which cannot be solved by the classic nationalist means of assimilation. Boross' views embrace ethnic nationalism in its crudest form:

Today nobody dares to say that immigration is not a problem of culture and civilisation, but an ethnic problem. At the same time millions of people speaking different languages and with a different skin color are arriving to Europe. [...] Cultural integration has not yielded anything good. Unfortunately, if this has not been a successful process in the case of the gypsies living with us, then there is not much chance that this is possible with the hordes of Muslims crossing the green border. [...] The European Union should not be thinking in terms of its own refugee quota system, but in forming its own armed forces.<sup>51</sup>

In this militaristic approach, 'national Christianity' is contrasted with the mainstream, universal form of Christianity as a religion of love. It is also contrasted with the Gods of the refugees, deemed unacceptable in Europe. In Hungary, ethno-nationalism provides a sufficient basis for political identification as a type of surrogate-religion. While Fidesz interprets Christianity within the framework of nationalism, Jobbik frames it as part of its nationalism and anti-Semitism. God is not presented as a symbol of universal religious identity, as understood in the New Testament or explained in the speeches of Pope Francis, but as 'the God of Hungarians', in its particularistic, tribal, paganised, political understanding. In this sense, Hungarian right-wing populism does not have to rely on religious affiliations and does not place a particular emphasis on mobilising them: they are part of its fundamentally nationalist and authoritarian worldview<sup>52</sup> without any substantive religious references.

### *Conclusion*

Hungarian right-wing populists, in both Fidesz and Jobbik, attribute a limited role to religious identities when providing answers to the question of 'who are we?'<sup>53</sup> Although religion in general—and Christianity in particular—serves as an important reference point that right-wing populists use instrumentally, neither their electorate's expectations nor their organisational self-interest

allow for an extensive role for Christianity and/or religious authorities in their policy formation.<sup>54</sup> Christianity therefore plays a secondary role in political identification, although it remains a primary attribute for the KDNP (Fidesz's small religious satellite party).

Relations between Church authorities and right-wing populist parties and politicians are generally friendly but not overly close. The Churches—especially the Catholic Church—view the semi-pagan practices of some far-right communities with deep suspicion. Yet, as the role of the large historical Christian Churches is becoming increasingly institutionalised in public education, healthcare and even in higher education, the interdependence between Churches and the right-wing government is also increasing. The conspicuous silence of the Catholic and Hungarian Protestant Churches on burning social and political issues in Hungary can be explained by their increasing institutional power, as legislated for by Fidesz and supported by Jobbik.

At the same time, the Fidesz government has created a new situation by exerting open political influence on the recognition of Churches. Religious communities and heads of Churches must take this into consideration, and may feel compelled to adjust their political strategies accordingly.

Although religion plays a limited role in Hungarian right-wing populism, we have argued that populism itself can be understood as a nationalistic surrogate religion. It functions as an organising principle of worldviews, providing a quasi-religious status for the nation as a collective identity, to which individuals are meant to be subordinated. Populist leaders themselves embody this collective identity, exercising illiberal, institutionally unconstrained governance. Hungary's Viktor Orbán is perhaps the closest approximation to this type of political leadership in contemporary EU politics. He is operating in a hybrid regime within the European Union where democratic institutions are facades of non-democratic practices, and where two populist radical right-wing parties compete for power, mesmerising the qualified majority of voters.

56. CBOS 2008, *op. cit.*, p. 6; CBOS 2011, *op. cit.*, p. 8.
57. In 2001—the first election in which the political influence of the movement came to wider attention—only 42 per cent of listeners voted for LPR. After Rydzyk's switching of horses, in 2005 PiS received 40 per cent, and in 2007, 62 per cent. However, in both 2001 and 2005 the majority of listeners voted for other parties, including the liberal enemy (8 per cent for UW in 2001; 16 per cent for PO in 2005), and in 2007 a full 20 per cent voted for PO (CBOS 2008, *op. cit.*, pp. 6–7). In the 2011 survey, 57 per cent of Radio Maryja listeners declared they had voted for Jarosław Kaczyński (compared with only 22 per cent of non-listeners), while 35 per cent declared they had voted for Bronisław Komorowski (compared with 70 per cent of non-listeners). After the 2011 parliamentary elections, 70 per cent of listeners declared that they had voted for PiS (compared with 20 per cent of non-listeners), while 14 per cent declared that they had voted for PO (compared with 46 per cent of non-listeners). (CBOS 2011, *op. cit.*, p. 9.)
58. *Ibid.*, p. 2.
59. Nicolet, Sarah, and Tresch, Anke, 'Changing Religiosity, Changing Politics? The Influence of "Belonging" and "Believing" on Political Attitudes in Switzerland', *Politics and Religion* 2(1) (2009), p. 81.
60. Gwiazda, Anna, 'Poland's Quasi-Institutionalized Party System: The Importance of Elites and Institutions', *Perspectives on European Politics and Society* 10(3) (2009), pp. 370–1.
61. Millard, Frances, 'Poland: Parties Without a Party System, 1991–2008', *Politics & Policy* 37(4) (2009), p. 795.

