Publications of Farkas, K.

Belief may not be a necessary condition for knowledge

Most discussions in epistemology assume that believing that p is a necessary condition for knowing that p. In this paper, I will present some considerations that put this view into doubt. The candidate cases for knowledge without belief are the kind of cases that are usually used to argue for the so-called 'extended mind' thesis.

Farkas K. A sense of reality. In: MacPherson F, Platchais D, editors. Hallucination : philosophy and psychology. Cambridge: MIT Press; 2013. p. 399-417.
Farkas K. Constructing a world for the senses. In: Kriegel U, editor. Phenomenal Intentionality. New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press; 2013. p. 99-115.

Constructing a world for the senses

It is an integral part of the phenomenology of mature perceptual experience that it seems to present to us an experience-independent world. I shall call this feature 'perceptual intentionality'. In this paper, I argue that perceptual intentionality is constructed by the structure of more basic sensory features, features that are not intentional themselves. This theory can explain why the same sensory feature can figure both in presentational and non-presentational experiences. There is a fundamental difference between the intentionality of sensory experiences and the intentionality of thoughts: unlike the former, the latter is not constructed.

Two versions of the extended mind thesis

According to the Extended Mind thesis, the mind extends beyond the skull or the skin: mental processes can constitutively include external devices, like a computer or a notebook. The Extended Mind thesis has drawn both support and criticism. However, most discussions – including those by its original defenders, Andy Clark and David Chalmers – fail to distinguish between two very different interpretations of this thesis. The first version claims that the physical basis of mental features can be located spatially outside the body. Once we accept that the mind depends on physical events to some extent, this thesis, though not obvious, is compatible with a large variety of views on the mind. The second version applies to standing states only, and has to do with how we conceive the nature of such states. This second version is much more interesting, because it points to a potential tension in our conception of minds or selves. However, without properly distinguishing between the two theses, the significance of the second is obscured by the comparative triviality of the first.

Farkas K. Independent intentional objects. In: The Analytical Way: Proceedings of the 6th European Congress of Analytic Philosophy. London: College Publications; 2010. p. 149-65.

Not every feeling is intentional

The most promising representionalist account of sensations and occurrent emotions is the ‘impure’ version of representationalism, which analyses the structure of an intentional state as consisting of an intentional content and a psychological mode. However, a critique of representationalism could question the analogy between propositional attitudes and sensory modes. Propositional attitudes cannot be exemplified without an object; but the same is far from clear in the case of sensory modes. In order to have a plausible account of non-intentional emotions and sensations, we need to conceive these mere feelings as playing certain characteristic functional roles. What makes this account possible is the observation that having a certain functional role does not entail that the state is intentional.

Laird Addis: Ontology and Explanation: Collected Papers

Reviews the book: Ontology and Explanation: Collected Papers, 1981-2005 by Laird Addis

Phenomenal intentionality without compromise

In recent years, several philosophers have defended the idea of phenomenal intentionality: the intrinsic directedness of certain conscious mental events which is inseparable from these events’ phenomenal character. On this conception, phenomenology is usually conceived as narrow, that is, as supervening on the internal states of subjects, and hence phenomenal intentionality is a form of narrow intentionality. However, defenders of this idea usually maintain that there is another kind of, externalistic intentionality, which depends on factors external to the subject. We may ask whether this concession to content externalism is obligatory. In this paper, I shall argue that it isn’t. I shall suggest that if one is convinced that narrow phenomenal intentionality is legitimate, there is nothing stopping one from claiming that all intentionality is narrow.

Time, tense, truth

A theory of time is a theory of the nature of temporal reality, and temporal reality determines the truth-value of temporal sentences. Therefore it is reasonable to ask how a theory of time can account for the way the truth of temporal sentences is determined. This poses certain challenges for both the A theory and the B theory of time. In this paper, I outline an account of temporal sentences. The key feature of the account is that the primary bearers of truth-values are not utterances, but sentences evaluated with respect to a time. I argue that unlike other views, the present proposal can meet the challenges faced both by the A and the B theory.

