Publications of Huoranszki, F.
Erkölcsi felelősség és gyakorlati modalitások
According to many contemporary accounts, although responsibility requires that agents’ actions be responsive to their reasons, it does not always require that agents be able to do otherwise in the particular situation in which they act. Some believe that the ability to act otherwise is a necessary condition of responsibility only when one performs a blameworthy action, whereas others, following Frankfurt, believe that the ability to act otherwise is never a condition of responsibility. However, there are many ways in which one can act for a reason, some of them are compatible with the agent’s responsibility, and some of them are not. The paper argues that only those agents who have the ability to act otherwise can act for or against some reason in a way that is compatible with their responsibility.
Freedom of the Will: A Conditional Analysis
The book provides a novel interpretation of G. E. Moore’s famous conditional analysis of free will and discusses several questions about the meaning of free will and its significance for moral responsibility. Although Moore’ theory has a strong initial appeal, most metaphysicians believe that there are conclusive arguments against it. Huoranszki argues that the importance of conditional analysis must be reevaluated in light of some recent developments in the theory of dispositions. The original analysis can be amended so that the revised conditional account is not only a good response to determinist worries about the possibility of free will, but it can also explain the sense in which free will is an important condition of moral responsibility. This study addresses three fundamental issues about free will as a metaphysical condition of responsibility. First, the book explains why agents are responsible for their actions or omissions only if they have the ability to do otherwise and shows that the relevant ability is best captured by the revised conditional analysis. Second, it aims to clarify the relation between agents’ free will and their rational capacities. It argues that free will as a condition of responsibility must be understood in terms of agents’ ability to do otherwise rather than in terms of their capacity to respond to reasons. Finally, the book explains in which sense responsibility requires self-determination and argues that it is compatible with agents’ limited capacity to control their own character, reasons, and motives.
Gyakorlati racionalitás és akaratgyengeség
The paper argues that the capacity of practical rationality can be best understood by investigating the conditions under which we would regard human behavior irrational. Practical rationality does not, in general, require that agents do what they judge best, since many cases such judgements are not available. But, contrary to some recent opinions, actions not controlled by agents’ judgement about the value of their own (future) actions when such a judgment is available cannot be practicaly rational. What practical rationality requires is that agents do not revise their intentions unless they have sufficient reason for doing so.
Weakness and Compulsion: The Essential Difference
This paper aims to defend the common-sense view that we exempt compulsive agents from responsibility to the extent that they are unable to choose what they do and hence they cannot control their actions by their choices. This view has been challenged in a seminal paper by Gary Watson, who claimed that akratic agents lack control in the same sense but they are responsible nonetheless. In the first part of the paper, I critically examine the arguments Watson advances for this claim first in his original paper and then in some more recent works. I conclude that his account is based on the widely held assumption that both compulsive behavior and weakness of the will must be understood as a direct result of some inner motivational conflict. In the second part, I argue for an alternative understanding of the difference between weakness and compulsion. My claim is that compulsion is a cognitive rather than a motivational deficiency, since the compulsive, unlike the weak-willed, does not desire to perform the action which she actually performs. Furthermore, I argue that compulsive agents cannot control their actions by their choices because they have a distorted view of their own actional abilities. In the final part of the paper, I discuss a consequence of this account to the conditional analysis of free will as a condition of responsibility.
Obligations, social emotions, and social contracts
This paper has two aims. First, it raises the issue whether and how contractarian political theory can justify political obligations toward some particular political authority. Second, it attempts to draw some brief conclusion from this regarding the prospect of Europe as a political community. The paper argues that there is a common assumption to almost all contemporary versions of contractarian political theory which must be dropped in order to make room for the contractarian justification of such obligations. The assumption of mutual unconcern seems to make it impossible for such theories to rationally justify particular obligations towards a particular political authority. I suggest that this limitation can be theoretically overcome. But I also suggest that the feeling of mutual concern of citizens towards each other is a necessary condition of their rationally justifiable obligations towards the decisions of a political authority. The developmentof this social emotion is a precondition of Europe as a political community.
Reasons and passions
Abstract Jonathan Dancy has argued that agents’ reasons for their actions are facts or features of the situations rather than their psychological states. The purpose of the paper is to show that even if we grant that this is so in most of the cases, there is a class of mental states that can be reasons. Although beliefs and desires are not reasons for actions, some emotional states—like loving, liking or disliking someone—can generate reasons. The distinctive feature of these states is that their content is a particular, and not a proposition. Hence in certain situations their love or admiration can provide agents with reasons to do one particular thing rather than another.