#### 9. 'THE GOD OF HUNGARIANS': RELIGION AND RIGHT-WING POPULISM IN HUNGARY

1. See also Enyedi, Zsolt, 'Clerical and Religious Polarization in Hungary', in Broughton, David, and Ten Napel, Hans-Martin (eds), *Religion and Mass Electoral Behaviour*, London: Routledge 2000, pp. 157–76; Koesel, Karrie J., *Religion and Authoritarianism: Cooperation, Conflict, and the Consequences*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014; Grzymala-Busse, Anna, *Nations under God: How Churches Use Moral Authority to Influence Policy*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2015.
2. See Chapter 5.
3. Lipset, Seymour M., and Rokkan, Stein (eds), *Party Systems and Voters' Alignments*, New York: The Free Press 1967.
4. Since the historic Hungarian Christian Democratic People's Party (KDNP—Kereszténydemokrata Néppárt) has practically become an inseparable part of Fidesz in the past decade, its ideology will not be discussed separately, but as part of Fidesz's public discourse on religion and religious values.

5. Bozóki, András (ed.), *The Roundtable Talks of 1989. The Genesis of Hungarian Democracy*, Budapest/New York: Central European University Press, 2002.
6. 'Two Decades after the Wall's Fall: End of Communism Cheered but Now with More Reservations', *The Pew Global Attitudes Project*. Pew Research Center, 2 November 2009. (<http://www.pewglobal.org/files/pdf/267.pdf>)
7. *Ibid.*
8. Simon, Zoltán, 'Orbán Says He Seeks to End Liberal Democracy in Hungary', *Bloomberg*, 28 July 2014.
9. See also Bozóki, András, 'Occupy the State: The Orbán Regime in Hungary', *Debate: Journal of Contemporary Central and Eastern Europe* 19(3) (2011), pp. 649–63; Korkut, Umut, 'A Conservative Putsch at EU's Periphery: Crisis of Democracy in Hungary', paper presented at the annual convention of Europeanists of the British Political Science Association, Gothenburg, 6 November 2014.
10. Kis, János, 'From the 1989 Constitution to the 2011 Fundamental Law', in Tóth, Gábor Attila (ed.), *Constitution for a Disunited Nation. On Hungary's 2011 Fundamental Law*, Budapest/New York: Central European University Press, 2012.
11. Chudziková, Alena, Kasprovicz, Dominika, and Vit, Michal, 'National Identities in Central-Eastern Europe', 2013, <http://ceidentity.eu/news/national-0>.
12. Horthy, Miklós, governor of Hungary between 1919 and 1944, maintained a multi-party but authoritarian regime that was characterised by a 'Christian-nationalist' ideology. See Ungyáry, Krisztián, *A Horthy-rendszer mérlege* (An Evaluation of the Horthy Regime), Pécs/Budapest: Jelenkor-OSZK, 2012.
13. After the 2006 elections, both FKGP and MIÉP disappeared from the Hungarian political scene.
14. Oltay, Edith, *Fidesz and the Reinvention of the Hungarian Center-Right*, Budapest: Századvég, 2012.
15. Jobbik, 'Short Summary about Jobbik', 3 May 2010, [http://jobbik.com/short\\_summary\\_about\\_jobbik](http://jobbik.com/short_summary_about_jobbik), accessed 19 April 2016.
16. *Ibid.*
17. Jobbik ran together with MIÉP at the 2006 elections, but received less than 1 per cent of votes.
18. Jobbik, *op. cit.*
19. Jobbik, 'Manifesto of Jobbik', 24 October 2003, [http://jobbik.com/manifesto\\_0](http://jobbik.com/manifesto_0).
20. *The Economist*, 'Right on Down: The Far Right in Eastern Europe', issue 8657, 14 November 2009.
21. See also Majtényi, László, and Szabó, Máté Dániel (eds.), *Az elveszett alkotmány. (The Lost Constitution)*, Budapest: L'Harmattan/Eötvös Károly Intézet, 2011.
22. Fundamental Law of Hungary, 25 April 2011.
23. See also Bozóki, András, 'Broken Democracy, Predatory State, and Nationalist Populism' in Krasztev, Péter, and Van Til, Jon (eds), *The Hungarian Patient: Social Opposition to an Illiberal Democracy*, Budapest/New York: Central European University Press, 2015, pp. 3–36.