Farkas K, Kelemen J. Nyelvfilozófia. In: Boros G, editor. Filozófia. Budapest: Akadémiai Kiadó; 2007. p. 1273-88.
Farkas K. Semantic internalism and externalism. In: Lepore E, Smith BC, editors. The Oxford handbook of philosophy of language. Oxford: Oxford University Press; 2006. p. 323-40.

Semantic internalism and externalism

This paper introduces and analyses the doctrine of externalism about semantic content; discusses the Twin Earth argument for externalism and the assumptions behind it, and examines the question of whether externalism about content is compatible with a privileged knowledge of meanings and mental contents.

Indiscriminability and the Sameness of Appearance

How exactly should the relation between a veridical perception and a corresponding hallucination be understood? I argue that the epistemic notion of 'indiscriminability', understood as a lack of evidence for the distinctness of things, is not suitable for defining this relation. Instead, we should say that a hallucination and a veridical perception involve the same phenomenal properties. This has further consequences for attempts to give necessary and sufficient conditions for the identity of phenomenal properties in terms of indiscriminability, and for considerations about the phenomenal sorites.

Farkas K. Is the whole world thinkable? In: Boros J, editor. Mind in world : essays on John McDowell's Mind and world. Pécs: Barmbauer; 2005. p. 135-41.
Farkas K. O Sentido Determina a Referência. In: The Explanation of Human Interpretation. Proceedings of the conference Mind and Action III. Lisboa: Ediçoes Colibri; 2005. p. 389-97.

The unity of Descartes's thought

Dualism--that the world divides to the mental and the corporeal--is a central tenet in Descartes's philosophy. It is therefore puzzling that Descartes sometimes suggests that certain phenomena--including perceptions, sensations, emotions, called the 'special modes'--belong to neither mind nor body alone, but specifically to the union of the two. It has been suggested that accordingly, we should regard Descartes as a 'trialist' rather than a dualist. I criticize the 'trialist' interpretation, and offer an explanation of the theory of the special modes which reveals it to be perfectly compatible with Descartes's dualism.

Farkas K. "Sajátos és eredeti módon" Frege az indexikus kifejezésekről. In: Neumer K, Laki J, editors. Minden filozófia "nyelvkritika" II : . Analitikus filozófia és fenomenológia. Budapest, Hungary: Gondolat; 2004. p. 54-68.
Farkas K. Tartalom és jelölet. In: Farkas K, Orthmayr I, editors. Bölcselet és analízis. Budapest, Hungary: ELTE Eötvös Kiadó; 2003. p. 61-73.
Huoranszki F. Mitől tudatos egy cselekedet? In: Farkas K, Orthmayr I, editors. Bölcselet és analízis. Budapest: ELTE; 2003. p. 170-86.

The Threefold Cord: Mind, Body and World

Reviews the book "The Threefold Cord: Mind, Body, and World," by Hilary Putnam.

Does Twin Earth Rest on a Mistake?

In this paper I argue against Twin-Earth externalism. The mistake that Twin Earth arguments rest on is the failure to appreciate the force of the following dilemma. Some features of things around us do matter for the purposes of conceptual classification, and others do not. The most plausible way to draw this distinction is to see whether a certain feature enters the cognitive perspective of the experiencing subject in relation to the kind in question or not. If it does, we can trace conceptual differences to internal differences. If it doesn't, we do not have a case of conceptual difference. Neither case supports Twin Earth externalism.

What is externalism?

The content of the externalist thesis about the mind depends crucially on how we define the distinction between the "internal" and the "external". According to the usual understanding, the boundary between the internal and the external is the skull or the skin of the subject. In this paper I argue that the usual understanding is inadequate, and that only the new understanding of the external/internal distinction I suggest helps us to understand the issue of the compatibility of externalism and privileged access.

A szkepticizmus kihívása

Reviews the book : A szkepticizmus kihívása by Újvári Márta

Farkas K. Externalizmus és önismeret. In: Kukla K, Sutyák T, editors. Kitolási szakasz : fiatal filozófusok antológiája. Budapest, Hungary: Balassi Kiadó; 1997. p. 238-48.