Russell leíráselmélete mint metafizika
Russell 100 évvel ezelőtt, 1905-ben a Mind hasábjain megjelent írása, A denotálásról,leíráselméletének első megfogalmazása. Elmélete azóta a nyelvfilozófiai kánon része lett. Nem abban az értelemben, hogy minden vitán felül álló igazság lenne, már csak azért sem, mert nehéz elképzelni, hogy a filozófiában léteznének efféle igazságok. Az azonban kétségtelen, hogy – bár bizonyos módosításokkal, és precízebb formában kifejtve, mint Russell meglehetősen obskúrus eredeti írásában –, a russelli javaslat egyike azoknak a versengő elméleteknek, amelyek a leírások logikai szerkezetéről, illetve a természetes nyelvekben betöltött funkciójáról szólnak.
On the Usefulness of Arts and Sciences
The paper addresses the problem whether arts, sciences and humanities can be regarded as useful. First it examines the means-ends relation and argues that some means are not causally but rather constitutively connected toends. Second, it specifies two dimensions along which the problem of values will be addressed. One is the issue about the relation between values and desirability, the other is the active and affective conceptions of valuation. Third the paper offers a concise reconstruction of the answers to the question of usefulness formulated during the enlightenment. It will be argued that traditionally usefulness was understood causally and not on the individual, but rather on the social level. In the final section the paper contends that values should be understood in terms of activities rather than in terms of desire satisfaction and that this interpretation can bring us closer to answering the question whether and why arts and sciences are useful.
Fate, freedom and contingency
Abstract Argument for fatalism attempts to prove that free choice is a logical or conceptual impossibility. The paper argues that the first two premises of the argument are sound: propositions are either true or false and they have their truth-value eternally. But the claim that from the fatalistic premises with the introduction of some innocent further premise dire consequences follow as regards to the possibility of free choice is false. The introduced premise, which establishes the connection between the first two premises (which are about the nature of propositions) and the concept of free choice is not innocent. It creates the impression that the truth of certain propositions can somehow determine the occurrence of certain events. But no proposition can have such an effect since the counterfactuals “If proposition P were true, event E would happen” does not say anything about determination. The argument for fatalism is, however, not a boring sophism. It does reveal something about the nature of propositional representation. It shows that each proposition represents necessarily the fact what it represents, i.e. it shows that propositions have their truth conditions non-contingently. But from this nothing follows as regards to the contingent nature of the facts represented. On the bases of the first two premises of the argument for fatalism we cannot infer to the impossibility of free choice. The argument for fatalism should not be interpreted as an attempt to prove on purely logical or conceptual grounds that we do not have the ability to influence future events by our choices. But it could be used to show something about the nature of propositional representation.
Book Review: A világ mint fogalom és séma – Gábor Forrai: Reference, truth, and conceptual schemes: A defense of internal realism
Forrai, G. (2001). Reference, truth, and conceptual schemes: A defense of internal realism. Synthese library, v. 296. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic.
Common Sense and the Theory of Human Behaviour
I offer an analysis of Reid's notion of the will. Naturalism in the philosophy of action is defined as the attempt to eliminate the capacity of will and to reduce volition to some class of appetite or desire. Reid's arguments show, however, that volition plays a particular role in deliberation which cannot be reduced to some form of motivation present at the time of action. Deliberation is understood as an action over which the agent has control. Will is a higher-order mental capacity enabling us to control our own attitudes, decisions and actions. Reid investigates several distinct forms of this control. I conclude with some remarks about the relation between Reid's arguments about the function of the will and his moral rationalism.
Book Review: Rendszerbe zárt szellem – Daniel C. Dennett: Az intencionalitás filozófiája
Daniel C. Dennett: Az intencionalitás filozófiája, Osiris kiadó, Budapest 1998
Book Review: Politikai érvek és erkölcsi érdek: János Kiss: Az állam semlegessége
Kis, J. (1997). Az állam semlegessége. East-European-non-fiction. Budapest: Atlantisz.
Book Review: Earthbound Thoughts – Karl Mannheim: A konzervativizmus
Mannheim, K. (1994). A konzervativizmus: Tanulmány a tudás szociológiájáról. Budapest: Cserépfalvi.
Book Review: Röghöz kötött gondolatok – Karl Mannheim: A konzervativizmus
Mannheim, K. (1994). A konzervativizmus: Tanulmány a tudás szociológiájáról. Budapest: Cserépfalvi.
Book Review: Harmadik út a tudományfilozófiában – György Márkus: Kultúra és modernitás
Márkus, G. (1992). Kultúra és modernitás. Hermeneutikai kísérletek. Budapest: T-Twins Kiadó
Book Review: Isaiah Berlin: Négy esszé a szabadságról
Berlin, I., & Ferenc, E. (1990). Négy esszé a szabadságról. [Budapest]: Európa Könyvkiadó.