24. Orbán, Viktor, 'Minden magyar a turulba születik' (All Hungarians are born into the Turul bird), *Népszabadság*, 29 September 2012.
25. Orbán, Viktor, 'Magyarország keresztény lesz vagy nem lesz' (Hungary will be either a Christian country or will cease to exist), *Index.hu*, 18 May 2015, quoted by Balogh, Éva, 'Viktor Orbán and the Christian-National Idea', *Hungarianspectrum.org*, 22 September 2015.
26. For instance, Márton Gyöngyösi, the foreign affairs spokesman for Jobbik and its deputy leader in Parliament, criticised the pro-Israel position of the Hungarian government. He called on the government to 'tally-up' the number of influential Jews in Hungary, especially in Parliament and in the government. Jews, he said, represented 'a national security risk', which he linked to the conflict in the Middle East. Later he attempted to justify his comments on the party's website, explaining that Hungary's position in support of Israel was determined by the number of Jews in the country and that he was only targeting those with 'dual nationality'. See CEJI, 'Anti-Semitism in Hungary: Jobbik in Parliament', <http://www.ceji.org/anti-semitism-in-hungary-jobbik-in-parliament>. According to the Medián Public Opinion Research Institute in March 2015, two-thirds of Jobbik voters are anti-Semites. Between 2009 and 2014 the percentage of those citizens who rejected Jews on emotional grounds grew from 10 per cent to 28 per cent. See [www.origo.hu/irthon/20150331-a-fovarosban-nagyobb-merteku-az-antiszemizmus-mint-videken.html](http://www.origo.hu/irthon/20150331-a-fovarosban-nagyobb-merteku-az-antiszemizmus-mint-videken.html), accessed 19 April 2016.
27. Pirro, Andrea L.P., *The Populist Radical Right in Central and Eastern Europe*, London: Routledge, 2015, pp. 67–86.
28. *Ibid.*, p. 71.
29. Thorpe, Nick, 'What happened when an anti-Semite found he was Jewish?' BBC.com News Magazine, 4 May 2015.
30. Vona, Gábor, 'Turanism instead of Euro-Atlantic Alliance', 23 January 2012, [http://www.jobbik.com/jobbik\\_news/europe/3198.html](http://www.jobbik.com/jobbik_news/europe/3198.html).
31. Akcali, Emel, and Korkut, Umut, 'Geographical Metanarratives in East-Central Europe: Neo-Turanism in Hungary', *Eurasian Geography and Economics* 53(5) (2012), p. 600.
32. *Ibid.*
33. See also Cueva, Sarah A., 'Attack of the Radical Right: Incomplete Democratic Consolidation in Hungary and the Fidesz-Jobbik Convergence', manuscript, 2015; Dobszay, János, 'Egyet jobbra, kettőt jobbra' (One Step to the Right, Two Steps to the Right), *HVG*, 9 May 2015, pp. 6–9; Mudde, Cas, 'Is Hungary Run by the Radical Right?', *The Washington Post*, 10 August 2015.
34. Fidesz kept its two-thirds parliamentary majority at the 2014 general elections, labelled as free and unfair, but lost it in February 2015 as a result of a local by-election.
35. József Torgyán, an old-school populist politician, served as minister for agricul-

