Phenomenal intentionality without compromise

TitlePhenomenal intentionality without compromise
Publication TypeJournal Article
AuthorsFarkas, K.
Journal titleMonist
Pages273 - 293

In recent years, several philosophers have defended the idea of phenomenal intentionality: the intrinsic directedness of certain conscious mental events which is inseparable from these events’ phenomenal character. On this conception, phenomenology is usually conceived as narrow, that is, as supervening on the internal states of subjects, and hence phenomenal intentionality is a form of narrow intentionality. However, defenders of this idea usually maintain that there is another kind of, externalistic intentionality, which depends on factors external to the subject. We may ask whether this concession to content externalism is obligatory. In this paper, I shall argue that it isn’t. I shall suggest that if one is convinced that narrow phenomenal intentionality is legitimate, there is nothing stopping one from claiming that all intentionality is narrow.


Phenomenal Intentionality Without Compromise; Farkas, Katalin; Source Info: Apr2008, Vol. 91 Issue 2, p273; Subject Term: INTENTIONALITY (Philosophy); Subject Term: PHILOSOPHY, Modern; Subject Term: ACT (Philosophy); Subject Term: EXTERNALISM (Philosophy of mind); Subject Term: MIND & body; Subject Term: PHILOSOPHERS; People: HORGAN, Terence; People: GRAHAM, George; People: TIENSON, John; Number of Pages: 21p; Document Type: Article

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