Publications of Ferenc Huoranszki

Huoranszki F. Free Will. In: Dainton B, Robinson H, editors. The Bloomsbury Companion to Analytic Philosophy. London: Bloomsbury Publishing ; 2013.

Powers, Dispositions, and Counterfactual Conditionals.

In this paper I argue for the following claims. First, the theoretical role of properties that are powers is to ground natural possibilities. An analysis of powers should be understood in view of this role. Second, the ascription of powers does not entail that objects are disposed to behave in certain ways. In this sense, we need to distinguish objects’ powers from their dispositions. Third, there are many specific powers that are extrinsic. Finally, it is argued that the ascription of powers and the ascription of dispositions entail different counterfactual conditionals. On the one hand, the ascription of dispositions entails counterfactuals the truth-conditions of which must be statistically understood. On the other hand, I argue for a non-reductive analysis of powers proposed by Mellor as an improvement on Carnap’s reduction sentences. The paper also argues that, so understood, the conditional analysis can provide a link between the ascription of powers and the specification of natural possibilities.