- ture and the development of the countryside in the first Orbán cabinet between 1998 and 2001.
36. Bartlett, J., Birdwell, J., Krekó, P., Benfield, J., and Györi, G., *Populism in Europe: Hungary*. London: Demos Publishing, 2012, [www.demos.co.uk/files/Demos\\_Hungary\\_Book\\_Web-1.pdf?1327923915](http://www.demos.co.uk/files/Demos_Hungary_Book_Web-1.pdf?1327923915), accessed 19 April 2016.
37. See Ungváry, Krisztián, *A Horthy-rendszer mérlege* (Evaluation of the Horthy regime), Budapest: Pécs—Budapest: Jelenkor & OSZK, 2012.
38. See Chapter 5.
39. Non-religious students can choose to study ethics instead.
40. 'The Constitutional Court in 2013 and the European Court of Human Rights in 2014 considered the deprivation of the status as a Church and recognition by Parliament as a rights violation, while the existence of two kinds of status for religious groups was considered discriminatory.' See Eötvös Károly Policy Institute, Hungarian Helsinki Committee, Hungarian Civil Liberties Union, Mérték Médiaelemző Műhely, 'Disrespect for European Values in Hungary 2010–2014. Rule of Law-Democracy-Pluralism-Fundamental Rights', Budapest, November 2014, <http://helsinki.hu/en/disrespect-for-european-values-in-hungary-2010-2014>, accessed 19 April 2016.
41. See also Novak, Benjamin, 'Lajos Simicska: "Orbán is a f\*cker"', *The Budapest Beacon*, 6 February 2015.
42. Novak, Benjamin, 'Archbishop claims laws prevent Catholic Church from helping asylum seekers', *The Budapest Beacon*, 4 September 2015.
43. *Ibid.* As the Hungarian Helsinki Committee pointed out, state laws, in fact, did not preclude giving shelter to registered refugees and this did not constitute people trafficking.
44. Some smaller Christian Churches acted differently. The evangelical Faith Church in its media outlets conducted a strongly religion-based anti-immigration campaign. See Zolnay, János, 'A Hit Gyülekezetének Dzsihadja' (The Jihad of Faith Church), *Beszélő*, 19 October 2015. Other small Christian Churches helped the refugees.
45. Balogh, *op. cit.*
46. 'Prime Minister Viktor Orbán's Speech in the European Parliament', website of the Hungarian Government, <http://www.kormany.hu/en/the-prime-minister/the-prime-minister-s-speeches/prime-minister-viktor-orban-s-speech-in-the-european-parliament>, last accessed 20 May 2015.
47. The summer camp is located in Transylvania and it is an important event for Hungarian youth living in Romania.
48. Mudde, *op. cit.*
49. See also Mudde, Cas, 'The Hungarian PM made a "rivers of blood" speech ... and no one cares', *The Guardian*, 30 July 2015.
50. Boross, Péter, 'Americans Are Intellectually Unsuitable to Lead the World', *Budapest*

*Sentinel*, 20 August 2015: Boross wasted no time in mentioning the political role of Iran and Russia in this issue.

51. *Ibid.*
52. Some authors claim that the official idea of Christian nationalism, reminiscent of the interwar era, cannot simply be categorised as a part of non-ideological 'populism', but is increasingly close to a transmuted form of fascism and national socialism in Hungary. See also Ungváry, Rudolf, *A láthatatlan valóság: A fasisztoid mutáció a mai Magyarországon* (The Invisible Reality: Transmuted Fascism in Today's Hungary), Bratislava: Kalligram, 2013; Balogh, *op. cit.*
53. Krekó, Péter and Mayer, Gregor, 'Transforming Hungary—Together? An Analysis of the FIDESZ-JOBBIK Relationship', in Minkenberg, Michael (ed.), *Transforming the Transformation?: The East European Radical Right in the Political Process*, London: Routledge, 2015, pp. 183–205.
54. On Hungarian populism in more detail, see Enyedi, Zsolt, 'Plebeians, Citoyens and Aristocrats or Where Is the Bottom of the Bottom-up? The Case of Hungary', in Kriesi, Hanspeter, and Pappas, Takis (eds), *European Populism in the Shadow of the Great Recession*, Colchester: ECPR Press, 2015, pp. 242–57; Bozóki, András, 'The Illusion of Inclusion: Configurations of Populism in Hungary', in Kopecek, Michal, and Wcislik, Piotr (eds), *Thinking Through Transition: Liberal Democracy, Authoritarian Pasts, and Intellectual History in East Central Europe after 1989*, Budapest/New York: Central European University Press, 2015, pp. 275–311.

#### 10. THE TEA PARTY AND RELIGION: BETWEEN RELIGIOUS AND HISTORICAL FUNDAMENTALISM

1. Abramowitz, Alan, 'Partisan Polarization and the Rise of the Tea Party Movement', paper presented at the 2011 American Political Science Association Conference.
2. The TP chose its name as a reference to the Boston Tea Party, a political revolt that took place in 1773 during which protesters destroyed supplies of tea in order to show their opposition to the taxation on tea imposed by the British Parliament.
3. The Moral Majority, a political organisation associated with the Christian right, was created in 1979 and played an influential role during the presidency of Ronald Reagan.
4. See Skocpol, Theda, and Williamson, Vanessa, *The Tea Party and the Remaking of American Conservatism*, New York: Oxford University Press, 2012.
5. For example, the Olin, Koch, and Scaife foundations. The John Olin Foundation, created in 1953 by John M. Olin, president of Olin Industries (manufacturing chemicals and munitions), supported conservative thinkers and activists through grants. The Charles Koch Foundation and the David Koch Charitable Foundation were founded by the two sons of Fred Koch, head of Koch Industries (involved in oil, gas and chemical industries). Through various grants, they support cultural, scientific and educational initiatives, informed by a libertarian worldview. The Scaife

- Foundation belongs to the millionaire Richard Mellon Scaife (head of Mellon Industrial). It supports conservative think tanks such as the Heritage Foundation and the American Enterprise Institute.
6. Ron Paul was formerly a Republican representative for Texas in the House of Representatives. He was also the Libertarian Party candidate for the presidential elections in 1988, 2008 and 2012.
  7. Kate Zernike shows that, even though the 'Santelli rant' has been viewed as the Tea Party's moment of creation, the first TP event actually took place three days earlier in Seattle, where Keli Carender, a twenty-nine-year-old woman of Mexican descent, organised a protest against Obama's stimulus plan. Santelli then 'gave the discontent a name and a bit of imagery'. See Zernike, Kate, *Boiling Mad: Inside Tea Party America*, New York: Time Books, 2010, p. 15.
  8. Barone, Michael, 'The Transformative Power of Rick Santelli's Rant', <http://www.creators.com/conservative/michael-barone/the-transformative-power-of-rick-santelli-s-rant.html>, accessed 24 June 2014.
  9. Burghart, Devin, and Zeskin, Leonhard, *Tea Party Nationalism: A Critical Examination of the Tea Party Movement and the Size, Scope, and Focus of Its National Factions*, Kansas City: Institute for Research and Education on Human Rights, 2010.
  10. Tea Party Nation had 31,402 online members in August 2010, and differs from the Tea Party Express, which is not a membership organisation. Tea Party Patriots is the most 'grassroots' organisation, with about 2,200 local chapters, but has the smaller budget. FreedomWorks focuses mainly on its anti-tax agenda. By contrast, the 1776 Tea Party has close ties with the Minuteman project and the anti-immigrant movement. It describes itself as a 'Christian political organisation'.
  11. Formisano, Ronald, *The Tea Party: A Brief History*, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2012; Carter, Jimmy, '1970s saw a Tea Party-like wave', *USA Today*, 29 September 2010.
  12. Huret, Romain, 'Le mouvement Tea Party, une illusion', *Hérodote*, La Découverte, Paris, 2013/2, no. 149, pp. 105–14.
  13. Kazin, Michael, *The Populist Persuasion: An American History*, New York: Cornell University Press, 1998.
  14. Hofstadter, Richard, *The Paranoid Style in American Politics*, New York: Vintage, 1965.
  15. The Pew Research Center for the People & the Press and the Pew Forum on Religion & Public Life, *The Tea Party and Religion*, 13 February 2011, <http://www.pewforum.org/2011/02/23/tea-party-and-religion/>, accessed 24 June 2014.
  16. Montgomery, Peter, 'The Tea Party and the Religious Right Movements: Frenemies with Benefits', in Rosenthal, Lawrence, and Trost, Christine (eds), *Steep: The Precipitous Rise of the Tea Party*, Berkeley: University of California Press, 2012, pp. 242–75.